In this accelerated appeal, appellant, mother, challenges the trial court's order, entered after a bench trial, terminating her parental rights to her minor children, M.A.A., A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V. (collectively, the "children"), and awarding the Department of Family and Protective Services ("DFPS") sole managing conservatorship of the children. Appellant, father, challenges the trial court's order, entered after a bench trial, terminating his parental rights to his minor child, M.A.A. In four issues, mother contends that the trial court erred in appointing DFPS as the sole managing conservator of the children and the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that she engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being; she failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children; and termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. In four issues, father contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the child's physical and emotional well-being; he failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of M.A.A.; and termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.

At the time the trial court entered its termination order, M.A.A. was twelve years old, A.M.V. was six years old, N.A.V. was four years old, and J.A.V. was three years old. The fathers of A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V. are not parties to this appeal.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.404; see also id. § 161.205.

See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).

See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).

See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Background

The background portion of the opinion discusses the evidence presented at trial. See In re D.L.W.W., No. 01-20-00507-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2020 WL 7517612, at *1 n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2020, no pet.); In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 142 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.) ("Although we recognize the trial court and the parties in this proceeding had many hearings before the date of trial, we emphasize that none of the previous hearings constitute evidence that can support the trial court's order terminating a parent's rights. The only evidence that can support the trial court's order is that evidence admitted at trial." (emphasis added)).

On May 28, 2019, DFPS filed its original petition. On January 31, 2020, DFPS filed its fifth amended petition seeking termination of mother's parental rights to the children and termination of father's parental rights to M.A.A. DFPS also sought managing conservatorship of the children.

Removal Affidavit

At trial, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the affidavit of DFPS Investigator Janese Grice. Grice testified that on January 14, 2019, DFPS received a referral alleging physical neglect of M.A.A. and the children's older sister, J.L., by mother. J.L., who was in the fourth grade at the time, exhibited poor hygiene. She had been wearing the same clothes for at least a month, her hair did not appear to be washed, her fingernails were dirty, and she seemed to have gone an extended period of time without bathing. It did not appear that a parent had been supervising J.L.'s hygiene, despite her young age. J.L.'s poor hygiene had led to her being isolated at school; she did not participate much in school and she was withdrawn. This affected J.L.'s academics. M.A.A., who was ten years old at the time, had similar problems with his personal hygiene. His "body smell" was "very strong," and it appeared that there was "a lack of parent[al] support when it c[ame] to washing [his] clothes and [M.A.A.] maintain[ing] proper hygiene."

J.L. was not involved in the termination case.

Following the referral, DFPS Investigator Raven Simon attended a meeting with personnel from M.A.A.'s elementary school and mother to address the issues with M.A.A.'s personal hygiene and academics. During the meeting, it was stated that M.A.A. had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), and despite his age, M.A.A. was still wearing diapers. Mother later told Simon that M.A.A.'s hygiene issues were because she worked long hours.

In March 2019, Grice met with M.A.A. M.A.A. told Grice that he took baths at home every day and mother made sure that he was clean. In contrast, personnel from M.A.A.'s elementary school told Grice that M.A.A. came to school "with a very strong odor." M.A.A. wore a diaper that smelled "very dirty and bad." School personnel encouraged M.A.A. to shower, but he refused at times. M.A.A. could change his diaper by himself.

School personnel also told Grice that M.A.A. attended special education classes at school because of an intellectual disability. And M.A.A. had been diagnosed with ADHD and encopresis—"a condition known as fecal soiling by a child over the age of four." M.A.A. took medication for his ADHD.

Grice also spoke with J.L. in March 2019. J.L. reported that she could take baths at home and she did not think that she "c[ame] to school with an odor." J.L., despite her young age, would help M.A.A. bathe and brush his teeth.

In April 2019, Grice went to mother's home. M.A.A. answered the door and said that mother was not home. Grice asked M.A.A. to get J.L. because she was older. J.L. told Grice that mother was not home, she had gone to the store, and she had not been gone "that long."

