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In re Justin C.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
May 20, 2008
No. B202806 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 20, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK60396 D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge.

M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Fred W. Klink, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


PERLUSS, P. J.

Rebeca H., the mother of Justin C., appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her petition for modification pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 seeking to reinstate family reunification services and increase visitation. We affirm.

All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 388, subdivision (a), provides a parent or other interested party “may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made . . . .”

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August 2005 the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral alleging Rebeca, the mother of Justin, then 12 years old, and one-year-old boy-girl twins, was addicted to drugs and involved in an abusive relationship. After investigating the matter, the Department negotiated a voluntary family maintenance program of services and counseling with Rebeca and her live-in boyfriend, Carlos M., the father of the twins.

The Department had investigated several other allegations of neglect, abuse or drug addiction against Rebeca between 1999 and 2005, but those charges were not substantiated.

Rebeca and Carlos made no effort to comply with the voluntary program. On September 1, 2005 the Department detained the children and filed a petition under section 300, alleging the children were at substantial risk of serious, non-accidental physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)) and, as a result of Rebeca and Carlos’s inability to protect the children, they were at substantial risk of harm (§ 300, subd. (b)). At the detention hearing Rebeca informed the court she was unaware of the location of Justin’s father, George C. Justin and the twins were placed with Rebeca’s father and stepmother. Rebeca was ordered to comply with the family maintenance program developed for her by the Department.

The report prepared for the September 29, 2005 jurisdiction and detention hearing advised George C. had been located and wanted to reestablish his relationship with Justin but was not financially able to care for him on a full-time basis. Justin, who had been diagnosed some months before as suffering from bipolar disorder and serious emotional disturbance, was described as extremely bright with excellent verbal skills and insight into his life. Recanting statements he had made at the time of his detention, Justin admitted to the social worker who prepared the report Carlos M. had hit Rebeca on several occasions, even though Rebeca denied any violence and characterized the bruises on her legs and arms as a product of her anorexia. As the social worker who prepared the report also noted, since the children’s detention, Rebeca had tested positive for amphetamine and hydrocodone and had failed to attend the required 12-step programs. According to her drug counselor, she was considered a “high-risk client” due to her anxiety and continuing drug use. The social worker who prepared the report concluded, “Given this young man’s history of living for twelve years in the home environments with a mentally ill mother who is a poly drug abuser, alcoholic, and a victim of domestic violence by all of the men that have lived with her and Justin, it is not surprising that Justin would present with serious mental and emotional issues that at this juncture have not been determined to be organic or environmental.”

Justin’s father, George C., appeared at the September 29, 2005 jurisdiction hearing and advised the court Rebeca had blocked his previous attempts to contact Justin. The court declared George C. to be Justin’s presumed father, ordered the Department to allow unmonitored visitation between Justin and George C. and granted the Department discretion to place Justin with George C. if George C.’s situation improved. The court ordered monitored visitation between Justin and Rebeca and instructed Rebeca to submit to a psychological examination.

According to the November 2005 psychological evaluation, Rebeca suffered from borderline personality disorder, anorexia nervosa, poly substance abuse, anxiety disorder and depressive disorder. The psychiatrist also reported Rebeca had admitted using drugs and had failed to participate in any of the counseling or drug testing programs ordered by the court. He described Rebeca as very bright, but unable to grasp the solutions to her problems or mobilize herself to implement the changes necessary to have her children returned. He recommended Rebeca, whose prognosis he described as “abysmal,” be treated by a “very competent” therapist who was willing to work with her on a long-term basis. In concluding his report, the psychiatrist stated, “[T]his is a very complex case with multiple issues that scream predictability of low success rate for anyone trying to change this situation.”

After a family mediation session in December 2005, Rebeca entered a residential drug treatment program but was discharged a week later. She told the social worker she and Carlos M. could not afford to be in a program. She also admitted she had failed to submit to any drug tests. At the disposition hearing on December 28, 2005 she and Carlos entered no contest pleas, and the court sustained four counts of the petition as amended by agreement of the parties. The children were declared dependents of the court, and the court ordered reunification services for Rebeca. Rebeca was ordered to attend and complete drug rehabilitation with random drug testing, parent education, domestic violence counseling and individual counseling. She was also ordered to have a psychiatric consultation and to follow all recommendations regarding medication. All three children were placed with their maternal grandparents, and a six-month review hearing was set for May 2006 (§ 366.21, subd. (e)).

The court sustained four counts of the amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b), based on Rebeca’s and Carlos M.’s ongoing drug abuse and violence, as well as Rebeca’s untreated emotional problems.

