Opinion
H12CP15015941A
06-16-2017
In re Kayson L.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS
Mary-Margaret D. Burgdorff, J.
In accordance with General Statutes § 46b-124 and Practice Book § 32a-7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.
Before this court is the termination of parental rights petition filed by the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) in the interest of Kayson L. (birth date: November 25, 2014). The Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) petition was filed on December 30, 2016. The respondents are Samantha M. (Mother) and Richard L. (Father). The respondent parents were properly served. Mother and Father appeared, were advised and appointed counsel. The child was appointed an attorney. The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child. This matter was tried to the court on May 10, 2017. Mother and Father failed to appear for trial. Mother's and Father's counsel appeared for trial. The child's attorney was present for trial. Twenty-one exhibits were entered into evidence as full exhibits. These included the social study and addendum in support of the TPR petition, the social study in support of the permanency plan, the social worker affidavit, Mother's specific steps, Father's specific steps, and psychological evaluation report. One witness, the DCF social worker, testified.
A motion for judicial notice was filed by DCF on April 10, 2017, and was granted by agreement. The court, therefore, takes judicial notice of the following:
(1) Filing of ex parte motion for order of temporary custody on March 20, 2015, granted ex parte by the Court (Burgdorff, J.) in the interest of Kayson L., accompanied by affidavits of Dr. Norell Atkinson, M.D. of the Connecticut Children's Medical Center, and DCF social worker Annette R. Charles; (2) Findings of the Court (Burgdorff, J.) on March 20, 2015, in the interest of Kayson L., finding that the child was in immediate physical danger from his surroundings; that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of said child; that temporary care and custody of said child be vested in DCF; and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child were made by the State; (3) Filing of the neglect petition on March 20, 2015, in the interest of Kayson L. alleging the minor child is neglected in that he is being permitted to live under conditions injurious to his well-being and that the minor child is abused in that he has physical injury or injuries inflicted by other than accidental means and that he has injuries that are at variance with the history given of them. (4) Preliminary hearing held on March 27, 2015, whereby the Court (Dannehy, J.) sustained the order of temporary custody; advised the respondent parents of their rights and reviewed, approved and ordered preliminary specific steps for the respondent parents; (5) Hearing held on July 2, 2015, whereby the court (Gilligan, J.) defaulted Father for his failure to appear; adjudicated the minor child neglected; committed the minor child to the care and custody of DCF; found the commitment was in the best interest of the minor child; and reviewed approved and ordered final specific steps for the respondent parents; (6) Hearing held on January 26, 2016, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption; found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child; and found that DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plan; (7) Hearing held on December 6, 2016, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption; found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child; and found that DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plan; (8) Hearing held on January 26, 2017, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) confirmed the service of the TPR as to the respondent parents; advised the respondent parents as to their rights; and whereby the respondent parents entered pro forma denials as to the allegations in the TPR petition.
The court also takes judicial notice of the entire record of the prior nondelinquency proceedings including pleadings, petitions, social studies, status reports, evaluations, court memoranda and specific steps as well as the dates and contents of the court's findings, orders, rulings and judgments.
A court may take judicial notice of the court's records for their existence, content and legal effect. In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 452-53, 755 A.2d 243 (2000); State v. Gaines, 257 Conn. 695, 705 n.7, 778 A.2d 919 (2001). Connecticut Code of Evidence § 2-1, In re Natalie J., 148 Conn.App. 193, 207, 83 A.3d 1278 (2014).
All counsel had the opportunity to participate in the examination of the witness.
The statutory grounds stated in the petition against Mother and Father allege that Kayson was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and that Mother and Father failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, considering the ages and needs of the child, they would assume a responsible position in the life of their child. A motion for technical correction was filed by DCF on February 16, 2017, and was granted by the court. The petition also alleges that reasonable efforts were made to locate Mother and Father, that reasonable efforts were made to reunify Kayson with Mother and Father or Mother and Father are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. It further alleges that reasonable efforts are not required for the Mother and Father because the court has approved a permanency plan other than reunification in accordance with General Statutes Section 17a-111b.
