Opinion
02-23-00465-CV
03-07-2024
IN THE MATTER OF J.S.
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323-122046-23.
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Elizabeth Kerr, Justice.
Sixteen-year-old J.S. (James) appeals from the juvenile court's "Order of Transfer to a Criminal District Court and Waiver of Jurisdiction." See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02. Relying on evidentiary contradictions and ambiguities, in one issue James challenges the legal and factual evidentiary sufficiency of the trial court's finding that probable cause existed to believe that he committed the offenses of murder and deadly conduct and, thus, contends that the trial court abused its discretion by waiving its jurisdiction. The record reflects no abuse of discretion, so we affirm the juvenile court's order.
James-an alias-was 15 years old at the time of the hearing. See Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(c).
I. Procedural Background
Because James is a child, the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over his delinquent proceedings. See id. §§ 51.02(2)(A), 51.04(a); In re D.S., No. 02-17-00050-CV, 2017 WL 3187021, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 27, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In its petition requesting the juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and to transfer James's case to the appropriate criminal district court of Tarrant County, Texas, for criminal proceedings so that he could be tried as an adult, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(b), the State alleged (1) that James had committed the murder of Ora Griffin, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b), and (2) that he had committed deadly conduct by knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of a habitation and was reckless as to whether the habitation was occupied, see id. § 22.05(b)(2).
More specifically, three of the four paragraphs in the State's petition alleged three different means of committing murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2), (3). The fourth paragraph contained the deadly-conduct allegation.
The juvenile court held a hearing, made the requisite statutory findings, waived its jurisdiction, and transferred James's case "to the appropriate District Court (with criminal jurisdiction) or Criminal District Court of Tarrant County, Texas for proper criminal proceedings." See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a), (c), (f). By law, James's appeal from that order "has precedence over all other cases." Id. § 56.01(h).
On appeal, James challenges only the juvenile court's probable-cause finding. We therefore do not need to review the evidentiary sufficiency of its other findings. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
II. Probable Cause
In his first issue, James argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by waiving its exclusive jurisdiction and transferring him to criminal district court because the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that there was probable cause to believe he committed the offenses alleged in the State's waiver-and-transfer petition. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3). Probable cause exists when there are sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a prudent person's belief that the suspect committed or was committing the offense. D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *2.
Under the law of parties, a person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01(a). A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2). Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense. Id. § 7.01(b).
A. Standard of Review
By a preponderance of the evidence, the State bears the burden of persuading the juvenile court that waiving its jurisdiction is appropriate. In re A.B., No. 02-18-00274-CV, 2019 WL 983751, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.17(a) ("Except . . . for the burden of proof to be borne by the state in adjudicating a child to be delinquent or in need of supervision . . . or otherwise when in conflict with a provision of this title, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure govern proceedings under this title."). We thus review a juvenile court's factual findings supporting its waiver-and-transfer order under traditional civil evidentiary-sufficiency principles. A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *2; D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *2.
A juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile case to the appropriate district court for criminal proceedings if certain statutory and constitutional requirements are met. Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports a finding under review, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable factfinder could not. D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *2; see also In re G.B., 524 S.W.3d 906, 914 n.13 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2017, no pet.). If more than a scintilla of evidence supports the finding, then legally sufficient evidence supports it, and a legal-sufficiency challenge fails. D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *2; G.B., 524 S.W.3d at 914 n.13.
Under a factual-sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence presented to determine if the court's finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of that evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *2. Put another way, we set the finding aside only if, after considering and weighing all the evidence pertinent to that finding, we determine that the credible evidence supporting it is so weak or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence that it should be set aside. G.B., 524 S.W.3d at 914 n.13.
If the juvenile court's findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, then we review the ultimate waiver decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *3; D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *3; G.B., 524 S.W.3d at 916-17. To determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion, we ask whether it acted without reference to the guiding rules or principles in reaching its decision. A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *3; D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *3.
The factfinder alone judges the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony and is free to accept all, reject all, or accept only parts of any witness's testimony. A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *3. The factfinder is free to accept or reject any apparent inconsistencies in the testimony and reconcile them. See Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 616 (Tex. 2018); A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *3. As an appellate court, we must avoid substituting our judgment for the factfinder's. A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *3.
