Opinion
Nos. L15-CP04-007932-A, L15-CP04-007933-A
September 15, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On August 2, 2004, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") filed petitions alleging that Joseph and Matthew L. were permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. On the same date, Orders of Temporary Custody ("OTC") were issued by the court (Brunetti, J.) as to both children who remain in DCF care. On May 17, 2005, DCF filed petitions pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Susan H. and John L. to their children, Joseph and Matthew. Respondent parents contest the allegations in both the neglect petitions and the termination petitions. Petitioner's motion to consolidate the neglect petitions and the termination petitions for trial purposes was granted by the court (Taylor, J.) on November 30, 2005. Trial of this matter took place before this court on March 6 through 10, May 19 and June 2, 2006 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
The statutory ground alleged against respondents as to both children in the termination petitions was that the mother and father of the children under the age of seven who are neglected or uncared for, have failed, are unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). On July 13, 2005, the court (Goldstein, J.) found that it was no longer appropriate to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify children with mother or father. The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children
Because the petitions for neglect and termination were consolidated in this case, the court must first determine, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, if the children have been neglected as alleged as of the date the neglect petitions were filed. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 263, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984); In re Clark K., 70 Conn.App. 665, 669-70, 799 A.2d 1099 (2002); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 350, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). If the petitioner's evidence does not support such a finding, then both the neglect and termination petitions must be dismissed. If the court finds the children to have been neglected, disposition is deferred until a decision is made on the termination petitions. The court must next determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that any pleaded ground exists to terminate the parents' rights as of the date the petitions were filed. If no ground for termination is found, the court must proceed on the neglect petitions and consider an appropriate disposition.
If grounds have been found to adjudicate the children neglected and to terminate parental rights, applying the respective standards of proof, the court must then move on to the third stage and consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interest, after considering the seven factors set forth in C.G.S. 17a-112(k). If the court does not find that the children's best interests would be served by termination, it must return to and dispose of the neglect petition. If the court does find that termination serves the children's best interests, an order shall enter terminating parental rights.
I. FACTS
At trial, the court heard the testimony of twenty-four witnesses. Petitioner introduced the DCF social study and addendum, psychological evaluations, police reports, hospital records, and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social workers Pam Lucier, Justin Fiorito, Tammy Cushman and Bradley Lawrence; Christopher Marciano of the Watertown Police Department; David Mandel of the Non-violence Alliance; David Mantell, Ph.D.; Leslie Kurt, M.D.; and Robert Neems, Ph.D. Respondent mother, Susan H., called as witnesses Janet Onidi and Retta Vadnais, M.A., introduced documentary evidence, and testified on her own behalf. Respondent father called as witnesses John Callas, DCF Central Office, Office of the Ombudsman; Joseph Berlenbach, P.A., Judith Tsukroff, L.M.F.T., Barbara Miller, Kent McLaughlin; Jack Plummer, Ph.D.; Samantha Littman; Thomas Kocienda, Psy.D.; Lisette Carinha; Debi Dennis; and Rebecca Rancourt, L.C.S.W.; and testified on his own behalf. The children's attorney offered photographs and participated fully, but did not call witnesses. The court also took judicial notice of the matters contained in the motion for judicial notice with one exception. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
The two children who are the subject of these proceedings are mother's ninth and tenth children and father's fourth and fifth children. None of either parents' other children has remained in the parents' care. The circumstances under which this case arises necessitate the recitation of parents' lengthy and troubled histories.
A. Respondent Mother — Susan H.
Respondent mother, Susan H., was born on May 26, 1964. When Susan was four, her parents divorced after four years of marriage. Both of her parents were alcoholics and the marriage broke up when Susan's mother relapsed after attempting treatment. Susan's mother reported that Susan's father was a violent man who tried to choke Susan when she was less than two years old because he found her crying annoying. Susan's mother had periodic hospitalizations as a result of her alcoholism, was married three times and had several other relationships with men during Susan's childhood. Susan's mother had three other children. Susan's first involvement with DCF occurred in 1977 when she was thirteen. At that time, the superintendent of schools in Seymour called DCF reporting that Susan's mother, a chronic alcoholic, had informed the school that she could not control Susan and was requesting foster care. The school reported that Susan experienced emotional problems, smoked heavily, ran away from home, did not relate well to her peers and had excessive absences from school. When DCF went to the home, the worker noted that there were cigarette burns covering every piece of furniture in Susan's room, including her box spring, and even the windowsill. Susan's mother reported that Susan missed significant amounts of school when she was younger and that when she complained that she hated school and was sick, mother allowed her to stay home. DCF learned that this began as early as 1971. Susan's behavior deteriorated and she was adjudicated out of her parent's control and a delinquent. Susan was ultimately dually committed to the care and custody of DCF and spent the next several years at a succession of group homes and foster placements. She frequently ran away from her placements and was sent to Long Lane on two occasions. She was released from Long Lane in June 1979 and placed at a group home in Norwich. After she ran away from that group home, DCF received a call in December 1979 from a resident of Glastonbury stating that mother and her boyfriend (the caller's son) were living in the woods and that Susan had become ill. Susan was placed in another foster home from which she ran away. She was picked up on January 7, 1980 by the Glastonbury police and placed at an emergency shelter in Hartford. While mother was at the shelter, St. Francis Hospital confirmed that mother, at age fifteen, was pregnant. Mother ran away from the emergency shelter and was whereabouts unknown for approximately six weeks. In March 1980, Debra G. offered herself as a placement resource for Susan and stated that she would care for the baby. On March 31, 1980 Susan gave birth prematurely to Tara Lynn H. who weighed four pounds, thirteen ounces. Due to a failure to bond with the child and a lack of any childcare plan, together with Susan's history of running away and emotional instability, the child was placed in DCF care. The child was returned to the care of mother and Debra G. (who married and became Debra C.). A short time later, mother left the home and left the child with Debra and her husband who assumed legal guardianship and adopted Tara Lynn in 1984.
At nineteen, Susan gave birth to her second child, Janet H., on May 8, 1983. When Janet was two months old, mother took the child to St. Vincent's Medical Center from which she was transported to Bridgeport Hospital and admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit with skull fracture and bleeding with injuries the hospital considered to be life threatening. The child had to be fed intravenously, was small for her age and pale, and described by the hospital as a "failure to thrive." Mother reported that her boyfriend, Stephen R., who was thirty-six, inflicted the injuries. She stated that they had gone out to dinner and afterwards to a Stratford beach where her boyfriend fell asleep. When mother tried to wake him up, he became violent. When she got out of the car with the baby, he tried to run them down. He then got out of the car, grabbed the baby who was still in the car seat and began slamming the car seat against the side of the car. He dropped the baby to the pavement striking the child's head. He then forced mother and child into the car and drove them around for approximately an hour slapping mother and pulling her hair while driving. When he stopped at a gas station, mother got out, gave the baby to an unidentified couple and asked them to take her home. When they got to her home in Bridgeport, father's car was there so the couple drove her to an emergency phone where she called the police who responded and requested that Stephen R. leave the home. Once he was gone, mother and child returned home at which time mother noticed considerable swelling of the baby's head and took her to St. Vincent's where mother learned that the injuries were extremely severe and nearly fatal. Although Susan initially cooperated with the police, when the child recovered from her life-threatening injuries, Susan stated that she did not wish to pursue charges against her boyfriend because she felt he did not mean to hurt the child and that the incident was probably her fault. Susan reunited with her boyfriend and did not make plans for the return of her child. When the baby was released from the hospital in July 1983, she was placed in foster care and committed to DCF in August 1983. On March 15, 1984, mother consented to termination of her parental rights to Janet, an order of termination entered on April 24, 1984 (Dean, J.), and Janet was subsequently adopted.
Susan gave birth to her third child, Crystal P., on April 9, 1986. The father of the child, Carl P., who was then forty-eight, filed a report with the Bridgeport Police Department to the effect that he had come home from work and found mother smoking marijuana and drinking beer while the child, unclothed and unsupervised, cried. Father obtained sole custody of the child approximately six months later.
Shawna M., Susan's fourth child, was born April 12, 1989. Although the hospital reported that the child was at risk due to mother's history and a suicide attempt when mother was eight weeks pregnant following the suicide of the child's father, the child was released to mother from the hospital. Mother's fifth child, Gage, was born October 1, 1990 and mother gave birth to her sixth and seventh children, twins, Jessica and Kiana, on April 23, 1992. In January 1993, the Seymour Police Department received a report that mother had hit Shawna in the face with a clenched fist knocking her to the ground. Mother and child continued the report. Although mother initially placed Shawna with friends, Richard and Barbara H., Shawna was later placed in a DCF foster home. Due to her difficult behaviors, Shawna has had numerous placements including four therapeutic foster homes, two safe homes, a group home, a residential facility and one psychiatric hospitalization. In March 2000, mother consented to termination of her parental rights to Shawna, a termination order entered March 29, 2000, (Hoyle, J.), and DCF continues to be the child's statutory parent.
As to the twins born in 1992, Jessica and Kiana, their father obtained custody of them in probate court in Ansonia in 1993 when they were still infants. With regard to Gage, he was placed in the care of Debra C. (who later became Debra H.) who had adopted mother's first child, Tara. Although there was evidence that Debra H.'s husband's name was placed on Gage's birth certificate so that Gage could be adopted by Debra, exactly when Debra H. took custody of Gage is unclear.
In February 1994, DCF received a report from Family Relations, Superior Court in Derby, that mother had been at an address where a fight had occurred. When the police arrived, mother, who was close to giving birth to her eighth child, was lying on the floor bleeding from the side of her head. She told the police that her live-in boyfriend Robert E. had hit her and that she fell to the floor and hit her head on the coffee table. She admitted that she had been drinking. Both parties were arrested, mother became involved in services, and continued her relationship with Robert E. She gave birth on March 5, 1994 to her eighth child, Samantha, and became involved with a parent aide. On September 5, 1995, mother reported to DCF that her boyfriend hit her, that she had a black eye and bruises, and that he would not let her leave the apartment. The next day, a representative from the parent aide program informed DCF that mother was in a shelter and that she had a black eye and bruises on her arms, neck and hands. In October, the parent aide made an unannounced visit to mother's home and found no formula for Samantha and father Robert E. in the home. Mother had not made herself available for almost three weeks and had failed to maintain contact with her service providers or DCF. In June 1996, mother was found intoxicated by the Derby Police Department walking along Route 34 pushing a stroller. She was swaying, had slurred speech and appeared confused. When she told the police that she was walking from Seymour to Derby to see the child's father, the police took mother and child to Robert E.'s and left them in his care. Mother was not compliant with services at this time. In February 1997, DCF received an anonymous call from a neighbor stating that mother hit her child, sent her to bed without food, left her in the same clothes day after day and went on drinking binges. The neighbor stated that mother left the child with drunks, and that the father came to the house and beat mother. In March 1997, DCF received another referral from the Derby Police Department which had received a report from an individual who had witnessed mother abusing the child including lifting her up by the ponytail because she was in mother's way, pushing the child and sending her across the room because mother was angry and leaving the child crying in her crib when mother was intoxicated. In May 1997, the Derby Police Department responded to a referral of a child left with an intoxicated adult male caregiver while mother went out to a bar drinking. DCF filed a neglect petition regarding Samantha on June 2, 1997. When mother was observed coming out of a known drug house carrying a case of beer while dragging the child, DCF sought an OTC on Samantha and the child was placed in DCF care.