The court has carefully considered the TPR petition, the criteria set forth in the relevant General Statutes, the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence and testimony presented, the demeanor and credibility of the witness, the evaluation of his testimony with the documentary evidence, according to the standards required by law. The court makes its findings by clear and convincing evidence.
A
Mother
Mother was born on April 10, 1992. Mother was born in Puerto Rico and came to the United States with her father. She graduated from high school and attended community college for several months. She attended JobCorp and successfully finished training to be a certified nursing assistant. She reports working part time as receptionist in a nursing home. Mother moved to Hartford in 2014 and resided with maternal uncle. She gave birth to Kayson on November 25, 2014. Mother was assisted in caring from Kayson by maternal great grandmother. She received financial help from Father through January 2015. Mother's relationship with Father ended in the Fall, 2015. She then commenced a relationship with Mario W. in July 2015.
Mother's involvement with DCF commenced in March 2015, when Kayson presented to St. Francis Hospital on March 17, 2015, with Mother reporting he fell off of the sofa. Kayson was transferred to Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC) for further evaluation. A skeletal survey revealed with six metaphyseal fractures including both ulnar bones, both femurs and both tibial bones. Mother reported that paternal grandmother performed a Jamaican cultural practice of " baby-stretching" while Kayson was in the bathtub as the cause of the injuries. The SCAN Program determined that the injuries were highly suspicious for inflicted injury or abuse.
Mother's presenting problems were mental health, substance abuse and lack of parenting skills. Mother was offered services with Voices and Intercommunuty Recovery Center (ICRC) for mental health and substance abuse services and treatment and Hartford Behavioral Health for mental health services. She was diagnosed with mild major depressive disorder and mild cannabis use. She engaged in her treatment and developed coping skills to address her depressed symptoms and substance abuse. She was successfully discharged from ICRC. She participated in a psychiatric evaluation at Intercommunity Recovery Center, Triple P Parenting education program, Intensive Family Preservation Therapeutic Family Time for supervised visitation and coaching, Reunification Readiness Assessment and Reunification Services.
Mother made significant progress in completing her court-ordered specific steps. She successfully completed her mental health and substance abuse treatment. She successfully reunified with Kayson in February 2016. She was actively engaged with Kayson's medical, emotional, and physical needs at that time. DCF enrolled Kayson in daycare at YWCA Growing Tree Daycare and Mother agreed to bring him to daycare every day. In March 2016, Mother expressed that establishing a routine was difficult for her and that she struggled with getting Kayson to daycare on time. Mother noted that she was not a " morning person." Kayson was not at daycare from March 1, 2016, through March 9, 2016. Mother missed an orientation at the program on March 8, 2016. Mother reported that she had been staying with Mario W. at this time and that Kayson stayed there as well and shared a play pen with Mario W.'s infant child. Mother signed a safety agreement wherein she agreed not to let Kayson sleep at Mario W.'s home until it could be assessed and agreed to enroll him in the day care program. Mario W.'s mother refused to allow DCF into the home. Mother continued her relationship with Mario W. and continued to visit his home. As of June 2016, Kayson was attending daycare approximately one-third of the month. Mother consistently left Kayson at Mario W.'s home and stated that it was inconvenient for her to drop him off at daycare. Mother failed to attend a scheduled meeting with Intensive Family Preservation (IFP) on July 7, 2016. Mother later confirmed that Mario W. was watching Kayson at his home which continued to be unassessed by DCF and was in violation of her safety agreement with DCF. Kayson was removed from Mother's care on July 14, 2016. She was discharged from the IFP program due to her failure to consistently engage and after Kayson's second removal from her care. Mother consistently failed to maintain good communication with DCF.
Mother was then referred to Hartford Behavioral Health (HBH) in August 2016 for therapeutic support due to Kayson's removal after reunification with her. She attended the intake appointment in September 2016, and tested negative for substances. She reported experiencing depression and anxiety symptoms. She was treated for anxiety disorder with mixed anxiety and depression. She was referred for biweekly outpatient psychotherapy. Mother denied needing therapy. DCF recommended Mother engage in My People Clinical Services to address her inability to protect Kayson, her inability to choose appropriate caregivers, and her inability to make sound judgments relating to Kayson's care. Despite Mother's significant progress with parenting services, she continued to exercise poor judgment in choosing poor caretakers for Kayson.