Later in April 2019, Grice interviewed mother. As to M.A.A., mother stated that she tried to bathe him, but M.A.A., at times, did not want to bathe and it was hard for her to bathe him. According to mother, she had to force M.A.A. to bathe. M.A.A. wore a diaper, but she was "trying to train him." As to J.L., mother said that she did not have trouble getting J.L. to bathe. Mother disclosed that she had transferred M.A.A. and J.L. to their current elementary school after she had received complaints from their previous school about their smell. Mother did not have difficulty bathing A.M.V., N.A.V., or J.A.V. Mother told Grice that she did not maintain contact with any of the children's fathers.

While at mother's home in April 2019, Grice noticed that the home was not clean. There were eggs on the kitchen floor and toys on the floor in the living and dining rooms. There were gnats and flies in the dining room and kitchen. In the master bedroom, where the children were, Grice saw trash on the floor, "such as paper, empty Cheetos bags, toys, clothes, shoes, crumbs of chips and food, empty bottles of water and juice boxes, and uncooked ramen noodles opened from the package." There were brown stains smeared on the walls. According to Grice, the bathroom in the master bedroom seemed clean and another bedroom in the home was neat and clean. Grice informed mother that the condition of the home was not acceptable and that it needed to be rectified. Grice attempted to contact mother for a follow up visit, but she was unable to reach mother after making repeated attempts to contact her.

On May 24, 2019, DFPS received another referral alleging neglectful supervision and physical neglect of the children by mother. On that day, an individual called law enforcement officers after the children were seen "outside wandering alone" without mother. When law enforcement officers arrived at mother's home, she was not there, and "the conditions of the home were deplorable." Officers found "decomposing food and garbage everywhere" and food stains on the walls. There was "something caked on the floor which may have been feces or food or both." One of the children "was found sleeping on the floor underneath a pile of rotting tacos and trash." The children were dirty, alone, and one of them was not clothed.

While law enforcement officers were at mother's home, mother returned and stated that she had gone to the grocery store. She did not have an explanation for the unsanitary conditions in her home. Mother was arrested that day for child endangerment after "leaving [the children] alone in a filthy home without proper supervision or care for their safety."

Grice also went to mother's home on May 24, 2019 after DFPS received the referral for neglectful supervision and physical neglect. When Grice entered the home, "multiple flies swarmed out of the house." In the dining room, Grice saw "a huge pile of trash that included[] plastic bags, spoiled food, food trays, garbage bags, and empty pizza boxes and egg cartons along with clothes on the dining room table, food crumbs, and hazardous and unsanitary debris." In the kitchen, Grice saw empty food plates and milk cartons. The kitchen sink was "very filthy with stains and unclean dishes piled on top of each other." The kitchen stove was stained with previously-cooked food, and a dirty skillet, a can of hair product, and trash were on the stove and surrounding it. In the living room, there were three big garbage bags and a broken "baby pack n play" that was filled with empty boxes and trash. The wooden floors in the living room and dining room were stained. The walls and blinds in the living room "had a brownish liquid stain [on them] that appeared as if liquid had been thrown." Near the fireplace, Grice saw "corn nibbles [sic], juice stains[,] and dirt along with three large black garbage bags filled with trash." One of the bags was ripped and trash had fallen out.

As Grice proceeded through the home, flies and gnats were everywhere. The walls in the hallway by the bedrooms had feces smeared across them. The first bedroom was filled with boxes, a baby crib that was partially put together, cups, and paper. Another bedroom had clothes and shoes lying on the floor as well as food crumbs on the carpet. The bathroom smelled, and "a huge pile of diapers" and trash were by the bathtub. There were also food crumbs and cups on the floor. The master bedroom was completely filled with toys, shoes, clothes, spoiled food that was embedded in the carpet, and a dirty mattress with no sheets on it. The room had a pile of trash with dirty diapers, empty drink cartons, food trays, and dried ramen noodles. The bathroom attached to the master bedroom was filled with flies, gnats, dirty clothes, food crumbs, potato chip bags, plastic cups, shoes, and dirty diapers. The sink was "completely stained with leftover burnt corn." The closet in the master bedroom was filled with overflowing clothes baskets and more clothes on the floor. A law enforcement officer told Grice that he had found one of the children sleeping under the trash in the master bedroom. In Grice's opinion, the condition of mother's home was deplorable and the home was not a suitable living environment for the children.

