Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK72138 Marilyn Mordetzky, Juvenile Court Referee.
Maryann M. Milcetic, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
WOODS, Acting P. J.
Mother, K.R., appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her children K.R., R.M., and H.R. She claims she was denied her due process rights because she did not receive proper notice of the continued Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Although mother attended the initially scheduled section 366.26 hearing, and received proper notice of that hearing, she contends there is no evidence in the record showing that notice of the continued hearing was given to her in compliance with section 294, subdivision (d) notwithstanding the court’s order to the court clerk to send mother notice in the mail. This, she says, is an error requiring automatic reversal. We do not agree. First, mother’s counsel was present at the continued section 366.26 hearing and failed to object on the grounds that mother was not properly noticed. Consequently, mother has forfeited any complaint concerning the defect in notice. In any event, her counsel was also present at the hearing where the court set the date for the continued section 366.26 hearing, and counsel’s presence at that hearing and counsel’s conduct at the continued section 366.26 hearing supports an inference that mother had actual notice of the continued hearing date. As a result, mother has not demonstrated a deprivation of her due process rights. Nonetheless, the clerk’s failure to serve mother with written notice of the continued section 366.26 hearing violates mother’s right to notice based on section 294, subdivision (d). We review the error under the prejudicial error standard applied to the violation of statutory rights. Based on the record before this court, we conclude the error is harmless. Accordingly we affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
K.R., is the mother of K.R., born in 2005, R.M., born in 2006, and H.R., born in May 2008. The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (hereafter “DCFS”) in May 2008 based on allegations of general neglect of the children by mother. Representatives of Antelope Valley Hospital had contacted the DCFS indicating that mother had given birth to H.R. in early May 2008. H.R. was born premature and was in a “life or death situation, ” and would probably stay in the hospital for a number of weeks. On June 13, 2008, the social worker received a phone call from the hospital advising that mother had not visited baby H.R. since June 4, 2008, and the doctors were concerned that there was no one to authorize medical care. Thereafter, on June 19, 2008, the social worker was advised that H.R. might need plastic surgery which would occur at UCLA hospital, but that the hospital had not heard from mother and were concerned they would lose the bed at UCLA if they could not get mother’s authorization for the surgery. The social worker attempted to locate mother at several addresses but was unsuccessful. The hospital also informed the DCFS that mother had tested positive for marijuana and amphetamine while pregnant with H.R.
None of the children’s fathers is a party to this appeal.
The DCFS detained the children. On June 27, 2008, a petition was filed pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (g) and (j) alleging that H.R. and her siblings were at risk of harm because: (1) mother had left H.R. at the hospital for 25 days without making contact with the hospital and without a plan for her supervision and care and that mother’s whereabouts were unknown; and (2) that mother had a history of substance abuse and tested positive for drugs in March and April 2008.
At the subsequent detention hearing, mother and the fathers of H.R. and R.M. appeared. The parents were each appointed separate legal counsel. The court ordered the children detained. The court ordered mother to submit to random, on-demand drug testing, including an on-demand test that day. DCFS was ordered to provide mother with referrals for drug rehabilitation, parent education and individual counseling. Mother was granted monitored visitation with each of the children for a minimum of three hours per week, limited only by the availability of the monitor. DCFS was granted discretion to liberalize mother’s visitation.
In late July 2008, the DCFS filed a first amended petition, adding allegations against the fathers of the children. On July 28, 2008, mother was present for the pre-trial resolution conference. Her counsel indicated a settlement had been reached and mother had signed a waiver of rights and the disposition case plan.
On July 30, 2008, the court found that the children were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (b), (g) and (j) and adjudged them dependents. The children were placed in the care of DCFS for suitable placement. Reunification services were provided to mother and the fathers of R.M. and H.R. No reunification services were ordered for the alleged father of K.L. Mother was ordered to attend a DCFS approved program of parent education, drug rehabilitation with random testing, and individual counseling to address mental health. She was also ordered to attend the children’s medical appointments. The court granted mother monitored visitation with the children by a DCFS approved monitor.