B. Alleged Offenses
In its waiver-and-transfer petition, the State alleged that on or about July 28, 2023, James committed murder by (1) intentionally or knowingly causing Griffin's death by shooting her with a firearm; (2) intentionally, with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to Griffin, committing an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting her with a firearm and thereby causing her death; and (3) committing or attempting to commit the felony offense of deadly conduct and, in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, committing or attempting to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting a firearm in the direction of a habitation, which caused Griffin's death. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2), (3). The State also alleged that on or about July 28, 2023, James committed one count of deadly conduct by knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of a habitation, being reckless as to whether the habitation was occupied. See id. § 22.05(b)(2).
C. Evidence at the Hearing
Early in the morning on July 28, 2023, 77-year-old Griffin was fatally shot at her Fort Worth apartment. Griffin's next-door neighbor at the apartment complex provided the police with surveillance footage from a video camera. Police reviewed that video, which showed a vehicle that looked like a Nissan Altima pulling into the apartment complex at 4:35 a.m., passing by Griffin's apartment, doing a U-turn, and then passing her apartment again, stopping out of the camera's view. The bottom half of a person carrying what appears to be a rifle then came into view, followed by bright flashes. The suspect, wearing distinctive bright-colored shoes, could then be seen running "along with a second shadow" in the direction of the stopped vehicle. Police located 14 fired 10-millimeter cartridge casings outside Griffin's apartment in the area where the suspect was seen shooting.
The video was not admitted into evidence. We describe it based on Detective Matt Anderson's testimony and a pre-diagnostic study admitted into evidence at the hearing.
Other testimony and evidence at the hearing indicated that the initial "shots fired" call had come in at 4:40 a.m.
According to Detective Anderson's testimony, this was "a person that appear[ed] to be shooting a rifle."
By reviewing footage from other cameras in the area, police found one vehicle of interest-a 2003 Nissan Altima-which matched the description of the vehicle on the surveillance footage. Police noticed that the Altima had blue tape on the windshield. They were also able to see the license plate number on the Altima but soon discovered that there were two different vehicles-both Nissan Altimas-with that same license plate. The other vehicle had been photographed in Dallas; police focused on "the newer model Altima" because it appeared to be the one caught on camera driving away from the crime scene.
Further research showed that the suspect Altima had been photographed near the crime scene on July 27 at 12:41 p.m., on July 28 at 12:20 a.m., and again on July 29 at 8:30 a.m.-before and after the shooting. Police further learned that the vehicle had been spotted at an address in Burleson on the night of the shooting. A detective found the vehicle parked on a "side street" with a different license plate on it. The fugitive unit took over the investigation and determined that the vehicle had been stolen out of Arlington. The unit kept the vehicle under surveillance and ultimately saw two brothers-both having the initials A.W.-approach it and get inside. The detectives first spoke with Ashton, who was in the passenger seat. Ashton initially said that an individual named "KD" had given him the vehicle, but then he "changed his story up" and admitted that on the night of the shooting, he had gone over to "KD's" house, and "KD" had left in the vehicle and come back. At that time, Ashton did not tell the detectives who else was in the vehicle.
Although it is not clear from the record how old these individuals were, we will refer to them by the aliases "Alan" and "Ashton" to protect their identities.
The detectives next spoke with Alan, who admitted that he drove two individuals along with his brother over to the shooting location. He identified the other two individuals as "Jim" and "Tito." Alan said that Jim had a 7.62 rifle and Tito had a Vector 10 millimeter rifle; they had picked both rifles up from Jim's father's house. Alan said he observed Jim shooting a rifle towards the apartment and "gave consistent statements about how he pulled into the apartment complex and the[n] left the apartment complex[, which] was consistent with the video from the neighbor." Detective Sullivan executed a search warrant on the brothers' residence and found "multiple 7.62 cartridges" inside the house.
We use aliases for the nicknames as well. The detectives initially identified "Jim" as L.L. and "Tito" as M.H., both minors at the time of the alleged offenses. See Tex.R.App.P. 9.10(a)(3). But the detectives later determined based on video surveillance that L.L. and M.H. were not present during the shooting.
Detective Sullivan then spoke with Ashton on his own, and Ashton said that Alan "drove to [Jim]'s father's house .... They met up with [Tito] to hang out, [and] while there [Jim] showed [them] a picture of an apartment and said that it was ['Juke']'s mother's house." Ashton then admitted to being present at the actual shooting. "He sa[id] that he heard multiple gunshots[,] and [Jim] and [Tito] got back into the Altima, but [Jim] explained that his gun had jammed. . . [a]fter that they drove right back to [Jim]'s father's house," where they dropped the rifles off. The brothers eventually rode with detectives and identified the residence where the rifles were dropped off, which was a reported drug house. A SWAT team executed a search warrant for James's father's house on July 30, 2023, and located James inside the residence.