Since his second removal from Mother, Kayson and Mother have enjoyed supervised visits together. They have a clear bond with one another.
B
Father
Father was born on March 25, 1985. Father completed high school and attended job training in the electrical field which he did not finish. He is currently employed in retail, stocking merchandise. He receives $94.00 in food stamps monthly. Father reports no history of substance abuse or mental illness. He has no criminal history. He presently resides in New York. Father's relationship with Mother ended in 2015.
Father has inconsistently visited with Kayson. He attended several supervised visits in July 2015, September 2015, and October 2015. He failed to attend a visit in July 2015, although he was provided a bus ticket. His interactions with Kayson during the visits were appropriate. He had no visitations with Kayson in 2016. Father contacted DCF in January 2017, to discuss case planning and requested immediate visitation with Kayson. Father attended a supervised visit with Kayson on January 9, 2017, and he acted appropriately with Kayson during the visit.
Father was offered a mental health and substance abuse evaluation at Wheeler Clinic, parenting classes in New York, case management, supervised visitation with Kayson, and bus passes.
Father has made minimal progress with his court-ordered specific steps. He did not attend parenting classes scheduled in New York in April 2015. He attended an intake evaluation in April 2015, and attended a parenting class but he has not attended since that time. The parenting service attempted to accommodate father's work schedule as long as he was consistent in his attendance. Father reported that he was unable to attend due to his work schedule. He has been inconsistent in his visitation with Kayson. Father did visit with Kayson on two occasions after he was returned to Mother's care in February 2017. He failed to participate in an administrative case review in November 2015 and May 2016. Father was referred for a mental health and substance abuse assessment at Wheeler Clinic as well as case management services. He has failed to maintain consistent contact with DCF. He has failed to be involved with Kayson's care. He has not been actively involved in planning for Kayson's physical, educational, or medical needs.
C
Kayson
Kayson was born on November 25, 2014, and is presently two years of age. As noted above, Kayson was first removed from his mother's care in March 2015. Initially after his removal, he displayed aggressive behavior. He exhibited tantrums, physical aggression, sadness and inability to follow rules at times. He has shown improvement in his behavior. He does well at daycare and plays well with others. Daycare provides him with a structured environment and an educationally based program that allows him to improve his development and interact appropriately with other children. Kayson was referred to Early Childhood Consultation Program (ECCP) through the Village for Children and Families in November 2016, to address his behavioral and emotional concerns. Kayson has no health concerns other than mild persistent asthma. He is developmentally on track and has improved verbal, motor and coping skills. Kayson is thriving in his foster home where all of his needs are being met. He has security and routine in his foster home. Kayson enjoys his visits with Mother and Father as well as his great aunt who seeks to be a permanent resource for him. During Kayson's prior removal, he had consistent visitations with his great aunt and her children from May 2015 to December 2015. After Kayson's second removal in July 2016, he resumed visitation with his great aunt and they continue to visit biweekly.
II
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The court must first determine whether DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of Mother and Father should be terminated. " A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 627, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012); In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 206, 903 A.2d 246 (2006).
A
Adjudication
Section 17a-112(j), adjudication involves finding by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent and that one of the statutory grounds for the termination of parental rights exists.
1
Reasonable Efforts
Section 17a-112(j) provides in relevant part: " The Superior Court . . . may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] . . . if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." (Emphasis added.) " [T]he department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate . . ." In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn.App. 177, 104 A.3d 805 (2014). " Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584, 102 A.3d 141 (2014) citing In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011); see also In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 837, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). " [I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of the events preceding the date on which the termination was filed . . . [T]he court, when making its reasonable efforts determination . . . is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., id., citing In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 870-71, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 466 (2014). See also Practice Book § 35a-7. In the present case, the petitions for termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights were filed on December 30, 2015.