The court held the section 366.21, subdivision (e) review hearing in late January 2009. Mother was not present. The report prepared for the hearing, indicated that mother had not participated in the case plan and her whereabouts were unknown. In addition, mother had not contacted DCFS to set up a visitation schedule with the children. The DCFS recommended that the court terminate family reunification services for mother. A due diligence search which was initiated for mother disclosed four addresses with postmaster results on three of the addresses listed, indicating none of them were valid addresses for mother. Notification from the postmaster was pending on the fourth address. The court found notice to mother improper and continued the matter for a contested hearing on DCFS’ recommendation to terminate mother’s reunification services. DCFS was ordered to notice mother for the next hearing.
Mother’s counsel was present, but mother did not appear at the subsequent section 366.2l, subdivision (e) hearing on March 5, 2009. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown; however notice was found to be proper for all parties. The court terminated mother’s reunification services. The fathers of H.R. and R.M. were found to be in partial compliance with the case plan and reunification services were continued as to them.
The court conducted the section 366.21, subdivision (f) 12-month review hearing in early September, 2009. The children continued to reside in the same foster home where they had been originally placed after their initial detention. The children had done well in their placement and their foster mother indicated that she was ready and willing to adopt them.
Counsel represented mother during the section 366.21, subdivision (f) proceeding but mother did not appear. The report prepared for the 12-month hearing indicated that mother’s whereabouts remained unknown, that she had not reported any progress to DCFS, and that mother had not visited the children. A declaration of due diligence executed on August 18, 2009, was attached to the report indicating that a valid address for mother could not be found. DCFS recommended terminating reunification services for the fathers. After a continued contested hearing for the fathers, H.R.’s father’s reunification services were terminated, but R.M.’s father’s reunification services were continued.
The court set a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 (hereafter “section 366.26 hearing”) for H.R., on February 16, 2010. Mother was not present at the 18-month review hearing for the children, K.R. and R.M. held on December 28, 2009. On February 1, 2010, the court terminated reunification services for the father of R.M. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for the children K.R. and R.M for May 28, 2010.
In the report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing for H.R. on February 16, 2010, DCFS recommended adoption as the most appropriate permanent plan for H.R. Mother was not present at the hearing, but she was represented by counsel. DCFS requested a continuance of the hearing in order to publish notice for mother. The court found notice was not proper for mother and granted the request to publish notice. The court ordered H.R.’s section 366.26 hearing continued to May 28, 2010, the same date as scheduled for the section 366.26 hearing for H.R’s siblings.
The report for the section 366.26 hearing, recommended that parental rights for all of the children be terminated. The social worker stated that since court intervention, mother had not had visited the children, had not been in contact with DCFS, and her whereabouts remained unknown.
Mother appeared at the May 28, 2010, section 366.26 hearing. Mother and father of R.M. requested that the court schedule a contested hearing, which the court set for July 21, 2010. The court ordered mother to appear without further notice. Mother provided the court with her new address in California City.
On June 3, 2010, the case was walked on calendar to correct the section 366.26 hearing date. The date previously set for the contested section 366.26 hearing-July 21, 2010-was a court “furlough day” and the courthouse would be closed. The court rescheduled the contest for the next day, July 22, 2010. Mother’s counsel and the father’s respective counsel were present at the June 3, 2010, hearing. The court ordered the clerk to send a copy of the minute order prepared for that day to all of the parties.
According to the document in the record entitled “Clerk’s Certificate of Mailing Juvenile Dependency, ” the clerk sent a copy of the June 3, 2010, minute order to the fathers. The clerk did not mail a copy of the minute order to mother, indicating that mother’s whereabouts were unknown.
