Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD467753, Elizabeth Feffer, Judge.
Stephanie J. Morgan, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Robert S. Metzger, in pro. per., for Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
In this marriage dissolution proceeding, the trial court entered a judgment following a seven-day trial, dividing the community estate and liabilities between appellant Stephanie J. Morgan, formerly known as Stephanie J. Metzger (wife), and respondent Robert Metzger (husband). On appeal, wife contests the trial court’s determination that the couple’s delinquent tax liability is a community debt because that determination contradicts the “innocent spouse relief” she obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Wife also contests the decision not to award retroactive spousal support, and the temporary support, and attorney fees orders entered before trial. We dismiss wife’s appeal insofar as wife seeks review of pendente lite orders that were separately appealable, and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2007, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ 26-year marriage. The couple has three children, one of whom was a minor at the time the petition was filed. The judgment of dissolution as to status only was entered on October 20, 2008, reserving jurisdiction over remaining issues, including retroactive spousal support and distribution of community assets and liabilities. Trial on reserved issues commenced nearly two years after the petition was filed.
Wife has elected to proceed only on a clerk’s transcript. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121(b)(1)(B), (C).) The clerk’s transcript, however, was incomplete. We granted wife’s motion to augment the record, and also received an augmented clerk’s transcript with additional documents. Since the appellate record does not include a certified reporter’s transcript of the trial in this matter, we disregard wife’s citations to the transcript. In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, this matter is a “judgment roll” appeal. (Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082-1083; Krueger v. Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.)
1. Temporary Spousal and Child Support Orders and Attorney Fees
On October 2, 2007, the trial court ordered husband to pay temporary spousal and child support.
The trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine a retroactive adjustment of spousal support “if the income predictions set forth by Respondent [husband] fail to be correct.” The spousal support order further states: “In the event that there is a material difference between actual income and the projected income as shown herein, the court will at the trial or other hearing of this matter retroactively adjust spousal support which may result in an arrearage due from father to mother.”
At the same hearing, the trial court ordered husband to draw on a line of credit on the family residence to provide wife $40,000 to pay attorney fees. Two months later in December 2007, the trial court ordered husband to pay an additional $15,000 to wife’s new counsel. Wife’s subsequent motions for attorney fees were denied.
Wife states “[t]he court’s calendar in this matter... reflects dozens of attempts to bring the attorney fee issue to the court’s attention.” Wife does not support her point with record citations. While we have independently reviewed the clerk’s transcript to uncover two additional minute orders reflecting the denial of wife’s motions for attorney fees, it is not the court’s obligation to search the record for evidence supporting this point. (See ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1270.) The absence of record citations in violation of court rules (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)) permits us to disregard such unsupported points. (See In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887-888.)
2. Trial on Reserved Issues of Retroactive Spousal Support and Division of Community Assets and Liabilities
When trial commenced in May 2009, both husband and wife were in pro per. By all accounts, the parties had a high standard of living during the marriage, which included funding their minor daughter’s equestrian sport and the associated expenses to own, train, and show several horses. Husband is a highly compensated attorney and an equity partner at Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP. He had been an equity partner for approximately 10 years at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Wife was not employed, but she previously had owned an interior design business.
At the time of separation, the parties had an outstanding federal tax liability of $3 million. While husband attempted to negotiate a payback plan, wife obtained innocent spouse relief from the IRS. Thus, the federal tax liens were released as to her but remained as to husband and still attached to half of their jointly owned residence.
See footnote 5, post.
3. Trial Court’s Statement of Decision and Judgment
Following a seven-day trial, the court determined the evidence did not support an order to retroactively modify the temporary spousal support.
The trial court also determined the tax liability for the years before wife petitioned for dissolution (2006 and prior) was incurred during the marriage and was a community debt. Citing In re Marriage of Hargrave (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1313, the trial court reasoned the IRS determination to grant wife innocent spouse relief had no bearing on the allocation of community liabilities. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that wife had knowledge of the tax liability, husband did not conceal income from wife or file false tax returns, wife benefitted from the income when taxes were not paid and the liability accrued, and wife was aware of the financial condition of the community.
The trial court entered judgment and wife timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Aside from challenging the judgment, wife attempts to appeal from the temporary support and attorney fees orders. Wife’s appeal from these pendente lite orders is untimely, and we find no basis to reverse the judgment denying retroactive spousal support or determining that the delinquent tax liability is a community debt.
Wife also raises a fourth contention addressing the unfairness in court procedures and the judicial officer’s bias toward her during these proceedings. We exercise our discretion to disregard undeveloped contentions of error. (See Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.)
