Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWJ009263 Michael J. Rushton, Judge.
Peter Amschel for Defendants and Appellants.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
King J.
I. INTRODUCTION
J.A. (Mother) and R.A (Father) (collectively, the parents) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights concerning their daughter, K.A., pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. They also purport to appeal from prior orders in this juvenile dependency case. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the parents have waived any arguments pertaining to orders for which the time for filing an appeal has expired. We reject the remaining arguments on their merits and affirm the court’s order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2009, mother gave birth to K.A. at her home. According to social workers with plaintiff and respondent, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), the baby was delivered at home because of mother’s ongoing drug addiction and to avoid involvement with child protective services. Mother also failed to “seek appropriate care for the child after giving birth.” Social workers also reported that father uses drugs, including heroin and methamphetamine.
On May 5, 2009, when K.A. was approximately two weeks old, a DPSS social worker and a Riverside County deputy sheriff went to the parents’ home. The social worker told the parents she was there to talk to them about an immediate response referral DPSS had received and to check on the welfare of the baby. They told the social worker they had decided to deliver their child by themselves at home, and felt confident they could do so. The social worker learned that the parents were arrested in January 2009 for possession of a controlled substance and stolen property. They had pled guilty to the possession of a controlled substance charge and were placed on probation.
When the social worker asked father about medication he was taking, father produced medicine from a bag for the baby. He had bottles for various prescription medication. In addition, the sheriff’s deputy found pills wrapped in cellophane. Father said he found the pills in the car, did not know whose they were, and was “just ‘holding them.’” The deputy arrested father for possession of narcotics.
Mother agreed to submit to a drug test and told the social worker she would test positive for marijuana, methadone, and methamphetamine. She said she was using these to control her anxiety and mental health problems.
K.A. had a very severe diaper rash due to being in a dirty diaper too long and not being changed often enough.
The social worker took K.A. into protective custody.
Two days later, DPSS filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), concerning K.A. As subsequently amended, DPSS alleged that K.A. has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that she will suffer, serious physical harm or illness: as a result of the failure or inability of the parents to supervise or protect the child; by the willful or negligent failure of the parents to provide K.A. with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment; and by the inability of the parents to provide regular care for K.A. due to the parents’ mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. In particular, DPSS alleged in part: Mother neglected K.A. by failing to provide essential medical care at the time of and after her birth; Mother abused controlled substances, including methadone, methamphetamine, and marijuana; Mother has a criminal history for possession of controlled substances; Father should have known Mother was abusing controlled substances; Father encouraged Mother to deliver the child at home without the assistance of health care professionals and failed to seek follow-up medical care for the child; Father abuses controlled substances; and Father has a criminal history that includes drug-related charges.
Prior to the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, K.A.’s paternal grandfather, Peter A., substituted in as counsel for the parents and filed a motion in limine for an order, among others, to exclude evidence obtained during and following the entry and search of their home at the time K.A. was taken into protective custody. The parents also sought to have California’s juvenile dependency laws declared unconstitutional because the laws prefer one race (Native Americans) over other races (the parents are of German ancestry) and an unspecified religion over other religions. They also demanded a jury trial. The court denied the motions and rejected the parents’ demand for a jury trial.
Following a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the court found the allegations of the amended petition true and adjudged K.A. a dependent of the court. K.A. was removed from the parents’ custody and placed in foster care. The court ordered DPSS to provide reunification services and the parents to participate in their case plan. The court further ordered the parents to undergo drug testing and psychological evaluation. Visitation was to take place twice each week.
With the parents’ consent, Peter A. moved to withdraw as counsel for the parents. The child’s counsel and DPSS’s counsel inquired as to whether Peter A. would advise the parents of their appellate rights. Peter A. responded, “I can advise [them of] that, Your Honor. Sixty days from today.” The court then relieved Peter A. as counsel and appointed new attorneys for the parents.
The parents did not file a timely appeal from the dispositional order.
Following the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the parents did not make a meaningful effort to comply with their case plans or to reunify with K.A. Mother did not communicate with social workers, did not comply with a random drug testing requirement, and rarely visited K.A. Father, incarcerated during part of the reunification period, was even less involved.
At the six-month hearing, DPSS requested that services be terminated for both parents and the court set a hearing to be held pursuant to section 366.26. The parents were not present and their counsel did not object. The court then terminated services and set the requested hearing.
