Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWJ008749. Michael J. Rushton, Judge.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Codrington, J.
I
INTRODUCTION
Mother appeals from orders entered at a combined hearing for status review, jurisdiction, and disposition on a supplemental petition, denying mother reunification services and placing mother’s daughters, D.W. and J.W., in long-term foster care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 364, 387.) Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain the findings and orders on the supplemental section 387 petition. Alternatively, mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her family reunification services.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
We conclude there was sufficient evidence supporting the court’s orders, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother additional services.
II
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2008, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the DPSS) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of mother and father’s daughters, D.W. (age 12) and J.W. (age 14), and son, S.W. (age 16).
This appeal is only as to D.W. and J.W., and not S.W.
According to the detention hearing report, Riverside County was notified in September 2008 that mother’s children were severely neglected. S.W., who could not talk, appeared malnourished. Mother’s oldest son, M.W. (age 18), who was legally blind and developmentally delayed, was left to care for the other three children while mother went out.
Mother had learning and developmental disabilities, as did all her children, with the exception of D.W. S.W. was severely handicapped, with autism, cerebral palsy, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and seizure disorder. He required constant supervision and help with all life skills.
According to the juvenile dependency petition, in September and October 2008, the county received referrals arising from S.W. being hospitalized after having seizures due to not having taken his medication for 10 days. Mother said she had not refilled S.W.’s prescription because she normally waited until after S.W.’s medication ran out before attempting to refill his prescriptions. She then had problems with completing the paperwork.
On October 3, 2008, the public health nurse, law enforcement, and DPSS social workers went to mother’s home. They found S.W. on the floor eating cat food out of the cat food dish. He was so weak, he was unable to hold himself up. The county workers further observed the home was filthy, with rodent droppings throughout the kitchen, cat feces on the wall and floors, exposed, frayed wires, mold in the bathrooms, with the floor rotted and collapsing, and broken windows, with glass on the carpets. Father had been visiting the home and was aware of the condition.
When mother was interviewed on October 3, 2008, she stated that the children’s father had moved out several months before, after mother and father had been in a fight. He had thrown things at her. Mother denied ever hitting the children and claimed she took good care of her children. She said S.W. would not eat what she fed him. When asked about the condition of her home, mother said the house had been sold and she was moving. She did not know where she would be living.
Mother and father were not married.
D.W. told the social worker her home had been filthy for a long time. The children usually had enough to eat but her mother ran out of money at the end of the month. Then her mother tried to borrow money from neighbors to buy food or tried to contact father, who would get food from food banks. S.W. was always hungry. He would only drink soda or juice. Mother put a bungee cord on the kitchen cabinet to prevent the children from eating all the food. With the exception of S.W., they could all open the cabinet anyway.
The social worker also interviewed J.W., who had been diagnosed as developmentally delayed, with limited intellectual functioning. She said father threw a table at mother but it missed mother. He also punched a hole in the wall. Father punched holes in the wall when he got mad. J.W. said she also punched holes in the wall when she got mad. Their home was always filthy, according to J.W., and the bungee cord was on the cabinet for S.W.
The family had an extensive child welfare history, dating back to 1997. In addition, the Inland Regional Center (IRC) had been constantly monitoring the parents due to concerns regarding mother and father’s ability to provide for their children.
Between 1999 and 2007, the DPSS received numerous reports of caretaker absence, incapacity, neglect, emotional and physical abuse, and sibling abuse. Mother and father reportedly had neglected and physically abused the children. The allegations were found to be inconclusive. In September 2008, the DPSS received a child abuse report, found to be substantiated, alleging that J.W. regularly failed to attend school. She refused to go and had lost her bus pass. J.W. claimed her parents hit her. Mother reported she did not know how to obtain another bus pass for J.W. or how to get J.W. to go to school.
Based on the unsanitary and unhealthful condition of mother’s home, and on S.W.’s condition, on October 3, 2008, mother’s children were placed in protective custody. S.W. was placed separately in a specialized care facility and is not the subject of this appeal.
