Opinion
2018–12311 Docket No. D-14115-18
11-13-2019
In the MATTER OF JOSUE M. (Anonymous), Appellant.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Dawne Mitchell and Raymond E. Rogers of counsel) for appellant. Georgia M. Pestana, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Deborah A. Brenner and Julia Bedell of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Dawne Mitchell and Raymond E. Rogers of counsel) for appellant.
Georgia M. Pestana, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Deborah A. Brenner and Julia Bedell of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, ROBERT J. MILLER, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, the Family Court issued an order of fact-finding, made upon the appellant's admission, finding that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree. After a dispositional hearing, the court issued an order of disposition which adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for a period of 18 months.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent and placing him on probation for a period of 18 months instead of granting his request for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (see Matter of Yaakov K. , 162 A.D.3d 1028, 1028, 80 N.Y.S.3d 146 ; Matter of Shemar G. , 152 A.D.3d 591, 592, 59 N.Y.S.3d 78 ). The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the disposition in a juvenile delinquency case (see Matter of Yaakov K. , 162 A.D.3d at 1028, 80 N.Y.S.3d 146 ; Matter of Shemar G. , 152 A.D.3d at 591, 59 N.Y.S.3d 78 ; Matter of Kieron C. , 140 A.D.3d 1160, 1161, 34 N.Y.S.3d 174 ) and the appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because the instant offense was his first encounter with the law, or in light of the other mitigating factors that he cites (see Matter of Kieron C. , 140 A.D.3d at 1161, 34 N.Y.S.3d 174 ; Matter of Tafari M. , 90 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 934 N.Y.S.2d 852 ; Matter of Jonathan F. , 72 A.D.3d 963, 964, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516 ). The disposition was appropriate in light of, among other things, the seriousness of the offense, the recommendation of the Family Court Mental Health Services, and the possibility that a related Family Court Act article 10 proceeding would be dismissed and the appellant would no longer be under the supervision of the Administration for Children's Services (see Matter of Yaakov K. , 162 A.D.3d at 1028, 80 N.Y.S.3d 146 ; Matter of Shemar G. , 152 A.D.3d at 592, 59 N.Y.S.3d 78 ; Matter of Kieron C. , 140 A.D.3d 1160, 34 N.Y.S.3d 174 ; Matter of Mark G. , 131 A.D.3d 1057, 1057–1058, 17 N.Y.S.3d 148 ; Matter of Tafari M. , 90 A.D.3d 1052, 934 N.Y.S.2d 852 ; Matter of Jonathan F. , 72 A.D.3d at 964, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516 ).
DILLON, J.P., COHEN, MILLER and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.