" [Section 17a-112] imposes on the department the duty . . . to make reasonable efforts to unite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act by which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts mean doing everything reasonable, not everything possible . . ." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 847 A.2d 883 (2004); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999). " [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872-73, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 466 (2014). See also In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 641, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). " The department has a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts." Id., 644. But " [t]he department is required only to make `reasonable efforts.' It is axiomatic that this does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). In addition, " making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The court may also determine that the respondent parents were either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. See In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).
DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate Mother and Father as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). The evidence clearly established that Father and Mother were properly served with the TPR petition and were provided notice of the TPR trial.
DCF has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Kayson with Mother and Father. Mother was offered numerous services to aid in attaining reunification with Kayson including substance abuse evaluation, mental health services and treatment including individual therapy and medication management, parent education and mentoring services, case management, supervised visitation, and bus passes. Father was offered a multitude of services including substance abuse and mental health services, parenting services, case management, supervised visitation and bus passes. Both Mother and Father have failed to successfully complete these services and change their circumstances, and both have failed to attain a level of stability to permit Kayson to be safely placed in either's care. They have both utterly failed to gain the necessary insight needed to care for Kayson. They have been unable to put Kayson's needs and safety ahead of their own and have been unable to do so for the majority of his young life.
Accordingly, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Mother and Father, and to reunify them with Kayson and, further, that they are unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.
2
Failure to Rehabilitate
In the adjudicatory phase, the court must next determine whether DCF has proved the statutory ground for termination of parental rights--failure to rehabilitate. " Failure of parent to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of six statutory grounds on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17a-112 [See General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).] " The . . . [grounds] alleged in this petition [are] that . . . mother and father failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I) which allows for termination if a child has found to be neglected, and the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. In re Leilah W., 166 Conn.App. 48, 141 A.3d 1000 (2016), citing In re G.Q., 158 Conn.App. 24, 25, 118 A.3d 164, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 918, 118 A.3d 61 (2015).
" Personal rehabilitation . . . refers to the restoration of the parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parents'] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . The statute does not require [the parent] to prove precisely when they will be able to assume a responsible position in [their child's] life. Nor does it require [them] to prove that [they] will be able to assume full responsibility for [their child], unaided by available support systems." In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 585, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015). " It requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the level of rehabilitation [they have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their child's] life." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004); In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 94, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009); In re Halle T., 96 Conn.App. 815, 835, 902 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006). " The critical issue is not whether the [parents have] improved [their] ability to manage [their own lives], but rather whether [they have] gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." Id. at 835. The ultimate question is whether the parents at the time of the filing of the termination petition are more able to resume the responsibilities of a parent than he or she was at the time of the making of the commitment. In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). In making this determination, the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time. In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002). See also In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 858-59, 949 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 150 (2008).
" A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court's factual findings and from its weighing the facts in assessing whether these facts satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)." In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 587-88. " Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying the child a safe and permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the biological parent] . . . continues to be incapable of providing such a home for the child. In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to mother and father.
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial as discussed in detail above prove clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute that Kayson was found to have been neglected on July 2, 2015. Mother and father were provided with court-ordered specific steps to facilitate the return of Kayson to their care. As discussed in detail above, DCF assisted Mother and Father by referring them to appropriate services. Mother did sufficiently comply with her specific steps and reunification with Kayson occurred in February 2016. However, as noted above, Kayson was removed from Mother's care a second time on July 14, 2016, due to Mother's lack of insight into providing safe care for Kayson by failing to transport him to his daycare facility. Specifically, she failed to understand how her decisions to place Kayson in Mario W.'s unassessed home placed him in danger especially in light of Kayson's unexplained fractures and his need to be visible to the community. Mother put her comfort and convenience ahead of Kayson's needs. As discussed above, Father has been inconsistent at best in complying with his specific steps. He has failed to consistently engage with his parenting education and has failed to consistently engage in visitation with Kayson. Mother's and Father's minimal compliance with their respective specific steps was not sufficient to achieve sufficient rehabilitation. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001); In re Coby C., 107 Conn.App. 395, 406, 945 A.2d 529 (2008). Further, there is clear and convincing evidence that when the TPR petition was filed on December 30, 2016, Mother and Father had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and needs of their child, they could assume a responsible position in his life. Mother and Father have failed to gain the insight and ability to care for Kayson given his age and needs within a reasonable time. See In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).