While Samantha was in DCF care, mother began a relationship with John L. In November 1998, mother called her ex-boyfriend, Walter L., to ask him to come pick her up as her boyfriend John L. had grabbed her. When Walter L. arrived, mother had been drinking and he took her to a friend's house. John L. went to the friend's house and made threatening statements to mother's friend and her son. According to Walter L.'s report to DCF, the police were called and mother was arrested for disorderly conduct. John L. bailed mother out of jail. In December, Walter L. reported to DCF that mother was living in a rooming house with John L. in New Haven. In January 1999, John L. called to inform DCF that he had obtained a restraining order against Susan and on January 26, 1999, Susan called DCF to ask to have her visits with Samantha changed because John L. was stalking her. In April 1999, Walter L. reported that Susan was drinking heavily and that John L. had beaten her up twice. Walter L. reported that mother left after the first incident and went to a friend's, but that John L. had picked the lock at the friend's apartment and beaten mother up a second time. At the time, Susan was pregnant with her ninth child. In June 1999, DCF filed a termination petition as to Samantha. Mother was offered numerous services including substance abuse, domestic violence and parenting classes. She failed to comply with or benefit from the services. Joseph L., mother's ninth child, was born on September 17, 1999. On November 3, 1999, mother consented to termination of her parental rights to Samantha B., an order of termination entered January 6, 2000 (Lopez, J.), and Samantha was later adopted by her foster parents.
Thus, about the time mother gave birth to the first of two children she had with John L., she was in a violent relationship with him and her parental rights to four of her eight children, Tara, Janet, Shawna and Samantha, had been terminated. As to the other four, three (Crystal, Jessica and Kiana) were in the custody of their fathers and one, Gage, was in the custody of Debra H. These eight children were the product of mother's relationships with seven different men.
On February 8, 2000, when Joseph L. was approximately four months old, mother and father were arrested following a domestic violence incident. When the police responded mother had a bloody nose and lip and stated that father had pushed her and she fell. Father told police that mother had charged him with a knife. The child was outside in a car as father was attempting to leave with him. The infant was wearing a one-piece outfit with no coat and his face, hands and feet were cold. Both parents were arrested and ultimately convicted of disorderly conduct for the incident.
Matthew L. was born May 11, 2002. DCF's next involvement with the family occurred in September 2003 when DCF received a referral after mother was arrested for a motor vehicle violation which led to drug charges as well when mother was alleged to have been smoking marijuana while her children were in the car with her. Mother denied abusing substances and denied domestic violence in her relationship with John L. Mother was convicted, however, of possession of marijuana and sentenced to pay a $1,000 fine.
Mother told DCF that she was aware that John L. had a history of domestic violence with other women, but stated that she believed those women deserved the abuse. Ex. at 12. When DCF made an unannounced home visit on September 10, 2003, mother identified herself as the babysitter. On October 21, 2003, mother tested positive for illicit substances even though she had denied using drugs. Physical neglect of the children was substantiated as to mother and DCF offered substance abuse evaluations, parent education classes and in-home services for both parents. Parents refused in-home services because father did not want anyone coming into their home but did attend the parenting class. Father refused the substance abuse evaluation, but mother participated in a hair test which was positive for marijuana. Mother participated with the Morris Foundation for substance abuse and the McCall Foundation for counseling and DCF was considering closing the case when mother's drug tests in February 2004, and again in March 2004, were positive for marijuana.
On April 28, 2004, the DCF Hotline received a referral from Joseph's daycare center reporting that Joseph had bruising on his lower back and buttocks and the staff had concerns that he was being hit with a belt. Joseph told the daycare center that he had to go to his room and that his mother hit him on the back with a belt. The day care center reported that father had left a voice-mail message at the center stating that mother had hit the child with a belt and left a mark on the child's back and that DCF was involved. Mother denied the allegations (which were not confirmed), but agreed to assistance from DCF as she stated she was having problems with Joseph who was being assaultive to other students and the staff at daycare and to his brother at home and was difficult to handle. In June 2004, when DCF requested that mother take a hair test, she refused.
On June 23, 2004, John L. reported to DCF that mother was an alcoholic and that he had been watching her. He stated that mother had been avoiding DCF and had asked him not to answer the phone when the caller ID showed DCF as the caller. John L. further stated that he let mother take the car to Stop Shop, but suspected she had gone to the liquor store next to the grocery store. When she came home, she kept going into the children's bedroom where he found two empty vodka bottles and a full one. When he confronted her, she hit him and he reported that he left the home before he did something he would regret later. When he returned, he found that mother had left with the children. Father told DCF that he was seeking a restraining order and custody and that although he previously had custody of Joseph through the New Britain probate court, he had agreed to modification of the order to joint custody when mother was doing better. He told DCF that he was trying to locate mother, and that the police were unable to assist him.
The next day, June 24, 2004, father told DCF that he learned that mother might be going to Florida to stay with friends, but that she had no money. He gave DCF a copy of the restraining order he had obtained from the Superior Court in Waterbury which granted him custody of the two boys. He reported that in addition to the alcohol, he had also found marijuana and "roaches" in the children's dresser. Later the same day, father informed DCF that mother and the children were in Florida and that he intended to go get them. Father was upset that DCF would not help him get the children returned.
On June 25, 2004, mother called DCF from Florida and made numerous statements regarding father's treatment of her. She stated that she would do anything to stay away from father and keep the children safe. She stated that she was willing to cooperate with DCF and the child protection authorities in Florida. She stated that her history with father included substance abuse, verbal abuse, physical abuse and control, as well as stalking. She stated that John L. had spray-painted messages on the sidewalk of places she was staying. She stated that father opened her mail and decided whether she got it or not. Mother told DCF that she was not allowed to have many friends visit and that John L. did not permit her to go anywhere.
Two days later, DCF was contacted by authorities in Florida who stated that father had contacted them to report that mother had kidnapped the children and that he had full custody. Mother had not been served with the order, however, and it was therefore not valid. The Florida police did not have concerns about mother's care of the children. The officer stated that the police had received reports that father was threatening mother and the people with whom she was living. These people alleged that father had slashed their tires. Mother also told the police in Florida that she had fled Connecticut because she was tired of the domestic violence with father.
Father also reported to the pediatrician that mother had kidnapped the children. Ex. U.
On July 6, 2004, father contacted DCF and reported that mother and the children were still with friends in Florida and that he was hiring a lawyer to assist him in getting the children back into his custody. Florida authorities recommended that mother go to a domestic violence shelter, but she declined, stating that she was planning to obtain her own residence in Florida.
On July 27, 2004, DCF received a referral from Florida Child Protective Services regarding Joseph and Matthew. Florida CPS confirmed that mother had been cooperative with services there and that they had interviewed the children who stated that they had seen father hitting mother and that he had hit them on their bottoms, and that they wanted to stay with their mother. Florida CPS stated that mother had returned to Connecticut to attend a court hearing and had left the children with friends in Florida. Mother was arrested at the court hearing and incarcerated. Father informed Florida CPS that mother had been charged with custodial interference and domestic battery against him. Florida CPS reported that they had sent an investigator out to the house where the children were staying and were told that father had picked them up and was returning to Connecticut.
On August 2, 2004, OTCs were issued as to both children by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Litchfield (Brunetti, J.). The OTCs were sustained following a contested hearing on September 1, 2004 by the court (Taylor, J.) at the Child Protection Session in Middletown.
Mother's criminal record contains convictions for possession of marijuana in May 2004; disorderly conduct, harassment in the second degree, and criminal mischief in the third degree in 2000; breach of peace and probation violation in 1999; assault in the third degree in 1994; and disorderly conduct in 1982.
B. Respondent father — John L.
Respondent father, John L., was born on May 24, 1957 in Derby, Connecticut. He graduated from high school in Ansonia and reported that he had friends, but that his relationships were violent at times due to his personality traits. He reported that he remains close to both his parents and sees them regularly. He has been employed doing seasonal snow removal and has received unemployment compensation during the off-season. Father has also been employed installing bouncers for children's parties. He stated to DCF that he had been employed in the past as a truck driver and a sheet metal slitter. Father reported to DCF that he has been able to maintain his current residence where he lives with mother, who is unemployed, because his father pays his rent.
Father has an extremely lengthy record of criminal convictions and a disturbing history of violent and controlling relationships. After he graduated from high school he was arrested on an auto theft charge. He told DCF that his friend stole the car and that he painted it and drove it around. In lieu of a one-year sentence, father accepted alcohol treatment at Fairfield Hills Hospital where he spent six weeks. There he met Dale M. with whom he had a child, Pamela, in 1982. He was later married to Dale for two years from 1987-1989. During the course of that relationship, both parties used crack cocaine heavily and, according to father, he "lost everything," including a job he had at the New Haven Copper Company. Father admitted that during his divorce from Dale, he slashed her tires and broke her windshield when she tried to prevent him from seeing Pamela. Father then moved in with his parents and was employed doing odd jobs and plowing snow in the winter.
In 1991, father began a relationship with Gloria S. Father stated to DCF that "I saw right away what a heavy drinker she was," and that the relationship was "tumultuous and argumentative" because he thought he could "control her drinking." Father was arrested approximately thirty-five times during the relationship because, according to father, "she drank." In a 1996 conversation with DCF, Gloria described her relationship with father. She stated that he was controlling and possessive and that the relationship became increasingly violent. He first struck her before she moved into his home and the domestic violence continued to escalate. Gloria stated that she was concerned when she became pregnant with their son John because she was stuck in a destructive relationship. John was born on April 22, 1994. On November 20, 1998, parental rights of Gloria S. and John L. were terminated as to the child, John. Gloria stated that John L. repeatedly harassed and stalked her, that he could not take no for an answer, that he spray-painted messages on the street and left notes on her car and mailbox. She tried to leave the relationship many times, and frequently returned because, as she reported, "he made everybody's life miserable until I went back to him and my mother threw me out." Gloria stated that both she and her children were terrified of him. She stated that he would "go off . . . slam things . . . yell like a maniac," and that when she attempted to leave the relationship, she would get beaten up. She stated that he kicked her in the stomach when she was five months pregnant.
In September 1995, father was released from jail after serving one year on numerous counts of harassment and violation of a protective order in connection with his relationship with Gloria S. Father was arrested on new charges of violation of protective order and harassment shortly after being released.