Neither mother, nor any of the fathers appeared at the contested section 366.26 hearing held on July 22, 2010. A discussion was held between the court and counsel regarding notice of the new date sent to the parties:
“The Court: All right. The matter is here for a [.26] hearing. And I do remember upon reviewing this matter this morning, I know that the [.26] date was changed. [¶] Did we send notice out?
“[DCFS Counsel]: Your honor, the minute order of 6/3 indicated that the clerk was to send a copy of this minute order to the parties; and in brackets, ‘not counsel.’ So we can assume that the clerk’s office did its job as required by the minute order, and that’s the law. That’s what the statutes say.
“The Clerk:
“[DCFS Counsel]: So I don’t have control over the clerk’s office. I'm just assuming they did what is required.
“[Counsel for father of H.R.]: Your honor, on behalf of father three [H.R.’s father], I waive any improprieties in notice.
“The Court: Is that the [sic] father?
“[Counsel for father of H.R.]: Correct.
“The Court: He’s with the adoption
“[Counsel for father of R.M.]: I can’t waive any improper notice on behalf of my client.
“The Court: Well, no one’s established that there’s improper notice. All right any other counsel wish to be heard?
“[Counsel for father of R.M.]: Your honor, just for the record, on behalf of [the father of R.M.], I’m objecting to his parental rights being terminated. The court ordered unmonitored visits for him. He does sporadically visit, and when he does visit, his visits are doing well. And I know that he does not want his parental rights to be terminated on his behalf. [¶] I’m just objecting for the record.
“The Court: All right.
“[Minors’ Counsel]: On behalf [of] the minors I’m asking the court to proceed. Finding that notice is proper, there is clear and convincing evidence that the child[ren are] adoptable, no exceptions apply, and no injury
“[Mother’s Counsel]: On behalf [of] the mother I would request a continuance for mother to be present.”
The request for continuance was denied. The court found notice to be proper for mother and the fathers and proceeded with the hearing. The juvenile court terminated parental rights.
Mother appeals.
DISCUSSION
Before this court, mother complains that she was denied due process because she did not receive proper notice of the July 22, 2010, rescheduled contested section 366.26 hearing. The DCFS responds that the notice was proper and that mother was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, including on June 3, 2010, when the section 366.26 hearing was rescheduled and at the subsequent contested section 366.26 hearing on July 22, 2010. The DCFS points out that mother’s counsel failed to timely object based on the grounds of improper notice at the July 22 hearing and therefore mother forfeits any complaint as to any defect in the notice. Finally, the DCFS also maintains that any defect as to notice to mother of the continued contested section 366.26 hearing constitutes harmless error. As we shall explain, the DCFS is correct.
1. Forfeiture.
Mother’s counsel was present on July 22, 2010, at the section 366.26 contested hearing. When the court and the parties discussed the issue of notice for the hearing, mother’s counsel did not object based on any impropriety of the notice, nor did mother’s counsel ask the court to make further inquiry of the clerk on the issue, even though the court specifically asked for counsel’s input. Instead, mother’s counsel requested only that the court continue the hearing so that mother could attend. Mother’s counsel’s silence on the issue of notice is particularly striking in view of the fact that counsel for the fathers both addressed the notice issue-counsel for the father of H.R. waived any irregularities as to notice, while counsel for the father of R.M. refused to do so. Mother contends that she has not forfeited the right to raise this matter on appeal, arguing that the issues are ones of law, and that the juvenile court had an affirmative, mandatory duty to determine whether she had received notice. If mother had brought this matter to the attention of the juvenile court, the court could have addressed and remedied it. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Allowing mother to raise these issues for the first time on appeal contravenes the dependency law’s objective of expediently providing a permanent home for children whose parents have been unable to reunify with them. (In reDesiree M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329, 334; see In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419.) Consequently we conclude that mother forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. Notwithstanding our conclusion on forfeiture, as we shall explain, even if we exercised our discretion to consider the matter, in our view, mother would not prevail on the merits.