T.H., another person who was a minor at the time of the alleged offenses, is identified in the record by his name, date of birth, and unique nickname. In keeping with our design to protect others' identities, we will use "Juke" or "Juke Box" as a substitute for his actual nickname.
Detective Anderson testified that "[n]othing was obtained physically" from that search, but the pre-diagnostic study stated that "an AR-1.300 caliber and a Mini Draco 7.62 firearm were recovered from the reputed drug house where [James] was located and arrested." Detective Anderson also testified that James had been detained back in March "with a mini Draco 7.62 firearm and an AER 1 300 caliber firearm."
Meanwhile, Detective Sullivan learned from Alan that the suspects had gone to a QT in Forest Hill right after the shooting. Police reviewed the QT's surveillance footage and identified the vehicle stopping at the QT approximately 16 minutes after the shooting. Detective Anderson identified three of the four individuals caught on the QT video exiting the vehicle and going into the store as Alan, Ashton, and James. He noted the distinctive shoes Ashton was wearing, which appeared to be the same shoes worn by one of the shooters in the apartment surveillance footage. The fourth individual's identity remained unknown at the time of the hearing but was not L.L. or M.H. Detectives showed the QT footage to James's mother, and she identified James as being one of the riders in the vehicle.
The video from QT was admitted for the record only. Again, our descriptions of what the video showed are based on Detective Anderson's testimony and the prediagnostic study.
Detective Anderson testified that the QT was roughly 15 minutes by car from the shooting location.
Police recovered the shoes through a later search warrant. Photographs of the shoes were admitted into evidence at the hearing, showing that they are blue and black in color but that the blue parts reflect light and appear white in the right lighting conditions.
Additional information surfaced when Detective Anderson located another report from April 2023, listing "Jimmy" as a potential suspect in a shooting tied to an individual named "Juke Box." Per other police reports, T.H. (a.k.a. "Juke Box") was inside a house that was shot up on April 14, 2023, and detectives working that case were given a suspect's nickname of "Little [Jimmy]." Griffin's family learned that another resident of her apartment complex had a son, T.H., who had the nickname "Juke Box." T.H.'s mother-Griffin's neighbor-was interviewed and confirmed that her son had been the subject of threats; she believed the disputes to be over "rap videos." T.H. was interviewed and denied having any disputes with anyone.
At the transfer hearing, Detective Anderson testified that "Juke's" mother lived in the same apartment complex as Griffin and that she, not Griffin, was the target of the shooting that night. Detective Anderson testified that, according to Alan, the person the brothers identified as "Jim" was the one who directed where the shooting should take place, and he testified that "Jim" was James. Other testimony at the hearing established that James's mother called him by the nickname "Jimmy."
Alan and Ashton refused to identify James as "Jim."
More specifically, James's mother called him by a nickname that is a diminutive of his first name. For purposes of our analysis, we will simply state that this familial nickname and the nickname by which Alan and Ashton referred to the would-be shooter who had said that his gun had jammed are as similar to each other as "Jimmy" and "Jim" are to one another.
III. Discussion
James's appellate argument focuses on Alan's and Ashton's "credibility issues," the inconsistencies in their stories, and conflicts between what they told police and what other evidence proved the truth to be. He contends that "the witness credibility issues in the instant case are so severe[] that a reasonable fact[]finder could not have relied upon them in determining that probable cause existed in this case." He cites no authority-from this or any other jurisdiction-stating that a witness can be so "uncredible" as a matter of law that any facts provided to law enforcement by that witness cannot support a juvenile court's probable-cause finding under Texas Family Code Section 54.02(a)(3). Regardless, the following testimony from Detective Anderson explains how a prudent person could reasonably believe-based at least in part on the facts provided by Alan and Ashton-that James committed the alleged offenses as a party:
Q. So is it fair to say some of what [Alan] was telling you such as him driving and how the vehicle came in and left the apartment complex was consistent and appeared to be truthful?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it also fair to say that some of [Alan]'s statements such as who [Jim] and [Tito] were, were not consistent?
A. True.
Q. Okay. And, again, later on you determined that the people that he's identifying as [Jim] and [Tito] were not at the shooting?
A. Correct. ....
Q. (By [the prosecutor]) So now with that information seeing [James] on that [QT] video and knowing that [Ashton] and [Alan] had both been talking about a [Jim] and [Tito], is it conceivable that the [Jim] and [Tito] they were talking about would be [James] and this other individual?