In April 1996, Dale M.'s mother reported to the police that father had threatened to burn her house down if she did not tell him where he could find her daughter. Kathy W., with whom father had a relationship, and Dale M. both reported to the police that they feared for their lives. Kathy W. reported that father had threatened to kill his daughter, Pamela, and her grandmother and burn the grandmother's house down. The police monitored telephone calls between father and Kathy W. during which he threatened her. A meeting was arranged between father and Kathy W. at which father was arrested and ultimately convicted of first degree harassment, criminal mischief in the second degree and probation violation. During the arrest, father broke the window of the police car and kicked two police officers.
In June 1996, Kathy W. allowed father to move back into her home, but by December, she was again seeking police protection from him and his removal from the home. In January 1997, she reported to the police that he had disconnected her phone line from the outside of the house. He threatened to come to the house, board up the doors and hold her hostage. He threatened to kill her and then himself. In August 1997, Kathy W. reported to the police that father had contacted her family members by mail in order to discredit her and have them turn against her. In October 1997, she stated that he almost killed her twice, smashed into her truck and broke furniture in her home.
At the same time father was involved with Gloria S., he was in a relationship with Stacey S., a crack addict. On December 12, 1994, eight months after Gloria gave birth to John, Stacey gave birth to David L., father's third child. On March 17, 1998, father reported to DCF that Stacey was using crack cocaine and had been arrested for prostitution. Father reported having concerns for his son. On March 25, 1998, Stacey S. admitted that she was actively using crack cocaine and marijuana, but stated that she did not use drugs in her son's presence. On March 26, 1998 father obtained a restraining order against Stacey alleging that Stacey had come at him with a butcher knife.
In April 1998, at a meeting at DCF in New Haven, Stacey told DCF that she came to DCF because she did not know what else to do. She stated that John L. would not let her or David out of his sight, and that she did not want to leave the office with him. She stated that the only way she got him to come with her to DCF was by promising him that she would file a false report against her boyfriend in order to obtain a restraining order against him to get him out of the house. Approximately one week later, Stacey called DCF and reported that John L. had taken her son from her boyfriend and would not return the child to her. Stacey S. told the Derby police that father had stated he would not give David back to her until she entered a substance abuse program. DCF contacted father who stated that he had the child who would be spending the night with him. He refused to let DCF see the child. When DCF pressed father as to the child's whereabouts, he stated, "When Stacey does what I want her to do, then I'll tell her where David is." DCF invoked a 96-hour hold when father refused to bring the child to Stacey's home. Although father refused to voluntarily cooperate with the 96-hour hold, DCF located David at his maternal grandfather's home where he was sleeping.
David's maternal grandfather ultimately received subsidized guardianship of David who continued to have some contact with father.
Approximately seven months later, on November 20, 1998, the parental rights of Gloria S. and John L. were terminated as to their child, John. In the memorandum of decision terminating parental rights the court (Foley, J.) wrote that, "The male biological parent has an emotional or mental disability that renders him unfit to parent and this disorder is untreatable. His history of domestic violence and disorder is the most severe ever seen by this court. He is an unremorseful and dangerous individual." 1998 WL 846526 (Conn.Super. 1998).
Thus, about the time father was beginning a relationship with Susan H., he had three children by three different women. None of these children was in his care as Pamela was sixteen and residing with her mother, his parental rights to John had been terminated and David was in the guardianship of his maternal grandfather. Father's relationship with each of the mothers of his children was characterized by extreme manipulation, control and violence.
Father has a criminal record of convictions spanning over a thirty-year period, including convictions for possession of drugs/marijuana in 2004; disorderly conduct in 2000; larceny in the fourth and fifth degrees, violation of a protective order, harassment in the first degree, probation violation and filing a false report in 1997; harassment in the first degree, criminal mischief in the second degree, probation violation (two counts), criminal trespass in the first degree, and violation of a protective order in 1996; violation of a protective order (two counts) in 1994; violation of a protective order and criminal trespass in the first degree, violation of probation (three counts), possession of drugs/marijuana, and criminal trespass in the first degree in 1993; larceny in the fifth and sixth degrees in 1991; assault in the third degree, harassment, criminal mischief in the third degree (three counts), breach of peace (two counts) probation violation, and reckless endangerment in the first degree in 1990; breach of peace (two counts), possession of drugs/marijuana, reckless endangerment in the first degree, probation violation and filing a false report in 1989; possession of marijuana, failure to appear in the second degree, and larceny in the fourth degree in 1983; possession of marijuana and larceny in the third degree in 1982; interfering, burglary in the second degree and larceny in the first degree in 1981; criminal mischief in the second degree, and breach of peace in 1980; disorderly conduct and possession of controlled substance in 1979; breach of peace, criminal trespass in the first degree and possession of controlled substance in 1977; breach of peace and loitering on school grounds in 1976; disorderly conduct and loitering on school grounds in 1975; and breach of peace in 1974. Among father's many convictions, his criminal record contains five convictions for violation of a protective order and eight convictions for violation of probation demonstrating a profound inability to abide by court orders.
As set forth above, father's relationship with mother was fraught with violence from the beginning, well before Joseph and Matthew were born. In November 1998 mother's ex-boyfriend came to pick her up after an incident with father and father threatened mother's friend and her son. Father told DCF in January 1999 that he had obtained a restraining order against Susan H. and later that month, mother asked DCF to change her visits with Samantha because John L. was stalking her. In April 1999, DCF received reports that father had beaten mother twice, and that the second time she was pregnant with Joseph. Mother reported that prior to learning that she was pregnant with Joseph, father backhanded her and split her lip during the course of a visit with a friend from New Hampshire.
Mother and father's tumultuous relationship culminated in a series of events in the summer of 2004 in which mother fled the state and took the children to Florida. After father brought the children back to Connecticut, OTCs were issued as to Joseph and Matthew. DCF requested the assistance of the Watertown Police Department in removing the children from father's care. DCF and the police arrived at father's home on August 2, 2004 to execute the OTCs. When father did not answer the door, even though his cars were in the driveway, the dispatcher telephoned father who stated that he was in Ansonia. The police called him again and told him that he had five minutes to come out of the house or they would go in. The officers observed cameras on the outside of the house and knew that they were under surveillance from inside. One camera was aimed directly at the front door of the residence so father could clearly see the police officers. Because the officers believed that father had weapons in the home, they drew their weapons while entering the home. The police entered the home and ordered father to come down the stairs. As they proceeded up the stairs guns drawn, father came around the corner carrying one of the children. He was ordered to put the child down immediately. Father was ultimately handcuffed and arrested for interference. He was released on bond August 3, 2004. The children were placed in DCF care. Social worker Cushman testified that in the car on the way to the foster home, Joseph stated to her that:
Mom hit Dad in the lip. Joey told me that Daddy beat up Mom hard and made her lip bleed, but now her lip `do better.' He told me that when Mom and Dad get mad at each other, they beat each other up. He told me when he's bad, `me and Matty get hit.' And he said that `Daddy could get drunk and die.' Tr. 3/6/06 at 94.
On August 11, 2004, mother told DCF that although she had been using marijuana as her drug of choice, she had no insurance and therefore could not get treatment. She stated that there was a protective order in place which prohibited contact, but that she and father were having telephone contact. She stated that she went to Florida because father was seeing another woman and threatening to take the children away from her. She also stated that father had another warrant out on her for custodial interference and that he had accused her of threatening to kill him in his sleep. On August 20, 2004, father told DCF that he and mother planned to remain together as a couple and that the protective order had been modified so that Susan could move back into his home. Following a hearing on August 31 and September 1, 2004, the OTCs were sustained. (Taylor, J.)
On September 13, 2004, father again contacted DCF and reported that mother had been drinking and had an accident and that she had "smashed up" his car. He stated that mother had gone to the McCall Foundation drunk on Friday night and got into an accident while driving drunk. He went to McCall Foundation and saw his car in the parking lot. He stated that an hour later the car was gone and that he went from bar to bar looking for mother. He stated that he finally found her at 1:00 am. He stated that mother threatened to commit suicide in front of the Southbury police who had been called and that mother was taken to Griffin Hospital for psychiatric review on September 11. Father stated to DCF that his relationship with mother was over and that she was not welcome in his home. Later that day he called DCF again and stated that the Watertown Police told him he could not refuse mother entry into the home, and that she had been released from the hospital. He stated that she had totaled the car. The McCall Foundation reported to DCF that mother was tested by breathalizer at her appointment on September 10 and that she registered a .50 on the test. The therapist, Mr. Reitano, had smelled alcohol at the group session, and, because mother appeared out of sorts, he conducted the breathalizer test on her which revealed that she was impaired, but not over the legal limit. He had taken her keys and asked her to get a ride home. She was concerned that her boyfriend not be notified. Later she stated she had a ride home and asked for her keys back. John L. later called and informed McCall Foundation that mother had crashed the car and was hospitalized.
C. Specific Steps
Specific steps were issued by the court on August 2, 2004 (Brunetti, J.) and again on September 4, 2004 (Taylor, J.). Respondent parents' specific steps required them to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; keep the children's whereabouts and their own whereabouts known to DCF, their attorneys and the attorney for the children; participate in counseling, individual, family and parenting, and make progress toward identified treatment goals; accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF; submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations made regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention, including hair testing; submit to random drug testing; recommended service providers include the McCall Foundation, parent aide, and Morris Foundation; cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing; obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; do not violate the laws of this state, any other state or the United States; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; consistently and timely meet and address the children's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs; make all necessary child-care arrangements; immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household; maintain the children within the State of Connecticut; cooperate with the children's therapy; visit the children as often as DCF permits; and conduct themselves appropriately during visits and follow DCF rules.
With regard to compliance with the specific steps, mother has complied with some, but not all of the specific steps. She has generally kept DCF advised of her whereabouts. Mother attended the McCall Foundation, Intensive Out-Patient Program "IOP" which provided parenting classes, visitation with the children and urine and hair tests for substance abuse. Initially, mother was not compliant with recommendations for counseling and treatment and continued to use marijuana and abuse alcohol. On November 10, 2004, mother's hair test was positive for marijuana on that date and for the preceding three months. Mother refused a hair test in March 2005 and refused urine and hair tests on April 22 and 25, 2005 when requested by her treatment provider. On April 27, 2005, father came to mother's counseling session and her counselor, James Ritano, observed that mother appeared uncomfortable. After telling mother and father there was no current release, Ritano asked father to leave. After he left, Ritano and mother spoke and mother signed a release so that father could be informed of the results of mother's drug tests. Father was informed of mother's test result in December which was positive for marijuana. He was surprised and mother did not know what to say. After father left, mother told Ritano she was afraid. Ex. 14. In July 2005, mother had a diluted urine specimen. Mother again had a hair test which was positive for marijuana in October 2005 and subsequently had a negative hair test in November 2005. Mother was scheduled for a hair test on February 22, 2006, however, she stated she had a conflict and had to reschedule. Mother ultimately had a negative hair test in March 2006. Significantly, although referred to the Susan B. Anthony Project for domestic violence services, mother did not participate. She stated in March 2005 that the service did not apply to her since there was no domestic violence in her relationship with John L.
