Opinion
02-23-00189-CV
10-19-2023
In the Matter of K.J.
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323-114380~20
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice
Appellant K.J. appeals the juvenile court's order transferring him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (Juvenile Department) to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Criminal Department). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01. In a single issue, K.J. argues that the juvenile court held an untimely transfer hearing, thus it lacked jurisdiction or abused its discretion when it transferred him to the Criminal Department to complete his determinate sentence. We hold that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to transfer K.J. and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. We affirm the juvenile court's transfer order.
K.J. asserts two issues but argues them as a single issue. Accordingly, we construe K.J.'s brief as raising only one issue.
I. Background
When K.J. was 15 years old, the State filed original and amended petitions alleging that he had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated assault on a police officer, reckless driving, evading arrest, and committing three counts of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The State also included a habitual felony notice and a deadly weapon finding. A grand jury approved a determinate sentence for K.J.'s delinquent conduct. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.045(a)(6). The juvenile court held a hearing and found that K.J. had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, evading arrest with a vehicle, and committing three counts of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02 (aggravated assault), § 31.07 (unauthorized use of vehicle), § 38.04 (evading arrest). The juvenile court ordered K.J. to serve a term of 14 years "in the custody of the [Juvenile Department] with a possible transfer to the [Criminal Department]."
"In a determinate sentence situation, a juvenile is initially committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice." In re R.C., 626 S.W.3d 76, 78 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.).
The Juvenile Department sent a letter to the juvenile court on December 5, 2022, requesting a transfer hearing under Section 244.014 of the Texas Human Resources Code and Section 54.11 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 244.014 (establishing requirements to refer juveniles serving determinate sentences for transfer to Criminal Department); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11 (establishing procedures for release or transfer hearing). The letter noted that K.J. was 18 years old and had not completed his determinate sentence. The Juvenile Department's letter recommended transferring K.J. to the Criminal Department and requested a hearing within 60 days. K.J.'s appointed counsel received notice on December 20, 2022, of a transfer hearing set for March 1, 2023. This hearing did not occur.
The Juvenile Department sent a second, identical letter to the juvenile court on March 9, 2023, again requesting a transfer hearing. The transfer hearing was held on March 29, 2023. At the hearing's outset, K.J. objected that the hearing was untimely under Section 54.11. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(h) ("The hearing on a person who is referred for transfer under Section 152.0016(j) or 244.014(a), Human Resources Code, shall be held not later than the 60th day after the date the court receives the referral."). The juvenile court denied K.J.'s objections, held the hearing, and announced that it would order K.J. transferred to the Criminal Department. The juvenile court issued its order on April 4, 2023, transferring K.J. "to the care, custody and control of the [Criminal Department] in accordance with the provisions of Section[] 245.151(c) of the Texas Human Resources Code, and [S]ection 54.11 of the Texas Family Code, . . . to serve the remainder of his sentence as required by law." This appeal followed.
II. Applicable Law
The Juvenile Department may refer a juvenile to the juvenile court for transfer to the Criminal Department if (1) the juvenile's conduct "indicates that the welfare of the community requires the transfer" and the juvenile (2) is between 16 and 19 years old, (3) is serving a determinate sentence, and (4) has not completed his sentence. Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 244.014(a). The juvenile court must set a hearing within 60 days of the referral. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(a), (h). In K.J.'s case, at the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court could either (1) order him returned to the Juvenile Department or (2) transfer him to the Criminal Department to complete his sentence. See id. § 54.11(i).
If the juvenile court ordered the juvenile to complete his sentence in the Criminal Department, the Juvenile Department would transfer him to the Criminal Department. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 245.151(c). If the juvenile court ordered the juvenile returned to the Juvenile Department, it could do so with or without approval to release him under supervision. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(j). But the Juvenile Department "may not release the [juvenile] under supervision without approval of the juvenile court" if the juvenile is serving a determinate sentence and has not completed the minimum term for his offense. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 245.051(c). If the juvenile court approved release on parole, then the Juvenile Department would transfer the juvenile on his 19th birthday to the Parole Division of the Criminal Department. See id. § 245.151(e).