At the detention hearing on October 8, 2008, the juvenile court ordered the children (J.W., D.W., and S.W.) detained and ordered reunification services provided to the parents. The court also authorized supervised visitation for parents. The court authorized the DPSS to place the girls (J.W. and D.W.) back with mother in her home, conditional upon the DPSS finding mother’s home suitable.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report, filed in October 2008, the girls remained in a foster home. When interviewed by the DPSS social worker, father stated that several months before the children were detained, he had moved out of their home because mother had a new boyfriend and the cats had taken over the home. He had had enough of living with the family.
The social worker assigned to the case stated in the jurisdiction/disposition report that there had been multiple referrals since 1997, and although most were found to be inconclusive or unfounded, in 2007, the family was offered “Differential Response services, ” which were declined: “Participation with those services at that time may have given the support to the family needed to have prevented the current situation.” The social worker concluded the primary problem was the parents’ inability to cope with and manage the household and children, without assistance. This situation was aggravated by mother’s developmental disability, along with the disabilities of her children. In addition, mother had lost the support of father.
In an interim order, on October 29, 2008, the juvenile court ordered all prior orders, including reunification services, to remain in effect. The court again authorized the return of the girls to mother’s home, conditional upon completion of a suitable home evaluation and upon mother participating in IRC services and cooperating with the independent living services provider.
At the jurisdiction hearing on December 3, 2008, the court sustained the allegations in the amended petition that the girls had been placed at risk by their parents failing to provide a safe and sanitary home. In accordance with the DPSS’s recommendation, the court ordered the girls be placed with mother in her new home, subject to the supervision of the social worker. The court ordered DPSS to provide mother and father with family maintenance services. Mother was ordered to participate in family counseling, cooperate with the IRC, and complete a parenting class.
At the status review hearing in June 2009, the court ordered an additional six months of family maintenance services. Mother had begun family counseling but had not started parenting classes. The girls had refused to participate in counseling and were resisting attending school.
At the status review hearing in December 2009, the girls reportedly continued to be truant from school and left home at night without permission. Mother had very little control over them. Mother’s male friends were often in her home and made inappropriate sexual advances toward the girls. The DPSS provided the family with intensified services by a team of professionals. The DPSS noted in the November 2009 status review report that the family had received “a significant amount of services in the home from many providers (i.e. Wraparound Program, Therapeutic Behavioral Services, Regional Center, etc.).” The court authorized six more months of family maintenance services.
On February 25, 2010, the DPSS filed a section 387 petition seeking removal of the girls from mother’s home and placement of the girls in foster care due to their parents’ inability to provide for the girls’ basic needs and protection. The section 387 petition stated that on February 23, 2010, a social worker and an IRC helper reported that D.W. refused to go to school and complained the family had no food and she was hungry. Mother had mismanaged her funds by failing to abide by a budget. The girls reportedly were engaging in dangerous sexual conduct, initiated over the internet. In addition, mother’s male friends, who were not to be in the home, continued to visit mother at her house, in violation of mother’s DPSS safety plan. The DPSS removed the girls from mother’s home on February 24, 2010, and placed them in foster care. The girls left willingly.
At the detention hearing in February, the court ordered the girls placed in foster care. Mother was granted weekly visitation. The court ordered additional services, including parenting education, to be provided to the family as soon as possible.
The status report filed in April 2010, stated that mother continued to receive IRC services and was currently receiving 30 hours a month of independent living services through Community Living Opportunities. Mother’s independent living coach met with her twice a week to assist her with budgeting, transportation, and daily living skills. Mother was resistant to establishing a budget and was unable to account for most of her finances. She usually ran out of her monthly funds by the middle of the month, necessitating getting food from food banks. Father was residing in mother’s home, even though mother did not want him there. He provided minimal financial assistance. Efforts were made to include him in the Wraparound program but his attendance at weekly family meetings was sporadic.