Since the issuance of the specific steps, mother has had no additional criminal convictions. The Southbury Police were called, however, when mother threatened to commit suicide and was transported to Griffin Hospital. Further, mother totaled John's car while driving under the influence of alcohol. She has maintained housing with John L. since the children were placed in DCF care. Mother has been continuously unemployed since the issuance of the steps, and for much of her life, relying on her poorly chosen partners for financial support. Mother has visited regularly with the children.
Father has complied with many of the steps. He testified that the only step he did not complete was family counseling. Father has informed DCF of his whereabouts. He has signed releases and has maintained stable housing, but has not been employed consistently. Father engaged in parenting classes and substance abuse treatment at the McCall Foundation and was discharged in March 2005. Father satisfactorily completed the DOVE program at the Wheeler Clinic. Dr. Kocienda testified that father received a positive discharge in March 2005. Although father acknowledged a history of domestic violence, he denied any violence in his relationship with Susan.
In October 2004, father had a positive hair test for marijuana indicating use during the preceding three months. Father denied using and told treatment providers at the McCall Foundation that the positive result could have been from his exposure to mother who was using at the time. Subsequent tests, including a hair test on February 22, 2006, have been negative.
Father engaged first in individual counseling and later in couples counseling with Judith Tsukroff beginning in October 2004. Tsukroff testified that she worked with father on controlling his impulsiveness, to avoid conduct such as cutting his neighbor's phone lines and impulsively telling off Susan's former lawyer. She stated that he had an anxiety disorder including a propensity to act in an impulsive manner. Tsukroff testified regarding a letter to DCF in which she stated that recently, father had little involvement with the law and that at present, while he is clean and sober, there is no evidence of violence independent of Susan's accusations, which were not independently substantiated. Tr. 3/9/06 at 64-65; Ex. A. She testified that she was not aware at the time she reached that conclusion that Joseph had stated to DCF and to Dr. Mantell at different times, that there had been domestic violence between parents and physical abuse of him. Tsukroff stated that she believed mother when mother said the statements she made to DCF about father were lies. She also stated that she included mother in couples counseling with father after she had been seeing father for months and after she had already decided that mother had lied about father. Tsukroff testified that she based her conclusion that John and Susan were excellent parents on what the parents told her. Tsukroff acknowledged that she previously stated that she believed parents had a strong bond with the children even though she had never seen the children alone or with the parents.
Following a court-ordered evaluation by Dr. Neems, father was evaluated by Jack Plummer, Ph.D., who saw him a total of five times in July and August 2005. Plummer testified that he agreed that anti-social personality disorder is a persistent syndrome, but that the behaviors associated with it might change. Father did not want to continue with Plummer beyond five sessions, but was planning to continue in treatment together with Susan with their therapist, Tsukroff. Plummer stated that "there is little to argue against [father's] regaining custody, except his very significantly contraindicating history." Ex. T. While Plummer found that father's diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder was no longer accurate, he noted that it was "still lurking in the background." Plummer testified that father was trying hard to demonstrate that he would be a good parent, but that Plummer was not able to develop a sense of father's future propensity to inflict physical violence on household members within a short period of time after he left treatment. Tr. 3/10/06 at 18-20.
Father has had no criminal convictions since 2004. He has consistently visited with the boys. Barbara Miller of the Family Center at Family and Children's Aid, Inc., supervised visitation starting in November 2005. She testified that the boys enjoyed their visits with parents, that father gives a lot of physical and verbal affection and displays good parenting skills and that both parents have incorporated her parenting advice.
D. The Children 1. Joseph L.
Joseph L. was born September 17, 1999. He was placed in DCF care on August 2, 2004 when he was almost five. On April 28, 2004, Joseph's daycare contacted DCF to report that the child had bruises on his back and buttocks and that he had stated that his mother had hit him on the back with a belt. The daycare facility also reported that father had contacted them to report that mother had hit the child. DCF did not confirm the allegations. On May 4, 2004, Joseph's day care facility reported concerns about his behavior including aggression toward other children and toward the teachers. Joseph was removed from father's care after father moved the children from Florida to Connecticut.
David Mantell, Ph.D., testified as an expert in the in the area of clinical and forensic psychology. He testified that on August 9, 2004, he conducted a trauma assessment of Joseph and Matthew in their first foster home. Joseph stated to Dr. Mantell that "my dad beats up my mom" and that his father made his mother's lip bleed. Joseph also stated that when his father hurt his mother, he "cried and cried and cried." The child reported that his father hits both him and his brother, hitting Joseph with a belt and Matthew with his hand. Joseph stated that his father made red and blue marks on him and his brother and that he hit them when they were bad. Joseph told Dr. Mantell that he was not afraid of his father when he was not hitting him. Dr. Mantell concluded that Joseph had post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") traits, i.e., there was evidence for some of the features of PTSD, but not enough to establish a full disorder. Joseph also had a phonological disorder and was very distractable. Dr. Mantell testified that the interview he had with Joseph showed that the child had exposure to significant violence and that it caused him distress and that it was still distressing for him. The foster mother reported to Dr. Mantell that Joseph did not talk about his parents, did not call out for them or ask to see them and did not express sadness about not being with them. As a result of his assessment, Mantell provided a diagnosis of Joseph as having PTSD traits, physical and emotional abuse of a child, phonological disorder and partner relational problem. Joseph was later diagnosed by his psychiatrist as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") and was prescribed medication.
Mantell testified: "And the question was, Does your mom get hurt? And his answer was to me, Yes, and I asked him, How? And he said — and I'm paraphrasing him — My daddy beats her up. And then he went, pow, pow, pow, pow with his fist showing a punching action." Tr. 3/7/06 at 33. Further, Mantell stated: "The reason he finally gave me as the source for that knowledge was twofold. He heard his dad yell at his mom; he saw the lip and the blood. His mom told him that his dad had hit her, and he himself was so distressed by all of those features and maybe the sound, pow, pow, pow, pow — now I don't know whether he was just dramatizing or whether he was repeating the — he talked about hearing screaming and he did pow, pow, pow, pow." Id. at 34.
When Joseph and Matthew were first placed in DCF care, they were placed in a foster home with their half-brother John. The boys had difficulty getting along and the foster mother asked that Joseph and Matthew be removed. John was adopted by this foster mother. In October 2004, both boys were placed in a legal risk foster home. In November 2005, they were removed from the home due to concerns about the foster parents' discipline of the children. They were then placed in a DCF safe home where they remained at the time of trial. Prior to removal from the foster home, Joseph's behavior had become uncontrollable. The foster parents were trying different methods of discipline as recommended by Joseph's therapists. Joseph has been engaged in attachment therapy with Dr. Pines.
The safe home has reported continued disruptive behavioral problems, including teasing, provoking, kicking and hitting other children. The safe home also reported that Joseph responds well to individual attention and structure, but that there is considerable sibling rivalry with Matthew often requiring the children's separation. At the time of trial, Joseph had been referred for an extended day treatment program. Samantha Littman, of Family and Children's Aid, Inc., testified that she began working with the boys in December 2005 at the safe home to address their hyperactive and impulsive behaviors and to assist with day-to-day living skills based on their ages and developmental needs. She stated that both boys enjoy their visits with mother and father and that they talk about wanting to live with their mom and dad and that Matthew had also expressed a desire to return to a previous foster home.
2. Matthew L.
Matthew L. was born May 11, 2002. He was placed into DCF care with Joseph at the age of two. Matthew is an energetic and friendly child who requires individual attention. He has exhibited aggressive behaviors such as hitting and kicking other children and adults and has a difficult time sharing toys. He is strongly bonded with Joseph with whom he has a high degree of sibling rivalry. On placement, Matthew was found to be behind in personal social skills, adaptive skills, expressive language skills and cognitive skills. He was evaluated by Birth-to-Three and was deemed ineligible for services. Matthew suffered from chronic ear infections. Matthew slept through much of Dr. Mantell's two-hour visit in connection with his trauma assessment. Ex. 10. Matthew requires speech therapy and has shown improvement in his speech as a result of the therapy he received with a speech and language pathologist. In April 2005, Matthew told his daycare teacher that his parents kicked him.
After moving to the safe home, Matthew became increasingly disruptive necessitating one to one staffing. He has been observed to put a belt around his neck while playing and when questioned, said his "mommy and daddy do it" and that father hit him with a belt. Ex. 2 at 6. Further, he has pulled his pants down in front of others and licked food off the floor when he spills. Matthew was evaluated by Dr. Jennings and in her report of January 17, 2006 he was diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder Unspecified, ADHD and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Matthew takes Focalin for ADHD.
Supervised visits with parents have been held weekly for two hours at a time since the children were placed in DCF care.
E. Psychological Evaluations/Expert Witnesses 1. J. Leslie Kurt, M.D.
Father was evaluated by J. Leslie Kurt, M.D. and diagnosed in 1998 as having a severe Anti-social Personality Disorder. Kurt testified as an expert in adult and forensic psychiatry and described the disorder as a fundamental defect in the character of the individual including a disregard for the rights and feelings of others. She stated that the disorder included "aggressive exploitation of others to serve one's own needs." Tr. 3/7/06 at 86. Kurt testified that such disorders are "remarkably persistent over time" and that "one's character doesn't change dramatically in the course of a lifetime." Id.
At the time of the initial evaluation, Kurt found that John L.'s "history and clinical presentation reflect a pervasive pattern of severe disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that began in childhood and continued into middle age." Ex. 5 at 22. In addition:
His attitude towards others is manipulative, highly exploitative, and intensely coercive. He demonstrates little capacity for empathy or warmth in human relationships. He is labile, very impulsive and highly aggressive. He has marked difficulty modulating anger and a history of rageful behavior. There is a predatory and distinctly sadomasochistic quality to his interactions with others. Though impulsive, there is a pre-meditative quality to his some of his actions and he seems to enjoy frightening and tormenting others. He demonstrates no remorse for his destructive behavior. For Mr. [L.], the over arching objective in relationships is to control, coerce and triumph over others no matter what the cost. He lies and dissimulates habitually. Id.
Kurt further found it significant that father's criminal activity occurred in the family setting and reflected a "highly maladaptive and violent pattern of relating to women in intimate relationships." Id. She noted:
According to available police reports, in addition to Gloria [S.], a number of other women have obtained restraining orders against John [L.], including Dale [L.], Stacey [S.], and Kathy [W.]. All of these women have been fearful that John [L.] would seriously harm them, and some have feared that he would kill them. Several women have alleged forcible sexual contact. Both Gloria [S.] and Marie [S.] have indicated clearly in police statements that Mr. [L.] has beaten them repeatedly. And there is evidence that Ms. [S.] and others have been harassed by John [L.] even when he was incarcerated. Further, there is documentary information that at least two children, his 15 year old daughter, Pamela, and the eldest daughter of Gloria S., are very frightened of him based on prior experience. There is also behavioral evidence that Nicholas [S.] has been fearful of him. Even if Mr. [L.] does not direct his violence toward children, any children residing with him would be subjected to an unstable and chaotic home environment fraught with domestic violence. Id. at 22-23.
