Opinion
Nos. L15CP05-008039 A, L15CP05-008191 A
October 1, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("DCF" or the "Department") seeks termination of the parental rights ("TPR") of the respondent Mother and Father, the biological parents of Joseph W. ("Joseph") and Daniel W. ("Daniel"). Mother and Father were each represented by legal counsel throughout the proceedings and each opposed the termination of their respective parental rights.
In addition, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(k), on February 22, 2008, DCF filed a Motion to Review Permanency Plans for each of the children. In its motions, the department requested the court to review and approve plans for termination of parental rights and adoption for both of them. Mother and Father, through their counsel, filed timely objections to the motions for review of permanency plans. The hearing on the motions to review the children's permanency plans, the objections thereto and the trial on the termination of parental rights petitions were ordered consolidated by the court, Goldstein, J, on April 30, 2008. The trial on the TPR petitions and consolidated hearings on the Motion to Review Permanency Plan was held on September 4, 5, 10, 17, and 18, 2008.
The court further finds that the court has jurisdiction and there is no known action pending in any other court affecting custody of any of these children. There is no claim of Native American affiliation of any of the children.
The TPR proceedings are governed by Connecticut General Statute § 17a-112 et seq. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 242-43 (2000). If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage and, at such stage, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.
The permanency plan hearing is governed by General Statutes § 46b-129 et seq. The petitioner must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the plan is in the best interest of the child(ren).
I FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Petitioner presented 12 witnesses and 35 exhibits (Exhibits 1-30, 32 and 35-38). Mother presented 2 witnesses and two exhibits (Exhibits AA and BB). Six witnesses testified for Father and Father presented 10 exhibits (Exhibits A-C and E-K). The court granted, without objection, the Motion for Judicial Notice filed by the petitioner on September 3, 2008 and the court took notice of items 1-3, 5-6 and 8-24 listed thereon. The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial supports the finding of the following facts. Unless otherwise specified, all facts are found by clear and convincing evidence.
The court further took judicial notice of court records including court memoranda and orders made in these cases for their existence, content and legal effect. See Colin C. Tait Eliot D. Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence §§ 2.3.4(d), 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. (4th ed. 2008).
A. Procedural History
Joseph was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania to Mother and Father. Mother and Father resided, according to information provided to the hospital in Scranton, in Waterbury, Connecticut. On July 21, 2005, the third day after his birth, Joseph was taken into Emergency Protective Custody by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for transfer to the custody of DCF upon the issuance of an Order of Temporary Custody. On July 21, 2005, the Department filed in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters Petitions of Neglect and an Order of Temporary Custody regarding Joseph. The Order of Temporary Custody was granted by Goldstein, J. on July 21, 2005. On August 5, 2005, the Order of Temporary Custody was sustained by Taylor, J. at the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters located in Middletown, Connecticut, following a fully contested trial.
Daniel was born in Waterbury, Connecticut on July 20, 2006. On the same day, DCF invoked a 96-Hour Administrative Hold regarding Daniel. On July 24, 2006, the Department filed an Order of Temporary Custody and Neglect Petition in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, located in Torrington, Connecticut, regarding Daniel. The Order of Temporary Custody was granted by Trombley, J. on July 24, 2006. The Order of Temporary Custody was sustained by agreement on August 11, 2006 at the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Middletown.
On August 2, 2007 an agreement was reached in which Mother entered a written plea of nolo contendere whereupon the court, Wilson, J., after canvassing the Mother and finding a factual basis, adjudicated the children neglected at the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Middletown, Connecticut. On the same date the children were committed to the care and custody of the Department. The children have remained committed to date.
Father on November 28, 2007 filed a motion to open the adjudication of neglect and commitment of the children and a hearing was held thereon on May 16, 2008. In a written decision dated May 30, 2008, the court, Bear, J., denied the relief sought ( i.e., to open the judgments of neglect) but permitted the Father to file a further pleading to indicate his desire to seek a trial on the issue of neglect. The petitioner filed on June 16, 2008 a Motion asking the court to reconsider its May 30, 2008 order. Father filed, on June 24, 2008 a pleading requesting a trial on the issue of neglect and seeking a clarification of the court's May 30, 2008 order. The court on July 9, 2008 heard the petitioner's motion to reconsider and did not change its order. At the same hearing, the court allowed Father to have a hearing on the issue of neglect and provided that the hearing would be consolidated with the TPR trial. Father filed on August 19, 2008 a Motion for Advice and August 21, 2008 the Petitioner filed an objection such motion. Father filed on August 21, 2008 another Motion for Consideration and Petitioner filed on the same day a Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Bear, on August 25, 2008, issued a second order which (i) denied Father's Motion for separate trial or bifurcation; (ii) sustained the Petitioner's objection to Father's motion and (iii) denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration; the order provided that it "did not grant to Father any more rights than he had on August 2, 2007, after Mother pled nolo contendere to each neglect petition" and further that "[i]f the father is found to be a custodial parent of a child named in such petition on the date of such petition . . . [then] at the consolidated trial DCF has the burden of proving . . . that each such child was neglected . . ." (emphasis found in original). On the first day of the TPR trial the court heard argument and evidence on the foregoing issue. The court, on consideration of the same, found Father did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that Father was a custodial parent of Joseph or Daniel as of the date of the respective petition. On September 15, 2008, Father filed a Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Articulate. The court heard argument thereon on September 18, 2008. Father's motion and argument rested on the premise, among others, that Father acknowledged paternity and was the legal guardian of each of the children; neither of those issues were (or are) disputed. The court denied the Father's motions.
The Department filed TPR petitions with respect to both children on December 10, 2007. The petitioner amended the petitions on September 4, 2008.
During the pendency of the proceedings involving Joseph and Daniel, DCF was simultaneously pursuing the termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to a petition of April 11, 2005, with respect to her first born child, Kristina H. ("Kristina"). By decision dated January 17, 2007, the court, Bear, J., granted the petition on ground B(i) and ordered the termination of Mother's and Kristina's father's parental rights (n.b., Father is not the father of Kristina).
