Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 15-0185
12-08-2015
IN RE IMANI L.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Advocate's Office, Phoenix By Arthur K. Merchant Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Lisa Marie Martin Counsel for Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JV197878
The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Advocate's Office, Phoenix
By Arthur K. Merchant
Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Lisa Marie Martin
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined. WINTHROP, Judge:
¶1 Imani L. ("Juvenile") appeals the juvenile court's order denying her request that the court refrain from notifying the Arizona Department of Transportation's Motor Vehicle Division ("MVD") of her adjudication of delinquency. For the following reasons, we affirm the court's order, but modify the order to reflect that Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of attempted unlawful use of means of transportation.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 On March 18, 2015, the Maricopa County Attorney's Office charged Juvenile, who was already on probation for disorderly conduct with a deadly weapon, with Count 1, unlawful use of means of transportation-control, a class five felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-1803(A)(1) (2010), and Count 2, false reporting to a law enforcement officer, a class one misdemeanor, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2907.01 (2010). Juvenile also received a citation, alleging one criminal and five civil traffic infractions.
¶3 On April 8, 2015, in exchange for dismissal of the other charges, Juvenile pled delinquent to amended Count 1, attempted unlawful use of means of transportation, as a class six undesignated felony, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1001 (2010) and 13-1803(A)(2). As part of the terms of her plea agreement, Juvenile agreed to the following: "The court decides the consequences for this offense. . . . For this offense, the law also requires: THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES SHALL IMMEDIATELY SUSPEND OR REFUSE TO ISSUE THE JUVENILE'S DRIVER'S LICENSE UNTIL THE JUVENILE'S 18TH BIRTHDAY. MVD MAY ALSO REVOKE THE JUVENILE'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES." Before accepting Juvenile's plea, the juvenile court advised Juvenile of the preceding provision, and Juvenile acknowledged she understood it. Juvenile's counsel then argued he believed the provision should not apply to Juvenile because she was "pleading to an attempt" rather than the completed act. The court stated it "tend[ed] to disagree," however, and reasoned that "any felony in which commission of a vehicle was used must be reported" under A.R.S. § 28-1559(F) (2012). Juvenile subsequently admitted the factual basis for amended Count 1, and the court found her delinquent. Juvenile later filed a disposition memorandum, arguing the juvenile court should not apply the mandatory suspension of driving privileges provision found in A.R.S. § 28-3320(A)(8) (2013) because the statute did not apply to the preparatory offense of attempted unlawful use of means of transportation, but only to the completed offense.
¶4 At Juvenile's April 29, 2015 disposition hearing, Juvenile's counsel requested the juvenile court refrain from notifying MVD of Juvenile's delinquency adjudication. The court placed Juvenile on standard probation, in the care of her mother, and took the request under advisement.
¶5 In a minute entry order dated May 26, 2015, the juvenile court denied Juvenile's request that the court refrain from notifying MVD of her delinquency adjudication, explaining as follows: "After review of the applicable statutory law, the Court declines the request. MVD shall be notified of the adjudication." On May 27, 2015, the court notified MVD of Juvenile's delinquency adjudication; however, the court itself neither suspended Juvenile's driver's license nor submitted a recommendation that MVD do so.
¶6 We have jurisdiction over Juvenile's appeal. See A.R.S. § 8-235(A) (2014).
ANALYSIS
¶7 Juvenile appeals the juvenile court's order that MVD be notified of her delinquency adjudication for attempted unlawful use of means of transportation. Because A.R.S. §§ 28-3305(B) (2013) and 28-1559 mandate such judicial notification, however, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
¶8 Although we generally review a disposition within the juvenile court's statutory authority for an abuse of discretion, we review de novo questions of law, including a statutory challenge to the court's disposition. In re Martin M., 223 Ariz. 244, 246, ¶ 4, 221 P.3d 1058, 1060 (App. 2009); In re Sheree M., 197 Ariz. 524, 525, ¶ 4, 4 P.3d 1067, 1068 (App. 2000).
¶9 Juvenile bases her argument for reversal of the court's order solely upon an analysis of A.R.S. § 28-3320(A)(8). Section 28-3320(A)(8) provides that, "on receiving the record of [a] person's conviction of theft of a motor vehicle pursuant to § 13-1802, unlawful use of means of transportation pursuant to § 13-1803 or theft of means of transportation pursuant to § 13-1814," MVD shall immediately suspend the driver's license or privilege to drive of a person who committed one of the specifically enumerated offenses while under eighteen years of age.
A "conviction" includes an adjudication of delinquency for purposes of § 28-3320. See A.R.S. § 28-3320(E).
¶10 Juvenile argues "A.R.S. § 28-3320(A)(8) does not apply to the preparatory offense of attempted unlawful use of means of transportation," and therefore concludes the juvenile court "should not have applied the mandatory suspension of driving privileges" under the statute to her. See State v. Wise, 164 Ariz. 574, 578, 795 P.2d 217, 221 (App. 1990) (concluding a mandatory fine did not apply to a defendant because he was convicted only of attempt to possess narcotics for sale); State v. Tellez, 165 Ariz. 381, 383, 799 P.2d 1, 3 (App. 1989) ("Preparatory offenses are separate and distinct from substantive offenses.").