Kurt opined that anti-social personality disorder was "generally regarded as an untreatable disorder." Id. at 23. She wrote:
The DSM-4 states that it `has a chronic course but may become less evident or remit as the individual grows older, particularly by the fourth decade.' Mr. [L.] has a particularly severe form of this disorder, and has demonstrated a significant increase in anti-social behavior with advancing age, which is somewhat ominous. He has a history of episodic alcohol and drug abuse. He has little capacity for insight or motivation for treatment. All of these factors suggest a very poor prognosis. Id.
Kurt testified regarding a number of characteristics of John L. that led her to diagnose him as sociopathic. These included lying, deceitfulness, and:
[t]he ease with which he dismissed the injuries done to the women in his life and the possible impact on the children who were present during incidents of domestic violence, his inclination to always turn the situation around so that it's a classically anti-social stance to — when stressed, to respond in an aggressive way; not necessarily physically, but intellectually aggressive as an alternative, so, to put others on the defensive. Tr. 3/7/06 at 88.
As an example, Kurt cited an incident set forth in Dr. Neems' report in which father complained about a domestic violence therapist whose group he was to attend and his subsequent threats to file a lawsuit. Kurt stated: ". . . what's always very troubling about these individuals is that they put tremendous energy into fighting others, and if they could direct that attention to dealing with the more fundamental issues they have, they would be better served." Id.
Kurt testified that in preparation for her testimony, she had reviewed substantial materials regarding the time period after her evaluation including Dr. Neems' report, a letter from David Mandel of the Non-Violence Alliance, the current neglect petitions and termination petitions, summary of facts and social studies in support of the petitions, and John L.'s current criminal history. Having reviewed all of that additional information, Kurt testified that her original diagnosis was corroborated. She stated that the fact that father had not been arrested in the past year and a half did not cause her to reconsider her diagnosis because often individuals with anti-social personality disorder do not have criminal records. She found that John L. "still demonstrates the most fundamental defect which is a disregard for the rights of others, and the inclination to aggressively pursue whatever he feels is standing in his way, or to attempt to manipulate, coerce, pressure, stress, menace until he achieves his end." Id. at 91. Further, the recent relative absence of physical violence did not surprise Dr. Kurt because "this is a time of intense scrutiny by the courts and DCF, and also, by — less intense scrutiny by treatment providers along with regular toxicology screening and regular DCF visits in which Mr. [L.] is focusing his efforts on the return of his children." Id. While recognizing that the inclination for physical violence may moderate with age, Kurt found the more fundamental issue with father to be his coercive, controlling and aggressive personality style. She stated that while he has been vulnerable to impulsive behavior and anger control issues, he has also shown a capacity for pre-meditative injury and terrorization of others. Thus, "if he can control others by coercion, then there's no reason for him to escalate to more dramatic forms of violence." Id. at 92. However, if he is unable to control others by intimidation, "there would be an inclination to pursue in a more aggressive manner, and that could be in a more intellectually or legally aggressive manner or in a more physically aggressive manner." Id. She cited to examples of John L.'s conduct in cutting phone lines and threatening neighbors or friends who assisted his partner.
Kurt testified that she was not surprised that father's therapist might find that father has nothing to work on because individuals such as father "go and say everything's great, I'm not having a problem, it's everybody else who has a problem with me." Id. at 93-94. Further, she stated: "individuals with anti-social personality disorder often sneak by because they can appear to be — they can appear quite charming; they're glib; they, sort of, breeze in and out of the consultation room, and you think you're dealing with just a terrific guy." Id. at 93. Kurt also found that father's successful discharge from the DOVE program does not lead to the conclusion that he no longer has problems in that area. She stated that there are people who can make significant progress, but as she read the reports, father "primarily stated that, yes, there was a history of domestic violence, but it's not a problem now; that he participated in group, but that was largely directed at assisting others to explore their problems." Id. at 95. Even those who do make significant progress still have "difficulties really feeling what other people feel, or really having a capacity to even notice what someone is feeling or needs or feeling that it matters to address their needs." Id. at 95-96. With regard to Dr. Plummer's conclusion that the diagnosis was no longer accurate, Kurt stated anti-social personality disorder is "quite durable" and that "some behavioral aspects of anti-social personality disorder may remit or diminish, but that the fundamental psychological difficulties remain." Id. at 96. Kurt stated that completing programs such as the DOVE program does not diminish the risk "because showing up is not enough. Just being there and going through the process isn't enough, particularly when one is unemployed and has the time to pursue this." Id. at 102. In describing father's legally aggressive behavior, Kurt explained that father is "really channeling [his aggression] through the legal system now, and that's his problem to solve, to overcome, to control, and it's an over-arching problem." Id. at 104. Resorting to complaints would be a manifestation of that: "attack, attack, attack, counter with aggression, fight about every little detail, split hairs, obfuscate, smoke and mirrors, just keep pursuing it." Id.
2. Robert Neems, Ph.D.
Father and mother were evaluated by Robert Neems, Ph.D., between December 20, 2004 and February 4, 2005. Neems testified as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology.
Neems diagnosed father with anti-social personality disorder and cannabis abuse, probable. He found that father "continues to be intense and to attempt to intimidate people when he does not get what he wants," citing as an example his attempt to intimidate the staff at the DOVE program by threatening legal action. Ex. 16 at 26. Neems also cited father's cutting his neighbor's phone lines when the neighbor assisted mother by giving her a ride. Neems noted that father was "somewhat casual" about his need to support himself financially and that father had reported that for years he relied on his parents for financial support since "it suited his partying lifestyle." Id. Neems found it concerning that father took the position that he has no significant problems which need to be addressed and that father failed to provide certain information to his therapist who agreed with him that he had little to work on. Id. Even in light of the significant progress that father made since his behavior was out of control five to seven years ago, Neems found that father qualifies for the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder. Id. He testified that father presented himself in an unrealistically positive manner and that father did not take responsibility for any of his more recent arrests, stating that these were "problems caused by other people and he had to deal with those problems." In 3/8/06 at 18. Neems flatly disagreed with father's counselor, Judith Tsukroff, who concluded that father did not have much to work on. Neems testified:
I've just finished describing someone here who's got a very extensive, massive history actually, of domestic violence and substance abuse who's doing somewhat better for the last seven years, but continues to have problems with domestic violence, substance abuse, controlling other people, manipulating people, and it's obvious that those things continue to effect his individual functioning and his functioning as a parent. Id. at 20-21.
Significantly, Neems found that there was negative information which father failed to report to Tsukroff. Neems stated:
I found that to be very, very important. I think that the foundation for therapy is helping the therapist understand the real situation as opposed to a polished-up, cleaned up version of the real situation. It appeared to me that he gave her a highly unrealistic view of what the situation was and what his problems are. A view that's consistent with his own view, but nonetheless, if he were taking more serious stock of his problems and trying to understand things he hasn't understood in the past, he would report to her some other pertinent things that probably don't make him look so good, but which are certainly relevant to her understanding where he's at. Id. at 21-22.
Neems also stated that if father had no positive drug tests in the previous year, it would be a positive sign of improvement, but would not permit a conclusion that father had nothing more to work on. Neems concluded that if father "persisted in further efforts to persuade his therapist of his lack of problems and lack of responsibility, this would be a very poor prognostic sign." Ex. 17 at 3. Neems testified that improvement in individuals who have anti-social personality disorder could be measured by looking at whether an individual is continuing to be arrested, having substance abuse relapses, recognition of defensiveness, controlling behaviors, adoption of clear goals and motivation for change. A better prognosis is indicated by an ability to identify clear-cut goals and an ability to engage with others to accomplish the goals.
Mother was also evaluated by Neems. He found that she reported her history of parenting problems in a "low key, glib manner, without any apparent recognition of the extent of her difficulties or of her remarkable and extended failure to appropriately raise her children." Ex. 16 at 8. Neems was struck by the contrast between the "awful history and her low key manner of explaining it." Id. Mother stated to Neems that her alcohol problems were the cause of past problems in her relationship with father and that she lied about father, causing him to lose custody of the children. She stated that she felt guilty because she lied about father when she was in Florida and that she did so in her efforts to obtain custody of the children. Mother reported a "rosy picture" of her relationship with father, stating that they only had one incident of violence at the beginning of their relationship, presumably referring to an incident in November 1999 when they were both arrested. Mother did not explain the February 2000 arrest for disorderly conduct in which father claims that she came after him with a knife. Mother reported that the police came to the home a few times when she was intoxicated and threatened to kill herself and father would not let her open the door so she called friends who called the police. She also confirmed that she had an altercation with father in June 2004 when she learned that father was sexually involved with a friend of hers. Mother told Neems that she blamed herself for causing some of the problems in the relationship and that she did not have concerns about father's behavior. She stated they were still together and trying to work out their relationship. Id. at 10.
Susan H. related to Neems that her history of alcohol and substance abuse began at age twelve. With regard to mother's alcohol abuse, Neems found that she admitted to drinking only on those occasions where there was evidence of her use because DCF and/or the police were already aware of it and that she attempted to conceal her alcohol abuse at other times. She minimized her use even on the occasions of which Neems was aware. For example, mother claimed that she drank on two isolated instances following consenting to termination of her parental rights with respect to Samantha and Shawna. She also stated that she did not use alcohol between February 2000 and September 2003 when she was arrested for having marijuana in the ashtray of the car. She stated that the marijuana was not hers, but since she had been arrested for it, she might as well do it, so she smoked marijuana, thus explaining the positive drug screen. Neems found that the causes of mother's drinking include "her serious impulsivity, her remarkable poor judgment, her irresponsibility, and the fact of her longstanding habit of relying on alcohol when she feels stressed." Id. at 11. Mother told Neems that she tried marijuana at age thirteen, and began using it regularly from fifteen or sixteen through age nineteen when she stopped. She stated that she used cocaine and marijuana during the year she lived with Walter L. Mother stated to Neems that in October 2003 she resumed using marijuana, but only used five or six times. As Neems discussed, this admission was highly suspect as mother was arrested in September 2003 for possession of marijuana, and had positive drug tests in February, March and November 2004. Moreover, father claimed mother used marijuana regularly and, indeed, he stated that the reason he tested positive for marijuana in October 2004, was because he was around mother who was using regularly in his presence for the previous ninety days. In his report, Neems stated that mother's parenting problems could be attributed to "her very long history of substance abuse, noncompliance, irresponsible decisions, impulsivity, terrible judgment about men, and of failing to establish her own ability to support herself." Id. at 25.