B. Mother
Mother is forty-one years old and the youngest of three children born to her parents. She has completed her high school education and also a medical assistance program. She has also taken some college level courses; however, despite her intentions to further her education, her history is replete with unfinished classes and programs. Her self-reported history of employment consists of various positions and demonstrates an inability to keep a job. Currently, Mother is reportedly residing with her parents and works part-time at a fast food restaurant.
Mother, while in high school, experienced a very significant medical emergency when she was diagnosed with a brain tumor. Surgery was performed to remove the tumor. It was after such removal that Mother completed high school. She subsequently had a follow-up surgery to drain the fluid which had built up in her skull. There is no evidence of further medical intervention being required to address the tumor, per se. As discussed below there has been many and varied interventions to address the mental health and/or emotional issues Mother presents — some of which may or may not have been occasioned as a result of the trauma suffered by Mother.
Her involvement with DCF began in 2002 at the time of the birth of her first child, Kristina. Kristina was removed from Mother's care prior to discharge from the hospital in which she was born due to, inter alia, concerns with Mother's mental health. Kristina was adjudicated neglected on March 15, 2004 and committed to the custody of DCF; she remained so committed until the date the TPR petition was granted as set forth above. During the pendency of Kristina's case, Mother continually denied to DCF that she was pregnant with Joseph despite her physical appearance to the contrary.
Except for the arrests resulting from a visit with Kristina in October 2006, as discussed below, Mother does not have a criminal history.
As to additional findings of fact concerning Mother's history, all of which are relevant to the instant proceedings, the court adopts the findings made by the court, Bear, J., in paragraphs 1-25 of the findings of facts set forth in the decision of In re Kristina H., 2007 Ct.Sup. 985, No L15-CP02-007724-A dated January 17, 2007 (judicial notice item 1).
Further additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
C. Father
Father reported met Mother during 2001 when she was employed as a cashier in a convenience store. They maintained a relationship after that date, although there was a reported break in the relationship during the late summer of 2007 after Mother entered her plea of nolo contendre in the neglect proceedings. Based on the testimony and the demeanor of Mother and Father during the TPR trial, they have resumed their relationship.
Father has a history of being guarded and imparts only limited information as to his past. His relationship with DCF can best be characterized as hostile. He remained wordless during his initial meeting with DCF on July 22, 2005 during which he would not even answer basic questions, including those requesting his address and phone number. Approximately three months later he reluctantly provided a minimal history to DCF. He reported being born in Connecticut on August 31, 1954 and being the second oldest of four children born to his parents; one sibling, a sister, lives in the same town as Father and a brother lives nearby. A younger brother is deceased.
Father graduated from high school at age 23; DCF gleaned from Father's high school yearbook that Father served in the U.S. Navy prior to his graduation. He has taken college level courses. His employment history includes factory machine work, construction work and work in a warehouse. Prior to Father's very recently obtained part-time employment at McDonald's, Father last worked as a stock clerk in a grocery store until he lost that job in December 2006. He currently lives in a home that was once owned by Father and his mother ("PGM") but is currently owned only by PGM. PGM and Father's grandmother also reside in the house, albeit in separate living areas.
Father has a limited criminal history with his last arrest occurring in 2002 for Assault 3rd and breach of peace arising out an incident of road rage.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
D. Joseph
Joseph was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania on July 18, 2005. His birth in Pennsylvania was as a result of Mother and Father leaving the State of Connecticut in an effort to prevent his removal by DCF. The plan was, according to Father, suggested by two attorneys and was not successful. On July 21, 2005, while still in the care of the hospital, the Pennsylvania authorities took temporary custody of Joseph due to Mother's reportedly bizarre behavior and the inconsistent and inaccurate statements made by both parents. He was on the same day delivered to the custody of DCF pursuant to an Order of Temporary Custody dated July 21, 2005. He was placed in a foster home at the time of removal and remained there until September 14, 2005 at which time he was placed with his current foster family. He is presently placed with his younger brother, Daniel and his half-sister, Kristina. Kristina has been adopted by the foster family.
There have been no concerns raised as to Joseph's physical development and he is on target with the same. His immunizations are up to date. Although he has been evaluated for Birth to Three, it has not been recommended that he receive such services. Joseph has exhibited some behavioral issues including aggression toward other children, adults and animals as well as the smearing of feces. The foster mother testified, credibly, that Joseph's behavior deteriorated when the duration of the visits with Father was extended to six hours per visit and then improved when the visits were shortened. He and the foster mother have also been receiving services to address such issues and Joseph is responding favorably.
The foster family has expressed a very strong interest and desire in adopting Joseph and Daniel. They are all quite bonded. As visitation with the parents has been consistent and on-going, Joseph is also bonded to his Father and Mother.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
E. Daniel
The second child born to Mother and Father, Daniel, was born in Torrington on July 20, 2006. DCF instituted a 96-hour hold on the same day. He was placed in a foster home on July 23, 2006. As set forth above, he is currently placed with Joseph and Kristina.
Daniel is developmentally on target and there are no reported behavioral concerns.
The current foster family desires to adopt Daniel and Joseph. Daniel appears bonded to and comfortable with his foster family. He has been visiting with Mother and Father on a consistent basis; he appears to enjoy his visits with Mother and Father and to be bonded to them.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
F. Specific Steps:
Specific steps (Exhibits 4-7) were ordered by the court and signed by the respondents. The court finds the following with respect to the parents' compliance with the steps:
As to Mother: Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem and keep your whereabouts known to DCF.Mother did not for the period of July 2005 to October 2006 provide the Department with a consistent address, telephone number, and times when she could be available for home visits. Since October 2006 Mother has been compliant with this step. Mother currently resides with her parents.
Participate in counseling (parenting and individual) and make progress toward identified treatment goals. The specific goals identified for Mother were: to learn safe, responsible and appropriate child care; address psychiatric problems, mental health and emotional concerns; comply with all psychotropic medication regimens; and other goals were to be determined by DCF and service providers. Mother has failed to satisfy this step.Prior to the removal of Joseph and Daniel, Mother engaged in treatment with Heather Toll, Ph.D., between April 12, 2004 and April 20, 2005 at which time Dr. Toll was, for reasons unrelated to Mother, disengaging from providing services to Mother. Earlier, in January of 2005, Dr. Toll had referred Mother to the Family Intervention Center in Waterbury for medication management. In April 2005 when Dr. Toll ceased treating Mother, Mother's case was transferred to Family Intervention Center. Mother failed to attend scheduled appointments and, as a result, she was discharged by the Center in November of 2005. She also failed to cooperate with medication management services with the Family Intervention Center.
