Opinion
No. COA12–1479.
2013-07-2
In the Matter of K.M., J.H.
Cumberland County Department of Social Services, by Elizabeth Kennedy–Gurnee, for petitioner-appellee. Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant mother.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 7 September 2012 by Judge A. Elizabeth Keever in Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2013. Cumberland County Department of Social Services, by Elizabeth Kennedy–Gurnee, for petitioner-appellee. Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant mother.
Beth A. Hall for guardian ad litem.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order adjudicating K.M. and J.H. abused, neglected, and dependent and ordering that custody remain with the Cumberland County Department of Social Services (DSS). After careful review, we affirm.
On 11 October 2011, DSS filed a petition alleging that K.M. and J .H., as well as their sibling J.C., were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. DSS stated that it had received a Child Protective Services (CPS) referral on 6 October 2011 concerning the safety of the juveniles. DSS alleged that respondent: (1) inappropriately disciplined the juveniles; (2) was homeless; (3) had a history of mental illness, was diagnosed with depression, anxiety and schizophrenia, and was not currently under psychiatric treatment; (4) had tested positive for marijuana; (5) failed to enroll the juveniles in school; and (6) had engaged in domestic violence with the father. DSS also alleged that respondent had a CPS history in Cumberland County, North Carolina and Odenton, Maryland, and that social services in Maryland were investigating a referral when respondent brought the juveniles to Cumberland County. Maryland social services made a referral to Cumberland County DSS when it found out where respondent had relocated. DSS obtained non-secure custody of the juveniles.
Custody of J.C. was later granted to the father and is not a subject of this appeal.
On 5 December 2011, physical and legal custody of J.H. was returned to respondent. The trial court subsequently dissolved the non-secure custody order as to J.H. Custody of K.M. remained with DSS while it worked with respondent to locate a therapeutic placement in Maryland, and pending respondent executing a voluntary placement agreement placing K.M. in an appropriate therapeutic placement in Maryland.
On 3 January 2012, DSS filed another petition and again obtained non-secure custody of J.H. DSS again claimed that J.H. was abused, neglected, and dependent. DSS alleged that it had received another referral concerning J.H. on 31 December 2011 and that law enforcement had been called. Respondent was arrested on outstanding warrants and for giving false information to police. J.H. told DSS that respondent had been “shoving and pushing him, and yelling, screaming in his face, and threatening him.” J.H. claimed that respondent was “trying to provoke him into hitting her so that she could call the police and have him arrested and tell them that his behavior was out of control.” J.H. further stated that respondent was trying to force him to take psychotropic medication that had not been prescribed for him.
Adjudicatory hearings were held on 25 and 26 July 2012. The trial court adjudicated K.M. and J.H. abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles and ordered that custody of the juveniles remain with DSS. Respondent appeals.
Respondent's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the 7 September 2012 adjudication and disposition order. Respondent disputes the trial court's exercise of home state jurisdiction, contends that Maryland was the juveniles' home state, and argues that the court should have contacted Maryland to ascertain whether Maryland was willing to exercise jurisdiction over the abuse, neglect, and dependency allegations. We are not persuaded.
Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, and is reviewed de novo on appeal. Powers v. Wagner, 213N.C.App. 353, ––––, 716 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2011) (citation omitted). The Juvenile Code grants our district courts “exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–200(a) (2011). However, the jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) must also be satisfied for a court to have authority to adjudicate petitions filed pursuant to our juvenile code. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 50A–101 et seq. (2012); In re Brode, 151 N.C.App. 690, 692–94, 566 S.E.2d 858, 860–61 (2002).
Pursuant to the UCCJEA, a district court in North Carolina may exercise jurisdiction to make child custody determinations if it determines that North Carolina is the child's home state. SeeN .C. Gen.Stat. § 50A–201(a) (2012). Additionally, according to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50A–204, the district court “has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50A–204(a) (2012). In In re M.B., this Court determined that North Carolina was the home state of the juvenile where the initial custody order was based on emergency jurisdiction, the juvenile and her parents had been physically present in North Carolina for more than six months, and no custody order had been entered and no custody proceeding was pending in any other state. In re M.B., 179 N.C.App. 572, 576, 635 S.E.2d 8, 11 (2006).
In deciding In re M.B., this Court did not require that the trial court make any inquiry of any other state to determine whether there was an unknown custody order in existence or to request that the alleged home state assume jurisdiction without an action pending in the unknown court. Per N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50A–204, the trial court is required to contact another state only “upon being informed that a child-custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child-custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under G.S. 50A201 through G.S. 50A–203[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50A–204(d) (2012). This is not the situation here because there was no pending child-custody proceeding in Maryland.
In the instant case, the trial court determined that it had home state jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 50A–201 and 202 (2012). The trial court based this conclusion on its findings that:
2 .... At the time the Petition was filed, this Court was exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50A–204 inasmuch as the juveniles had only returned to the State of North Carolina for a period of thirty (30) days.
....
4. The Court further finds with regard to jurisdiction that no custody action has ever been filed in another state, including the State of Maryland[.]
5. At the time of the entry of this Adjudication Order, the juveniles had been residing [in the] State of North Carolina for a period in excess of nine (9) months.
....
8. At all times pertinent to the present proceeding, the juveniles were residing with the Respondent Mother or her relatives in Cumberland County, North Carolina.
Respondent does not challenge these findings of fact and they are binding on appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (citation omitted).
Given the trial court's unchallenged findings as to the court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction, the juveniles' residency in North Carolina for over six months, and the lack of any other custody proceedings or orders in any other state, we conclude that North Carolina became the home state wherein the trial court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter orders adjudicating the juveniles abused, neglected, and dependent. See M.B., 179 N.C.App. at 576, 635 S.E.2d at 11;see also In re E.X.J., 191 N.C.App. 34, 43, 662 S.E.2d 24, 29 (2008) (“The focus is ... on how long the child has lived in the state with either one parent or someone acting as a parent.”) (emphasis in original), aff'd, 363 N.C. 9, 672 S.E.2d 19 (2009). Accordingly, the trial court's order is affirmed.
Affirmed. Judges McCULLOUGH and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).