A. Correct. ....
Q. So the [Jim] and [Tito] that [Alan] and [Ashton] keep referring to, although you identified them as other individuals, it could be the same people we see on video, which is [James] and then that other unknown child, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Based on that assumption, did it appear that [Jim], which is similar to [James], was [James] and the information that [Alan] and [Ashton] were giving you?
A. Yes. ....
Q. And all the statements that you received, did it appear that four individuals went to that apartment complex; one driver, and three passengers, two of them got out of the vehicle, one shot, and then another - the second person that got out of the vehicle attempted to shoot, but claimed their gun jammed, and then they left and went to QT?
A. Correct.
Q. And based on that information it appears that there were supposed to be two different people shooting at that apartment not just one, fair?
A. Fair. Q. So even though you found only 10-millimeter rounds, there was supposed to be another weapon used?
A. Yes.
Q. And based on the information that you got that weapon was malfunctioned and was not able to be fired?
A. Correct. ....
Q. It is your belief that [Ashton], [Alan], [and James] all acted in concert in order to result in the death of Ora Fay Griffin . . ., is that fair?
A. Correct.
Q. And you base that information off of your investigation, also any ancillary reports that you would have received since then such as autopsy reports, is that fair?
A. Correct.
James relies on the initial misidentification of "Jim" as L.L. and "Tito" as M.H. and erroneously claims that "the police cleared [Jim] and [Tito] from the offense" and that "it clearly was not conceivable that . . . either [Jim or Tito] could have been" James. He also points out that Alan told Detective Anderson that he saw "Jim" shooting a 7.62 caliber rifle, but the police found 10 mm casings at the crime scene. This, James contends, further proves that Alan had no credibility up to that point, so the trial court should not have given evidentiary weight to any investigative leads developed as a result of Alan's statements to law enforcement. The foregoing testimony demonstrates that these contentions lack merit.
We must analyze this appeal "not under a criminal-law, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard but rather under a far less stringent preponderance-of-the-evidence standard; that, after all, is the only quantum of evidence that a trial court needs in this kind of proceeding." A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *1. And the record contains evidence, as we have recounted above, to warrant a prudent person's believing that (1) James targeted T.H.'s (a.k.a. "Juke Box's") mother's apartment; (2) Alan and Ashton drove to James's father's house, where they picked up two rifles-a 7.62 and a 10 mm; (3) James directed the brothers and a fourth young male to the apartment complex at which Griffin and T.H.'s mother both resided; (4) Alan drove the group to the apartment complex, where Ashton got out of the car with the 10 mm rifle and James got out with the 7.62 rifle; (5) Ashton fired at least 14 shots into Griffin's apartment, some of which hit and killed her; (6) James attempted to fire the 7.62 rifle into Griffin's apartment, but the rifle jammed; and (7) Ashton and James immediately got back into the car, and the foursome fled the scene, stopping at a QT shortly thereafter and eventually returning the rifles to James's father's house. Considering the evidence favorable to the juvenile court's probable-cause finding and disregarding all contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not, we conclude that more than a scintilla of evidence supports the trial court's finding that there was probable cause to believe that James committed the offenses alleged in the State's waiver-and-transfer petition. See D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *2; G.B., 524 S.W.3d at 914 n.13.
Further, considering all the evidence presented at the waiver-and-transfer hearing, we conclude that the juvenile court's probable-cause finding is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *4; G.B., 524 S.W.3d at 914 n.13. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court's probable-cause finding is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. See D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *4; G.B., 524 S.W.3d at 914 n.13.
Having concluded that the trial court's finding is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, we now consider whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by waiving its jurisdiction and transferring James's case. See A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *6; D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *4. The juvenile court's order reflects its conclusion that the State had met the requisite statutory criteria. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(j); see also In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554, 556-57 (Tex. 1999) (stating that all five parts of section 54.02(j) must be satisfied before a juvenile court can waive its exclusive, original jurisdiction and transfer a person to district court). The only reason James advances in contending that the juvenile court's waiver-and-transfer order was an abuse of discretion is that sufficient evidence does not support the probable-cause finding. We have concluded otherwise. We now further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by waiving its jurisdiction and transferring James's case because the record shows that it acted with reference to both the evidence and the guiding rules and principles in reaching its decision. See A.B., 2019 WL 983751, at *6; D.S., 2017 WL 3187021, at *4.
Because our standard of review is not one that calls for proof beyond a reasonable doubt but simply a preponderance of the evidence, we overrule James's issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled James's sole contention, we affirm the trial court's order.