Opinion
W.C. No. 3-846-454
June 12, 1996
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Wheelock (ALJ), which awarded the claimant medical benefits for an injury to his back. We affirm.
The claimant sustained a compensable knee injury in 1985. At that time, the claimant was also suffering from an unrelated back condition. The claim for the knee injury was apparently closed after the respondents admitted liability for permanent partial disability. In 1993, the claimant's knee condition worsened and the claim was reopened.
In August 1994, while the knee claim remained open, the claimant was installing light bulbs at a rental property which he owned. As the claimant descended a step ladder he placed his right foot on the floor and his leg gave away. This caused the claimant to twist and injure his back.
Ultimately, the claimant required surgery for the back problem and he sought compensation under the knee claim. One of his physicians, Dr. Schutt, opined that the claimant's "present medical problems are such that he really needs a total joint in his knee and the simple fall from the ladder is just a manifestation of his inability to function in a satisfactory manner with his present medical limitations."
Significantly, the claimant testified that his knee often buckled when walking on uneven ground. However, the claimant also stated that he was never restricted from climbing ladders. (Tr. p. 10).
Citing Standard Metals Corp. v. Ball, 172 Colo. 510, 474 P.2d 622 (1970), the ALJ found that the back injury and consequent surgery were compensable as natural and proximate results of the 1985 knee injury. In so doing, the ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Schutt, and stated that "climbing a ladder to change light bulbs is not an extraordinary activity, especially if an individual has not been given restrictions on climbing ladders."
On review, the respondents contend that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in finding that the back injury was a compensable consequence of the claimant's 1985 knee injury. In support of this contention, the respondents place great reliance on Post Printing Publishing Co. v. Erickson, 94 Colo. 382, 30 P.2d 327 (1934), for the proposition that the claimant's action in climbing the step ladder constituted an efficient intervening cause of injury which severed the relationship between the claimant's knee injury and the 1994 back injury. We reject this argument.
The respondents' argument notwithstanding, we do not believe there is any inherent inconsistency between Post Printing and Standard Metals. Both cases acknowledge that the natural and proximate results of an industrial injury, which are uninfluenced by efficient intervening causes, are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. Post Printing merely holds that, on the facts present in that case, there was insufficient evidence that the claimant's industrial knee injury was the cause of an ankle injury which the claimant sustained when he slipped on a snow-covered sidewalk. Standard Metals reached the opposite result where there was medical evidence that the work-related leg injury left the claimant in a weakened condition, and the weakened condition contributed to a bone fracture when the claimant fell on a snow-covered sidewalk.
Considering these cases together, we have previously held that the question of whether an injury is the natural and proximate result of a prior industrial injury is generally a question of fact. See Landolt v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., W.C. No. 4-130-484, March 25, 1994. It is only where reasonable minds could draw but one inference that the issue of causation becomes one of law. Schrieber v. Brown Root In, 888 P.2d 274 (Colo.App. 1993). To the extent there is a factual dispute, we must uphold the ALJ's pertinent findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.).
Here, the record reveals a factual dispute concerning whether or not the claimant's back injury was the result of weakness caused by the industrial knee injury, or the result of the claimant's intervening act of climbing the ladder despite awareness of the weak knee. In cases of this type, Professor Larson has stated the following:
"When we come to the cases that are not in the quasi-course category, inevitably we will encounter close questions on what constitutes negligence . . . A typical borderline example might be that of the man who knew that his compensably injured knee was apt to give away without warning, because it had done so on a number of occasions, but who nevertheless undertook to carry an armload of trash down the cellar stairs. His knee collapsed and he fell the length of the stairs, striking his head on a drain and breaking his jaw. Compensation for these injuries was denied." 1 Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, section 13.11(d).
In this case, the ALJ has determined that the claimant's venturing onto the ladder was not an intervening cause of the back injury because the claimant's action was not unreasonable under the circumstances. It is true that the claimant was aware that his knee had buckled when he walked across uneven ground. However, there was countervailing evidence that the claimant had not been medically warned that climbing ladders could cause his knee to buckle, and there was no evidence that the claimant had trouble climbing ladders.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the question of whether the claimant's action in climbing the ladder was an efficient intervening cause was one of fact for resolution by the ALJ. The ALJ resolved the factual issue against the respondents, and we may not substitute our judgment for her's concerning the weight of the evidence or the inferences to be drawn therefrom. May D F v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo.App. 1988).
Because we do not believe Post Printing and Standard Metals are irreconcilable, we reject the respondents' argument that we should apply Post Printing for "policy reasons." We do note that the respondents' liability for subsequent injuries is not "unlimited" since the statute of limitations for reopening applies. Similarly, the respondents' "double recovery" argument lacks merit where, as here, the subsequent injury produces an entirely new disability for which no compensation was awarded in the original proceeding.
Insofar as the respondents argue that the ALJ's finding of causation is unsupported by the evidence, we disagree. Causation is a factual matter for resolution by the ALJ. F. R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo.App. 1985). Here, the opinions of Dr. Schutt, as well as the claimant's testimony, provide ample support for the ALJ's finding.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order, dated July 31, 1995, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEAL PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Kathy E. DeanNOTICE This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed June 12, 1996 to the following parties:
Charles H. K. Lutgen, 1317 Whitehouse Dr., Colorado Springs, CO 80904
Teller County School District No. 2, P. O. Box 99, Woodland Park, CO 80866-0099
Carolyn Boyd, Esq., Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority Interagency Mail
Steven R. Waldmann, Esq., 303 S. Circle Dr., #202, Colorado Springs, CO 80910-3000 (For Claimant)
Douglas A. Thomas, Esq., 1700 Broadway, #1700, Denver, CO 80290-1701 (For Respondents)
By: ___________________________