Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
Santa Clara County, Super. Ct. No. FL122412.
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Nenette Hoffman and respondent Steven Hoffman were married in Reno, Nevada in 1989. In 2004, Steven petitioned for dissolution of marriage. Less than one year later, Steven amended his petition to seek a judgment of nullity of marriage. He asserted that his marriage to Nenette was void because it was bigamous, due to her prior marriages to Romeo Lim in 1982 and to Crisanto Cabalic in 1985.
Hereafter, we will refer to the parties by their first names for purposes of clarity and not out of disrespect. (See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, fn. 1.)
After a trial, the court found that Nenette’s marriage to Crisanto Cabalic had been dissolved prior to her marriage to Steven. However, the court ruled that Nenette was still legally married to Romeo Lim at the time of her marriage to Steven, and therefore the parties’ marriage was void. Additionally, the trial court determined that Steven (but not Nenette) had entered into their marriage in a good faith belief that it was a valid marriage, and granted Steven putative spouse status.
Nenette appeals from the judgment of void marriage and putative spouse status. She contends that the trial court erred in failing to give full faith and credit to the May 18, 2005, judgment of annulment ab initio of the Superior Court of New Jersey, in which the court granted Nenette an annulment of her marriage to Romeo Lim. According to Nenette, the New Jersey judgment removed her prior marriage to Lim as an impediment to her valid marriage to Steven. Nenette also contends that she is entitled to putative spouse status.
For reasons that we will explain, we determine that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and therefore we will affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties’ Prior Marriages
Before their marriage in 1989, Steven and Nenette were both married to other persons. Steven’s first marriage to Mindy Cohen was annulled in 1985. Nenette’s first husband was Romeo Lim, whom she married in 1982 in her home country of the Philippines. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division--Family Part, County of Hudson, granted an annulment of Nenette’s marriage to Lim on May 18, 2005.
Nenette moved to the United States in 1983 and married her second husband, Crisanto Cabalic, in North Carolina in 1985. Cabalic obtained a judgment of divorce in 1987.
B. The Marriage of Steven and Nenette
Nenette and Steven dated for two years and then lived together in New York for a brief time before moving to California in 1987. They continued living together in California before marrying on January 10, 1989. Their wedding took place in a wedding chapel in Reno, Nevada, where they received a marriage certificate issued by a minister authorized to perform marriages in Nevada. Thereafter, the parties had two religious marriage ceremonies that were presided over and memorialized by rabbis, including a June 1989 ceremony in San Francisco and an August 1992 ceremony in Brooklyn, New York.
During their marriage, Nenette took Steven’s surname of Hoffman and converted to the Jewish religion. Their daughter Alyssa was born in 1991 and her sister Samantha was born in 1994. According to Steven, the parties were married for nine years and 11 months before separating on January 1, 1999. Nenette states that the parties did not separate until September 1, 2004.
On September 22, 2004, Steven filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.
C. The Amended Petition for Nullity of Marriage
On March 14, 2005, Nenette was ordered to show cause why Steven should not be allowed to amend his petition for dissolution of marriage by changing it to a petition for nullity of marriage. In support of the order to show cause, Steven filed a declaration in which he asked the trial court to determine, on the basis of documentary evidence, that his 1989 marriage to Nenette was void ab initio due to Nenette’s two prior marriages.
The documentary evidence included Nenette’s Philippine marriage contract, which indicated that she had married Romeo Lim in 1982, and a North Carolina marriage certificate, which indicated that she had married Crisanto Cabalic in 1985. Steven also submitted the parties’ January 10, 1989 application for a Nevada marriage license, which stated that Nenette had not been married before.
In his declaration, Steven also asserted that Nenette had not disclosed her prior marriages to him. He argued that Nenette was not entitled to putative spouse status and quasi-marital property rights because, unlike him, she did not have a reasonable good faith belief that their marriage was valid.