In April 2010, the DPSS filed an amended section 387 petition, alleging mother continued to demonstrate an inability to care for the girls, resulting in D.W. being allegedly raped while walking home due to mother’s failure to arrange for a ride for her.
During the contested jurisdictional hearing on May 12, 2010, the court adjudged the girls dependents of the court, and ordered them removed from parents’ custody and placed in foster care. The court further found the time limit for services had been exceeded, with no possibility of the girls being reunited with their parents. The court ordered a permanency plan for the girls of a planned permanent living arrangement, and authorized continued visitation. Mother’s attorney, along with the girls’ attorney, requested family reunification services for mother. The court denied mother’s request for reunification services, noting the case was at the “18-month mark in terms of services.”
Mother appeals the May 12, 2010, jurisdiction and disposition orders.
III
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SECTION 387 ORDER
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings that the allegations in the section 387 petition were true. In the section 387 petition, the DPSS alleged: “The mother continues to demonstrate an inability to provide for the children’s basic needs and protection, including providing adequate food, allowing unsafe individuals in the home, and inadequate supervision in that child, D.W., was allegedly raped while walking home due to the mother’s refusal to pick the child up. In addition, the mother has been resistant in participating in case plan activities and wraparound services.”
A. Applicable Law
Section 387, subdivision (a) states, “An order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a child from the physical custody of a parent... and directing placement in a foster home... shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.” The substantive requirements of the section 387 petition are set out in subdivision (b) of section 387: “The supplemental petition shall be filed by the social worker in the original matter and shall contain a concise statement of facts sufficient to support the conclusion that the previous disposition has not been effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the child....” (See also In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1199 (Joel H.).)
When a section 387 petition has been filed, the DPSS must prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Jonique W. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 685, 691.) As the court explained in Joel H., section 387 does not require the same jurisdictional findings demanded under section 300, which authorizes the juvenile court’s initial jurisdiction over the child. “The ‘jurisdictional fact’ necessary to modify a previous placement is that the previous disposition has not been effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the minor.” (Joel H., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) Thus, the juvenile court need not find that there has been physical or emotional abuse. (Ibid.) Rather, the goal of the juvenile court’s inquiry “is to protect the child from some perceived danger or actual harm.” (Id. at p. 1201.)
Jurisdictional findings under section 387 are reviewed for the existence of substantial evidence. (Joel H., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) We will therefore affirm the jurisdictional findings if examination of the record, reviewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the order, discloses evidence that is “‘reasonable, credible and of solid value, ’” which would allow a reasonable trier of fact to make the pertinent findings. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080.) Upon review for substantial evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.)
B. Discussion
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 387. There was ample evidence that mother did not adequately care for and protect the girls. She failed to ensure that the girls had adequate food. In January 2010, mother acknowledged to a social worker that she had run out of food and money. Despite receiving Wraparound services, which included budgeting assistance, as well as approximately $3,300 in cash and $200 in food stamps each month, mother repeatedly mismanaged her funds. As a consequence, she frequently ran out of money by the middle of the month. In February 2010, D.W. told a social worker she was hungry. The social worker found spoiled food in the refrigerator and on the kitchen counter. Mother told the social worker she did not have any money left for food or other necessities.
There was also evidence that mother was not adequately supervising the girls and was neglecting them. In February 2010, the DPSS received three referrals reporting general neglect. On one occasion, the girls had called mother asking for a ride home at 1:00 a.m. Mother told them she could not give them a ride since she did not have any money for gas. As the girls were walking home, they met two men and D.W. had sex with one of them. While mother did not drive, and therefore could not personally pick up the girls, she apparently did not arrange for anyone else to pick them up. Instead of letting the girls spend the night at their friend’s home, she told them to walk home or she would call the police.
Mother also failed to protect the girls from her male friends’ sexual advances. Contrary to her safety plan barring mother’s male friends from entering her home, mother continued to allow her male friends to do so. On one occasion, a social worker found mother’s boyfriend in the home.