With regard to personal rehabilitation, as noted in detail above, Mother initially made substantial progress with her services which led to her reunification with Kayson. However, she exercised poor judgment in choosing appropriate caretakers for Kayson by leaving him with Mario W.'s family which has a significant history with DCF, and who refused to allow DCF to assess their home, all of which placed Kayson's safety at risk.
Despite DCF's reasonable efforts, both Mother and Father are unable to parent Kayson and serve as his caretaker. They are both unable to meet the developmental, emotional, educational, medical and moral needs of Kayson. They cannot provide for the shelter, nurturance, safety and security of the child. See In re Paul M., Jr., 154 Conn.App. 488, 107 A.3d 552 (2014). Neither Mother or Father has the stability in their own lives to enable them to care for Kayson. Neither parent has made significant progress towards personal rehabilitation and clearly cannot assume a responsible position in Kayson's life considering his age and needs. Despite Mother's participation in parenting programs, she has clearly not benefitted from those services as she has placed Kayson's safety in question by making poor choices with regard to his care. Father has failed to sufficiently engage in his services. While Mother and Father clearly love Kayson, their attempts to reunify with him have failed. " [M]otivation to parent is not enough; ability is required." In re Paul M, Jr., Id., citing In re G.S., 117 Conn.App. 710, 718, 980 A.2d 935, cert. denied., 294 Conn. 919, 984 A.2d 67 (2009). " The fact that the respondent may love the child does not in itself show rehabilitation." Id., citing In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667, 769 A.2d 718 (" [a] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough"), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).
The legal obligation of a parent necessarily encompasses that fundamental right of a child to be safe-physically, psychologically and emotionally. General Statutes § § 46b-120(8) and (9) and 17a-112(j). See also In re Nelmarie O., 97 Conn.App. 624, 629, 905 A.2d 706 (2006) (trial court properly found that the respondent had failed to provide for the emotional well-being of her child). Our laws recognize that a child is legally entitled to some minimum standard of safety which should include a parent's desire to protect and keep his child safe in all ways including physically and emotionally.
In light of the above, the court finds that DCF has met its burden of proof that Mother and Father have failed to rehabilitate in that, given the age and needs of Kayson, they cannot assume a responsible position in his life within a reasonable period of time. Both Mother and Father continue to fail to demonstrate the ability to rehabilitate despite being offered ongoing services.
Of paramount consideration to the court is the issue of stability and permanency for Kayson. See In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666-67, 6 A.3d 86 (2010). Kayson's need for permanence far outweighs any remote chance that Mother and Father may rehabilitate in the far distant future. Both Mother and Father have, either because of lack of ability or lack of desire, failed to successfully accomplish what was needed to consider reunification as an appropriate conclusion. Kayson cannot afford to wait for his parents to rehabilitate. DCF has presented compelling evidence that he needs permanency and stability now. He has the same needs of all children for permanency and stability in his life.
Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that as of the end of the trial of this matter, Mother and Father have not sufficiently rehabilitated themselves to the extent they could assume a responsible position in Kayson's life in view of his age and needs or within a reasonable period of time.
B
DISPOSITION
For all of the above reasons, the court, having found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of the Mother's and Father's parental rights have been proven, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(k). In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). " In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the interest of the child . . . [T]he trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the [child]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 97-98, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009). " The best interests of the [child] includes the [child's] interest in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability in his environment . . . In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 794-5, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008).
1
Findings Under § 17a-112(k)
The seven statutory findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent
As discussed above, DCF offered timely and appropriate services to Mother and Father all in an effort to facilitate reunion with Kayson. Mother was offered case management services, mental health services and substance abuse assessment and treatment, psychiatric evaluation, intensive family preservation services, parenting services, supervised visitation and parent coaching, reunification services, intensive family preservation, and bus passes. Father was offered case management services, substance abuse evaluation and services, mental health evaluation services, parenting services, supervised visitation and bus passes. All of the recommended services were appropriate and offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended
As discussed in detail above, reasonable efforts to reunify Kayson with his mother and father were made by DCF pursuant to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended. The services offered were appropriate and offered on a consistent and timely basis. Mother and Father failed to benefit from the services offered and provided. They failed to adjust their circumstance, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of Kayson to return to the care of Mother or Father. They have each failed to demonstrate their ability to appropriately parent Kayson. DCF has clearly made reasonable efforts toward family reunification.