A report prepared for the May review hearing disclosed Justin was having a difficult time adjusting to living with his grandparents. Rebeca’s visits, which had been increasingly sporadic, ceased in January 2006. Although Rebeca had agreed to call Justin once a week, she had not done so. The social worker reported Rebeca had failed to appear for any court-ordered drug tests or to participate in any of the mandated programs. As of the date of the report, her whereabouts were unknown. Not surprisingly, Justin had become more rebellious at home and school and had been suspended from school twice for unruly behavior. The Department recommended Rebeca’s family reunification services be terminated and attached a letter from Justin’s therapist stating, “Justin is a capable, likeable young man who carries a history of difficulty with interpersonal relationships. The etiology of these issues stem[s] from family issues, in particular, his mother’s inability to set boundaries, provide structure, and give adequate supervision.”

Rebeca explained her failure to respond to the social worker in a letter to the court dated May 1, 2005, in which she complained about the worker’s prejudice against her. According to Rebeca, the worker had told Rebeca’s family members she had only returned one child to drug-addicted parents in her 20 years of working with the Department. Rebeca asked the court to remove the social worker from the case and grant her more reunification services.

At the section 366.21, subdivision (e), review hearing in May 2006, Rebeca testified she stopped visiting Justin because the social worker told her Justin did not want to see her. She admitted, however, she had also failed to visit the twins, who were not yet two years old. She claimed she could not participate in domestic violence counseling because her file was likely to end up on the desk of her mother, a psychologist who specialized in domestic violence. Her assertion she had been participating in a methadone program since December 2005 was impeached with a letter from the program stating she had just enrolled in April 2006. Asked why she had not attended any of the court-ordered programs, Rebeca claimed the social worker had told her in December 2005 she was terminating Rebeca’s reunification services. But when the Department’s counsel pointed out she had been present at the December 28, 2005 hearing at which the court had ordered the continuation of services, Rebeca claimed not to have heard what the judge said.

Carlos M. then testified he had participated in the same drug program as Rebeca and produced a letter purportedly attesting to his attendance. In an exchange that, while not specifically relevant to Justin’s status, provides insight into the depth of the court’s distrust of Rebeca and Carlos M., the court compared his letter with that submitted by Rebeca and, based on their similarity, stated its concern the two letters were forged. The court continued the hearing for a week to allow the parties to authenticate the letters; but, on the rescheduled date, neither appeared, and the Department advised the court the program had declined to authenticate the letters in light of the parents’ failure to authorize them to do so. At that point, the court terminated Rebeca’s and Carlos M.’s reunification services and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing for the twins (§ 366.26) and a 12-month review hearing for Justin (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), whose father was still receiving reunification services.

The maternal grandparents had indicated they were willing to adopt the twins, but not Justin. Justin, in turn, stated he wanted to live with his father, George C. George C. continued to request visitation, but stated he could not yet support Justin.

The Department allowed Justin to move from his grandparents’ home to the home of his maternal aunt and uncle, where, initially, his grades and behavior improved. Justin was seeing George C. on weekends, but Rebeca made no effort to visit him. Meanwhile, Rebeca failed to appear at the section 366.26 hearing for the twins, and her (and Carlos M.’s) parental rights as to the twins were terminated on November 17, 2006. At the hearing her counsel advised the court Rebeca had moved to Hawaii where she had entered a drug recovery program.

A final order of adoption for the twins, Heidi M. and David M., was granted in July 2007, and juvenile court jurisdiction was terminated.

In a letter dated May 22, 2007, Rebeca reported she had been a resident in a drug recovery program since November 5, 2006 and was now enrolled in a work training program. She reported her life had “changed drastically” and she was no longer as impulsive in making decisions as she had been. She attached a letter from the “Set Free Recovery Program” attesting to her participation in the residential program, her attendance in Narcotics Anonymous meetings, her enrollment in a domestic violence program and her participation in other recovery-oriented services.

A review report for Justin’s permanency planning hearing (§ 366.22), scheduled for February 26, 2007, disclosed Justin’s behavior had deteriorated in his placement with his aunt and uncle. Although Justin was visiting with his father every other weekend, George C. again stated he was not ready to have Justin placed with him. As a result, the Department recommended George C.’s reunification services be terminated and a permanent plan be implemented for Justin.

Justin’s situation continued to deteriorate. Asked if he wished to visit Rebeca in Hawaii, Justin declined, stating he had no desire to see his mother because of the disappointments she had caused him in the past. At a May 2007 hearing the court terminated George C.’s reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for August 22, 2007. In the interim, the Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387 seeking to move Justin to foster care because his aunt and uncle were no longer willing to care for him. A detention report attached to the petition stated Justin had been placed in a foster home and seemed to be assimilating well. He continued to have visits with George C. and had spoken by telephone with Rebeca. At the section 387 hearing Rebeca’s counsel stated Rebeca wanted Justin to come live with her in Hawaii and indicated she intended to file a section 388 petition based on her changed circumstances. Asked for his opinion, Justin told the court he still wanted to be placed with his father.