The section 366.26 hearing took place on July 27, 2010. Peter A. appeared and presented two documents. The documents stated that Peter A. was filing them as the attorney for the parents. However, because Peter A. was not the parents’ counsel of record at the time, the court allowed him to file them solely in his capacity as K.A.’s grandfather. One of the documents was titled, “Motion to Disqualify Juvenile Court Judge, County Counsel and DPSS for Impermissible Financial Interest in Case Outcome and to Dismiss This Case and Return Forthwith the Infant Child Herein to her Parents” (motion to disqualify). In this motion, Peter A. asserted that financial incentives from the federal government to DPSS and the court for terminating parental rights and adoption creates a conflict of interest and a constitutionally impermissible level of bias on the part of DPSS and the court. The court denied the motion, explaining that it was both procedurally defective and without merit.
The second document was an “Affidavit Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 388.” The purpose of the affidavit was to obtain an order that K.A. be returned to the parents or, if not to the parents, to him (as the child’s grandfather). If the court did not order the return of K.A. to the parents or to him, he requested the court to order DPSS to produce evidence on various subject matters, including (1) what DPSS did to seek out family members for placement, (2) what DPSS relied on to rule out placement with Peter A.; (3) evidence pertaining to the prospective adoptive parents; (4) records of “incentive payments” by the federal government and an accounting of all payments received by the county “relating to activities of the county in seizing children, terminating the rights of the parent and child and adopting the child out to strangers”; and (5) statistics as to children “who have actually been released back to their parents during the past five years either at a detention hearing or a jurisdictional hearing....” The court treated the affidavit as a request for change order pursuant to section 388, commonly referred to as a section 388 petition, and denied the request without a hearing.
The court then proceeded with the section 366.26 hearing. The section 366.26 report was admitted into evidence without objection. The parents offered no affirmative evidence. The court terminated the parents’ parental rights, determined that K.A. was likely to be adopted, and directed DPSS to refer the child for adoptive placement.
On September 16, 2010, the parents, once again represented by Peter A., filed a notice of appeal. The notice states: “Parents herein hereby appeal the final judgment herein of 8/2/2010 which judgment purports to terminate the natural law familial bonds of the parents to their child and which purports to terminate the natural law familial bond of the minor infant herein to her parents. Parents hereby also appeal each and every judgment or order entered herein by the trial court insofar as any such interim or interlocutory prior order contributed in any respect to the said final order entered herein on 8/2/2010.” (Capitalization omitted.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Waiver of Challenge to Jurisdictional and Dispositional Orders
In the parents’ first argument, they appear to challenge the initial detention of K.A. and the trial court’s dependency jurisdiction over the child. The parents contend that dependency jurisdiction cannot exist when there is no evidence of injury to the child, and DPSS “cannot legally take a child who is healthy and content and well cared for as in the instant case....” They do not provide any citation to authority for their argument. Indeed, they acknowledge that courts have held that a juvenile may be declared a dependent even in the absence of injury to the child. (See, e.g., In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136 [child “need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate”], disapproved on another point in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
The parents’ argumentative heading states: “Is it a miscarriage of justice for the court to terminate parental rights in a case where the newborn child had lived contentedly with her parents for two weeks and was in perfect health with no injuries at the time she was taken?” (Capitalization omitted.) Although this heading refers to the termination of parental rights, the argument is focused on the findings made at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.
We need not consider the merits of the parents’ argument because they have waived it by failing to appeal from the dispositional order. As this court explained in In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], the jurisdictional order is interlocutory and not appealable. (Id. at p. 624.) The first appealable order in a dependency proceeding is the dispositional order. (Ibid.) Challenges to the jurisdictional order must therefore be asserted in an appeal from the dispositional order. (Ibid.) An appeal from the dispositional order must be filed within 60 days of that order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).) Peter A., parents’ counsel at the time, acknowledged his understanding of this at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing.
All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
An unappealed dispositional order “is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.) “In other words, ‘A challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.’ [Citation.] The rule serves vital policy considerations of promoting finality and reasonable expedition, in a carefully balanced legislative scheme, and preventing late-stage ‘sabotage of the process’ through a parent’s attacks on earlier orders. [Citation.]” (In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.)
