Opinion
B315425
06-14-2023
In re the Marriage of MARIO and IRMA FRAUSTO. v. IRMA FRAUSTO, Respondent. MARIO FRAUSTO, Appellant,
Michael A. Younge for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VD036924 . Veronica Sauceda, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael A. Younge for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
EGERTON, J.
Mario Frausto failed to disclose his pension when he petitioned to dissolve his marriage to Irma Frausto. A little over 20 years after the court entered judgment, Irma filed a petition under Family Code section 2556 to adjudicate the omitted asset, which the court granted. On appeal, Mario argues the court erred because the defense of laches barred Irma from claiming an interest in his pension, his pension is not an omitted asset, and Irma abandoned the property by failing to pursue her initial request in 2013. We affirm.
We refer to Mario Frausto and Irma Frausto by their first names for the sake of clarity.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 1999, Mario filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Irma. Irma did not respond to the petition, and the court entered default judgment. According to Irma, Mario gave her the divorce papers and told her to sign them, but she did not understand what they meant because she could not read well at the time.
Irma later learned that Mario had a pension from his employer that he had not disclosed. In April 2013, she filed a request for an order adjudicating the asset, and the court issued an order to show cause. In a May 2013 minute order, the court ruled Mario's employer "is authorized to release to [Irma] information regarding [Mario's] pension plan. [Irma] is to subpoena the documents regarding the pension plan." The court continued the matter for a month.
Irma, who was representing herself, sent the employer the minute order, but the employer refused to disclose the documents without a valid subpoena. Irma apparently did not follow up with the employer. She did not appear at the next scheduled hearing, and the court placed the matter off calendar.
Irma retained an attorney, and in 2015, she filed a petition for spousal support arrearages. In response, the court ordered Mario to pay Irma approximately $13,000. Irma did not request, and the court did not make, any orders related to the pension.
About six years later, in April 2021, Irma filed a new request for order to determine her interest in Mario's pension. According to the request, the pension existed during the marriage, but Mario failed to disclose it in connection with the dissolution petition. Irma asserted she had tried to resolve these issues on her own, but she struggled to do so because she is deaf and speech impaired.
Mario opposed the request on the sole basis that Irma was barred from obtaining relief until she set aside the default. After Irma disputed that claim, Mario filed a "Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities," in which he newly argued he was not required to disclose the pension, the pension is not an "omitted asset," and laches barred Irma from raising the issue.
In support of his supplemental arguments, Mario claimed Irma had known about the pension since 2013, and he was harmed by her eight-year delay in filing the request. Mario said he lives on a fixed income, he had grown accustomed to receiving his full pension, and it would cause substantial financial hardship if he were required to give a portion of it to Irma. Mario said it would have been easier for him to have adjusted to less income in 2013, which was closer in time to his retirement.
At the hearing, Irma said that after she discovered Mario had an undisclosed pension, she had tried her best to represent herself in court. She struggled, however, because she is not well educated and her family does not speak English. Irma said she did not mean to abandon her request in 2013; at that time, she had recently moved and did not receive notice of the next court date. Irma said she had been frustrated for eight years until she was able to retain a lawyer to help her.
The court determined the pension is an omitted asset and it set a trial to determine how to divide it. The court explained that under section 2100, Mario had a duty to disclose all assets and liabilities that existed at the time of the separation. Because he failed to disclose the pension, the judgment did not address it and it is an omitted asset for purposes of section 2556.
Mario timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mario argues the court erred in granting Irma's request for three reasons: (1) the defense of laches barred Irma from claiming an interest in his pension; (2) his pension is not an omitted asset; and (3) Irma abandoned the property by failing to pursue her initial request in 2013.
1. Relevant law
Section 2556 provides that, "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, . . . the court has continuing jurisdiction to award community estate assets or community estate liabilities to the parties that have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding. A party may file a postjudgment motion or order to show cause in the proceeding in order to obtain adjudication of any community estate asset or liability omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment. In these cases, the court shall equally divide the omitted or unadjudicated community estate asset or liability, unless the court finds upon good cause shown that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset or liability."
"[S]ection 2556 imposes no time limit on former spouses to seek to adjudicate omitted or unadjudicated community property after a dissolution judgment was entered.... [T]here is no statute of limitations imposed by Family Code section 2556 on a former spouse who seeks adjudication of omitted or unadjudicated community property. Section 2556 also imposes no limitation for default judgments ...." (In re Marriage of Huntley (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1060 (Huntley).) Moreover, section 2556 "applies even when former spouses were aware of the community property at the time the dissolution judgment was entered." (Huntley, at p. 1060.)
2. The court was not required to apply laches
Mario first contends the family court erred because Irma's request under section 2556 was barred by laches.
A court may apply the equitable defense of laches and bar a party from asserting a right if the court concludes the party's delay in asserting the right has caused prejudice to an adverse party. (In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 183.) A party asserting a laches defense has the burden to prove three elements: "(1) delay in asserting a right or a claim; (2) the delay was not reasonable or excusable; and (3) prejudice to the party against whom laches is asserted." (Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Internat., Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1157.) "Generally speaking, the existence of laches is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all of the applicable circumstances, and in the absence of manifest injustice or a lack of substantial support in the evidence its determination will be sustained." (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614, 624.)