III. Discussion
In his sole issue, K.J. contends that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the transfer order. Although labeled a jurisdictional attack, K.J.'s contention exclusively relies on Section 54.11's requirement that a transfer or release hearing must be held within 60 days of the Juvenile Department's referral. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(h).
Courts that have addressed a juvenile court's failure to conduct a timely transfer hearing have consistently ruled that such a failure does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to issue a transfer order. See In re B.T., No. 05-10-00977-CV, 2011 WL 2860107, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[A]ppellant presents no authority-and we have found none-supporting the argument that failure to comply with [S]ection 54.11(h) deprives the trial court of jurisdiction."); In re K.H., No. 12-01-00342-CV, 2003 WL 744067, at *2 (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 5, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[E]ven if the court had completely failed to hold the hearing within the time specified, . . . it would not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to order Appellant transferred to [the Criminal Department]."); In re H.V.R., 974 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) ("[A] juvenile court's failure to hold a release hearing before the [deadline] . . . does not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction to order the juvenile transferred to [the Criminal Department] "). Rather, a juvenile court's untimely transfer hearing constitutes error. K.H., 2003 WL 744067, at *2 (holding failure to hold timely transfer hearing "would constitute error"); H.V.R., 974 S.W.2d at 217 (holding "a juvenile court's failure to hold a [timely] release hearing . . . constitutes error but not fundamental error"). K.J. cites no authority to the contrary.
We agree with our sister courts and conclude that an untimely transfer hearing would not have deprived the juvenile court of jurisdiction to transfer K.J. to the Criminal Department.
K.J. contends that, if the juvenile court had jurisdiction, it abused its discretion by issuing the transfer order despite Section 54.11(h)'s "prohibition" on untimely transfer hearings. We review a trial court's decision to transfer a juvenile from the Juvenile Department to the Criminal Department for an abuse of discretion. See In re W.S., No. 02-22-00323-CV, 2023 WL 2325578, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Mar. 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re K.Y., 392 S.W.3d 736, 737 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.); In re J.D.P., 149 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Under this standard, we review the entire record to determine whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules. J.D.P., 149 S.W.3d at 792. "We may not reverse a trial court's decision merely because we disagree with that decision, so long as the trial court acted within its discretionary authority." Id. There is no abuse of discretion when some evidence of substantive and probative character supports the trial court's decision. K.Y., 392 S.W.3d at 737.
The State contends that the transfer hearing was timely because the Juvenile Department's second hearing request restarted the hearing deadline. The State, however, cites no authority for this proposition, see Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(i), 38.2(a)(1), but invites us to draw such an inference from the applicable statutes' silence on this point. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11; Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. §§ 244.014, 245.051. We need not entertain the State's invitation because K.J. has failed to establish that the juvenile court abused its discretion by issuing the transfer order or that he was harmed by the untimely hearing. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1.
K.J. does not assert any issue with the evidence or argument presented at the transfer hearing. Nor does he contend that the juvenile court's transfer order lacked evidentiary support. Indeed, he does not contest the substance of the transfer order at all. See, e.g., W.S., 2023 WL 2325578, at *3-5 (analyzing evidence and argument presented at transfer hearing and substance of juvenile court's ruling). Rather, he asserts only that the juvenile court abused its discretion by issuing the transfer order from an untimely transfer hearing. This argument, however, implicitly assumes what we have already rejected-that the untimely transfer hearing deprived the juvenile court of authority to issue the transfer order. See H.V.R., 974 S.W.2d at 217 (rejecting appellant's harm assertion that was based solely on the juvenile court's untimely transfer hearing). Thus, we reject this argument.
K.J. offers no other argument to demonstrate how he was harmed by the untimely transfer hearing. See In re C.O., No. 02-21-00235-CV, 2021 WL 5933796, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Dec. 16, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 767-68 (Tex. 1999), and acknowledging that the harmless-error analysis applies to a juvenile court's statutory error); In re C.J.M., 167 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied) ("[H]arm in juvenile appeals from determinate sentences should be analyzed under [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure] 44.2."); Tex.R.App.P. 44.2(b) (requiring us to disregard any nonconstitutional error that does not affect appellant's substantial rights). Accordingly, we overrule K.J.'s sole issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled K.J.'s sole issue, we affirm the juvenile court's transfer order.