Opinion
A23-1858
05-21-2024
In re the Marriage of: Thomas Chazin, petitioner, Respondent, v. Kristin Chazin, Appellant.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-FA-000302134
Considered and decided by Gaitas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larson, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
ELISE L. LARSON JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In this second appeal arising from proceedings to docket a 2006 marital-dissolution judgment, appellant Kristin Briggs challenges the district court's decision to deny her requests for need-based attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022), for proceedings in district court and her prior appeal.
Kristin Briggs was formerly known as Kristin Chazin. We refer to appellant as Kristin Briggs consistent with her briefing.
2. We set forth the relevant facts in our prior opinion on this matter. See Chazin v. Chazin, No. A23-0330, 2023 WL 5695633, at *1 (Minn.App. Sept. 5, 2023). There, we affirmed the district court's decision to grant respondent Thomas Chazin's motion to vacate the 2006 judgment. Id. at *2-3. But we reversed the district court's decision to deny
Briggs's request for need-based attorney fees on the ground that the district court did not make the required statutory findings. Id. at *3-4. We remanded for the district court to make findings under section 518.14, subdivision 1, for need-based fees associated with both district court and appellate proceedings. Id. at *4.
3. Section 518.14 provides that a "[district] court shall award attorney fees, costs, and disbursements" if it determines:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the party's rights in the proceeding and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay them.Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.
4. On remand, the district court concluded that Briggs failed to prove the elements by a preponderance of the evidence and did not award any need-based attorney fees for either the district court or appellate proceedings. We review a district court's factual findings for clear error. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 52.01. "In applying the clear-error standard, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings." In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021). "We will not conclude [the district court] clearly erred unless, 'on the entire evidence,' we are 'left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Id. (quotation omitted).
5. Regarding the district court proceedings, in this appeal Briggs failed to challenge the district court's finding that attorney fees were not necessary for a good-faith assertion of her rights. By failing to challenge the district court's finding, Briggs forfeited that argument. See Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. 1987) ("[I]ssues not argued in briefs must be deemed waived on appeal." (quotation omitted)); see also Stone v. Invitation Homes, Inc., 4 N.W.3d 489, 494 n.6 (Minn. 2024) (noting that recent caselaw distinguishes waiver from forfeiture, and that waiver occurs "when a known right is voluntarily relinquished, whereas forfeiture occurs when a party fails to timely assert a right"). And because all three statutory elements are required for the district court to award need-based attorney fees, Briggs's challenge fails. See Phillips v. LaPlante, 823 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn.App. 2012) (providing party seeking need-based fees must prove all three elements), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2013).
6. Regarding the appellate proceedings, Briggs challenges the district court's finding that attorney fees were not necessary for a good-faith assertion of her rights. She argues the district court improperly relied on the fact that her appeal was unsuccessful. See id. (providing party need not prevail on the merits to obtain award under section 518.14). This argument mischaracterizes the district court's order. When analyzing this element, the district court highlighted that the appeal challenged the district court's decision to deny her attempt to docket a judgment "nearly sixteen years after the parties' Judgement and Decree was entered." This finding goes beyond a mere determination that Briggs's appeal failed on the merits; it goes to the time within which Briggs attempted to assert her legal rights. See Peters v. Peters, No. A13-2286, 2014 WL 4388776, at *5 (Minn.App. Sept. 8, 2014) (concluding district court did not abuse its discretion when it characterized mother's motions as misuse of funds when deciding mother's motions were not necessary for goodfaith assertion of her rights). And the finding related to the time within which Briggs initiated the proceedings to docket a 2006 marital-dissolution judgment are well supported by the record. The district court did not clearly err when it found attorney fees were not necessary for a good-faith assertion of Briggs's rights. As a result, we need not address her challenges to the district court's findings related to the second and third elements. See Phillips, 823 N.W.2d at 907.
8. In sum, because Briggs failed to show the prerequisites for an award of needbased attorney fees, we affirm the district court's refusal to award those fees.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.