Steven’s amended petition for nullity of marriage was presented at the time of trial on June 1, 2005. Although Steven’s attorney advised the trial court that the petition was ready to be filed, it was not actually filed until July 5, 2005.
D. Trial
A trial was held on June 1, 2005, on the bifurcated issues of the validity of the parties’ marriage and their status as putative spouses.
Nenette filed a trial brief in which she disputed Steven’s claim that he alone was entitled to putative spouse status. She explained that she had believed that her prior marriage to Romeo Lim was not valid because they had not lived together or held themselves out as husband and wife. Nenette also requested judicial notice of the July 17, 1987, judgment of divorce between Crisanto Cabalic and Neonita Lacgao Cabalic (her former name) filed in the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Twelfth Judicial District, Cumberland County, North Carolina. Alternatively, assuming that her 1989 marriage to Steven would be deemed invalid due to her prior marriages, Nenette argued that a putative marriage existed and therefore she was entitled to a division of quasi-marital property.
In her supplemental trial brief, Nenette changed her argument. She requested judicial notice of the May 18, 2005, judge of annulment ab initio of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division--Family Part, County of Hudson, in which the court granted an annulment of Nenette’s marriage to Romeo Lim on the ground that Lim’s refusal to join Nenette in the United States and live with her constituted a fraud. Nenette then argued that the termination of both of her prior marriages removed any legal impediment to her marriage to Steven and therefore the marriage was valid.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ab initio” as “From the beginning.” (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 4, col. 2.)
In addition to the documentary evidence admitted at trial, the trial court heard the testimony of Steven and Nenette, as summarized below.
1. Testimony of Nenette
Nenette received a bachelor of science degree in nursing in 1980. She married Romeo Lim on November 17, 1982, as memorialized in their Philippine marriage contract. She believed that their marriage was valid at that time. After Nenette came to the United States in 1983, Lim failed to join her and they did not have a marital relationship.
Regarding the parties’ January 10, 1989 application for a Nevada marriage license, which indicated that her marriage to Steven was her first marriage, Nenette explained that they were both inebriated when the application was filled out and she merely signed her name. Also, she did not believe that she was married to Romeo Lim at the time of her marriage to Steven. In accordance with Philippine custom, her marriage to Lim was not valid because they never lived together and did not represent themselves as husband and wife. She did not take any action to terminate her marriage to Lim prior to initiating the annulment action in New Jersey in 2005. In 1995, Nenette saw Lim when he stopped in San Francisco on his way to the Philippines. He told her he was married and had a child.
Nenette also did not believe she was married to Crisanto Cabalic at the time of her marriage to Steven. However, Nenette admitted that in 1985 she paid Cabalic $5,000 to marry her so she could obtain a green card. She only saw Cabalic once. He returned the money and did not sponsor her for a green card after she declined to return his affections. Nenette later believed that they were divorced because she had hired a lawyer and filed papers for a divorce. However, Nenette acknowledged that she had failed to follow up on the default divorce her lawyer said he would obtain if Cabalic could not be found. She first saw the July 17, 1987 judgment of divorce obtained by Cabalic in 2005 and did not know about the divorce before then. Nenette told Steven that she was divorced from Cabalic because that was what she believed at the time.
Steven sponsored Nenette for her green card, but that is not the reason she married him. According to Nenette, she married Steven because she loved him. During her marriage to Steven, Nenette contributed a portion of her salary as a clinical supervisor to pay for household expenses and lessons for the children. She was also involved in the children’s religious upbringing.
2. Testimony of Steven
Steven was married prior to his 1989 marriage to Nenette. However, he obtained an annulment of his first marriage in 1985. He met Nenette in 1986 or 1987 and dated her for two years before they married. She told him that she had married someone in North Carolina to obtain a green card and had divorced him, but never mentioned Romeo Lim.