Despite the extensive assistance and services provided to mother to help her manage her home and care for her children, mother demonstrated an inability to adequately care for D.W. and J.W. To make matters worse, over time, she became resistant and even hostile to the support offered and rejected various services. She refused to adhere to a recommended monthly budget that would have enabled her to meet her family’s needs. She also refused to allow anyone else to manage her money for her. In addition, mother was not making a sufficient effort to ensure her girls regularly attended school. She refused to rely on parenting assistance provided by the various social workers, such as suggestions for setting limits and boundaries for the girls.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s findings, as we must, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the factual allegations in the section 387 petition. Because there was substantial evidence supporting the allegations in the section 387 petition that mother was not adequately caring for and protecting D.W. and J.W., the girls’ removal from mother’s custody was proper.
Mother complains that the juvenile court improperly judicially noticed the entire case file. Mother asserts that the facts contained in the judicially noticed documents, such as the social workers’ reports, constituted inadmissible hearsay which the court improperly relied on when ruling on the section 387 petition. Mother argues that the only documents properly entered into evidence were the February 25, 2010, detention report, the March 26, 2010, jurisdiction report, the April 29, 2010, addendum report, and the March 18, 2010, status review report. Mother did not object to these documents during the May 12, 2010, hearing.
Mother’s attorney objected to the DPSS’s attorney referring to information in the six-month review report regarding mother rejecting counseling. The court responded that it was appropriate to consider the case history since mother’s attorney was arguing that, during the past 18 months, mother had not received adequate services. Mother’s attorney stated she was merely noting that the report had not been admitted into evidence. In response, the court stated that it would take judicial notice of the entire case file and allow the parties to argue the propriety of doing so. Mother’s attorney stated that she objected to the court taking judicial notice, “just for the record.”
We conclude the juvenile court did not commit reversible error by judicially noticing the entire court file. This was done solely for the purpose of establishing that the family had received adequate services throughout the 18-month period preceding the court’s ruling denying additional services. There is no indication in the record that the court improperly relied on any particular inadmissible evidence or that reliance on such evidence constituted prejudicial error.
Even if the court had not judicially noticed the entire file, there was more than ample evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional and disposition findings under section 387. We thus reject mother’s contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional and disposition orders on the supplemental section 387 petition.
IV
REUNIFICATION SERVICES
Mother contends the trial court erred in denying her request for reunification services at the section 387 hearing on May 12, 2010. She argues that the juvenile court erroneously assumed that she had already received 18 months of family reunification services, whereas she had not received any. She claims she only received family maintenance services.
A. Applicable Law
The grant of family reunification services is governed by section 361.5. (In re N.M. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 845, 852 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] (N.M.).) Under subdivision (a) of that section, normally, “... whenever a child is removed from a parent’s or guardian’s custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)
Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A) further provides that where, as here, a child is at least three years old when initially removed from parental custody, services shall not exceed twelve months from the date the child entered foster care. A child is deemed to have entered foster care either on the date of the jurisdictional hearing or 60 days after the child was initially removed from parental custody, whichever is earlier. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).)
Notwithstanding the presumptive 12-month limitation, reunification services may be extended up to a maximum of 18 months from the date the child was originally removed from parental custody. The court can only extend the time if it finds a substantial probability the child will be returned to parental custody within the extended period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).) A juvenile court may, in rare instances, continue reunification services beyond 18 months if the court determines that the best interests of the child warrant the continuation, despite the recognized need for a prompt resolution of his or her custody status. (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4that p. 852.)
We review a juvenile court’s dispositional orders, including orders terminating reunification services, under the abuse of discretion standard of review. (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4that p. 852.)
