Opinion
No. COA12–1393.
2013-05-7
In the Matter of J.B., IV D.B.
Sharp, Michael & Graham, L.L.P., by Steven D. Michael, for Petitioner Dare County Department of Social Services. Peter Wood for Respondent-mother.
Appeal by Respondent-mother from order entered 12 July 2012 by Judge Amber Davis in Dare County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 April 2013. Sharp, Michael & Graham, L.L.P., by Steven D. Michael, for Petitioner Dare County Department of Social Services. Peter Wood for Respondent-mother.
Administrative Office of the Courts, by Appellate Counsel Tawanda N. Foster, for Guardian ad Litem.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from a review and permanency planning order entered 12 July 2012 which appointed the paternal grandfather of her minor children, juveniles J.B. and D.B., as their legal guardian. We affirm.
On 13 May 2010, Petitioner Dare County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed petitions alleging J.B. and D.B. were neglected and dependent juveniles. In the verification section of each pre-printed petition form, the “SWORN AND SUBCRIBED TO BEFORE ME” section is signed by M.P. Duprey. The word “Magistrate” is hand-written beneath the signature, in the same space where the form has boxes for “Deputy CSC,” “Assistant CSC,” and “Clerk of Superior Court.” Petitioner's signature space is signed by social worker Jennifer Hutchinson. The letters “DCDSS” are hand-written next to Hutchinson's signature, and “Dare” is typed in the blank preceding the pre-printed phrase “County Department of Social Services” below her signature. On both petitions, however, the boxes for “Director” or “Authorized Representative of Director” underneath Hutchinson's signature are unchecked. A verified affidavit, also signed by Hutchinson, is attached to each of the petitions.
After DSS filed the petitions, J.B. and D.B. were placed in nonsecure custody. In an adjudication order entered 27 September 2010, both parents stipulated that the juveniles were neglected, and they remained in DSS custody. On 6 October 2011, the trial court entered an order ceasing reunification efforts. Respondent-mother filed written notification of her objection to the order ceasing reunification efforts. On 12 July 2012, the court entered a permanency planning and review order which awarded legal guardianship of J.B. and D.B. to their paternal grandfather. From this order, Respondent-mother appeals.
The father of the juveniles is not a party to this appeal.
J.B., born in June 1997, and D.B., born in January 2003, have been living with their paternal grandfather since October 2011 and both juveniles have stated that they feel safe with their grandfather and want to remain with him.
Respondent-mother's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter any orders in this case because the juvenile petitions are not properly signed and verified. In related sub-arguments, Respondent-mother first contends that the signatures on the petitions are not identifiable. Respondent-mother also contends that Hutchinson is not properly identified as an authorized representative of the DSS director, and that Duprey is not properly identified as a person authorized to witness the signature. We disagree.
“A trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787, 792 (2006). “Although the question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, ... where the trial court has acted in a matter, every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be indulged in favor of jurisdiction [.]” Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557, 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
A juvenile petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency “shall be drawn by the [DSS] director, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk, recording the date of filing.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–403(a) (2011). The statutory definition of director includes “[t]he director of the county department of social services in the county in which the juvenile resides or is found, or the director's representative as authorized in G.S. [§ ] 108A–14.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(10) (2011). Accordingly, a DSS director may “delegate to one or more members of his staff the authority to act as his representative” to file an abuse, neglect, and dependency petition. In re Dj.L., 184 N.C.App. 76, 79, 646 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, we conclude that the petitions are properly signed and verified pursuant to section 7B–403 (a). Contrary to Respondent-mother's argument, the signatures on the petitions are identifiable as Duprey's and Hutchinson's. The first page of each petition is stamped as “[r]eceived by Magistrate” M.P. Duprey on 12 May 2010, the same date as the verification. Duprey also signed the nonsecure custody orders entered on 13 May 2010. In addition, the affidavits attached to each of the petitions contain Hutchinson's name and signature and identify her as a social worker for DSS. Thus, the record contradicts Respondent-mother's assertion that the signatures in the verification sections of the petition are unidentifiable, and affirmatively establishes that the petitions were signed by Duprey and Hutchinson.
Respondent-mother contends that her position is supported by this Court's decision in In re A.J.H–R, 184 N.C.App. 177, 645 S.E.2d 791 (2007). We find that case distinguishable. In In re A.J.H–R,
the petitions were neither signed nor verified by the director of DSS. The verification section of the juvenile petition in case number 06 J 150 shows the “Signature of Petitioner” as: “James D. Bumgarner by MH” with the “Director” box checked. Similarly, the verification section in case number 06 J 154 shows the “Signature of Petitioner” as: “James D. Bumgarner by MHenderson” with the “Director” box checked.
Id. at 179, 645 S.E.2d at 792 (citation omitted). Observing that, “the record shows that ‘MH’ and ‘MHenderson’ completed the petitions on behalf of the director, not in her own capacity as the director's authorized representative[,]” we concluded that “the petitions were neither signed nor verified by an authorized representative of the director.” Id. at 179–80, 645 S.E.2d 791,645 S.E.2d at 792–93. Here, in contrast, Hutchinson did not sign the director's name on behalf of the director, but rather signed her own name “in her own capacity as the director's authorized representative.” Id. at 179, 645 S.E.2d at 792.
While finding In re A.J.H–R readily distinguishable, we conclude that the relevant facts here are very similar to those in In re Dj.L., 184 N.C.App. at 79–80, 646 S.E.2d at 137. In that case, a social worker signed her name as the petitioner, but failed to indicate that she was the DSS director or an authorized representative thereof. Id. at 79, 646 S.E.2d at 137. The petition included language that the social worker had “sufficient knowledge or information to believe that a case has arisen which invokes the juvenile jurisdiction of the Court.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Further, the social worker listed her address as “Youth and Family Services,” a division of the county DSS. Id. Thus, this Court held that the petition contained “sufficient information from which the trial court could determine that [the social worker] had standing to initiate an action under section 7B–403(a).” Id. at 80, 646 S.E.2d at 137.
Similarly, in this case the petitions include the specific language that Hutchinson had “knowledge or information to believe that a case has arisen that invokes the juvenile jurisdiction of the court[.]” Id. at 79, 646 S.E.2d at 137. As in In re Dj.L., Hutchinson's signature indicates that she worked for DSS, and she listed DSS as the petitioner. Accordingly, we hold that the petitions contained sufficient information to indicate to the trial court that Hutchinson had standing to initiate the action by filing the petition.
Finally, the petitions are properly verified by Duprey, the magistrate. Magistrates are authorized by statute to administer oaths and verify pleadings. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–292(1), (5) (2011); see alsoN.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–148 (2011). A signed verification, witnessed by an authorized official, is valid unless evidence in the record impeaches the verification. Skinner v. Skinner, 28 N.C.App. 412, 414, 222 S.E.2d 258, 260–61,disc. review denied, 289 N.C. 726, 224 S.E.2d 674 (1976).
Here, Respondent-mother identifies no evidence to impeach the magistrate's verification of the petitions. To the contrary, the record supports the conclusion that the signatures on the petitions are those of Hutchinson and Duprey. Accordingly, we overrule Respondent-mother's argument and hold that the petitions were properly signed and verified.
AFFIRMED. Judges STEELMAN and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).