When their application for a Nevada marriage license was filled out, Nenette was not intoxicated. Steven truthfully stated on the application that he had been married once before, that the marriage had been annulled, and his marriage to Nenette would be his second marriage. After moving to California from New York in 1987, Steven and Nenette lived together until September 1, 2004. Nenette was regularly employed as a nurse, while Steven’s employment as a salesperson was sporadic. He also bought and sold homes that he improved. They filed joint tax returns because Steven believed that they were legally married.
3. The Statement of Decision
On September 16, 2005 the trial court issued its tentative decision and statement of decision, which included several rulings concerning Nenette’s marriages.
First, the court found that Nenette’s second marriage to Crisanto Cabalic was dissolved prior to her marriage to Steven. Second, the court determined that Nenette’s first marriage to Romeo Lim was not terminated before either of her subsequent marriages. Third, the court ruled that the marriage of Steven and Nenette was void because Nenette was legally married to Lim at the time of her marriage to Steven. Finally, the court concluded that the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio (of Nenette’s marriage to Lim) did not result in the validation of the marriage of Steven and Nenette.
The trial court also tentatively ruled that Nenette was not a putative spouse within the meaning of Family Code section 2251, subdivision (a) because she did not have an objective good faith belief that her marriage to Steven was valid, in light of her failure to ascertain that she was divorced from Lim and Cabalic before marrying Steven. The trial court stated, “If the test were a subjective good faith standard, then the Court would have no trouble believing that Nenette in good faith believed that her prior marriage to Mr. Lim interposed no obstacle to her legal marriage to Steven.” However, the trial court determined that “[t]his Court just cannot conclude that a reasonable person, having no divorce from a first spouse (and no paperwork on a second divorce, ) would not stop to check the records or take care of these issues before marrying a third person.”
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
However, the trial court was troubled by this ruling because Nenette had devoted 12 years to her “ ‘marriage’ ” to Steven, including raising his children and enabling his enterprise of buying and selling houses for profit. The trial court remarked, “[Nenette] should be able to leave this relationship with some assets, and it is not clear what she will be entitled to as a result of this decision.”
E. The Judgment of Nullity and Putative Spouse Status
The trial court entered its judgment of void marriage and putative spouse status on November 3, 2005. Having received no objections from the parties to its statement of decision, the trial court ruled that the January 10, 1989, marriage of Nenette and Steven was void ab initio and therefore invalid. Accordingly, the court granted a judgment of nullity based on a void marriage.
The trial court also ruled that Nenette’s marriage to Romeo Lim in November 1982 was not dissolved prior to her marriage to Steven in January 1989 and therefore Nenette could not have married Steven with a good faith belief that it was a valid marriage. For that reason, the trial court determined that Nenette was precluded from attaining putative spouse status. The court further determined that Steven had entered into the marriage with a good faith belief that it was a valid marriage and granted him putative spouse status “along with all of the benefits thereto.”
The judgment of November 3, 2005, also provides that the automatic temporary restraining orders will continue in effect for a period of 60 days from the date the judgment was entered and specified that all other issues are reserved. These portions of the judgment are not challenged in the present appeal.
Nenette filed a timely notice appeal from the judgment. This court subsequently granted Nenette’s petition for a writ of supersedeas and on October 27, 2006, ordered that the automatic temporary restraining orders remain in effect until final determination of this appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Rules Pertinent to a Judgment of Nullity Based on a Void Marriage
On appeal, Nenette contends that the trial court erred in ruling that her marriage to Steven was void and entering a judgment of nullity. We will begin our analysis with a review of the rules pertinent to a judgment of nullity based on a void marriage.
There is a fundamental difference between an action for dissolution of marriage and an action for nullity. “One seeks to terminate the marital status; the other seeks to inquire whether any such status ever existed.” (Estate of Goldberg (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 265, 270.) An invalid marriage may be void or voidable. (See In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 718 [construing former section 4452] (Vryonis).)
