Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 14-0055
11-04-2014
IN RE KENNETH G.
COUNSEL Coconino County Attorney's Office, Flagstaff By Angela R. Kircher Counsel for Appellee Coconino County Public Defender's Office, Flagstaff By Sandra L. J. Diehl Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300JV201200437
The Honorable Margaret A. McCullough, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Coconino County Attorney's Office, Flagstaff
By Angela R. Kircher
Counsel for Appellee
Coconino County Public Defender's Office, Flagstaff
By Sandra L. J. Diehl
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Maurice Portley joined.
HOWE, Judge:
¶1 Kenneth G. ("Juvenile") appeals the juvenile court's order denying his motion to modify probation and ordering restitution still outstanding. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In February 2012, Juvenile and three codefendants trespassed onto their high school in Cochise County and damaged it by breaking windows and doors. Juvenile subsequently was placed on twelve months of probation after he was adjudicated delinquent for criminal trespass and aggravated criminal damage. As a condition of his probation, Juvenile had to pay $1,268 individually and $1,865 jointly and severally to the school.
¶3 In November 2012, the level of supervision for Juvenile's probation was increased from standard to intensive because he was adjudicated delinquent for another offense. The court ordered twelve months of intensive probation, building on Juvenile's previous probation order, because it found that he was a repeat offender. Juvenile's probation would end on November 14, 2013. He subsequently moved to Coconino County, and his probation was transferred there.
¶4 On November 8, 2013, Juvenile notified the juvenile court and the State that he intended to seek a modification of his restitution by moving to terminate his probation. He had paid a portion of the joint and several restitution, and the school said it would "accept what he has paid towards the restitution as payment in full for his complete restitution." Juvenile did not file the motion to terminate probation until November 20, 2013. Because the case originated in Cochise County, the juvenile court asked counsels to contact their counterparts in that county while it contacted its counterpart to better understand the basis of Juvenile's restitution order so that the court could rule on the motion.
¶5 On January 21, 2014, the juvenile court stated that to modify Juvenile's restitution, the proper procedure would be for him to move for modification of probation. That same day, Juvenile moved to modify his probation, requesting that the remaining $1,430 of joint and several restitution be modified to $540 as his portion severally, thereby relieving him from the full amount. The State objected to both motions.
¶6 On February 14, 2014, the juvenile court refused to modify Juvenile's probation because his probation had already terminated on November 14, 2013. The court found restitution was still outstanding and
ordered a hearing to enter a civil judgment against Juvenile for the remaining amount. Juvenile turned eighteen on February 26, 2014. He timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Juvenile argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to modify probation. He contends that pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 31(C), the juvenile court could modify any condition imposed by a probation officer after notice had been provided to the prosecutor and the juvenile. The court could thus modify restitution as a condition of probation.
¶8 The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine proper disposition of a delinquent juvenile. In re Thomas D., 231 Ariz. 29, 31 ¶ 9, 290 P.3d 223, 225 (App. 2012). This discretion extends to revoking, modifying, or terminating the juvenile's probation. Id. A court's disposition will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Miguel R., 204 Ariz. 328, 331 ¶ 3, 63 P.3d 1065, 1068 (App. 2003).
¶9 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Juvenile's motion to modify probation. Under Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 31(A), a court may place a juvenile on probation at the time of disposition and include conditions of probation that will promote rehabilitation and public safety. After its disposition, the court retains limited jurisdiction to implement the orders made until the juvenile turns eighteen or until a court order terminates jurisdiction before such time. A.R.S. §§ 8-202(G), -246(A); see also Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 31(D). An order placing a juvenile on probation for a definite period of time effectively is an order that terminates the court's jurisdiction after that period ends, absent a valid modification of the order or the revocation of probation pursuant to applicable procedural rules. See Andrew G. v. Peasley-Fimbres, 216 Ariz. 204, 206 ¶ 8, 165 P.3d 182, 184 (App. 2007).
¶10 Here, the court ordered Juvenile to serve twelve months of intensive probation in November 2012. It never modified this order, and thus, the court effectively lost jurisdiction over Juvenile when his probation ended twelve months later on November 14, 2013. Although Juvenile notified the court and the State on November 8, he did not move to terminate his probation until November 20 or modify it until January 21 of the following year—after the court no longer had jurisdiction over him. Consequently, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Juvenile's motion to modify probation.
¶11 Juvenile further argues that the juvenile court "abused its discretion when it ordered restitution remained outstanding." But the juvenile court did not order restitution remain outstanding. Instead, it found that restitution remained outstanding and ordered "a hearing pursuant to [A.R.S. § 8-344] regarding a judgment for outstanding restitution after the minor attains the age of 18." Juvenile turned eighteen on February 26, twelve days after the court issued its order. Under A.R.S. § 8-344(D), (F), the juvenile court was perfectly within its authority to order a hearing for the purpose of entering a civil judgment against Juvenile for restitution and for enforcement after Juvenile turned eighteen. Consequently, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a hearing to enter a civil judgment against Juvenile for the remaining restitution amount.
CONCLUSION
¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.