In February 2006, DCF referred Mother to Dr. Anthony Campagna for psychotherapy. Mother was unwilling to attend sessions with Dr. Campagna as she felt his office was too far away; his office was located in Hamden. DCF offered to reimburse Mother for mileage. Mother continued to decline to engage in services with Dr. Campagna.
Mother engaged in individual counseling services at Thomaston Counseling with Sally Guest, LPC between approximately May 2006 and October 2006. Ms. Guest was not recommended to Mother by DCF. Dr. Humphrey, who conducted court-ordered evaluations of Mother, opined that Ms. Guest was unlikely to pick up on Mother's issues due to Ms. Guest's assumed lack of training in neuropsychology and her methods of therapy which did not include an element of confrontation which Dr. Humphrey felt would be required to effectively treat Mother's presenting issues. (Exhibit 9, unnumbered page 20.)
Mother had also been evaluated by Dr. Logan Green. Dr. Green's evaluation recommended a medication review to address his diagnosis of Mother's attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"). DCF provided a copy of such evaluation to Ms. Guest. To address such recommendation, Ms. Guest referred Mother to an APRN at Thomaston. Mother was advised by the APRN that she did not have the proper credentials so as to be able to treat Mother. Ms. Guest subsequently confirmed the same to DCF and advised that Mother needed to be treated by a psychiatrist. Ms. Guest was unable to effectuate a referral to a psychiatrist. DCF continued to refer Mother to The Family Intervention Center for psychiatric treatment and medication management. Mother chose neither to engage in such treatment nor to accept the medication management.
In September 2006 Mother attempted to engage in treatment and medication management with Dr. Jeremy August; Dr. August had been engaged with Mother on a sporadic basis during the prior four years. Dr. August did not provide ongoing treatment services for Mother.
During December 2006, DCF referred Mother to Comprehensive Neurological Services, located in Cheshire, Connecticut. On February 2, 2007, Mother began counseling services with Dr. Brett Steinberg, Ph.D., from Comprehensive Neurological Services. Mother was subsequently discharged from this service in October of 2007, due to failing to attend scheduled appointments.
As more particularly set forth below, Father was referred by DCF to Dr. Warren Corson, III for services. Although the referral did not include Mother, Dr. Corson permitted Mother to attend sessions with Father. Mother attended such services until August 2007 at which time she was unable to attend due to Father being upset with her due to her plea at the time of the neglect adjudication.
In August 2006, DCF referred Mother to the McCall Foundation's PEAS Program for parent education and assessment service. The assigned parent educator, Maria Coutant-Skinner testified that Mother failed to recognize the need for goals. The program was designed to last only 12 months however it was extended to allow the parents additional time to improve their parenting skills. The services ceased in December 2006 due to Mother's failure to make progress. Thereafter, in February 2007, the Program re-engaged with Mother. Mother was inconsistent in keeping scheduled appointments, but she did make some progress in her goals (which included moving toward independence) as evidenced by her securing employment. The PEAS Program discontinued services in November 2007 due to Mother's failure to make adequate progress with regard to identified goals.
DCF engaged Delta-T Group to provide supervision of the visits with the children. Mother cooperated with the Delta-T Group as to the scheduling of the weekly supervised visits but was at times hostile, argumentative, and resistant to parenting interventions. During visitation Mother demonstrated that she struggled to care for Joseph and Daniel; she demonstrated poor judgment and inadequate disciplinary skills, including a lack of understanding the importance of consistent and timely discipline. The service providers have had to intervene during the visits to keep the children safe — in one instance Mother lost sight of her child for more than 5 minutes during a visit and, in another instance, Mother proceeded to chase her 2-year-old son through the mall while leaving her 1-year-old son with a stranger. Despite the occurrence of incidents that should have served to prove to her that she was in need of services, Mother continued to deny her need for assistance and supervision which, if received and implemented, would have assisted her in developing an ability to provide safe and nurturing parenting for the children.
Currently, Mother is attending sessions with Rachel Sampson, PhD. DCF did not provide the referral to Dr. Sampson. Other than an invoice outlining dates for office visits for psychotherapy as set forth on Exhibit AA, no further evidence was submitted of the consistency, methodology and effectiveness of the therapy.
Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.
As set forth above, Mother's acceptance of and cooperation with the in-home services to which she was referred by DCF was inconsistent; the PEAS program, in particular, was discontinued due to Mother's failure to make progress.
Cooperate with Court-ordered evaluations or testing and follow recommendations.
On August 3, 2004, Mother engaged in a sleep disorder evaluation with Dr. Daniel P. McNally, M.D. at the UCONN Health Center in Farmington, Connecticut. Dr. McNally confirmed a diagnosis of narcolepsy and made several recommendations which included a sleep schedule, medication, and educational component. Mother was further recommended to secure services with a physician experienced in sleep disorders and follow recommendations about behavioral and medication issues. Mother was referred to a respiratory physician but Mother preferred to have her own psychiatrist prescribe medication for her. Mother was seen by such psychiatrist for one visit in 2003, but not thereafter. (Finding of fact 23 In re Kristina H.) There is no evidence that Mother has successfully followed up on the recommendations made to address the narcolepsy.
On August 1, 2005 and August 12, 2005, Mother participated in a psychological evaluation with Dr. Deborah Gruen, PhD (Exhibit 15). Dr. Gruen recommended that Mother needed to manage and treat her narcolepsy aggressively through medication and sleep regulation. Dr. Gruen stated that Mother's compliance with treatment should be monitored.