In contrast to mother's statements to Neems, records from the McCall Foundation reflect mother's alcohol and drug use. She acknowledged that she used marijuana daily prior to her last use on September 13, 2004, and that she also smoked crack on a daily basis prior to her last use six years ago. She also noted that her longest period of abstinence had been between 1984 and 1988. Ex. 14.
Neems' diagnosis of mother included alcohol dependence, in early full remission, cannabis dependence, in early full remission, social phobia and depressive disorder NOS. Neems testified at trial that mother is a very dependent person, financially and psychologically, with a "long, long history of relying on poorly chosen partners." Tr. 3/8/06 at 11. Further, mother told Neems that she believed the removal of the children was due to her behavior and use of alcohol alone and not because of any behavior or conduct of father. Id. at 10. This statement by mother demonstrated her dependence on father and her willingness to adopt his strategy and tactics, including the strategy with DCF of taking the blame on herself "hoping that, even if the court finds her to be a poor choice to parent the children, that Mr. [L.] would be found acceptable by the Court." Id. at 11. Neems recognized that mother was functioning "somewhat more adequately in recent years" and that the "frequency of arrests and domestic violence incidents seems to be decreasing." Ex. 16 at 25. However, he stated it was hard to know if her drinking had decreased and that when she did start drinking she had an insufficient support network to help her. Regarding mother's ability to parent her children, Neems testified that her "very long dramatic, serious history with substance abuse, dependency on poorly chosen people, remarkably poor judgment, repeated instances of irresponsible decisions in regard to her children, all of those things have had remarkable impact on the history of her parenting, and unless she were to remedy them very dramatically, would continue to impact her parenting of children." Id. at 15.
Neems also conducted an interactional evaluation with the parents and children. When Joseph saw there was a person in the room whom he did not know, he jumped back out and hid. It was clear to Neems that Joseph had been told that something important was going to happen. After spending time with parents and children together, and allowing Joseph to become comfortable, Neems asked to speak with Joseph in the room next door. Before Joseph went out of the room with Neems, father pointedly told Joseph to tell the truth. Once in the room, Joseph was "very, very cautious" and did not want to talk about anything with Neems. Id. at 44-45. Neems stated, "I thought this boy had been told that there was an awful lot at stake. I observed behaviors on his father's part that, kind of, stayed in touch with him to let him know, you know, be careful." Id. at 45. In his report, Neems observed:
Given Joseph's guarded communications, I had little information available to evaluate his functioning. Based on this limited amount of information, I think it is accurate to say that he has an Adjustment Disorder, with Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct that he has developed in response to his chaotic and conflictual home environment. He also reportedly shows signs of impulsivity, inattention, and hyperactivity, raising the question of whether he has Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Ex. 16 at 27.
Neems recommended individual counseling for Joseph to help address the possibility of ADHD and his Adjustment Disorder.
As to Matthew, Neems found that he was enthusiastic about interacting and playing with his parents. He noted that it appeared that Matthew had adjusted to the routine of being in a foster home and that he enjoyed being with his brother. Matthew was easy going even when Joseph teased and provoked him. Overall, both boys enjoyed seeing their parents, were comfortable with them and seemed to be close to both parents. Id.
3. David G. Mandel, M.A.
David Mandel of the Non-Violence Alliance testified as an expert in the area of domestic violence. He testified that based on his review of the materials provided to him father engaged in coercive control. He defined coercive control as:
a term that gives definition beyond physical violence to the pattern which leads to somebody feeling afraid, intimidated, controlled ultimately their thinking, actions and feelings, and it allows for the fact that some of the behavior is not physical violence. It can be emotional and non-physical in terms of the threats, intimidation, and so on. Tr. 3/6/06 at 121.Mandel also testified that:
many parts of a pattern of coercive control don't always arise to the level of arrestable offense, but could be part of terrorizing somebody, making them scared, and would be of concern as it relates to the safety and well being of an adult or a child in a family. Id. at 122.
He stated that a lack of recent arrests does not mean there is no coercive control. "It's a common mistake for people to assume that if there's no evident physical violence that somebody isn't able to . . . terrorize and control somebody." Id. at 125. Mandel stated that father's driving mother everywhere she needs to go would be relevant to an assessment of coercive control because isolation can be part of a pattern of coercive control. He stated that in making the assessment he would factor in mother's autonomy and whether she is hampered from having contact with outside friends, family, professionals and independence to work. Id. He stated that surveillance cameras which allow someone to monitor another's behavior would also be relevant to coercive control.
F. Testimony — Respondent Mother
Respondent mother testified on her own behalf. She stated that she was removed from her home and placed in DCF care at the age of thirteen. She described her own history and the history concerning each of her ten children acknowledging that none of them was in her care and that she either consented to termination of parental rights or agreed that they be placed in the custody of others. Regarding the events of the summer of 2004, mother testified that she began drinking, that John L. confronted her, gave her a week to leave the house, that there was an altercation in which she hit him, and that she left with the children. Her neighbor gave her a ride to Ansonia and from there she took the boys to Florida where she stayed with friends. Mother testified that when DCF reached her by telephone in Florida, she lied about John because she was afraid of the consequences for herself.
Mother stated that in July 2005, she and John had concerns about the boys' foster placement, called the DCF Hotline, and that ultimately the child advocate's office had the boys removed from that placement. Mother stated that she has a valid driver's license, but that she does not like to drive and that John L. drives her everywhere she wants to go. In addition to an accident in 2001, she stated that she was driving under the influence in 2004 and totaled John's car and that it scared her. She stated that she does not have any need to drive. Mother admitted that she used marijuana on a regular basis from January through September 2004 and stated that the last time she drank or used drugs was in November 2004. She stated that John would allow her to work, but that she does not have a job because "there's just, emotionally, there's so much going on that I just don't feel I could take on a job right now." Tr. 3/10/06 at 116. She stated that John takes her to her weekly counseling sessions and either waits outside or comes back in a half hour. She stated that she does not need John's permission to visit with family or friends. Mother stated that she believes she has changed and that her attendance at church and Alcoholics Anonymous has helped her, that she is mentally healthier now than she has ever been, that she loves her children and can parent Joseph and Matthew.
Mother called as a witness Janet Onidi, a parent aide supervisor with the Parent/Child Resource Center who worked with Susan approximately fifteen years earlier in connection with a previous child. Onidi testified that Susan contacted her directly in February 2005 to see if there were any services available to her. She stated that occasionally John and Susan had come together to see her and that she often spoke to Susan by telephone. Although the previous child did not remain in Susan's care, and Onidi did not observe Susan or John with Joseph or Matthew, Onidi testified that Susan had made progress and that when she sought services she was very dedicated and committed to change and that Susan had much more confidence than she had in the past.
Retta Vadnais, M.A., of the Northwest Center for Mental Health and Family Service testified that she has been mother's therapist and has seen her weekly since May 2005. She stated that she was treating mother for Depression NOS and Anxiety NOS, that mother was in full sustained remission for alcoholism, and that mother was afraid of returning to her previous lifestyle. Vadnais stated that mother had developed coping strategies, that her level of self-esteem had improved, and that she was fully committed to maintaining changes and improving positively. Although Vadnais stated that she believes mother could resume her role as a parent with current providers and supports in place, she acknowledged that mother still has work to do and that she had never seen mother with the children. Vadnais further acknowledged that she conducted no tests for substance abuse and did not focus on whether mother had income or employment in considering whether she was under the coercive control of John L. Vadnais recommended continued treatment and counseling to address mother's history of substance abuse.
G. Testimony — Respondent Father
Respondent father testified on his own behalf He stated that Joseph and Matthew stopped attending day care at the Kangaroo Corner because the state stopped paying for it; even though he appealed that decision and won, the children were not in his care by then as mother had taken them to Florida. He stated that he drove to Florida and picked them up after mother's arrest for custodial interference. He stated that in 2004, he took a parenting class. He indicated that he never possessed a weapon or fired a gun. He stated that he has numerous cameras mounted inside and outside of his home. The cameras mounted on the inside allow Susan, a smoker, to be outside on the porch smoking and still see the children inside. The cameras on the outside are there because he wanted to be able to keep an eye on the children when they were playing outside since his ten year old visited at times and there was a registered sex offender living nearby. He stated that he was in couples counseling with Susan to try to work out their problems. Father stated that when he suspected that there was a problem with the children in the foster home in July 2005, he went to the police, the Office of the Child Advocate, the DCF Ombudsman's Office and threatened to contact the Governor's Office. He stated that he hired a private investigator to obtain information on the foster parents. Father testified that he gives mother whatever money she needs. Mother smoked marijuana for over ninety days in his presence and that she "probably got the money from me." Tr. 3/10/06 at 34. Father testifled that he filed for bankruptcy in October 2005, discharging almost $80,000 in debt. John L. admitted cutting the telephone wires of the downstairs neighbor who drove mother and the children to Ansonia. John L. cut the wires to prevent the neighbor from communicating with mother.
John Callas of the DCF Ombudsman's Office testified that father made a complaint to his office that the children had been injured while in foster care. Callas stated that there was a factual basis for the complaint.
Beginning in April 2006 father was seen three times by a therapist, Rebecca Rancourt, at the Northwest Center for Family Service and Mental Health. Rancourt testified that she was addressing with father the goals of anger management and maintaining sobriety.
II. ADJUDICATION A. The Neglect Petitions
The court finds that the petitioner has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence the elements of neglect in this case. Here, there was ample evidence that the children were neglected in that they were permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. Both parents have a deeply concerning history of substance abuse, criminal conduct and involvement in physically violent relationships. At the time parents met, mother had already given birth to eight children, none of whom was in her care and father had three children, none of whom was in his care.
The children were at risk right from the start when mother and father had a domestic violence incident even before Joseph was born when DCF received a report that father had beaten mother on two occasions and that she was pregnant at the time. Another domestic violence incident occurred in the winter of 2000 when Joseph was an infant. Mother and father were both arrested and convicted following the incident in which mother had a bloody nose and lip and stated that father had pushed her and she fell. Father told police that mother had charged him with a knife. The child was outside in a car as father was attempting to leave with the infant who was inappropriately dressed for the weather.