2. Notice of the Continued Section 366.26 hearing.
Section 294 describes the obligations and manner in which the social worker (or probation officer) must provide notice to various interested parties in dependency cases, including the parents and counsel of record, of a section 366.26 hearing. Specifically section 294, subdivision (a), required the DCFS to give notice of a section 366.26 hearing to the mother. (§ 294, subd. (a)(1).)
Under section 294, subdivision (j), the social worker is relieved of any obligation to serve notice of a section 366.26 hearing under certain circumstances, to wit: “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if the attorney of record is present at the time the court schedules a hearing pursuant to section 366.26, no further notice is required, except as required by subparagraph (A) of paragraph (7) of subdivision (f).” Subdivision (f)(A)(7) addresses the situation where the identity of the parent is known but his or her whereabouts are unknown.
Mother does not challenge the validity of the notice given with respect to the initial section 366.26 hearing set for May 28, 2010. However, she says the record fails to show that service upon her was given in accordance with section 294, subdivision (d) with respect to the continued hearing. Section 294, subdivision (d) provides as follows: “Regardless of the type of notice required, or the manner in which it is served, once the court has made the initial finding that notice has properly been given to the parent, ... subsequent notice for any continuation of a Section 366.26 hearing may be by first-class mail to any last known address, by an order made pursuant to Section 296 , or by any other means that the court determines is reasonably calculated, under any circumstance, to provide notice of the continued hearing. However, if the recommendation changes from the recommendation contained in the notice previously found to be proper, notice shall be provided to the parent, ... regarding that subsequent hearing.”
Section 296 provides that, at any hearing, the court may order the parent to reappear.
Mother claims that she was not properly served with notice of the continued section 366.26 hearing under section 294, subdivision (d). She points out that on June 3, 2010, when the court rescheduled the section 366.26 hearing it ordered the court clerk to serve the notice and that notice was defective because it was not sent to the address that she had provided the court on May 28, 2010, when she appeared at the previously scheduled section 366.26 hearing. Instead the clerk’s notice listed mother’s address as “unknown.” Mother says that the record contains no evidence to demonstrate that she was provided notice by first-class mail by the DCFS, was ordered to reappear by the court, or was given notice by any other means that the juvenile court determined was “reasonably calculated... to provide notice of the continued hearing.” (§ 294, subd. (d).) Indeed, we have found no proof of service in the record to show mother was properly given written notice of the continued hearing, and inasmuch as mother did not appear at either the June 3, 2010, hearing when the contested section 366.26 hearing was continued from July 21 to July 22, the court could not then have ordered her to reappear at a continued hearing. Thus, none of the notice provisions described in section 294, subdivision (d) were satisfied in this case. These points are not dispositive, however.
Mother argues that separate and apart from the court’s order that the clerk provide the parents with written notice of the July 22, 2010, hearing, the DCFS was also required under section 294, subdivision (d) to provide her with notice of the hearing. We do not agree; the court’s comments at the June 3, 2010, hearing demonstrate that the court (via the clerk) was going to provide the notice of the hearing. In fact, when the DCFS lawyer specifically raised the issue of notice, the court stated “We’ll mail it to the parties.” The court’s reference to “We’ll” indicates that the court had assumed responsibility for the notice, effectively relieving the DCFS of any further obligation to provide notice of the July 22 hearing. The court’s order to the clerk qualified under section 294, subdivision (d) as “any other means that the court determines is reasonably calculated, under any circumstance, to provide notice of the continued hearing.”
In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250 (Phillip F.) is instructive. In Phillip F., the mother was served with notice of the initially scheduled section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at p. 255.) At the time of the hearing, however, the mother did not appear, although her counsel did. The hearing was continued. The social services agency mailed written notice of the continued hearing date to the mother at an outdated address. The mother’s counsel, but not the mother, appeared at the continued hearing. Counsel requested the court to set the matter for a contested hearing. At the date of the contested hearing, once again, the mother did not appear but her counsel did. (Id. at p. 256.) The court found that proper notice had been provided to the mother and terminated her parental rights as to her two sons. (Id. at pp. 252, 255-256.)