On August 3, 2005, Mother engaged in a psychiatric evaluation with Dr. David A. Krulee, M.D. (Exhibit 12). Dr. Krulee diagnosed Mother with Axis I: Major Depression, recurrent, severe, with a history of mood incongruent psychotic features, with post partum exacerbation, currently in partial to full remission and Personality Change Due to Sequelae of Brain Tumor removal, combined type, including features of both paranoid type, empathetic type, and unspecified type (non-verbal processing problems related to non dominant frontal lobe dysfunction). (Exhibit 12, page 10.)
On January 6, 2006, Mother engaged in a neuropsychological evaluation with Dr. Logan L. Green, Ph.D. (Exhibit 20). Dr. Green diagnosed Mother with ADHD. He recommended that she receive psycho-educational and psychopharmacological intervention with regard to the diagnosis of adult ADHD and that her narcolepsy be addressed. He concluded, "The extent of her personality dysfunction (whether it be the Axis I form suggested by Dr. Krulee or the Axis II form suggested by the other evaluators or both) will be more amenable to treatment once her attentional difficulties have responded to treatment." (Exhibit 20, Page 11.) He also opined that" . . . difficulty in organizing her life in both major and minor ways can be expected due to poor planning . . . These are all difficulties which can be expected to impair her ability to discharge child care responsibilities in a timely manner." (Exhibit 20, page 11.)
On September 26, 2006, Dr. Stephen M. Humphrey, Ph.D. conducted a court-ordered psychological evaluation of Father and Mother. (Exhibit 9.) As is clear from the above, Mother was the subject of numerous evaluations performed by other professionals. Dr. Humphrey observed that "[r]egardless of the conception of the genesis of [Mother's] problems, the features of her presentation have been clearly described . . ." and he recommended Mother and Father "consult together with a psychotherapist . . ." (emphasis in original, exhibit 9, last page).
Following Dr. Humphrey's evaluation, DCF referred Mother to Comprehensive Neurological Services. On February 2, 2007, Mother began counseling services with Dr. Brett Steinberg, Ph.D., from Comprehensive Neurological Services. Mother was subsequently discharged from this service in October of 2007, due to failing to attend scheduled appointments.
Although not referred for individual counseling services with Dr. Warren Corson, III, Ph.D., Mother attended family counseling with Father, with Dr. Corson. Mother ceased attending sessions with Dr. Corson after Mother and Father had a disagreement arising from Mother's plea in the neglect proceedings for Joseph and Daniel.
Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this court. Mother did not sign a release for her neurolologist Dr. Roger Bobowick when requested to do so by DCF during the pendency of Kristina's case. Mother did sign subsequent releases.Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.
Mother reports her address and place of residence to be with her parents. Ms. Coutant-Skinner testified that one of the goals set by the PEAS program which Mother failed to meet was to obtain independent housing.
Mother has a history of very short-term employment. Despite her history of an inability to retain a job, Mother denied ever being referred to human resources at any employer. Mother worked at the Patco convenience store/gas station for a few years with her employment ending in sometime around November 2004. It is not clear if she quit or was fired from this position. Mother thereafter worked at a convenience store in Bristol, Connecticut in October of 2007. She is currently working part-time at a McDonald's.
Do not violate the laws of this state, any other state, any district or territory of the United States or the laws of the United States.
Except as set forth below, Mother has been compliant with this step.
On October 10, 2006 an incident occurred during a visit at the DCF office in Torrington, Connecticut, wherein Mother allegedly pushed DCF social worker, Kathy Dayner, against the wall while Ms. Dayner was attempting to carry Kristina out of the visitation room. On the same day Mother was arrested and charged with Risk of Injury to a Minor and Assault 3. In July 2007 Mother was re-arrested for Failure to Appear. She was incarcerated for several days after the warrant for her re-arrest was served. These charges are currently pending. The court issued criminal Protective Orders against Mother for the benefit of Ms. Dayner and Kristina. The court further ordered Mother to not be in the vicinity of the foster home where her children reside.
Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs including but not limited to, keeping the child's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric or educational providers. Attend regularly scheduled pediatric appointments. Mother has attended two pediatric appointments with Joseph and Daniel.Visit the child as often as DCF permits.
Mother has been consistent with this step — to the extent that she has been permitted visitation. Mother's visitation was suspended after the October 10, 2006 arrests after the assigned DCF social worker, Ms. Dayner, and two DCF social worker case aides, Ms. Evelyn Bodor and Ms. Sandra Ruscoe, filed affidavits with the Superior Court in Juvenile Matters in Torrington, describing the incident and DCF moved to suspend Mother's visitation pending the results of a psychiatric evaluation to determine her capacity to provide a safe visiting environment for her children and others involved in visitation. As a result, the court granted an ex-parte order to suspend Mother's visitation with all of her children on October 11, 2006. Mother resumed visitation with the children on January 2, 2007, following a hearing on the matter.
Establish residence separately from father. Mother not to be in father's residence from 10 p.m. to 8 a.m. Comply with medications management as prescribed to address ADHD, narcolepsy, and personality disorder. Follow recommendations of UCONN sleep study.Currently Mother is in compliance with the first part of this step as she resides with her parents. Prior to August of 2007, she was a regular presence in the father's home when DCF arrived with the children for visits. DCF believes Mother failed to comply with the Step requiring that she be absent from Father's home between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m. as Mother's car was observed at Father's home after 10 p.m. on February 7, 2007, March 3, 2007 and March 10, 2007. DCF did not, however, observe Mother in the home on any of those times.
Mother has not otherwise complied with this step. There is no evidence that she is currently and consistently receiving medication for ADHD or that she is in compliance with the recommendations made as a result of the sleep study conducted at UCONN.
Other miscellaneous steps.
The specific steps included other obligations for Mother which, in this case, are either inapplicable or were complied with by Mother. For example, there is no indication that Mother is engaging in substance abuse; nor is she known to using illegal drugs or medication not prescribed for her use by a qualified healthcare provider; and Mother has maintain the children within the state of Connecticut during the duration of this case.
As to Father: Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem.Father, during the period of July 20, 2005 to October 16, 2006, refused DCF and service providers access to the actual apartment in which he resided as he allowed access only to PGM's apartment. Father consistently refused Ms. Coutant-Skinner, the PEAS worker, access to his home. Father did not demonstrate to the service providers during any home visits that Father's actual residence would provide a safe and nurturing environment for the children.