B. Discussion
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother reunification services at the section 387 petition hearing in May 2010. In Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159 (Carolyn R.), the court held that the various deadlines contained in section 361.5, subdivision (a) apply to all court-ordered services, including family maintenance services. Among other things, the court explained that section 361.5 “speaks in terms of ‘child welfare services’ (§ 361.5, subd. (a)) which consist of maintenance as well as reunification services (§ 16500 et seq.). Both reunification and maintenance services are part of the continuum of child welfare services. (§ 16501, subd. (a).)” (Carolyn R., at p. 165, fn. omitted.)
Thus, “[w]hen a juvenile court sustains a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, the case does not return to ‘“square one”’ with regard to reunification efforts. [Citation.] Instead, the question becomes whether reunification efforts should resume [i.e., whether, among other things, the parent is entitled to receive services for an additional time period].” (Carolyn R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 166, fn. omitted.)
Mother relies on In re Joel T. (1999)70 Cal.App.4th 263(Joel T.) and In re A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636 (A.C.) for the proposition the juvenile court erred in denying mother reunification services based on the erroneous assumption sufficient reunification services had already been provided. But Joel T. and A.C. are not on point. In Joel T., the children were ordered detained due to allegations their father molested one of the children. The juvenile court ordered “trial placement” of the children with mother pending the jurisdiction hearing. The children were also allowed to remain with their mother on a trial basis at disposition. (Joel T., at p. 265.) Over a year later, the children were removed from their mother under a section 387 petition. Over 18 months after the children’s original detention, the juvenile court ordered the children placed in long-term foster care and denied the mother’s request for additional services, finding she had already been provided with 18 months of services. (Joel T., at pp. 266-267.)
The appellate court in Joel T., reversed the dispositional orders, holding that the juvenile court erred in removing the children from parental custody and denying reunification services solely based on the mother receiving services for 18 months after the children’s original detention. The court concluded that those services were family maintenance services, not reunification services mandated under section 361.5, as the children had not been removed from the mother’s custody. (Joel T., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 268-269.)
The Joel T. court explained that “The distinction between the services provided when the minors remain in parental custody and when the minors have been removed from parental custody is a subtle but important one. Services designed merely to support a family’s functioning may or may not be the same as those designed to reunify a family even if the ultimate goal in each case is to ameliorate the problems which led to the dependency at the outset.” (Joel T., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.)
Joel T. is distinguishable from the instant case in that, unlike in Joel T., mother’s children were removed from both parents and placed in foster care, with the court ordering reunification services for mother and father during that time. The children were initially removed and placed in foster care on October 3, 2008. The girls remained in foster care for over 60 days, until the juvenile court on December 3, 2008, ordered them returned to mother. At this point, the court ordered family maintenance services provided to mother and father, since the girls were returned to mother. S.W. remained in foster care and was never returned to his parents.
Consistent with our decision in N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 845, we conclude the 18-month period, during which both reunification and maintenance services were provided, was triggered when mother’s children were initially removed from mother and placed in foster care on October 3, 2008. In N.M., the juvenile court ordered the parents’ 18-month-old child detained due to the parents’ drug abuse and ordered the DPSS to provide reunification services. At the jurisdiction hearing, the court found dependency jurisdiction over the child but ordered the child placed with mother under a family maintenance plan. The father was granted reunification services and visitation. (N.M., at p. 848.) Later, the court allowed the father to move back in with the mother and returned custody to the father under a family maintenance plan. (Id. at p. 849.)
Due to the parents in N.M. resuming their drug abuse, the DPSS detained the child and filed a section 387 petition. The court sustained the petition, removed the child from the parents, and granted the parents reunification services. At the review hearing, the court concluded the family maintenance services provided to the mother would not be considered when calculating the amount of reunification services provided to father. (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.) As a consequence, the juvenile court concluded reunification services should continue. The child appealed the court’s order continuing the reunification services, and the N.M. court reversed the ruling, explaining: “Mother’s 18-month period commenced at the time of the original detention and not later when she lost custody on the section 387 petition.” (Id. at p. 855.)