At the outset, it is not clear the defense of laches applies to a request under section 2556. In Lakkees v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 531 (Lakkees), for example, the court noted there is no statutory support for the argument that a dilatory party may be barred from seeking relief under the predecessor to section 2556. (Lakkees, at p. 540, fn. 5.) A leading family law treatise similarly advises that, although a court may consider equitable principles when dividing an omitted asset under section 2556, it may not refuse to consider the issue altogether by applying the defense of laches. (See Hogoboom &King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 8:1516.)
The primary case on which Mario relies, In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal.3d 897, was decided before the Legislature enacted section 2556 and its predecessor, Civil Code section 4353. At the time, a party seeking post-judgment adjudication of an omitted asset was required to file a separate action in equity. (See Lakkees, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 540, fn. 5 [discussing the history of Civil Code section 4353]; Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059 [discussing the history of section 2556 and Civil Code section 4353]; see also Huddleson v. Huddleson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1564, 1573 ["An action to divide an omitted asset is an action in equity."].) The Modnick court, therefore, considered the laches defense in the context of an equitable action to set aside a dissolution judgment based on extrinsic fraud. (See Modnick, at pp. 904-906.) Here, in contrast, Irma filed her request under section 2556, which expressly grants family courts continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate omitted assets.
Apparently aware of this problem, Mario contends he raised the laches defense under section 1101, which governs claims "for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate ...." (§ 1101, subd. (a).) Section 1101, subdivision (d) provides a spouse must bring such a claim "within three years of the date [the] spouse had actual knowledge that the transaction or event for which the remedy is being sought occurred," and the "defense of laches may be raised in any action brought" under section 1101. (Id., subd. (d)(1), (3).) Contrary to Mario's contentions, however, Irma did not bring a claim under section 1101; instead, she asked the court to adjudicate an omitted asset under section 2556. Unlike section 1101, section 2556 does not have a statute of limitations or expressly state a party may assert the defense of laches.
Even assuming laches is a valid defense to a request under section 2556, Mario has not shown the family court erred in declining to apply it here. When an appellant challenges a lower court's refusal to apply laches,"' "the question for a reviewing court [is] whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law"' because' "the appellant's evidence was (1) 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' and (2) 'of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.'" '" (Lent v. California Coastal Com. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 812, 837-838.)
Mario insists his declaration "demonstrated his hardship based on [Irma's] excessive delay." He fails, however, to point to the specific assertions in his declaration that show prejudice; we are not obligated to search the record and make arguments for him. (Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545.) In any event, the only possible prejudice we have found in Mario's declaration is his claim that he is living on a fixed income and has grown accustomed to his full pension. The court reasonably could have determined this conclusory assertion, lacking any supporting detail, showed insufficient prejudice for a laches defense. At the very least, reasonable minds could differ on the issue.
The court also reasonably could have found Irma provided a sufficient explanation for the delay. The record shows Irma asserted her right to the pension in 2013, shortly after she learned of its existence. Irma explained, however, that she struggled to comply with the necessary legal procedures because she is disabled, not well-educated, and lacked family support. Mario does not contest these claims or explain why they are insufficient to excuse the delay.
On this record, the family court was not compelled to apply the defense of laches as a matter of law. Therefore, Mario has not shown the court erred.
3. The pension is an omitted asset
Mario argues his pension is not an omitted asset because it "was disclosed since May 6, 2013," when the court considered Irma's first request for division of the asset.
" 'Under California law, a spouse's entitlement to a share of the community property arises at the time that the property is acquired. [Citations.] That interest is not altered except by judicial decree or an agreement between the parties. Hence "under settled principles of California community property law, 'property which is not mentioned in the pleadings as community property is left unadjudicated by decree of divorce, and is subject to future litigation, the parties being tenants in common meanwhile.'" [Citations.] This rule applies to partial divisions of community property as well as divorces unaccompanied by any property adjudication whatsoever.'" (Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059.)
Here, Mario does not contest that his pension is community property. Nor does he contest that, because he failed to disclose the pension in connection with his dissolution petition, the judgment did not address it. Although Irma raised the issue in 2013, the court did not adjudicate the pension at the time. The pension, therefore, is an omitted asset for purposes of section 2556; it is irrelevant that it "was disclosed" in 2013. (See Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1059-1060.)
4. Mario forfeited his abandonment argument
Mario contends that, by not pursuing her initial request in 2013, Irma demonstrated she knowingly intended to relinquish control over the pension and give up any rights to it. Therefore, Mario argues, Irma "abandoned" her right to the pension. Mario, however, did not make this specific argument below, which forfeits the issue on appeal. (See In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 462 ["As a general rule, a party who does not raise an argument below forfeits the argument on appeal."].) He also forfeited the issue by failing to support his argument with a single citation to relevant authority. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 ["To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error."].) Accordingly, we do not consider the argument. (See County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 862, 870 [refusing to consider forfeited arguments].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. As respondent did not participate in this appeal, no costs are awarded.
We concur: EDMON, P. J., LAVIN, J.