The court of appeal in Phillip F. cast the issue on appeal as “whether a parent who is represented by counsel and fails to appear at the properly noticed section 366.26 hearing must be renoticed of the continued hearing date pursuant to [former] section 366.23.” (Id. at p. 252.) (See now current section 294.) The court concluded that “a parent who fails to appear at a properly noticed section 366.26 hearing must be notified of the continued hearing.” (Id. at p. 258.) However, it also held that a failure to renotice in compliance with the statute was not necessarily fatal, as long as the notice that was given satisfied due process concerns. (Id. at p. 252.) The court observed that “[d]ue process merely requires that the parent receive notice ‘“‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the [continued] pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 258.) It also stated: “[W]hen a parent receives proper notice of a section 366.26 hearing and chooses not to come to court to learn the outcome of that hearing, duplication of the more demanding and time-consuming service requirements of section 366.23, where the permanent plan recommendation is not changed, would do nothing to enhance the likelihood the parent would appear at the continued hearing. [¶] Accordingly, we hold that actual notice of the continued hearing date will suffice.” (Id. at pp. 258-259, fn. omitted.)
The appellate court in Phillip F. also noted that while the juvenile court had found proper notice was given, there was no direct evidence of such notice. (Id. at p. 259.) However, the appellate court concluded the juvenile “court could have inferred that [the mother] had actual notice of the continued hearing because her appointed counsel had notified her of the continued hearing dates in conformance with counsel’s statutory obligation to provide competent representation. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The court said such an inference was reasonable because: (1) at the initially scheduled section 366.26 hearing, the court had verbalized its assumption that counsel would notify the mother of the continuance in writing; (2) counsel indicated at the first continued hearing that her client wanted the matter set for a contested hearing; (3) counsel remained silent when, at the contested hearing, the court made a finding that proper notice had been given; and (4) because mother’s subsequent request for modification was based on her purported inability to attend the contested hearing, rather than a lack of awareness of the hearing date. (Ibid.) The appellate court also noted that the mother did not contend that she that she lacked actual notice of the continued hearing.
In our view, the record before us allows a reasonable inference that mother had actual notice of the continued hearings. At the July 22, 2010, section 366.26 hearing, mother’s counsel made a verbal request for a continuance, for “mother to be present.” Unlike counsel for the fathers, mother’s counsel made no reference to the issue of notice. Counsel did not say that, so far as he was aware, mother had no notice of the hearing, or that counsel had not been able to confirm whether mother was aware of the hearing. Counsel simply asked for a continuance. In short, counsel had several opportunities to tell the court that mother had received no notice of the hearing, if that was the case, but he did not do so. As the court observed in Phillip F., counsel’s duty to provide competent representation includes a duty to communicate with the client and keep him or her apprised of key points in the proceedings – such as a hearing at which parental rights could be terminated and a child put up for adoption. Moreover, although mother assails the defective notice provided by the clerk before this court, she does not claim that she lacked actual notice of the hearing.
In short, the record before us, like the record in Phillip F., contains no direct evidence that mother was sent notice of the continued section 366.26 hearings. However, it contains evidence sufficient to permit an inference that she had actual notice. (See In re Desiree M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.) That being the case, the court clerk’s failure to provide mother with written notice, while running afoul of the statutory notice requirements of section 294, subdivision (d), did not amount to a denial of due process.