On January 8, 2007, Father was not present for a scheduled visit with the children as Father was attending trial on the termination of Mother's parental rights to Kristina. On August 3, 2007, during a visit scheduled by Mother to be held at Father's home, the site of the earlier visits by both parents, Father ordered Mother and the DCF social worker, off of his property.
Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child.
At the time of Joseph's birth, Father provided the hospital in Scranton with an address for him in Waterbury (Exhibit 32). DCF was not able to verify that Father ever resided at such address. Not until October 2006 did Father provide DCF with an address — which is not in Waterbury. He has since then been compliant with this step.
Participate in counseling (Parenting and Individual) and make progress toward identified goals. Father's specific goals were to learn safe, responsible and appropriate child care with other goals to be determined by DCF and service providers.Father has not complied with this step.
Between July 2005 and November 2006, Father was provided with copies of his specific steps and was referred to several agencies for individual counseling; letters were sent to Father by DCF stating his need to engage in individual counseling and including offers of assistance in fulfilling the court-ordered steps to Father. In February 2006, during a court-ordered evaluation, Father stated to Dr. Stephen Humphrey, Ph.D., that the only service he had been ordered to engage in was parenting education classes. Father did attend parenting classes as evidenced by a certificate of perfect attendance in the Family Ties Parenting with Care Class (Exhibit K).
On November 11, 2006, services with Dr. Warren Corson III, PhD were initiated. To assess Father's needs, Dr. Corson met with Father four times. Thereafter, Dr. Corson recommended that Father could benefit from individual and family therapy to help address issues relating to DCF involvement and related adjustment issues. Dr. Corson further diagnosed Father with an Axis II Personality Disorder NOS. Father continued to express that he did not feel the need for this service and did not re-schedule further appointments with Dr. Corson until February 2, 2007. In October 2007, Dr. Corson discharged Father from services due to his failure to maintain regularly scheduled appointments. Father maintained that transportation issues prevented him from attending his appointments. On October 30, 2007, Dr. Corson agreed to resume services for Father under specific conditions that were made known to Father. The Department provided Father transportation to his counseling appointments. On November 13, 2007, Father re-engaged in services with Dr. Corson and stated to the doctor, among other things, that he did not want to attend counseling services. He was discharged as a result.
On November 21, 2006, Father participated in an initial home visit with the Northwest Center, Parent Aide Program. Father presented as unreceptive and distracted during a home visit during December 2006. Father articulated annoyance at having to answer hypothetical parenting questions and requested that the meeting be held at times different than the visits with his children. To address Father's concerns, the program modified their involvement to include one scheduled visit with and one without the children. The service providers advised DCF that Father had a difficult time setting goals and developing a treatment plan for himself as Father believed he did not need help parenting his children as he possessed strong and appropriate parenting skills and he was only engaging in the service upon the advice of his attorney. The parent Aide Program reported to the Department on February 12, 2007 that they would be closing Father's case as they felt the program was ineffective for Father.
Commencing in August 2006, Father participated in parenting services with the McCall Foundation PEAS Program. The program is designed to run for one year. The program worker, Ms. Coutant-Skinner reported Father did, in general, play with and engage his children appropriately during the visits she observed. Father's parenting deficits arose due to his resistance to cooperating fully with the program and the program's outlined goals — he denied the worker access to his own apartment so that she could measure his progress, if any, in creating a home for his children, he failed to maintain scheduled appointments and to make future appointments regularly. At the end of the initial twelve-month term of the program, the assigned parenting support worker reported minimal progress with respect to Father's goal achievement. The program was extended beyond its initial twelve-month term in an effort to further assist Father in meeting his goals. In November of 2007, Father's participation in the PEAS Program was discontinued due to his failure to make adequate gains toward identified goals.
In December 2006, the Department engaged Delta-T Group to provide supervision and parenting instruction during the parent child visits. Initially cooperative, Father has over time demonstrated oppositional and passive aggressive behaviors when offered suggestions on how to better meet his children's needs during visits. Father provided care for his children during his twice weekly supervised visits in his home. Father exhibited behaviors that did not address his children's needs at times, for example, he resisted disciplining Joseph and failed to provide adequate parenting interventions when needed, failed to recognize the need to get them out of the hot sun, allowed them to wander too close to a busy traffic area, resisted having his son Joseph fed in a high chair when it was developmentally appropriate that he do so and he was repeatedly oppositional when asked to provide his children with a nap and routine during visits.
Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.
See above for the discussion of Father's compliance and non-compliance with this step.
Recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment including but not limited to: Service providers to be determined by DCF service providers. CT Page 15795 Father has failed to substantially comply with this step. DCF has referred Father to The Family Intervention Center, Charlotte Hungerford Behavioral Health Center, Family Strides program and Family Services of Greater Waterbury. Father did not involve himself at any of these agencies. For example, he attended an initial appointment at the Family Intervention Center in October 2005, but refused to fill out basic paperwork and the agency could not proceed. He was told he could be seen if he cooperated with completing the necessary paperwork. Father reported that he did not want to be there, did not need to be there and he found the questions offense. Father did not return to the Family Intervention Center.Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing and follow recommendations.
Father has failed to fulfill this step. He attended the court-ordered appointment with Dr. Stephen Humphrey, Ph.D., on February 3, 2006 although the evaluation was delayed as Father would not speak to Dr. Humphrey until his attorney was present. Father did not advise Dr. Humphrey or DCF of his request to have his attorney present until the start of the appointment. The attorney was contacted and did arrive about one hour into the appointment. Dr. Humphrey, during the evaluation, administered the Personality Assessment Inventory ("PAI") to provide information on critical client variables that he deems central for the treatment planning, implementation and evaluation of a client. Father's profile was "entirely invalid." (Exhibit 8, page 7.) Father's score on the PAI was construed by Dr. Humphrey as being an attempt by Father to present himself as "extraordinarily free of common faults . . ." (Exhibit 8, page 7.) Dr. Humphrey made several specific recommendations in his evaluation regarding steps he wanted Father to take in order to proceed with a reunification plan. These included informing DCF of his specific childcare plan including alternate caregivers and allowing DCF into his home to determine the suitability for the children's care. Following the evaluation, DCF sent two written requests to Father, on April 21, 2006 and June 9, 2006, requesting this plan. Father did not provide the Department with his childcare plan until approximately 8 months after Dr. Humphrey's recommendation and he has not provided access to his home to allow for a determination of its suitability for the children's care.