In California, section 2201 provides that a bigamous marriage is void or voidable, depending on the circumstances: “(a) A subsequent marriage contracted by a person during the life of a former husband or wife of the person, with a person other than the former husband or wife, is illegal and void from the beginning, unless: [¶] (1) The former marriage has been dissolved or adjudged a nullity before the date of the subsequent marriage. [¶] (2) The former husband or wife (i) is absent, and not known to the person to be living for the period of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent marriage, or (ii) is generally reputed or believed by the person to be dead at the time the subsequent marriage was contracted. [¶] (b) In either of the cases described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), the subsequent marriage is valid until its nullity is adjudged pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 2210.” (See Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 718 [construing former section 4452].)
Section 2210 specifies other circumstances under which a marriage is voidable and may be adjudged a nullity. (Estate of DePasse (2002)97 Cal.App.4th 92, 105-106.) Pursuant to section 2212, subdivision (a), a judgment of nullity restores the parties to the status of unmarried persons. Section 2212 further provides that “[a] judgment of nullity of marriage is conclusive only as to the parties to the proceeding and those claiming under them.” (§ 2212, subd. (b).)
Section 2210 provides, “A marriage is voidable and may be adjudged a nullity if any of the following conditions existed at the time of the marriage: [¶] (a) The party who commences the proceeding or on whose behalf the proceeding is commenced was without the capability of consenting to the marriage as provided in Section 301 or 302, unless, after attaining the age of consent, the party for any time freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. [¶] (b) The husband or wife of either party was living and the marriage with that husband or wife was then in force and that husband or wife (1) was absent and not known to the party commencing the proceeding to be living for a period of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent marriage for which the judgment of nullity is sought or (2) was generally reputed or believed by the party commencing the proceeding to be dead at the time the subsequent marriage was contracted. [¶] (c) Either party was of unsound mind, unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. [¶] (d) The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless the party whose consent was obtained by fraud afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife. [¶] (e) The consent of either party was obtained by force, unless the party whose consent was obtained by force afterwards freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife. [¶] (f) Either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the marriage state, and that incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.”
California also recognizes the validity of marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. (Rosales v. Battle (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1183.) Section 308 provides that “[a] marriage contracted outside this state that would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in this state.” Thus, the law of the place of marriage ordinarily controls the question of its validity. (Colbert v. Colbert (1946) 28 Cal.2d 276, 280 [discussing former Civil Code section 63; now see section 308].)
Having reviewed the rules generally pertaining to a judgment of nullity based on a void marriage, we next address the applicable standard of review.
B. The Standard of Review
Nenette states that the applicable standard of review is de novo because the essential facts are not in dispute and the issues involve mixed questions of law and fact. We disagree.
Review of a judgment of nullity or a decision regarding the validity of a marriage is under the substantial evidence standard. (Patillo v. Norris (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 209, 216; In re Marriage of Liu (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 143, 155.) This standard is appropriate in light of the evidentiary burden placed on the party attacking the validity of a second marriage.
“It is well established that when a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is upon the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved by the death of a spouse or by divorce or had not been annulled at the time of the second marriage. [Citations.]” (Estate of Smith (1949) 33 Cal.2d 279, 281.) This presumption is based upon the policy that a person entering a second marriage is not presumed to have committed bigamy. (Patillo v. Norris, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 215.)
The burden of proof is sustained if the evidence, in the light of all reasonable inferences therefrom, shows that the first marriage was not dissolved or annulled. (Estate of Smith, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 281; Vargas v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 470, 473.) In other words, the presumption that the second marriage is valid is rebuttable, and may be overcome “ ‘ “upon a consideration of the attending facts and circumstances and such inferences as fairly and reasonably flow therefrom.” ’ ” (Vargas v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at p. 476.) Thus, “the question is whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding.” (Estate of Smith, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 281.)
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Judgment of Nullity
Because she obtained a judgment of annulment ab initio from the New Jersey state court on May 18, 2005, which annulled her 1982 marriage to Romeo Lim, Nenette argues that her marriage to Steven on January 10, 1989, was valid. She asserts that the trial court erred in ruling otherwise because the court refused to admit the judgment of annulment ab initio into evidence and refused to give full faith and credit to the judgment in violation of the United States Constitution, article IV, section 1.