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders in this case were made on August 26, 2009. The time to appeal from those orders expired 60 days later, on October 25, 2009. (See rule 8.406(a)(1).) The parents filed their notice of appeal more than 10 months later, on September 16, 2010. Their challenges to the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders have therefore been waived. (See In re Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.) As noted below, these waiver principles also apply to most of the parents’ other arguments as well.
Courts have relaxed the waiver rule when, for example, there is “some defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208.) An argument may also fall outside the waiver rule if it goes “beyond mere errors that might have been held reversible had they been properly and timely reviewed.” (Id. at p. 209.) The parents’ challenge to the court’s jurisdictional findings do not fall within either of these exceptions.
B. Right to Jury Trial
The parents contend the court’s denial of their request for a jury at the jurisdictional hearing was error.
Initially, we note that the argument was asserted below in connection with the jurisdictional hearing and the trial court rejected it at that time. The parents did not thereafter reassert the argument as to any subsequent hearing. For the reasons set forth in part A. above, the parents have waived the right to appeal from the court’s ruling.
Even if the argument was preserved for appeal, it is without merit. As our state Supreme Court has stated: “A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to trial by jury (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.), but in a dependency proceeding the juvenile court makes all factual and legal determinations.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915.)
The parents’ reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 is misplaced. The Apprendi court held that: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490.) Apprendi was concerned with the right to jury trial in criminal prosecutions. It has no application to juvenile dependency proceedings. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings, despite the similarities between delinquency proceedings and criminal prosecutions. (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 545, 551; see also Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 984, 997 [same].) There is no basis for finding a constitutional jury trial right in dependency proceedings, which “are civil in nature, designed not to prosecute a parent, but to protect the child.” (In re Mary S. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 414, 418.) Accordingly, we reject the parents’ argument.
The parents also rely on In re J.L. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1394, review granted March 2, 2011, S189721. That case, however, is now on review before the Supreme Court and may not be cited or relied upon. (Rules 8.1105(e)(1), 8.1115(a).)
C. Motion for Sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7
The parents argue that the court erred by failing to “make inquiry” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The argument is without merit.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was set for July 29, 2009. On that date, the parents filed a document titled, “Points and authorities in support of motion to return infant and suppress evidence and for other terminating sanctions on petitioner.” (Capitalization omitted.) This document was filed concurrently with declarations by each of the parents “in support of motion pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5[, subdivision] (a)(1) and for other sanctions.” After describing facts that suggest DPSS committed an unlawful search and seizure of their home when K.A. was taken into protective custody, the parents stated: “In addition to the violation of the rights of the parents by Riverside County employees entering the home of their father and seizing their baby, the parent declarations allege additional shocking and sanctionable conduct including removal of exculpatory evidence and other serious allegations. A sanctions process in which the County employees can be given an opportunity to present their own proof as specified in [Code of Civil Procedure section] 128.7 should be scheduled, or the court should otherwise utilize its powers under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 128 as a federal court might do [under] these circumstances, and order this case dismissed.” (Capitalization omitted.)
There does not appear to be a notice of motion corresponding to these points and authorities and declarations. Our record does not include proofs of service of the documents. Although the caption of the points and authorities refers to a hearing date of July 29, 2009 (the same date it was filed), the only matter addressed by the court on that date is a motion by the parents pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to disqualify the commissioner assigned to the case. There was no mention of the points and authorities or the declarations. It does not appear from our record that the court ever received a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, treated the points and authorities as such a motion, discussed it, or made any ruling concerning it.
The matter was then reassigned to a new department, and the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was continued to August 20, 2009. At the subsequent hearing, the parents reasserted their arguments concerning the alleged illegal search and seizure, but did not refer to Code of Civil Procedure section128.7.
Even if the argument has been preserved for appeal, and assuming that Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 applies in juvenile dependency proceedings, there was no error. First, there was no notice of motion as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1010. Second, a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 must be served on opposing parties 21 days before it is filed with the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) This allows the opposing party an opportunity to withdraw or correct the challenged paper and thereby avoid sanctions. (See Barnes v. Department of Corrections (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 126, 132.) Here, our record does not indicate that any notice of motion or the points and authorities (if that is deemed a motion) was ever served on DPSS, let alone 21 days prior to it being filed. A motion for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, therefore, was not properly before the court. There was thus no error in failing to impose sanctions or make any other order pursuant to such a motion.