3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order
Mother has not successfully fulfilled her obligations pursuant to the specific steps ordered by the court with regard to Kayson's safety. She has not sufficiently benefitted from the services she did engage in and clearly has not made sufficient progress in addressing her child protection concerns. As discussed in detail above, Father has not successfully complied with his court-ordered specific steps to successfully address his child protection concerns.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional tics
Kayson recognizes Mother and Father and engages with them during his visits with them. Mother's and Father's interaction with him is appropriate. He has a loving bond with them. Kayson has developed a significant emotional bond and loving bond with his current foster mother and with whom he is extremely attached. Foster mother has presented herself as an adoptive resource for Kayson. Kayson seeks comfort and solace from her.
5. The age of the child
Kayson was born on November 25, 2014. He is two years old.
6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child
Neither Mother nor Father have made sufficient efforts or adjustment to their individual circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Kayson to return to their care in the foreseeable future. While Mother has regularly maintained contact with Kayson during her supervised visitation with him, and has a loving bond with him, she has failed to adequately address her issues in order to demonstrate the ability to protect and care for Kayson. Mother has failed to successfully address her parenting needs and has not fully rehabilitated in the time that Kayson has been removed from her care. Father has failed to address his parenting needs, and has not fully rehabilitated himself in the time that Kayson has been removed from his care. He has been inconsistent at best in visiting with Kayson. As such, Mother and Father have not adjusted to their circumstances. Kayson has a strong bond with his foster parents as well as his great aunt.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.
There is no credible evidence that Mother or Father have been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Kayson. No unreasonable act or conduct of any person including Mother and Father have prevented either of them from a meaningful relationship with Kayson. Their economic circumstances have not prevented them from having a relationship or visits with Kayson. Mother and Father were offered and provided programs and services at no cost to them to assist them with their issues. There has been no claim that Mother or Father were unable to obtain services due to lack of financial resources. Legal counsel was appointed for each of them at no cost to them.
2
Best Interests of the Child
Once the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court must find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998). " [T]he determination of the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights has been established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009). The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare. In determining whether terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights would be in the best interest of Kayson, the court has considered various factors, including his interest in sustained growth, developed well-being, and in the continuity and stability of his environment; Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15, 23 A.3d 18 (2011); the ages and needs of the child; the length and nature of his stage of foster care; the contact and lack thereof that the child has with his Mother and Father; the potential benefit or detriment of retaining a connection with his biological Mother and Father; his genetic bond with his birth parents; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999); and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon. The court has also balanced Kayson's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefits of maintaining a connection with his biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).
The court finds that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights is in the best interest of Kayson. The convincing and clear evidence has established that Mother and Father are in no better position today to provide. for him than they were at the time of his removal. The problems that led to the removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are bleak. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of the witness as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at the time of trial. The evidence clearly and convincingly reveals that Mother is not willing or able to provide Kayson with a safe and DCF-assessed caregiver. She has failed to understand the danger posed to Kayson in placing him in an unassessed environment especially in light of Kayson's history of unexplained fracture. Father has not made sufficient progress to the extent he can play a responsible role in Kayson's life. Neither Mother nor Father have been able to put Kayson's needs and interests ahead of their own.
Kayson desperately needs the permanency and stability that he now has in his foster home. Termination of parental rights will bring that much needed stability and permanency to him and the opportunity to have a healthy and emotionally stable life. Kayson's needs are those of all children. He has an interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and a continuous, stable environment. Accordingly, based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented, it is in Kayson's best interest to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence, and after due consideration of the child's need for a secure, permanent placement, it is accordingly ordered:
That the parental rights of the respondent Mother, Samantha M., and respondent Father, Richard L., are terminated;
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of Kayson for the purpose of securing his adoption as expeditiously as possible, with first consideration to be given to the current foster parent of Kayson;
That a written report of the plan for the child shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.