On September 26, 2006, Dr. Humphrey conducted a second court-ordered psychological evaluation of Father and Mother. Dr. Humphrey recommended that Mother and Father consult together with a psychotherapist experienced in treating individuals with a history of neuropsychological deficits. He reported that the nature of this consultation would be to help instruct both adults as to Mother's condition, assess their understanding and integration of this knowledge, and, if successful to that point, help them develop strategies and coping mechanisms that would minimize interpersonal conflict and provide for effective supervision of the children. He recommended Mother and Father engage in a clinical environment designed to assist both parents in better understanding Mother's mental health and medical issues. He further stated that Father should continue to engage in parenting education services with the PEAS Program. Father has failed to follow the recommendations of Dr. Humphrey.
Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this Court.Father has been compliant with this step although he initially failed to fully comply with this request when he refused to sign a release for the Family Ties parent education class.
Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.
Father shares a home with PGM and his grandmother. The adequacy of his apartment has not been demonstrated.
As to securing and maintaining adequate income, prior to December 8, 2006, Father was employed as a night Stock Clerk in a grocery store. He lost that job when he chose to attend a concert instead of going to work. Father remained unemployed until he recently obtained part-time work at McDonald's.
Father also receives Social Security disability payments. He has stated that his disability arose from an automobile accident and is a permanently disabling injury to his cervical disks. Father reported to Dr. Humphrey in the court-ordered evaluation on February 3, 2006 that he experiences pain "constantly." (Exhibit 8, page 5.) DCF has asked Father to sign a release for Social Security records to confirm his disability and Father has not provided the same. Notwithstanding his disability, Father participated in the riding of BMX bikes as a hobby. Father testified that he continues to ride BMX bikes although, unlike the depiction of Father doing so in Exhibit 38, he doesn't go over jumps.
Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs including but not limited to, keeping the child's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric or educational providers. Attend regularly scheduled pediatric appointments.Father has attended two pediatric appointments with Joseph and Daniel. Father failed to attend a scheduled pediatric appointment on April 24, 2007.
Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child.Since November 2006 at which time DCF became aware of the composition of Father's household, Father has been relatively compliant with this step although DCF believes that Mother has occasionally resided with Father in violation of court-ordered steps.
Visit the child as often as DCF permits.
Father has been compliant with this step. Father initially had two visits a week for 2 hours at a time. After Dr. Humphrey's first evaluation of February 3, 2006, visits were expanded to two times per week for 6 hours with such visits. The duration of the visits was later reduced.
Other miscellaneous steps.
The specific steps included other obligations for Father which, in this case, are either inapplicable or were complied with by Father. For example, Father was not to be involved or have further involvement with the criminal justice system and he has not had any such involvement. Father was also not to engage in substance abuse and there is no evidence that he has done so. Father has also maintained the children within the State of Connecticut during the duration of this case.
II ADJUDICATION Termination of Parental Rights
The Department seeks to terminate the rights of the Mother and Father to Joseph and Daniel.
As to Mother, the Department is alleging two grounds specifically § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) and as to Father, the Department alleges one ground, specifically § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). Only one ground needs to be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), supra, 194 Conn. 258; In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106 (1994), aff'd., 40 Conn.App. 73 (1996).
The court has considered the petitions, the credible evidence, including testimony and exhibits presented, and the arguments of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of the Mother and Father in both children.
A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "The court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47 (2005). Further, the court need not make such finding if at a prior hearing it was determined pursuant to § 17a-11b that such efforts are not required.
"The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof." Id. at 48. "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619 (2007); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). In re Shaiesha O., the Appellate Court held that the court must look to events prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made, 93 Conn.App. 42, 47 887 A.2d 415 (2005).
The evidence is clear and convincing that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate and reunify Mother and Father with their children. DCF made numerous, specific and repeated referrals to various service providers. Specifically, DCF made the following referrals and re-referrals for Mother: Connecticut Resource Group, Dr. Heather Toll, Ph.D. for individual counseling services; Family Intervention Center for individual counseling services and medication management; Dr. Anthony Campagna Ph.D. for individual counseling services; Dr. Brett Steinberg, Ph.D., for individual counseling services; Northwest Center for Families and Mental Health-Parent Aide services; and McCall Foundation, Parent Education and Assessment Services (PEAS). DCF specifically made the following referrals and re-referrals for Father: Family Intervention Center for individual counseling; Charlotte Hungerford Behavioral Health Center for individual counseling; Family Strides Program for parenting classes; Family Services of Greater Waterbury for individual counseling; Northwest Center for Families and Mental Health-Parent Aide services; McCall Foundation, PEAS; Family Intervention Center for Counseling services; and Dr. Warren Corson III, Ph.D. for individual counseling services.
Mother and Father repeatedly failed, by their own volition, to engage in and take advantage of the services offered by DCF. The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Father with Joseph and Daniel. The fact that these efforts did not result in reunification with the children is due to the decisions, actions, and omissions of the respondent parents. The court further finds, by clear and convincing evidence, Mother and Father are unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.
B. Termination of Mother's and Father's Parental Rights under Ground B(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondent Mother's and Father's parental rights to Joseph and Daniel should be terminated because each has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
On August 2, 2007 Joseph and Daniel were each adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of DCF. Thus, the critical issue for this court is whether respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for Joseph and Daniel within a reasonable period of time.
Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in her child's life. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).
In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85 (2000). In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. Id. "Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998).
In assessing rehabilitative progress, the question is not simply how far the parent has come, but have they come far enough to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, the parent can assume his role as parent in the life of the child. In re Stanley D. 61 Conn.App. 224, 230. See also, In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694 (2000)). Further, the court may, in considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may assume or resume within a reasonable time a useful role in the child's life, rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the termination of parental rights petition. In re Stanley D., supra, 230. Additionally, the court, in assessing the ability of the respondent parent may make inquiry into the full history of the respondent's parenting abilities. See, In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999).