1. Appeal from Temporary Support Orders is Untimely
Wife contends the trial court’s temporary spousal and child support orders did not reflect wife’s or the minor child’s needs and husband’s ability to pay. We need not reach the merits because the appeal from the temporary support orders is untimely.
An order for temporary spousal and child support is in the nature of a final judgment and is directly appealable. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368-370; In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 595; County of Yolo v. Worrell (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 471, 474, fn. 6.) These awards are severable from the portion of the judgment in a dissolution proceeding dividing the community property and are operative from the moment of pronouncement and immediately enforceable. (In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, at p. 369.) “When a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken. [Citations.] This constitutes a necessary exception to the one final judgment rule. Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding.” (Id. at p. 368.)
As these temporary support orders were separately appealable, wife had to timely file a notice of appeal following the October 2, 2007 orders. (See In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).) Wife did not do so.
We reject wife’s argument that the October 2, 2007 orders were not final because the trial court reserved issues of husband’s obligation to pay retroactive spousal support. A temporary support order is final and appealable notwithstanding language in the order reserving authority to modify the order if circumstances change. (See In re Marriage of de Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359 [modification language in final judgment does not render the judgment nonappealable because the judgment created enforceable rights and obligations].) Here, the reserved issues left open the possibility husband would have to make additional support payments, which had no bearing on husband’s obligations under the temporary support orders. Thus, these orders were immediately enforceable and appealable. We therefore dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging the amount of temporary spousal and child support awarded by the trial court.
2. Appeal from Attorney Fees Orders is Untimely and Unsupported
Wife contends the trial court’s attorney fee award of $40,000 was too low to maintain a dissolution proceeding based upon husband’s admission that he spent close to $300,000 on attorney fees during the course of these proceedings. This appeal is untimely.
A direct appeal lies from a pendente lite attorney fees order. (In re Marriage of Weiss, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 118-119; see also In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1311.) Wife did not timely appeal from any attorney fees order, or identify an order denying pendente lite attorney fees for appellate review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) On an appeal from a judgment we cannot review a decision or order from which an appeal might previously have been taken. (In re Marriage of Weiss, supra, at p. 119; Code Civ. Proc., § 906.) Thus, the portion of the appeal challenging attorney fees orders must be dismissed.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Determining Reserved Issues
Wife appeals the trial court’s decision not to award retroactive spousal support and to disregard her innocent spouse relief for purposes of determining community liabilities. Based upon our limited review, we find no error.
When, as here, an appeal is “on the judgment roll, ” we must conclusively presume evidence was presented that is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings. (Allen v. Toten, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1082-1083.) Our review is limited to determining whether any error “appears on the face of the record.” (National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.163.)
Wife’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to award retroactive spousal support is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. As we explained, the law compels us to assume the evidence presented to the trial court supported its decision. We find no error on the face of this record.
Wife also contends the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in concluding the federal tax obligation should be charged as a community debt rather than a separate property debt. Wife claims the trial court’s conclusion directly contradicts the innocent spouse relief she obtained from the IRS. Wife appears to argue that the IRS determination has a preclusive effect in any subsequent proceeding.
Neither husband nor wife explains innocent spouse relief in their respective briefs. The federal tax code’s innocent spouse relief provision authorizes relief from joint liability for understatement of tax if, among other things, the spouse claiming relief establishes that in signing the return he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, there was an understatement and it would be inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable for the tax deficiency. (Int.Rev. Code, § 6015(b); see Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2010) ¶¶ 10:269 to 10:272, pp. 10-83 to 10-89.)
An innocent spouse determination operates only to relieve that spouse from liability to the IRS and does not control the community liability as between spouses. (In re Marriage of Hargrave, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320-1321.) The IRS does not treat innocent spouse relief as a determination of the rights and liabilities between the spouses because the “other spouse is not permitted to participate or [to] present countervailing evidence in the proceedings....” (Id. at p. 1320.)
We find no error in the trial court’s legal conclusion based on In re Marriage of Hargrave, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th 1313. Wife misconstrues the nature of the trial court’s ruling. The court was not making a tax liability adjudication. Instead, the trial court considered the evidence, including wife’s knowledge of underpayment and the benefit she received from the income during the period of time that taxes were not paid, for purposes of determining as between spouses if the tax liability was a separate or community debt. With no reporter’s transcript of the trial, we must presume there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the tax liability was a community debt. We find no error on the face of this record.
Wife’s remaining arguments are without merit and any discussion of them is unnecessary.
DISPOSITION
The trial court judgment on reserved issues is affirmed. The purported appeal from the temporary support orders and attorney fees orders is dismissed. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: CROSKEY, Acting P.J., KITCHING, J.