The parents refer us to In re Mark B. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 61, 80, in which the Third District held that Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 applies in juvenile dependency proceedings. DPSS points out that this court has stated that rules applicable in civil cases are not applicable in dependency cases unless expressly made so (In re AthenaP., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 627), and the dependency law does not expressly make Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 applicable to dependency cases. Because we hold that the parents’ Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 motion, if any, was procedurally defective, we need not decide this issue.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1010 provides, in part: “Notices must be in writing, and the notice of a motion, other than for a new trial, must state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based. If any such paper has not previously been served upon the party to be notified and was not filed by him, a copy of such paper must accompany the notice.”
D. Motion to Suppress Evidence
On August 20, 2009, the parents filed a document titled, “Motions in limine and points and authorities.” (Capitalization and underlining omitted.) This document begins by stating: “Parents hereby reassert their motion to exclude all evidence or otherwise sanction Riverside County for illegal search and seizure and other misconduct.” (Capitalization omitted.) (This document does not mention Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7.) The parents refer to the previously filed declarations (which refer to Pen. Code, § 1538.5) and request that the court “hold the county responsible for the misconduct and exclude all evidence obtained from the time of the illegal search, or such as would justify the court in dismissing this case....” This argument and other arguments presented in the motions in limine were addressed by the court on August 20, 2009, just prior to the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. The court rejected each argument.
For the reasons discussed in part A. above, the parents waived this argument by failing to timely appeal from the court’s ruling on their motions.
Even if it is not waived or forfeited, there was no error. As our state Supreme Court explained: “[U]nlike a defendant in a criminal proceeding, ‘[a] parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, since “the potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from suppressing evidence” unlawfully seized.’ [Citation.]” (In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 915.) The parents do not refer us to any contrary authority. Therefore, even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the court did not err in refusing to exclude evidence obtained thereby.
E. Racial and Religious Discrimination
The parents next contend that the dependency law “illegally provides for special consideration of parents who are members of the Indian race or who are members of the Christian Science religion.” The parents, who are of “the German race, ” are allegedly the subjects of unlawful discrimination.
This argument was asserted in their motions in limine and rejected by the court at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. As with other arguments rejected by the court in its jurisdictional/dispositional orders, this argument is waived by failing to timely appeal from the orders.
Moreover, the parents do not specify the allegedly discriminatory provisions and offer no citation to authority to support the argument. We therefore decline to address it on the merits. (See Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [court need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished]; Trinkle v. California State Lottery (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413 [court may treat a legal argument made without citation to authority as waived and pass on it without consideration].)
F. Bill of Attainder
The parents contend that two provisions of California’s juvenile dependency law—section 300.2 and subdivision (b)(13) of section 361.5—“enabled the County to use the law as a Bill of Attainder.” The argument (which was not asserted below) is without merit.
Bills of attainder are prohibited by the federal Constitution. (See U.S. Const., art. I, § 10 [“No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder”].) A bill of attainder is a legislative act that applies to “named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial....” (United States v. Brown (1965) 381 U.S. 437, 448-449.) The prohibition of such laws “reflected the Framers’ belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness, of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons.” (Id. at p. 445.)
Section 300.2 provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the purpose of the provisions of this chapter relating to dependent children is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm. This safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being may include provision of a full array of social and health services to help the child and family and to prevent reabuse of children. The focus shall be on the preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child. The provision of a home environment free from the negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition for the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being of the child. Successful participation in a treatment program for substance abuse may be considered in evaluating the home environment. In addition, the provisions of this chapter ensuring the confidentiality of proceedings and records are intended to protect the privacy rights of the child.”
The parents appear to argue that this provision constitutes a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment (the termination of parental rights) on easily ascertainable members of a group, namely, people who abuse controlled substances and fail to successfully participate in a treatment program. We disagree. Section 300.2 is a statement of legislative intent concerning the juvenile dependency law that bears no resemblance to a bill of attainder. No individual is named and it identifies no easily ascertainable group upon whom punishment is inflicted without a judicial trial. Moreover, as DPSS points out, the court did not rely upon section 300.2; jurisdiction was based on section 300, subdivision (b).
