Opinion
No. 4-274 / 03-1838
July 14, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Robert J. Curnan, Judge.
Michael Nolan appeals alimony and property provisions of the district court's dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Robert Day, Jr., of Day Hellmer, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.
Jennifer Clemens-Conlon of Reynolds Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
In this appeal from a dissolution decree, we are asked to review the district court's alimony and property awards. We find the alimony award equitable but modify the property award.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Michael and Cathy Nolan married in 1981 and divorced in 2003. This was each party's second marriage. They had one child, a daughter. Michael had two children from his previous marriage. At the time of trial, both parties were fifty-three and both had college degrees.
Michael had a variety of jobs during the marriage. At the time of trial, he was vice-president of a company's data center and earned $111,000 annually. He received a $15,000 bonus in 2002 and a $50,000 bonus in 2003.
Cathy stopped working outside the home approximately two years after she married Michael. In 1989, she returned to school and obtained a degree in computer and management information systems. She did not obtain employment in this field. Instead, she continued to care full-time for the parties' home and child. Eventually, Cathy began working part-time as a church bookkeeper, earning $9.88 per hour. About three months before trial, she obtained a full-time position as a bank teller, earning $10.25 per hour or $21,000 per year. She continued to work at the church, but reduced her hours from twenty-five or thirty to ten or twenty per week.
Following trial, the district court ordered Michael to pay Cathy spousal support of $1700 per month until he reached the age of sixty-five and retroactive temporary spousal support of $2,400 per month for five months. The court also entered a judgment of $2,000 in favor of Cathy for "one-half of the approximate cost of [Michael's] daughter's wedding." Michael appealed.
II. Spousal Support
Michael contends the spousal support award should be eliminated or reduced. We begin by noting that we afford the district court wide latitude in making spousal support determinations, and its ruling will be disturbed only if there has been a failure to do equity. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996).
With respect to Michael's contention that alimony is unnecessary, the record suggests otherwise. The marriage lasted twenty-two years. Cathy is in her fifties. She did not earn wages for more than ten years of the marriage and, when she did, her earnings did not exceed $14,000 annually. Although Cathy has college degrees in child development and computer and management information systems, her computer training is obsolete and her work experience is dated. In contrast, Michael's further studies allowed him to enhance his positions and earnings. Beginning in the 1990's, his salary increased from $44,705 to $111,000 annually.
At the time of the dissolution Cathy had moved from the parties' debt-free home to an apartment that required monthly payments of $500. The sale of the home netted her only $6,200. While her share of Michael's retirement benefits was 47.8%, those benefits had a stipulated value of less than $67,000. Stock accumulated by Michael and ordered divided equally was valued at $22,400. We believe these circumstances entitle Cathy to spousal support. See In re Marriage of Weinberger, 507 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (stating in marriage of long duration where earning disparity is great, alimony and nearly equal property division may be appropriate). We turn to Michael's contention that the amount and duration of the award are excessive. Michael cites several factors: 1) Cathy's "full earning capacity," 2) the parties' modest lifestyle during the marriage, 3) Cathy's apparent ability to support herself during the dissolution proceedings, 4) the unequal property distribution, and 5) Cathy's overstatement of expenses.
Michael's first argument is premised on the district court's failure to consider all of Cathy's earnings. Cathy testified that she retained her job as a church bookkeeper after obtaining a full-time position as bank-teller, but reduced her hours at the church. She further stated she intended to continue with the reduced hours as long as she could, but noted that the church would eventually need someone who could work at least twenty-five to thirty hours a week. The district court only considered Cathy's earnings as a bank teller. We believe this was equitable under the circumstances. Cathy's decision to work fifty to sixty hours per week in the short-term does not mandate an attribution of income to her in excess of her full-time position. Cf. In re Marriage of Elbert, 492 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992) (stating it may be appropriate to exclude uncertain or speculative overtime pay income for purposes of calculating spousal support).
Michael next contends that Cathy, on her own income, can easily maintain a lifestyle commensurate with what they enjoyed during the marriage. However, Cathy testified that her annual income at the time of trial was at least $10,000 less than the parties' lowest earnings during the marriage. Additionally, Michael's earnings more than doubled in the eleven years preceding divorce discussions, with Cathy's only increasing from $0 to $12,992. While it is true the parties did not live lavishly, Cathy's earnings of $21,000, even when supplemented with her church income, could not leave her in as comfortable a position as she was with joint income in excess of $100,000. See In re Marriage of Stark, 542 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (stating spouse with lesser earning capacity is entitled to support resembling standard of living during the marriage).
Michael next contends Cathy is capable of supporting herself and has "exhibited lassitude" and a "tendency to pursue dependency." We disagree. Although Cathy did not immediately secure full-time employment, she was working fifty to sixty hours per week at the time of trial. She stated that she did so to make ends meet, in the absence of temporary support. We do not believe her efforts at self-sufficiency during the divorce proceedings should diminish the amount and duration of the award.
Turning to the fourth factor, Michael contends that the district court's property distribution left him with approximately $19,000 less in assets than were awarded to Cathy, warranting a reduction in the amount and duration of the alimony award. The discrepancy arises due to the court's treatment of Michael's $50,000 bonus. Of that sum, $20,000 was deposited into Michael's retirement account and divided between the parties. The balance remaining after taxes was approximately $20,000. This was deemed income to Michael rather than an asset subject to division. See In re Marriage of Lalone, 469 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Iowa 1991). Although the result is a property distribution that favors Cathy, we are not convinced this discrepancy mandates reduction of the alimony award. In re Marriage of Murray, 213 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Iowa 1973) (stating although property rights are closely related to alimony, the two are distinguishable and have divergent purposes). As we have stated, equity does not demand an equal distribution of assets, but an equitable one. In re Marriage of Bonnette, 584 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
Finally, Michael argues that Cathy overstated her expenses to make a case for spousal support. We agree. Cathy listed a car payment of $402 even though she had an unencumbered 2002 Toyota Camry. She also listed $400 per month in retirement savings she hoped to accumulate, arguing this was a necessary and actual living expense. Finally, she listed $100 per month for a computer she had apparently yet to purchase, on the ground that Michael had taken the parties' computer. She also conceded she overstated her monthly health insurance costs. These overstated monthly expenses totaled more than $900. Despite this overstatement of expenses, we conclude the amount and duration of the award were equitable, given the five to one differential in the parties' earnings, the age at which Cathy reentered the workforce full-time, the fact that she started at an entry-level position, the modest property settlement, and the wide latitude we afford district courts in fashioning an award. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996).
III. Property
Michael requests that we eliminate the judgment for $2,000.00 representing reimbursement for funds spent on the wedding of Michael's daughter from his previous marriage. He claims, "[o]nce we start to allow second-guessing of the mutual expenditures made by a couple throughout a long marriage, there is no logical place to stop." We agree.
Our court has stated that the focus should be on whether "payment of the obligation was a reasonable and expected aspect of the particular marriage." In re Marriage of Burgess, 568 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We believe a contribution toward the wedding expenses of a daughter is a reasonable and expected expense of this twenty-two year marriage. Accordingly, we modify the decree to eliminate the judgment of $2,000 in favor of Cathy.
IV. Disposition
We affirm the district court's spousal support award but modify the decree to eliminate the judgment for Cathy in the amount of $2,000. We award Cathy $1000 in appellate attorney fees. Costs are taxed to Michael.