DCF became involved again in the fall of 2003, when mother was arrested for possession of marijuana while driving one of John's cars with both children in the car. This conduct clearly placed the children at serious risk. Even though DCF offered services to parents beginning almost a year before the removal, parents did not avail themselves of the services, the conflict and problems escalated and DCF received another referral from Joseph's daycare center in April 2004 after staff observed bruising on Joseph who stated that his mother hit him with a belt. John L. also called the daycare center and stated that mother hit the child and that she was drinking. Shortly thereafter, father called DCF to say that mother was an alcoholic and that he was watching her. The events surrounding mother's drinking, the physical confrontation by father, her flight to Florida with the children to get away from father, his following them there, engaging in threatening behavior there and finally bringing the boys back to Connecticut, all constitute conditions, circumstances and associations injurious to the children's well-being. Indeed, mother admitted that she was "still using" at the time DCF took custody of the children. Ex. 14. Moreover, Dr. Mantell found that Joseph had post-traumatic stress disorder traits. He described the traumatic effect upon Joseph who "cried and cried and cried" when his father hurt his mother. Joseph had reported to Mantell that "my dad beats up my mom" and that his father made his mother's lip bleed. Joseph also told Mantell, in addition to the DCF worker, that his father hit both him and his brother. Joseph told Mantell that father hit the children when they were bad, hitting Joseph with a belt and Matthew with his hand and made red and blue marks on him and his brother. Joseph told social worker Cushman that "Daddy beat up Mom hard and made her lip bleed, but now her lip `do better.'" He told the worker that when his parents get mad at each other, they beat each other up and that "me and Mattie get hit." As Dr. Mantell testified after his evaluation in August 2004, Joseph had PTSD traits; he was exposed to significant violence and he was distressed by it. In short, mother and father's conduct leading up to the removal of the children and the filing of the neglect petitions in August 2004 continued to place the children at risk and constituted neglect. Thus, the court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the allegations in the neglect petitions have been established.
B. The Termination Petitions
Because the court has found the allegations in the neglect petitions to have been established, it proceeds to the termination of parental rights petitions. "The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC.) 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB) at 264. "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 357. However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the children's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, CT Page 18184 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
The ground alleged as to both children in the termination petitions was that the mother and father of the children under the age of seven who are neglected or uncared for, have failed, are unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).
1. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). On July 13, 2005, the court (Goldstein, J.) found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their mother and father were no longer appropriate. Under the statute, a finding that reasonable efforts were made is not required if the court has determined, as in this case, that reasonable efforts are no longer appropriate. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001).
The court nevertheless also finds that DCF made substantial efforts to reunify the children with mother and father in this case. Throughout DCF's involvement, numerous referrals were made to service providers who could help both parents address substance abuse, domestic violence and mental health issues as well as parenting concerns. Although respondents participated in some services, they did not participate in all services offered and did not benefit from the services provided. Visitation was provided throughout the case. Mother failed to benefit from substance abuse treatment and tested positive for marijuana in November and December 2004 and refused drug tests in April 2005. She had a diluted urine specimen in July 2005 and tested positive in October 2005. Mother also declined to participate in the Susan B. Anthony Project for domestic violence services stating in March 2005 that there was no violence in her relationship with father. The TPR petitions were filed in May 2005 after mother had refused domestic violence counseling and continued to test positive for drugs. Father had a positive hair test in October 2004 and began counseling with Tsukroff in October 2004, but failed to provide her with relevant information. In February 2005, Neems' report concluded that father needed to address defensiveness, temper, controlling behavior and his ability to rationalize his behavior. Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify both father and mother with the children and that as of the filing of the petitions, they were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
2. Parental Failure to Rehabilitate § 17a-112(j)(3)(E)
The statutory ground alleged against respondents as to both children in the termination petitions was that the mother and father of the children under the age of seven who are neglected or uncared for, have failed, are unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). The court has found Joseph and Matthew, who are under the age of seven, to be neglected. Additionally, as to both parents, their parental rights to another child or children were terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF. As to mother, termination orders entered as to Janet H., on April 24, 1984 (Dean, J.), as to Shawna M., on March 29, 2000, (Hoyle, J.), and as to Samantha E. on January 6, 2000 (Lopez, J.). With regard to father, a termination order entered as to his son John L. on November 20, 1998 (Foley, J.). Therefore, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the children. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner. CT Page 18186
`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that [within a reasonable time] she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 706 . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted). In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]. In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 269 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent mother nor father has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the ages and needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448.
The court considers that as of the adjudication date, mother continued to have a substantial substance abuse problem. Shortly after the children were removed, mother went to a substance abuse group counseling session while impaired, and later drove while under the influence, totaling father's car. Later that night, she was taken to Griffin Hospital with suicidal ideation. When she began treatment at the McCall Foundation, she indicated that she had used marijuana daily until September 2004. This use was confirmed by the hair test performed in October 2004 which was positive across all three segments for marijuana use over the previous ninety days. Mother continued to have positive drug screens in November 2004 with a diluted specimen on November 3, 2004 and a positive hair test November 10, 2004. She had a urine screen which was positive for marijuana on December 3, 2004. On April 13 and 15, 2005, mother failed to attend her group counseling sessions at the McCall Foundation and on April 22, 2005 she refused to take a drug screen. Thus, mother continued to have substantial issues with substance abuse at the time the petitions were filed even though she was attending the McCall Foundation services.
Mother also continued to be under father's control in all aspects of her life. As of the adjudication date of May 13, 2005, mother continued to be completely dependent on father, economically and physically. She was dependent on him for money as she did not work and had no independent income. Although the children had been out of her care since August 2004, she did not seek any employment or any independent source of financial support. Mother also was completely dependent on father for transportation as she did not drive. Although she testified that she had a valid license and therefore legally could drive, she did not have a car and father refused to allow her to borrow one of his. Father drove her to all counseling sessions and mother signed a release so that mother's drug test results could be provided to father. Father also had initiated multiple contacts with mother's drug counselor to discuss her progress. Moreover, seven surveillance cameras continued to be mounted inside and outside the home. Thus father continued to control all aspects of mother's life.
With regard to father, he had substance abuse issues after the filing of the TPR, as his hair test in October 2004 was positive across all three segments. Even if the court were to credit his claim that it was positive due to mother's use in his presence, that would simply demonstrate his poor judgment in being in the presence of marijuana on a daily basis. Although father did participate in the DOVE program, he did not believe he needed the services. As Kocienda reported to Neems in February 2005, father initially disagreed with the recommended treatment and threatened to call the state to report the program for fraud. Ex. 13. As set forth, in the discharge summary, "[f]ather did not feel he needed treatment, but was later willing to learn from the experience." Id. The discharge summary also noted that a barrier to treatment was that father believed that "all [domestic violence] related behaviors have ceased despite some emotional abuse that was present at intake." Id. Father's diagnosis upon entering the DOVE program, which remained the same at discharge, included impulse control disorder, partner relational problem and cocaine dependence, SFR. Id.
In father's intimate violence self-assessment which he completed at the outset of the DOVE program on October 6, 2004, he denied any physical or emotional abuse of a partner in the previous seven years. He admitted to substantial abuse occurring over seven years ago, but stated that since that time he had only made threats to leave including "or else" threats and yelling, and claimed no use of isolation in the past seven years other than disabling a car. Ex. 13 at 2-3. Father represented that he had not threatened to take the children away, threatened to call DCF or withheld access to the children in the last seven years. He also stated that he had not cheated on his partner or used any kind of economic abuse; he denied any property damage as a form of intimidation in the past seven years. Id. Contrary to the information provided to the program on the self-assessment, father had made threats to mother including threats about taking custody of the children away from her. The statements mother made to DCF about her relationship with father revealed that father did make threats of violence and engaged in acts of violence against her. Joseph's statements to Mantell and social worker Cushman that father beat mother up demonstrate that father was not truthful in his statements to the DOVE program. Contrary to father's representations, he did use isolation in his relationship with mother by screening all her mail, driving her everywhere she went and not allowing her access to his cars. Further, mother told DCF that in June 2004, she had a conflict with father when she learned that he was sexually involved with one of her friends. He therefore had cheated on his partner within the last seven years. Additionally, his denial of property damage was false in view of not only the tire slashing incident in Florida which father denied, but also in view of his conduct in cutting his neighbor's phone line in retaliation for his assistance to mother, which conduct father admitted. Thus, the information father provided at the outset of the program was false in numerous respects. The failure to provide honest information to the program undercut father's ability to benefit from the services provided. Further, in reaching the conclusion upon discharge that father likely benefitted from the program, the program was unaware that father had not provided truthful information about his conduct at the outset. Even without an awareness of the extent of father's controlling behavior, the discharge summary reflects father's functional status as only "somewhat improved" and his prognosis as "fair." Similarly, father failed to provide his therapist, Judith Tsukroff, with certain relevant information as reflected by her testimony that she was not aware of Joseph's statements to Dr. Mantell or to the DCF worker. Father's failure to be forthcoming demonstrates a superficial level of participation in counseling. As Neems testified, "the foundation for therapy is helping the therapist understand the real situation as opposed to a polished-up, cleaned up version of the real situation." Tr. 3/8/06 at 21. Neems noted in his report that, "Mr. [L.] is intense in his efforts to control the opinions of others and it can be quite difficult for a therapist operating with limited information to get an accurate view of his difficulties." Ex. 17 at 2-3.
"The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). The psychological evidence in this case clearly establishes that neither parent has achieved the requisite rehabilitation. Dr. Kurt initially diagnosed father with severe anti-social personality disorder in 1998 and opined that the disorder was "generally regarded as an untreatable disorder." Ex. 5 at 23. Although she found that father's disorder may become less evident or remit as he grows older, she also found that father has a particularly severe form of the disorder. Given his significant increase in anti-social behavior with advancing age, his history of episodic alcohol and drug abuse and little capacity for insight or motivation for treatment, she found at that time that he had a very poor prognosis. Id.
Father argues that his compliance with specific steps and diminished level of criminal activity shows that Kurt's diagnosis is no longer accurate and that he has rehabilitated. He also points to Plummer and Tsukroff's testimony that he has made substantial improvements. Father claims that the symptoms of his anti-social personality disorder have moderated with age such that he can now parent his children. After a thorough review of substantial recent material, however, Kurt found that her original diagnosis was corroborated. The decrease in the number of father's arrests, while a positive factor, is not particularly significant because, as Kurt testified, often individuals with anti-social personality disorder do not have criminal records and father "still demonstrates the most fundamental defect which is a disregard for the rights of others, and the inclination to aggressively pursue whatever he feels is standing in his way, or to attempt to manipulate, coerce, pressure, stress, menace until he achieves his end." Id. at 91. Kurt also noted that the recent relative absence of physical violence was not surprising in view of the intense scrutiny by the court and DCF, less intense scrutiny by treatment providers and regular visits. Given father's capacity for pre-meditative injury and terrorization of others, his fundamental issue of coercive, controlling and aggressive personality style persists despite any moderation of physical violence. As Kurt noted, "if he can control others by coercion, then there's no reason for him to escalate to more dramatic forms of violence." Id. at 92. Kurt cited father's conduct in cutting telephone lines and slashing tires of those who assisted mother as examples of pursuing more aggressive behaviors if he is unable to control others by intimidation. Significantly, Kurt stated that completing programs such as the DOVE program does not diminish the risk "because showing up is not enough. Just being there and going through the process isn't enough, particularly when one is unemployed and has the time to pursue this." In describing father's legally aggressive behavior, Kurt explained that father is "really channeling [his aggression] through the legal system now . . ." Id.