As to Mother: With the above standards as the court's parameters, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has failed to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, she could resume her role as a parent for Joseph and Daniel. At the time of the neglect adjudications, Mother's presenting problems arose from her failure to address her mental issues and a lack of parenting and life skills.
Mother has not been compliant with the specific steps requiring her to participate in counseling and follow the recommendations of the court-ordered evaluations, among others. Mother has been generally compliant with several steps, including visiting the children when permitted to do so, however, the others steps with which she has complied are rendered inconsequential due to her failure to engage in and benefit from with the services, therapies and programs made available to her. There has been a consistent pattern of Mother failing to follow recommendations from court evaluators to address her psychiatric problems, mental health and emotional concerns. She has failed to obtain and follow up with appropriate medication management. Her efforts to self-regulate her narcolepsy have not been successful. The court observed Mother having difficulty remaining awake and focused during court proceedings.
Mother has not demonstrated that she has improved her ability to safely parent and care for her children despite having attending parenting classes and the institution of the PEAS program. Mother demonstrated her lack of progress by failing to adequately supervise her children including an incident at a mall in which Joseph bolted from Mother and Mother proceeded to leave one-year-old Daniel with a total stranger while she ran off though the mall to corral Joseph. She has failed to learn and employ safe, responsible and appropriate child care methods. She has further demonstrated no ability to maintain gainful employment and live independently.
By all accounts months of personal therapy and professional help will be required to deal with her psychological problems. Dr. Steinberg in August 2007 opined that "[d]ue to chronicity, severity, and pervasiveness of symptoms, treatment expected to be a gradual and long term process that could task as long as several years. Under ideal circumstances, i.e., active and sustained engagement in therapy with full utilization of coaching resources, prognosis would be guarded. If patient failed to develop greater awareness and remained other-focuses and skeptical about treatment, prognosis would be poor." (Exhibit 28, page 3.) Dr. Steinberg a few months thereafter, in November 2007, terminated the psychotherapy with Mother due to her failure to actively participate in treatment. (Exhibit 29.) The court cannot make decisions for these children's future based upon the hope of parental rehabilitation, but must predicate decisions on successful completion of counseling and parental training or on demonstrated competence.
As to Father: Applying the standards set forth above, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Father has failed to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, he could assume a role as a parent for Joseph and Daniel.
Father continues to reside in a home owned by PGM. He collects disability payments yet engages in BMX bike riding. He works sporadically and is currently working only part-time. He has not obtained his own bank account and he continues to comingle his assets with PGM. He has not demonstrated that he has created a safe and nurturing home for his children.
Father did visit consistently. However, as is apparent from the service providers' reports and testimony Father would not accept their assistance nor benefit from their interventions. He made minimal progress in achieving goals that had been set which, if realized, would have demonstrated progress in the establishment of a safe and nurturing environment for the children. Expressing love for a child during visits is vastly different from being able to care for the day to day needs of the child. Father has not demonstrated an ability to do so.
Father did not make himself available to DCF when Joseph was removed; he failed to speak or engage with DCF for fifteen months after the removal of Joseph. In explanation of such behavior, Father reported that he was advised by his counsel to exercise his right to remain silent. While he undoubtedly had the right to do so, Father's election to do so prevented any meaningful communication with him which clearly and obviously hindered Father's rehabilitation. After he decided to speak with DCF, when he did so, he was rude, hostile and terse.
Notwithstanding Father's refusal to engage, DCF, appropriately and in compliance with the court-ordered steps, referred Father to numerous services. Father did not take advantage of the same. Once Father did engage with DCF, he indicated a willingness to engage in services and to do what was necessary to reunify with this children. In an example of actions speaking louder than words, Father was repeatedly discharged from services for his failure to engage in the programs and services offered. He was resistant to clinical intervention, reporting that he did not need the same even though there were repeated recommendations from clinical professionals that Father obtain in and participate in therapy. Further, in contradiction of observations made by several health professionals, he continued to deny and minimize Mother's psychiatric and mental health needs. Dr. Humphrey stated that "[h]is adamant defense of [Mother] is augmented by a substantial amount of paranoia regarding how others will interpret his statements and actions." (Exhibit 9, 5th unnumbered page.)
Father, according to Dr. Corson, does not feel that he needs therapy and believes there is nothing wrong with him or anything in need of change nor does Father believe therapy or psychotherapy are legitimate. Based on Father's self-reported beliefs, Dr. Corson concluded that further therapeutic interventions would be fruitless. (Exhibit 25.)
If the fulfillment of the specific steps is to be more than empty enticements, then, correspondingly, the failure to complete them must carry serious weight in assessing parental rehabilitation. The court must decide if the parents have met their requirements to attend the services and whether they have benefitted from the same to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, they will be in a position to resume parenting responsibilities for these children. In the case of Joseph and Daniel, the court finds the parents have not done so. In making this assessment the court finds the parents have not accepted that their personal conduct and shortcomings resulted in the removal of the children. They have not accepted responsibility for their acts and omissions and continue to blame others, specifically DCF, for their situation. Despite recommendations and referrals for services, neither parent has sufficiently engaged in or benefited from the identified services designed to promote rehabilitation and strengthen their parenting abilities. Mother and Father consistently sabotaged efforts made by others to assist each of them in rehabilitating themselves so as to allow for to reunification with the children.
Neither Mother nor Father have, respectively, demonstrated that they are capable, singly or together, of resuming the role of a responsible parent within a reasonable time considering Joseph's and Daniel's needs and ages and neither has demonstrated any ability to rehabilitate themselves so as to allow any belief that she or he could, in any reasonable time, assume a role as a parent for Joseph and/or Daniel.
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, the court finds the petitioner has met her burden and proven Ground B(i), the "failure to rehabilitate" ground, by clear and convincing evidence.
C. Termination of Mother's Parental Rights under Ground E
The Commissioner has further alleged as a ground for termination that Mother has failed to rehabilitate herself after her children have been previously adjudicated as neglected and her parental rights of other child were previously terminated. This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) states in part: "[t]he Superior Court . . . may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected . . . is unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Child and Families."