The parents’ argument regarding section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), fares no better. That subdivision states that reunification services need not be provided to a parent when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “the parent or guardian of the child has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court’s attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan... on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available and accessible.” The statute cannot reasonably be viewed as a bill of attainder. Additionally, the parents have no standing to complain of this provision because they were not deprived of reunification services under this statute. Indeed, they were offered reunification services, but declined to participate.
The parents rely on Renee J. v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1019, review granted October 3, 2000, S090730. That decision, however, was depublished when our state Supreme Court granted review of the decision. As a result, the case may not be cited or relied upon by any party. (Rules 8.1105(e)(1), 8.1115(a).)
G. Due Process Under Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 (Santosky)
The parents next contend the juvenile court erroneously applied a preponderance of the evidence standard at the jurisdictional hearing when it should have applied a clear and convincing standard. The parents argue that the higher standard is constitutionally required under Santosky. The argument is waived for failing to timely appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, as explained in part A. above. Even if the argument was not waived, it has been squarely rejected by California courts.
Santosky was concerned with New York state law, which allowed the state to terminate parental rights if a court finds by “a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’” that the child is “‘permanently neglected.’” (Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 747.) The court held “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than this. Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.” (Id. at pp. 747-748.)
If the only finding concerning the fitness of the parents was the jurisdictional findings based on the preponderance of the evidence, we would agree that termination of parental rights would violate due process under Santosky. (See In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 538; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1212.) However, at the dispositional hearing, the court further found clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances described in section 361, subdivision (c)(1). That section and subdivision provides that a “dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents... unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence of any of the following circumstances...: [¶] (1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physical custody.” This finding, together with other procedural protections afforded parents throughout the dependency proceedings, satisfy the requirements of due process. (See Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 246-256; In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 606-607.) Accordingly, we reject the parents’ due process argument.
H. Motion to Disqualify Based on Financial Bias and Request for Discovery Under Section 388 Petition
The parents contend the court erred in denying Peter A.’s motion to disqualify and the request for discovery contained in the section 388 petition. These requests were based on alleged “financial bias” on the part of DPSS and the court due to the flow of “federal money... in the dependency system, ” which incentivizes those involved in the dependency system to remove children from parents and place them for adoption. These incentives, they argue, create an impermissible conflict of interest and foster corruption in the system.
As DPSS points out, Peter A. asserted these arguments below in his capacity as K.A.’s grandfather, not as counsel for the parents. The parents, DPSS asserts, therefore have no standing to assert this argument on appeal. DPSS further asserts that the arguments were not within the scope of the issues that can be litigated at a section 366.26 hearing. Without deciding these arguments, we conclude that there is no merit to the parents’ claim.
The parents cite to Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017. In that case, the court held that temporary administrative hearing officers are subject to disqualification based on a pecuniary interest when the government unilaterally selects and pays the officer on an ad hoc basis and the officer’s income from future adjudicative work depends entirely on the government’s goodwill. (Id. at p. 1024.) Haas would be analogous if DPSS could select which judges are assigned to handle dependency cases and the judges were paid based upon the number of cases they handled. In that situation, a judge would have an incentive to rule in favor of DPSS on a particular case in the hope of receiving additional judicial assignments in the future. (See id. at p. 1020.) The parents offer no evidence of any similar scheme here. Haas, therefore, has no application to the parents’ claim.
The parents rely primarily on an online newspaper article about the use of federal “adoption incentive bonuses” given to states to promote the adoption of children. Even if the federal government provides financial incentives to states for adoptions, there is no basis for concluding that the judges deciding adoption cases have any pecuniary interest or bias in favoring adoptions; they are not selected by DPSS to hear dependency cases and will presumably be paid the same regardless of how they decide a particular case. There is nothing to indicate otherwise.
To the extent that DPSS itself could be financially incentivized to increase the number of adoptions, we see no due process violation. Regardless of DPSS’s motivations for pursuing adoption of a child, the ultimate decision is not the agency’s to make; that decision belongs to the court. As set forth above, there is no reason to believe that the juvenile court in this case or otherwise has an impermissible financial interest in favoring DPSS or increasing the number of adoptions. We therefore conclude there is no merit to parents’ claim.
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
We concur: Hollenhorst Acting P.J., McKinster J.