Opinion
2014-03-26
In the Matter of LEONCE K.O. (Anonymous), appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers of counsel; Nicholas J. Murgolo on the brief), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers of counsel; Nicholas J. Murgolo on the brief), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Leonce K.O. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (McElrath, J.), dated March 6, 2013, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated December 20, 2012, made after a hearing, finding that he had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation until February 14, 2015. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review ( see Matter of Janmalone R., 112 A.D.3d 833, 834, 977 N.Y.S.2d 85;cf.CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree ( see Matter of Anthony S., 112 A.D.3d 948, 948, 978 N.Y.S.2d 293;Matter of India G., 40 A.D.3d 856, 857, 834 N.Y.S.2d 475), and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree ( see Matter of India G., 40 A.D.3d at 857, 834 N.Y.S.2d 475;Matter of Willie W., 32 A.D.3d 479, 480, 819 N.Y.S.2d 478). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 617–618, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709;cf.CPL 470.15[5] ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 779, 779–780, 868 N.Y.S.2d 897;cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Darnell C., 66 A.D.3d 771, 772, 887 N.Y.S.2d 211;cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercisedits discretion in adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent and placing him on probation until February 14, 2015, instead of directing an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 315.3; Matter of Jesus S., 104 A.D.3d 694, 695, 961 N.Y.S.2d 231). The appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his first encounter with the law ( see Matter of Uriah D., 74 A.D.3d 1194, 1195, 904 N.Y.S.2d 164;Matter of Nikita P., 3 A.D.3d 499, 501, 769 N.Y.S.2d 602). The disposition was appropriate in light of, among other things, the seriousness of the offense, and the appellant's failure to take responsibility for his actions ( see Matter of Jesus S., 104 A.D.3d at 695, 961 N.Y.S.2d 231;Matter of Uriah D., 74 A.D.3d at 1195, 904 N.Y.S.2d 164).
Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant's remaining contention is without merit.