As set forth above, Joseph and Daniel were adjudicated neglected on August 2, 2007. Joseph was born on July 20, 2005 and Daniel was born on July 18, 2005 and so each is found to be less than seven years of age. Mother had her parental rights terminated as to a child, Kristina on January 17, 2007 (Judicial notice, item 1.)
In determining whether Mother has achieved a degree of personal rehabilitation, sufficient to encourage a belief that she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children, the court adopts the definitions, meanings, and findings set forth above in the discussion of Ground B(i) as it has been applied to Mother.
The credible evidence in this case, presented through the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits presented and as found by the court above, clearly and convincingly establishes that Mother has not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that she could, within any reasonable time, assume a responsible position in the lives of these children.
Accordingly, the court finds the petitioner has met her burden and proven Ground E by clear and convincing evidence.
To conclude, the petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more statutory grounds exist for the termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights to their children Joseph and Daniel. Having so determined, the court must next consider whether clear and convincing evidence has been presented that it is in the best interests of the child that the parental rights of the biological parents to their children be terminated.
III DISPOSITION
During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether "termination is in the best interests of the child." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103, 758 A.2d 863, cert. den. 255 Conn. 903, CT Page 15805 762 A.2d 909 (2000). Except when the termination of parental rights is based on the consent of the parent "[i]n arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528 (2001) (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833 (1999)). The court, having read the verified petitions and exhibits and having weighed the testimony, makes the following seven written findings by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered services to the children. The court further finds DCF offered many services to Mother and Father to address the presenting issues of each and to provide for reunification of the family. The results have already been discussed. Neither parent regrettably attained the benefit from services necessary to appropriately nurture and parent the children or be a resource for them.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order, the court finds specific steps were ordered for the respondents. As set forth above, Mother and Father were generally non-compliant with the majority of the steps — in particular they were non-compliant with the steps requiring that they make progress toward specific and identified goals. They were compliant with the steps having, in this proceeding, somewhat lesser import. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such children's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the children for at least one year and with whom the children have developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the children do have some positive feelings and emotional ties to Mother and Father. Joseph and Daniel have a strong bond with each other, with their half-sister, Kristina H. and with their current foster family with whom they have lived since September 14, 2005 and July 23, 2006, respectively. The children have adjusted well to their placements although Joseph has demonstrated some behavioral issues which are being addressed by the foster mother. The foster mother is providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the children need. The foster mother is fully committed to these children and would like to adopt them.
There was inquiry made by counsel for the respondent parents during the trial as to whether DCF investigated relatives of the parents as placement resources: Mother did offer her parents as a potential resource for Joseph and Daniel; however, in March 2004, in connection with Kristina's placement, the court determined the maternal grandparents were not suitable. The Department subsequently did not review maternal grandparents as a suitable resource for Joseph and Daniel. Neither of the maternal grandparents visits the children regularly, despite being offered the opportunity. Father did not offer any family member as a placement resource for the children.
(5) As to the ages of the children: Joseph was born on July 20, 2005 and he is approximately three years and three months old. Daniel was born on July 18, 2006 and he is approximately two years and three months old.
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the children as part of an effort to reunite the children with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the children; the court finds Mother and Father have maintained contact with the children on a consistent basis. However, the court further finds Mother and Father have presented as openly defiant regarding the need to engage in services offered to strengthen their abilities to care for their children. They failed to engage in services within a timely manner and to make any meaningful progress regarding their abilities to achieve identified goals. The parents have failed to follow treatment recommendations and have over the course of this case denied any personal responsibility for the cause of the children's removal from their care. The court finds giving Mother and Father additional time would not likely enable either parent to modify their condition to make it in the best interest of the children to be reunited with either of them. See In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989).
As of September 19, 2008, Joseph has been in the care of DCF for approximately three and one-quarter years and Daniel for two and one-quarter years. These children deserve permanency and Mother and Father, by virtue of their inactions, have not shown sufficient progress in their respective rehabilitation to allow the court to form any reasonable belief that they will be capable of assuming a responsible position in their children's lives within any reasonable time. The court further notes that the children's attorney advocated for the termination of parents' parental rights.
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parent(s) or third parties. Further, while the parents' financial condition is limited, economic factors did not prevent the parents from rehabilitating themselves.
In addition to considering the evidence presented in this case, the court has also considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the children including the children's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability, continuity of their environment, their length of stay in foster care, the nature of their relationship with the foster and biological parents and the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). As the Appellate court noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on your children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander, supra, at 748. The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). The court finds these children require the stability of placement and continuity of care. Based upon all of the foregoing, the court by clear and convincing evidence finds termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father is in the best interest of Joseph and Daniel.
IV REVIEW OF PERMANENCY PLANS
The Department further seeks to have the court approve the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. The respondent parents timely filed objections to such plan.
General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Nine months after placement of the child or youth in the care and custody of the commissioner . . . or removal of the child . . . pursuant to section 17a-101g or an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, whichever is earlier, the commissioner shall file a motion for review of a permanency plan." The court is required to hold a permanency hearing even absent an objection. The department has the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1). At a permanency hearing held in accordance with this provision, the court shall approve a permanency plan that "is in the best interests of the child . . . and takes into consideration the child's . . . need for permanency. The child's . . . health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan." General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2).
Having considered the evidence presented at the consolidated permanency plan hearing and the termination of parental rights trial, the court hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence the plans for termination of parental rights and adoption are in the best interests of Joseph and Daniel.
The court hereby approves the plans filed on February 22, 2008 for both children, which call for the termination of their parents' rights so the children may be placed for adoption. The respondent Mother's and Father's objections are overruled.
The court further finds DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plans.
V ORDERS
It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Mother to Joseph and Daniel are hereby terminated.
It is further, ORDERED, that the parental rights of Father to Joseph and Daniel are hereby terminated.
The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Joseph and Daniel.
The Commissioner will file such reports as shall be required by law on a timely basis.
The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of each of these children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Torrington of the date when any such adoption is finalized.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered this 1st day of October 2008.