In reaching our holding in N.M., we explained: “The 18-month limitation set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (a) applies to all ‘court-ordered services.’ [Citation.] Nothing in the statute suggests the limitation period should be calculated separately for maintenance and reunification services.... [¶] The fact a parent had custody during part of the total period does not stop the limitation period in section 361.5 from continuing to run. Section 361.5 states: ‘Physical custody of the child by the parents or guardians during the applicable time period... shall not serve to interrupt the running of the period.’ [Citation.] ‘To construe the section’s language as requiring the court to start services anew simply because a parent succeeded in temporarily regaining physical custody “would scuttle the purpose of the statute merely to preserve its form.” [Citation.]’” (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 853-854.)
We went on to explain that “if it were otherwise, a parent whose child was initially detained but who regained custody at the jurisdiction hearing could receive up to 12 months of family maintenance services [citation], lose custody again on a section 387 petition, and then receive up to 18 additional months of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (a) by arguing that the ‘original’ removal did not occur until the loss of custody pursuant to the section 387 petition. The resulting total hiatus of 30 months manifestly would not advance the legislative purpose of minimizing delay in dependency proceedings. ‘While [22 months] may not seem a long period of time to an adult, it can be a lifetime to a young child.’ [Citation.]” (In re N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 855.)
As we further noted, “‘When a juvenile court sustains a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, the case does not return to “‘square one’” with regard to reunification efforts. [Citations.] Instead, the question becomes whether reunification efforts should resume. The answer is yes if: the parent has received less than 12 months of child welfare services (§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 366.21, subd. (e)); the parent did not receive reasonable child welfare services (§§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)); or the case has passed the 12-month mark but there is a substantial probability the child will be returned within 18 months of the date the child was originally removed from the parent’s physical custody (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)).’ [Citation.]” (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 853.)
This reasoning applies in the instant case. We recognize that the applicable version of section 361.5, subdivision (a) relied upon in N.M. differs from the amended version applicable in the instant case. The current, 2010 version of section 361.5 limits subdivision (1)(A) to reunification services, as opposed to encompassing child welfare services in general, and clarifies the term, “foster care, ” as defined in section 361.49. These changes in section 361.5, subdivision (a), however, do not change our views expressed in N.M. that family maintenance services, along with reunification services, may be considered in determining whether there has been compliance with the welfare services requirement in section 361.5, subdivision (a).
The version in effect in the instant case at the time of the hearing on the section 387 petition on May 12, 2010, states in relevant part as follows: “[W]henever a child is removed from a parent’s or guardian’s custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians.... [¶] (1) Family reunification services, when provided, shall be provided as follows: (A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (C), for a child who, on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian, was three years of age or older, court-ordered services shall be provided beginning with the dispositional hearing and ending 12 months after the date the child entered foster care as defined in Section 361.49, unless the child is returned to the home of the parent or guardian.” The amended language is italicized.
Even under section 361.49, the girls were in foster care, as defined by section 361.49, with mother receiving reunification services, before the court ordered the girls returned to mother on December 3, 2003. Under section 361.49, they “entered foster care on... the date that is 60 days after the date on which the [girls were] initially removed from the physical custody” of their parents, on October 3, 2008. (§ 361.49.)
Here, as in N.M., the dependency proceedings did not return to “square one” at the hearing on the section 387 petition, since the juvenile court in 2008 initially granted two months of reunification services while the girls were in foster care and, upon returning the girls to mother in December 2008, ordered over 12 months of extensive family maintenance services. Then, after the DPSS detained the girls a second time in February 2010, under the section 387 petition, the juvenile court ordered additional services up until the section 387 petition hearing on May 12, 2010, at which time the court denied mother’s request for additional services.