¶11 Juvenile's argument is misplaced, however, because her analysis of § 28-3320(A)(8) is immaterial to the specific matter on appeal, i.e., whether the juvenile court erred in deciding to notify MVD of Juvenile's delinquency adjudication for attempted unlawful use of means of transportation. More specifically, Juvenile's § 28-3320(A)(8) argument is irrelevant to this appeal for two reasons: First, the driver's license suspension mandate of § 28-3320(A)(8) is directed at MVD—not the juvenile court—and the juvenile court case did not itself suspend Juvenile's driver's license; second, although § 28-3320(A)(8) may not specifically require MVD to suspend a person's driver's license upon receipt of the record of that person's conviction for an offense falling beyond the scope of the statute (such as Juvenile's delinquency adjudication for attempted unlawful use of means of transportation), the statute does not, either explicitly or implicitly, bar the juvenile court from notifying MVD of such a conviction.
The record fails to show whether MVD has suspended Juvenile's driver's license as a consequence of her adjudication of delinquency, or in the event MVD has done so, whether MVD suspended her license pursuant to § 28-3320(A)(8) or otherwise. See generally State v. Rivera, 168 Ariz. 102, 103, 811 P.2d 354, 355 (App. 1990) (recognizing the appellant bears the responsibility to provide the record for the issues raised on appeal). We disagree with the State, however, that Juvenile's § 28-3320(A)(8) argument should be summarily "dismissed" on this basis.
¶12 On the contrary, this court has previously held that, pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 28-3305(B) and 28-1559(B) and (H)(2), a juvenile court is required to notify MVD of a juvenile's delinquency adjudication for violations of offenses that regulate the operation of motor vehicles. See In re Hillary C., 221 Ariz. 78, 80-82, ¶¶ 8-14, 210 P.3d 1249, 1251-53 (App. 2009).
¶13 Section 28-3305(B) mandates that any court possessing jurisdiction to determine violations of any Arizona statute "regulating the operation of motor vehicles on highways" notify MVD of a person's conviction for such an offense. The statute also grants such courts discretion to provide MVD with a recommendation to suspend that person's driver's license. Under A.R.S. § 28-101(13)(a) (Supp. 2015), a "conviction" is defined in part as "[a]n unvacated adjudication of guilt or a determination that a person violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction." "[T]he definition of conviction in title 28 is sufficiently broad to encompass a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency." Hillary C, 221 Ariz. at 81, ¶ 10, 210 P.3d at 1252. Accordingly, pursuant to § 28-3305(B), a juvenile court is required to report to MVD a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for a violation of an offense regulating the operation of motor vehicles. See id. at ¶ 8.
Subsection (B) of A.R.S. § 28-3305 provides as follows:
B. A court with jurisdiction over offenses or civil traffic violations committed under this chapter, any other law of this state or a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of motor vehicles on highways shall forward a record of the conviction of or judgment against a person in the court, except for a violation related to standing or parking, to the department and may recommend the suspension of the driver license of the person.
¶14 Hillary C. further acknowledged that "had we any doubt that the reporting requirements found in § 28-3305 apply to juvenile delinquency adjudications, it would be dispelled by A.R.S. § 28-1559." Id. at ¶ 13. The court continued:
Like § 28-3305, § 28-1559 imposes an obligation to report convictions for certain offenses found in title 28 and "any other law regulating the operation of vehicles on highways."
§ 28-1559(B), (H). In contrast to § 28-3305, which refers to the reporting duties of courts, § 28-1559 describes the duties of "[e]ach magistrate, judge or hearing officer of a court," as well as the "clerk of the court of record." § 28-1559(A), (B). In addition, § 28-1559 specifically defines the reporting obligations of juvenile court officers in providing that "[e]ach judge, referee, hearing officer, probation officer or other person responsible for the disposition of cases involving traffic offenses . . . committed by persons under eighteen years of age shall" report violations to ADOT. § 28-1559(H)(2) (emphasis added). Pursuant to § 28-1559(J), "[f]ailure, refusal or neglect of a judicial officer to comply with [§ 28-1559] is misconduct in office and grounds for removal from office."Id. at 81, ¶ 13, 210 P.3d at 1252 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, Hillary C. held that § 28-1559(B) and (H)(2), like § 28-3305(B), mandates that a juvenile court notify MVD of a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for a violation of an offense regulating the operation of motor vehicles. Id.; see also A.R.S. § 28-1559(F).
¶15 In this case, Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of attempted unlawful use of means of transportation, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1001 and 13-1803(A)(2). Juvenile's delinquency adjudication involves a statute that regulates "the operation of vehicles on highways." Juvenile's adjudication of delinquency is therefore subject to the mandatory MVD reporting requirements imposed upon juvenile courts through A.R.S. §§ 28-3305(B) and 28-1559. Consequently, the juvenile court properly declined Juvenile's request to forego notifying MVD of her delinquency adjudication.
Although not noted by either party, the juvenile court's May 26, 2015 order (and subsequent July 2, 2015 signed order) indicates Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for unlawful use of means of transportation. The court, however, adjudicated Juvenile delinquent of attempted unlawful use of means of transportation. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4036 (2010), we modify the court's May 26 and July 2 minute entry orders to reflect that Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of attempted unlawful use of means of transportation. --------
CONCLUSION
¶16 We affirm the juvenile court's order declining Juvenile's request to forego notifying MVD of her delinquency adjudication, but modify the order to reflect that Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of attempted unlawful use of means of transportation.