Additionally, Neems confirmed that Kurt's diagnosis remained accurate approximately six years later, even though the level of father's criminal conduct had decreased. Neems found that father continued to "attempt to intimidate people when he does not get what he wants," citing as an example his attempt to intimidate the staff at the DOVE program by threatening legal action. Ex. 16 at 26. Neems found it concerning that father took the position that he has no significant problems which need to be addressed and that father failed to provide certain information to his therapist who agreed with him that he had little to work on. Id. He also found that if father persisted in efforts to convince his therapist that he had nothing to work on, it would be a very poor prognostic sign. Neems acknowledged that father had been doing somewhat better for the last seven years, but found that he "continues to have problems with domestic violence, substance abuse, controlling other people, manipulating people, and it's obvious that those things continue to affect his individual functioning and his functioning as a parent." Tr. 3/6/06 at 20-21. Even father's witness, Dr. Plummer, testified that he would tend to agree that the behaviors associated with anti-social personality disorder do not tend to go away, but stated that the behaviors might change. Although Plummer stated in his report that Kurt's diagnosis was no longer accurate, he conceded that it was "still lurking in the background" and testified that he did not know what the Axis II diagnosis might be.
Although specific steps were issued with regard to mother and father, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that they did not comply with all the requirements of the steps. As described above, respondent mother did not refrain from substance abuse as she continued to test positive and/or refuse testing up until the TPR petitions were filed and even after they were filed. In September 2004, she was admitted to Griffin Hospital with suicidal ideation after showing up to her group counseling session impaired and totaling father's car while driving under the influence. Significantly, she refused to participate in the Susan B. Anthony domestic violence program. With regard to father, although he did attend the required services, he was not truthful with his service providers and therefore his capacity to benefit from the services was greatly diminished. Moreover, DCF had been working with the family since as early as 2003 when mother was arrested with marijuana in the car while the two children were in her care. Although at that time DCF offered in-home services, the services were refused because father did not want anyone coming into the home. Thus, over a substantial period of time, parents showed little real improvement.
At the time of the filing of the TPR petitions, mother had engaged in insufficient individual counseling to address her particularly concerning history of substance abuse and unstable relationships fraught with domestic violence. Her history of moving from one dependent, abusive relationship to another began at approximately fifteen when she had her first child. From that point forward, due to her own struggles with alcoholism and drug use, she was unable to maintain any of her eight other children in her care and indeed, placed many of those children in danger as a result of her relationships with violent men. Her second child, Janet, sustained life-threatening injuries when mother's then boyfriend became angry, slammed the car seat into the car and dropped the infant onto the pavement. As mother's counsel noted, mother acknowledged her inability to parent those children by consenting to termination or transferring guardianship.
Finally, mother's failure to rehabilitate is apparent in that her history of dependency continued in her relationship with father. As noted above, mother failed to participate in domestic violence counseling, a chronic issue in her relationships and one which has had a long-standing deleterious effect on her ability to retain custody of her children. As Neems noted, mother's "very long dramatic, serious history with substance abuse, dependency on poorly chosen people, remarkably poor judgment, repeated instances of irresponsible decisions in regard to her children, all of those things have had remarkable impact on the history of her parenting, and unless she were to remedy them very dramatically, would continue to impact her parenting of children." Tr. 3/8/06 at 15. Neems also found that mother had no insight into father's personality functioning, did not stand up to him, and simply went along with father's approach. Mother's recantation of the statements she made to DCF from Florida show her desire to simply go along with father's approach. Although she claims that the statements she originally made to DCF from Florida were false, the court does not credit her recantation. Indeed, mother's actions in fleeing from father after he discovered her relapse with alcohol, hurriedly packing a few things for herself and the children and seeking out the assistance of a neighbor to drive her away from the home, are the actions of a person who was afraid. The reports from mother's friends in Florida and mother's statements to the police in Florida that she left to get away from the domestic violence with father, all show that mother's initial statements reflected the true essence of her relationship with father.
The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of May 13, 2005, respondents had not brought themselves into a position in which they could provide adequate care for the children. Mother had not demonstrated sufficient stability and sobriety and father did not demonstrate insight into his significant abusive history or honestly participate with his service providers. Thus respondents did not demonstrate an ability to provide day-to-day care for the children.
The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 230; In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. at 749-50 (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). Both parents' conduct after the adjudicatory date undoubtedly shows some improvement. Despite that improvement, after the filing of the TPR petition, mother had a diluted urine sample in July 2005 and tested positive for drugs in October 2005. She had a negative hair test, however, in November 2005. Ex. M-1. To their credit, mother has been substance-free for a number of months since the October 2005 drug test and father has not had any recent arrests. Parents have continued in counseling with Tsukroff and father has recently begun counseling with Rebecca Rancourt.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). While parents have completed parenting classes, attended counseling and have not incurred any additional criminal convictions since 2004, numerous other factors compel the conclusion that they have not achieved rehabilitation and rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In view of father's extraordinary history, his recent conduct in exposing Joseph and Matthew to violence, cutting his neighbor's telephone lines after the neighbor helped mother flee, slashing the tires of individuals who assisted mother in Florida and embroiling the children in an interstate tug-of-war, all demonstrate that father is not in a position to parent the children. Additionally, even though father's drug screens after October 2004 were negative, mother continued to test positive and/or diluted while the two continued to live together. Moreover, father has not shown an ability to be economically stable in that he continued to work only seasonally doing snow removal and had filed for bankruptcy in October 2005, discharging $80,000 in debt. According to the statements made by father to DCF, his father paid his rent.
Although mother has recently remained substance-free, she continues to be completely dependent upon father for all of her needs. Even since the adjudicatory date of May 13, 2005, she has not obtained employment or any means of generating independent income. Despite the fact that mother does not have any children in her care, she testified that, "there's just, emotionally, there's so much going on that just don't feel I could take on a job right now." Tr. 3/10/06 at 116. Thus mother remains dependent upon John L. whom Judge Foley described as "an unremorseful and dangerous individual" who had an "untreatable" disorder and "the most severe domestic violence history and disorder ever seen by [the] court." 1998 WL 846526. Mother remains under the coercive control of father. As Mandel testified, a lack of recent arrests does not mean there is no coercive control. "It's a common mistake for people to assume that if there's no evident physical violence that somebody isn't able to . . . terrorize and control somebody." Tr. 3/6/06 at 125.
Joseph and Matthew are in great need of permanency. Given the parents' inability to have the children placed with them, additional time would be unreasonable and detrimental to the children. Joseph and Matthew have been in DCF care since August 2004. Here, for children who are ages six and four, given parents' astounding histories, additional time for rehabilitation is not appropriate. The court finds that the parents are not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children or to assume a useful role in their lives and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus, at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the children.
In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. at 261; accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. at 292; In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. at 384-85. The issue is not whether respondents have improved their ability to manage their own lives, but rather whether they have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the children. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. at 180; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. Joseph and Matthew both have specialized needs to the extent that they have behavioral issues, require medication and continued therapy. Although they have both made progress in treatment, Joseph has PTSD traits and ADHD for which he takes medication and will need to continue treatment. Matthew is doing well, but continues to struggle with behavioral problems requiring individual staffing. He has been diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder Unspecified, ADHD (for which he takes medication) and PTSD. Mother's history of an inability to parent any of her previous eight children raises significant concerns about her ability to provide appropriate parenting for these special needs children, particularly since both suffer from PTSD or PTSD traits and ADHD. As Mantell testified, Joseph was clearly distressed by the significant violence to which he was exposed while living in the home. Mother has never maintained steady employment or supported herself. She has always been dependent on someone else, even when her children were out of her care. The dependent relationships mother entered into were unstable, intense and abusive, with the last of those relationships, with father, John L., being particularly abusive right from the start and culminating with the tumultuous events of the summer of 2004 when mother fled to Florida to get away from the abusive relationship. Similarly, father has been unable to parent any of his other children and in view of the special needs of these children, would be unable to parent them.
Joseph and Matthew desperately need and deserve a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "[t]erminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, despite respondent parents' efforts, they remain unable to provide the day-to-day care these children need within a reasonable time. DCF removed the children from one foster family in November 2005 due to concerns about the foster parent's discipline of the children. Any consideration of placing the children with the parents would unreasonably prolong the risk of future placements.
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondent mother and father remain unable to successfully parent the children and lack the ability to assume a responsible position in the children's lives within a reasonably foreseeable time. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proven respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
III. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of these proceedings, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including June 2, 2006, the date upon which the trial in this matter was completed. "`If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 103. "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001) (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered services including, among other things, parenting education, domestic violence counseling, substance abuse evaluation and testing, and mental health evaluation and counseling. Respondent mother and father engaged in some services, including parenting classes, but failed to engage in others.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts. The court also finds that on July 13, 2005, the court (Goldstein, J.) found that it was no longer appropriate to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify children with mother or father.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent mother and father. As set forth above in detail, there was compliance by respondent mother and father as to some steps, but failure to comply with others. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the children do have an emotional bond with their biological parents with whom they have visited regularly for approximately two years. The children have a strong emotional bond with each other.
(5) As to the ages of the children, the court finds that Joseph, born September 17, 1999 is now almost seven years old and Matthew, born May 11, 2002, is now four. The court further finds that these children require stability of placement and continuity of care and that the children's attorney recommends termination.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V. 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; the court finds that respondent mother and father have maintained a regular visiting relationship with the children. The court further finds that although respondents have recently made progress in their ability to live within the law and to remain apparently substance-free, they continue to be unable to assume a responsible parental role in the children's lives. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. Further, while the parents' financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the children.
With respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Susan H. and John L. to Joseph and Matthew L. is in the best interest of the children. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Joseph and Matthew. The children have already endured many difficulties in their lives, including the trauma of witnessing various domestic violence incidents and living in an environment of coercive control by father. Mother and father are unable to assume a responsible parental role for the children. Mother has continued her pattern of total reliance upon another and continued to exercise extremely poor judgment in continuing a relationship with a violent, controlling individual. Although both parents love their children and would like to care for them, they have not put themselves into a position to be able to do so.
In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the children's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with foster parents and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents; and their genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the children's best interest. Joseph and Matthew undoubtedly have an attachment to parents and the evidence established that the boys enjoyed their visits with parents. However, the existence of a bond between parent and child does not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 105-07; In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 536, 857 A.2d 963 (2004). Despite the existence of a bond with parents, termination can nevertheless be in a child's best interest. This is particularly true where the children are in need of permanency and the parents remain unable to provide the day-to-day care these children need within a reasonable time.
These children are entitled to a resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as their parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the children supports termination.
After considering the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights is in the children's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Susan H. and John L. to Joseph and Matthew L. are hereby terminated. The Commissioner of DCF is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children. Permanency plans shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.