Opinion
2013-12-18
In the Matter of KENNY I. (Anonymous), appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Diane Pazar of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F.X. Hart and Julie Steiner of counsel; Emily Chen on the brief), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Diane Pazar of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F.X. Hart and Julie Steiner of counsel; Emily Chen on the brief), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Kenny I. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Bogacz, J.), dated February 14, 2013, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated November 29, 2012, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts), adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 18 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated November 29, 2012.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621; Matter of Starsha R., 96 A.D.3d 952, 952, 946 N.Y.S.2d 492; Matter of Ashley P., 74 A.D.3d 1075, 1075–1076, 903 N.Y.S.2d 146; Matter of Eddie J., 68 A.D.3d 870, 870, 889 N.Y.S.2d 485), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts) ( seePenal Law § 130.50[3]; Matter of Travis A., 105 A.D.3d 1041, 1041–1042, 963 N.Y.S.2d 599; Matter of Eli N., 67 A.D.3d 802, 803, 888 N.Y.S.2d 591; Matter of Xavier–Jamaal H., 51 A.D.3d 922, 922, 856 N.Y.S.2d 880; Matter of Oliver C., 48 A.D.3d 682, 682, 850 N.Y.S.2d 920). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685; Matter of Quamel D., 78 A.D.3d 1050, 1051–1052, 911 N.Y.S.2d 471; cf.CPL 470.15[5] ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d at 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685; Matter of Kalexis R., 85 A.D.3d 927, 928–929, 925 N.Y.S.2d 356; Matter of Macye Mc., 82 A.D.3d 892, 894, 918 N.Y.S.2d 542; Matter of Darnell C., 66 A.D.3d 771, 772, 887 N.Y.S.2d 211; cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 342.2[2]; Penal Law § 130.50[3]; Matter of Travis A., 105 A.D.3d at 1042, 963 N.Y.S.2d 599; Matter of Eli N., 67 A.D.3d at 803, 888 N.Y.S.2d 591; Matter of Xavier–Jamaal H., 51 A.D.3d at 922, 856 N.Y.S.2d 880; Matter of Oliver C., 48 A.D.3d at 682, 850 N.Y.S.2d 920; cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).