“Judgments of another state must be given full faith and credit under article IV, clause 1 of the United States Constitution if final and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (In re Marriage of Hattis (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1162, 1171.)
Nenette further contends that the trial court erred in failing to apply the relation back doctrine. She explains that because the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio related back to the date of her marriage to Lim, the effect of the judgment was to erase the Lim marriage and validate her marriage to Steven.
Steven insists that none of Nenette’s arguments have merit. According to Steven, the trial court properly excluded as irrelevant the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio because it was entered after the parties’ marriage. Additionally, Steven maintains that the judgment was properly excluded because it was produced after the discovery cut off and only 13 days before trial.
The record reflects that the trial court took judicial notice of the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio.
Regarding the merits, Steven argues that his marriage to Nenette is void under Nevada law due to her prior marriage to Lim. He emphasizes that section 125.290 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides that a marriage is void if either of the parties have a former husband or wife then living. Alternatively, Steven contends that annulment of his marriage to Nenette was proper under Douglass v. Douglass (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 867, because Nenette actively concealed her marriage to Lim and lied about her prior marriage on her Nevada marriage license application.
As Nenette points out, Steven did not present in the trial court his theory that their marriage was void under Nevada law. We observe that during the trial court proceedings the parties confined their arguments regarding the validity of their Nevada marriage to California authorities. However, as we have discussed, it is the law of the place of marriage that controls the validity of the marriage. (Colbert v. Colbert, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 280 [discussing former Civil Code section 63; now see section 308].) The question of whether the parties’ Nevada marriage is void must therefore be determined under Nevada law. We will address this issue on appeal, because, as explained below, Nevada law regarding the validity of a bigamous marriage is similar to California law. Consequently, the parties’ arguments under California law are equally applicable under Nevada law and Steven does not raise an entirely new theory on appeal.
Section 125.290 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides in pertinent part, “All marriages which are prohibited by law because of: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Either of the parties having a former husband or wife then living, if solemnized within this state, [¶] are void without any decree of divorce or annulment or other legal proceedings.” Thus, as the Nevada Supreme Court has instructed, “A marriage is void if either of the parties to the marriage has a former husband or wife then living.” (Williams v. Williams (2004) 120 Nev. 559, 564.) Applying this rule, the court in Williams stated that “Richard and Marcie’s marriage was void because Marcie [Williams] was still married to another man when she married Richard [Williams].” (Ibid.)
Thus, Steven had the burden of proving in the trial court that his marriage to Nenette was void under Nevada law because Nenette was married to another man when she married Steven. On appeal, we must determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that the marriage was void because Nenette was married to Romeo Lim at the time of her marriage to Steven. As explained below, we find that the trial testimony of Nenette was sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling.
It is well established that “[t]he uncorroborated testimony of one witness can constitute substantial evidence, unless the testimony is inherently unreliable.” (Plastic Pipe & Fittings Assn. v. California Building Standards Com. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1407; Evid.Code, § 411.) Here, Nenette admitted during her testimony that she married Lim in 1982; the marriage was memorialized in their Philippine marriage contract; she believed the marriage was valid when contracted; and she did not take any action to terminate her marriage to Lim prior to initiating the annulment action in New Jersey in 2005. Additionally, it may be reasonably inferred that Lim was alive at the time of the parties’ 1989 Nevada marriage because Nenette testified that she saw Lim in San Francisco in 1995. We find nothing inherently unreliable in Nenette’s testimony. Accordingly, Nenette’s testimony was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Nenette was married to Lim at the time of her marriage to Steven. The parties’ marriage is therefore void under Nevada law, and we need not determine whether the marriage was voidable on the alternative ground of false representation and concealment of prior marriage.