3. Harmless Error.
The error in failing to comply with section 294, subdivision (d), however, is not a structural error requiring automatic reversal. This error - a failure to comply with a statute - is subject to assessment in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389, 394-395 [citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, and concluding that lack of notice to mother of continued section 366.26 hearing was harmless where she had notice of the proceedings from the outset and the opportunity to be heard, her participation in the proceedings was poor, she was properly notified of original § 366.26 hearing date, and she failed to attend that hearing or notify anyone as to her position]; In re Desiree M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 335; see also In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 912-913.) As we shall explain, in view of the circumstances outlined above, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
As in Angela C., mother had notice of the dependency proceedings from the outset, and received proper notice of the originally scheduled section 366.26 hearing and attended the hearing and requested that the court conduct a contested proceeding. Mother did not receive written notice that the court had continued the contested hearing to July 22, 2010. Where mother received proper notice of the originally scheduled section 366.26 hearing but did not receive notice of the continued hearing, “[t]he error at most affects the manner in which the court conducts the termination hearing in that it becomes an uncontested hearing.” Given mother’s lack of prior participation in the proceedings, we can quantitatively assess the error in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Angela C., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.)
Thus, this case differs from In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 100, which found reversible structural error (rather than trial error subject to the harmless error standard) where the child services agency never tried to notify a parent of a six-month review hearing at which reunification services to that parent were terminated. (Id. at pp. 106-107.) This case also differs from In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, in which the juvenile court ordered the children’s service agency to attempt to notify the parent, but the child services agency ceased to make any attempt to locate the parent after a six-month review hearing, failed to inform the parent of the upcoming section 366.26 hearing in eight conversations in which a social worker spoke with the parent, and did not even try to notify the parent at her new address or to advise the parent’s attorney of that address. The juvenile court denied a request by the parent’s attorney to continue the section 366.26 hearing to allow him to locate and notify her. (Id. at pp. 1113-1114.) In these circumstances Jasmine G. found that failure to attempt to give the parent statutorily required notice of a section 366.26 hearing was a structural defect requiring automatic reversal. (Id. at p. 1116.) It was the lack of any attempt to give notice which made Jasmine G. “qualitatively different” from Angela C. (Id. at pp. 1117-1118.)
Here, it can be inferred that notice to mother’s attorney at the June 3, 2010, hearing, constituted actual notice to mother of the continued July 22, 2010, hearing. (In re Desiree M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.)
Having reviewed the error under the Chapman standard, we find that the failure to notify mother of the continued section 366.26 hearing date was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The main issue in a section 366.26 hearing is whether the dependent child is likely to be adopted. The juvenile court found, and the evidence supports the finding, that the children were likely to be adopted, as they were developing appropriately and were successfully placed with a foster parent with whom they had bonded emotionally and who expressed the desire to adopt them.
Once the court finds the likelihood of adoption, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) requires termination of parental rights unless an exception in subdivision (c)(1)(A) or (c)(1)(B) applies. One such exception would apply if the juvenile court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child because of one or more circumstances enumerated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) through (C)(1)(B)(vi). Mother’s counsel made no argument in the juvenile court hearing that any exception applied, and does not do so on appeal. From our review of the record, none of the exceptions would require reversal of the order terminating parental rights. The evidence in the record is clear. Mother did not participate in the case plan or seek in anyway to resolve the issues that led to the children’s detention. She had not visited with the children since they had been detained and it appears she made no effort to maintain any relationship with them. Therefore we can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in notice to mother of the continued section 366.26 hearing on July 22, 2010, was harmless and does not require reversal.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: ZELON, J., JACKSON, J.
The DCFS argues that based on section 294, subdivision (j), because mother’s counsel was present when the section 366.26 hearings were initially scheduled (and later rescheduled) then mother was not entitled to any additional notice of the continued section 366.26 hearing. The DCFS reads subdivision (j) too broadly. In our view section 294, subdivision (j) relieves the social worker of the statutory duty under section 294, subdivision (a) of providing notice to certain parties of the initial section 366.26 hearing when those parties’ counsel are present at the hearing when the court initially schedules a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. However, as we shall discuss more fully here, notice of a continued section 366.26 hearing is governed by a different subdivision of section 294-subdivision (d) that expressly describes the manner of providing notice of continued section 366.26 hearings.