Rebeca filed a section 388 petition on August 17, 2007 seeking a renewal of reunification services and unmonitored visits in Hawaii. She again attached documentation of her enrollment in various recovery programs. However, Justin, who was now 14 years old, told the social worker he was happy in his foster home and did not want to live with any of his family members.

On August 22, 2007 the court continued Justin’s section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing to Septembr 24, 2007 and scheduled the hearing on Rebeca’s section 388 petition for the same date. At the hearing Justin’s counsel joined in Rebeca’s request for reunification services, indicating Justin was now willing to visit his mother. The court denied the petition, observing Rebeca had failed to obtain any of the individual counseling so strongly recommended in her psychiatric evaluation and had failed to show the requested order would promote Justin’s best interests. Noting the case had been pending for more than 24 months and reunification services were not required to grant Rebeca liberalized visitation, the court directed the Department to facilitate monitored visits between Rebeca and Justin and authorized liberalized visits if warranted, including the opportunity to seek an order allowing Justin to visit his mother in Hawaii. Finally, the court declined to terminate Rebeca’s parental rights and ordered long-term foster care, adopting Justin’s current foster care arrangement as his permanent plan.

Rebeca appeals from the denial of her request for further reunification services.

CONTENTIONS

Rebeca argues the court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition because the evidence demonstrated she had taken significant steps toward stabilization; Justin had a fully developed relationship with his mother and was now open to contact; and his permanent plan called for long-term foster care. With renewed support services, she contends, it is possible he could be returned to his family of origin.

DISCUSSION

The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Rebeca’s Section 388 Petition

“‘A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. . . .’” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205.) We review the juvenile court’s decision on a petition under section 388 for an abuse of discretion. The appellate court will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision unless the juvenile court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination. (Ibid.; see also In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460.)

Rebeca argues her completion of recovery programs in Hawaii demonstrates a profound change in her ability to provide care for Justin and he deserves an opportunity to be restored to his family of origin, a move, she contends, that would undoubtedly be in his best interests. The juvenile court, however, questioned the scope of Rebeca’s purported recovery, noting she had failed to address the specific recommendation made by the psychiatrist to obtain long-term individual counseling to treat her borderline personality characteristics, without which her prospects for sustained recovery were slim. Further, the court plainly disagreed with her unsupported assertion that renewal of reunification services would be in Justin’s best interests.

As we observed in In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217, “‘It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the importance of reunification in the dependency system.’” After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability, and a rebuttable presumption arises that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309-310.) A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, what is in the best interest of the child. (Stephanie M., at p. 317.)

In determining the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to consider, among other factors, the reason for the dependency, the reason the problem was not overcome, the strength of the parent-child and child-caretaker bonds, the length of time the child has been a dependent, the nature of the change of circumstance, the ease by which the change could be achieved and the reason it was not made sooner. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446-447.) Although the specific circumstances a court must consider vary with each case, the child’s welfare necessarily involves elimination of the specific factors that required placement outside the parent’s home. (In re Heather P. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 886, 892.)

The record reveals the court was amply familiar with both the facts and family dynamics disclosed during the Department’s two-year supervision of Justin and his family of origin and considered them in denying Rebeca’s request for renewed services. The defining characteristic of their relationship was Rebeca’s inherent unreliability, which resulted in Justin’s unwillingness to be placed again with his mother. The cause of this unreliability was not limited to Rebeca’s drug abuse, for which she had sought treatment, but included her serious psychiatric disorders, which plainly exacerbated the risk of a relapse in her newly attained stability. Justin, meanwhile, had found stability in his foster care placement. As one court has observed in affirming the denial of a parent’s section 388 petition under similar circumstances, “At the point of these proceedings -- on the eve of the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing -- the children’s interest in stability [is] the court’s foremost concern and outweigh[s] any interest in reunification.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 594.) At age 14, Justin was quite capable of articulating his own concerns about disruption of this placement, a factor plainly foremost in the court’s assessment of his best interests. Moreover, rather than deny Rebeca’s petition in its entirety, the court quite reasonably directed the Department to facilitate visits with Rebeca in a manner that required Rebeca to demonstrate her continuing recovery and her ability to restore Justin’s trust.

Under these circumstances we see no error in the juvenile court’s decision to deny Rebeca’s request for restoration of her reunification services.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

We concur: WOODS J., ZELON J.


Summaries of

In re Justin C.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
May 20, 2008
No. B202806 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 20, 2008)
Case details for

In re Justin C.

Case Details

Full title:In re JUSTIN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

Date published: May 20, 2008

Citations

No. B202806 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 20, 2008)