Nenette’s arguments do not persuade us to change our conclusion. She contends that the trial court’s errors, consisting of the court’s refusal to admit the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio into evidence and failure to properly apply the relation back doctrine, caused the trial court to incorrectly determine that the parties’ marriage was void. Even assuming that the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio had been given full faith and credit and admitted for the purpose of establishing that Nenette’s marriage to Lim was annulled in 2005, Nenette’s arguments fail because her reliance on the relation back doctrine is misplaced. Based on Sefton v. Sefton (1955) 45 Cal.2d 872 (Sefton), Nenette contends that the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio had the legal effect of erasing her marriage to Lim and validating her marriage to Steven because the judgment related back to the date of her marriage to Lim.
In Sefton, the California Supreme Court stated, “[A]n annulment decree has the effect of declaring a marriage void ab initio. A divorce in this state merely dissolves the existing marriage, leaving intact the marriage relationship between the time of the marriage ceremony and the entry of the final decree. An annulment, on the other hand, has been said to ‘relate back’ and erase the marriage and all of its implications from the outset.” (Sefton, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 874.)
However, as this court has previously noted, our Supreme Court also explained in Sefton that the relation back doctrine is not absolute. The doctrine “should be sparingly applied in cases involving the rights of third parties.” [Citation.] (In re Marriage of Campbell (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 502, 509.) Further, “[a] legislative caveat may be fairly inferred from [former] Civil Code, section 86 [now (§ 2212, subd. (b)], which provides that: ‘A judgment of nullity of marriage rendered is conclusive only as against the parties to the action and those claiming under them.’ [Citations.] Therefore, whatever may be said for the fiction of ‘relation back’ as a general principle in annulment cases, it must be deemed to apply only where it promotes the purposes for which it was intended.” (Sefton, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 876.) The purpose of the relation back doctrine is “to do substantial justice as between the parties to a voidable marriage.” (Id. at p. 875.)
The issue in Sefton was whether the annulment of a wife’s second marriage (to a man already married) revived the obligation of her divorced husband to pay spousal support. (Sefton, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 875.) The California Supreme Court rejected the wife’s argument that the annulment of her second marriage related back and therefore the second marriage was erased and she was entitled to the continuation of support by her divorced husband, as set forth in their property settlement agreement. (Id. at pp. 875-876.) The court reasoned that it would be improper to reinstate the divorced husband’s support obligation because he was entitled to recommit the assets previously reserved for support payments after his former wife remarried. Additionally, the court determined that knowledge of the voidability of the remarriage could not be charged to the divorced husband and it was his former wife who was responsible for the situation. The Sefton court therefore concluded that the relation back doctrine did not apply in these circumstances and terminated the divorced husband’s support obligation. (Id. at pp. 877-878.)
The relation back doctrine is similarly inapplicable in the present case. Steven is a third party with respect to the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio and therefore the judgment cannot relate back to the 1982 date of the Lim marriage for the purpose of determining Steven’s rights. Moreover, Steven cannot be charged with knowledge that his marriage to Nenette was void at the time of the marriage in 1989, since Nenette did not tell him that she was already married to Lim. Application of the relation back doctrine in this case for the purpose of validating the parties’ bigamous marriage would also be inconsistent with the public policy expressed in both California law (§ 2201, subd. (a)(1)) and Nevada law (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 125.290) that a bigamous marriage is illegal and void at its inception.
For these reasons, we determine that the trial court did not err in ruling that the parties’ marriage was void.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Ruling on Putative Spouse Status
Nenette also contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant her putative spouse status because the New Jersey judgment of annulment ab initio validated her subjective good faith belief that her prior marriage to Lim posed no obstacle to her marriage to Steven.