Mother argues the girls were not removed from mother’s custody within the meaning of section 361.5 until the section 387 petition hearing in May 2010 and therefore the juvenile court was required under section 361.5, subdivision (a) to order reunification services. We rejected a similar, if not identical contention in N.M., when we concluded that the child in N.M. was “originally removed from [the mother’s] custody when the court ordered him detained.... [¶] Case law demonstrates that a detention pending a jurisdictional hearing should be considered an original removal from custody for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (a).” (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 854.) We explained in N.M. that the phrase concerning removal from custody within the meaning of section 361.5, “should be construed to mean ‘the date on which the child was initially removed from the home of a parent” by a peace officer or social worker. (Id. at p. 855.) We thus held in N.M. that “Mother’s 18-month period commenced at the time of the original detention and not later when she lost custody on the section 387 petition.” (Ibid.)
Likewise, here, the juvenile court correctly concluded mother commenced receiving services under section 361.5, subdivision (a) at the time of the girls’ original detention in October 2008, and not later, when the girls were removed from mother a second time in 2010, under the section 387 petition. Therefore the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother reunification services on the ground she had already received over 18 months of services.
Mother argues that contrary to N.M., the court in A.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at page 650, held that a brief detention of a child prior to disposition does not constitute a removal from custody within the meaning of section 361.5, subdivision (a). Mother urges this court to disregard our analysis and holding in N.M. as wrongly decided, and rely on A.C. for the proposition mother did not start receiving statutory mandated welfare services under section 361.5 until after the DPSS filed the section 387 petition and the girls were removed from mother’s custody a second time.
A.C. is not controlling in this case and, to the extent it conflicts with N.M., we adhere to our analysis and holding in N.M. In A.C., the children were detained from their mother, placed with their father at disposition, and ordered removed from the mother under section 361, subdivision (c). Later, the children were also ordered removed from father under a section 387 petition. (A.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 640-641.)
As the court in A.C. noted in distinguishing N.M. and Carolyn R., the N.M. father received reunification services, “thereby, according to the analysis in the N.M. case, triggering the section 361.5 time limitations at the beginning of the dependency.” (A.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.) The A.C. court added in a footnote that, “Of course, the correctness of the result in N.M. depends on the conclusion that it is accurate to find section 361.5 applies in the first instance even if dependent children are placed with a parent at the dispositional hearing.” (Id. at p. 649, fn. 13.) Since we adhere to our analysis and holding in N.M., we conclude section 361.5 applies in the first instance even though the girls were placed with mother at the dispositional hearing.
A.C. is distinguishable from the instant case in that A.C. concerned the initial removal of children from the custodial parent and placement under section 361.2 with the noncustodial parent at disposition, with no reunification services provided to the noncustodial parent. (A.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4that p. 649.) The A.C. court did not address the circumstances in the instant case in which the child was initially removed from both parents and placed in foster care for over 60 days, with reunification services granted to both parents.
In fact, the court in A.C. distinguished cases, such as Carolyn R. and N.M., which are similar to the instant case: “Carolyn, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 159, is inapplicable. Because the time limits provided in section 361.5, subdivision (a) never began, father’s custody of dependents cannot be considered an “interruption” of the running of the 18-month period. N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 845, can be distinguished on its facts: The N.M. father did receive reunification services, thereby, according to the analysis in the N.M. case, triggering the section 361.5 time limitations at the beginning of the dependency.” (A.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4that p. 649, fn. omitted.)
Consistent with N.M., we conclude placement of D.W. and J.W. in foster care for over 60 days in 2008, during which mother and father were offered court-ordered reunification services, triggered the running of the 18-month period of services, which included reunification and family maintenance services. As a consequence, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request for reunification services at the May 2010 hearing on the section 387 petition, on the ground mother had already received sufficient services.
V
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez P.J., Hollenhorst J.
The version of section 361.5, subdivision (a), in effect at the time of the N.M. hearing on the section 387 petition, in October 2002, stated: “(a)... Child welfare services, when provided, shall be provided as follows: [¶] (1)For a child who, on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian, was three years of age or older, court-ordered services shall not exceed a period of12 months from the date the child entered foster care, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3).” (Italics added to show language differing from the subsequent 2010 version.)