This court has previously stated the rules governing putative spouse status: “Where a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, an innocent party may be entitled to relief under the putative spouse doctrine. The doctrine is codified in section 2251, which provides in relevant part: ‘(a) If a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall: [¶] (1) Declare the party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse. [¶] (2) If the division of property is in issue, divide . . . that property acquired during the union which would have been community property or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or voidable. . . .’ [¶] Putative spouse status may be based on the reasonable expectations of the parties to an alleged marriage entered into in good faith where the marriage is void or voidable pursuant to section 2200, 2201 or 2210. It also applies where the marriage is invalid for reasons other than those enumerated in sections 2200, 2201, and 2210. [Citation] However, a subjective good faith belief in a valid marriage by itself, even when held by a credible and sympathetic party, is not sufficient. [Citation.] A determination of good faith is tested by an objective standard. [Citation.] Therefore, a proper assertion of putative spouse status must rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a lawful California marriage.” [Citation.] (Estate of DePasse, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 107-108, italics added; see also Welch v. State of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1378; Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 721.)
In accordance with the rules governing putative spouse status, a claim to putative spouse status was rejected by this court where the parties were married by a hospital chaplain without a marriage license, which is one of the prerequisites for a valid marriage in California. (Estate of DePasse, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) The evidence showed that the purported husband was aware of the licensing requirement but elected to go forward without a marriage license. (Ibid.) Similarly, a good faith belief that a common law marriage was valid was deemed insufficient for putative spouse status, where the couple had made no attempt to comply with the procedural requirements for a lawful California marriage. (Welch v. State of California, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1378-1379.) A good faith belief that a private marriage was valid because it conformed to religious beliefs was likewise deemed insufficient for putative spouse status. (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 724.)
In the present case, the trial court found that the parties’ marriage “had all the indicia of a valid marriage, ” including a marriage license and Nenette’s change of her religion for the marriage, as well as children born after the marriage, moving across the country together, and living as husband and wife for many years. The trial court also found that Nenette had a subjective good faith belief that her prior marriage to Romeo Lim posed no obstacle to a legal marriage to Steven. However, the trial court determined that Nenette did not have a reasonable good faith belief in the validity of the parties’ marriage, stating, “This Court just cannot conclude that a reasonable person, having no divorce from a first spouse (and no paperwork on a second divorce, ) would not stop to check the records or take care of these issues before marrying a third person.”
We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Nenette did not have an objectively reasonable good faith belief in the validity of her marriage to Steven. While Nenette believed that her marriage to Lim was invalid under Philippine custom because they had never lived together or held themselves out as husband and wife, Nenette also confirmed that she took no action to terminate her 1982 marriage to Lim before she married Steven. A reasonable person would not believe that California law authorized a valid marriage absent termination of a prior marriage to a living spouse, since section 2201, subdivision (a)(1), expressly provides that a bigamous marriage is void where the former spouse is known to be alive. Therefore, although Nenette and Steven had lived together and held themselves out as husband and wife for many years, Nenette could not have had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that her marriage was valid.
Nenette’s arguments to the contrary are founded in her contention that it is inequitable to deny her putative spouse status, since that ruling may have the effect of precluding her from a share in the parties’ quasi-marital property despite her long commitment to the marriage and the parties’ children. Nenette asks this court to address her entitlement to a division of quasi-marital property “for guidance in the property division portion of the trial.” We decline to do so, although we acknowledge the trial court’s concern that the determination that Nenette is not a putative spouse may impact the equitable division of property. The issue of property division is not before us in the present appeal and we may not give an advisory opinion. “ ‘The rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this court.’ [Citation.]” (Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1126.) We therefore express no opinion regarding the division of property in this matter.
E. Amendment of Petition
Nenette’s final contention on appeal is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a judgment of nullity because Steven failed to file his amended petition for nullity of marriage until July 5, 2005, over one month after Steven presented the petition at the time of trial on June 1, 2005.
However, Nenette does not indicate that she objected to the trial being held in the absence of a filed petition for nullity and our review of the record shows that no such objection was made at the time of trial. Accordingly, her claim of procedural error is waived. As this court has stated, “ ‘ “ ‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method . . . .’ [Citation]” [Citation.]’ ” (In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1558.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Mcadams, duffy, J.