While she was at mother's home on May 24, 2019, Grice saw the children, who were sitting in an ambulance. The children did not have any marks or bruises on them. But an emergency medical technician ("EMT") told Grice that J.A.V. was naked when the EMTs arrived at mother's home. The EMTs cleaned J.A.V.'s feet, which were "completely dirty," and put a diaper on him. A sheet was wrapped around J.A.V. because he did not have any clothes.

Mother told Grice that she needed help taking care of the children because of her hectic work schedule. Mother also told law enforcement officers that she had only left the children for about thirty or forty-five minutes, but a neighbor told officers that mother had been gone for at least two hours that day. Mother was arrested for the felony offense of abandoning or endangering a child, and the children were removed from her care.

The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the indictment related to the felony offense with which mother was charged. The indictment alleged that, on or about May 24, 2019, mother "unlawfully, having custody, care and control of [A.M.V.], a child younger than fifteen years of age . . . , intentionally abandon[ed] [A.M.V.] . . . under circumstances that exposed [A.M.V.] to an unreasonable risk of harm, namely le[aving] [A.M.V.] alone in the apartment for two hours and with the intent to return for [A.M.V.], and [mother] did not voluntarily deliver [A.M.V.] to a designated emergency infant care provider under [s]ection 262.302, Texas Family Code." See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(b), (d) (abandoning child constitutes state jail felony offense); see also id. § 12.35(a) ("[A]n individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony shall be punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or less than 180 days."). At the time of trial mother's criminal case was pending.

DFPS Caseworker Clark

DFPS caseworker Kirby Clark testified that the children entered DFPS's care after mother left them at home alone and law enforcement officers were called. When officers arrived at mother's home, the home was in deplorable condition. And the children were immediately removed from mother's care out of a concern for their safety. According to Clark, photographs of the home showed food and trash all over. Mother told Clark that her home was in its condition because she had lost her mother in 2018, she was "just trying to stay afloat being a single mother," she was overwhelmed and was working multiple jobs, and she did not have a support system. According to Clark, mother was arrested for the felony offense of "leaving the children with intent to return."

Clark stated that the children's older sister, J.L., was also removed from mother's care on May 24, 2019. J.L. was placed with her father.

The trial court admitted into evidence photographs of the home at the time that the children were removed from mother's care. The photographs show a large amount of trash and debris throughout the entire home as well as unclean surfaces in multiple rooms.

As to M.A.A., Clark testified that when M.A.A. entered DFPS's care, there was a concern about the condition of his teeth. Mother had not taken M.A.A. for regular dental examinations. He also had not had his annual medical examination for 2019. According to Clark, M.A.A. had special needs. He had been diagnosed with ADHD and took medication for it. M.A.A. also had encopresis—meaning that he was "unable to control his bowel movements" and defecated on himself. Mother could not provide a medical explanation for M.A.A.'s encopresis. When M.A.A. entered DFPS's care, he was wearing a diaper every day. But, while in DFPS's care, M.A.A. stopped wearing a diaper. He had fewer accidents, and he became more social. M.A.A.'s doctor attributed the improvement in M.A.A.'s health to the child having a consistent routine as well as stability in his home. While in DFPS's care, M.A.A.'s life improved significantly, and he was doing well.

As to schooling, Clark noted that M.A.A. qualified for special education services at school, and while in DFPS's care, M.A.A. had received such services. But when M.A.A. entered DFPS's care, DFPS was not able to confirm that he had been receiving special education services while in mother's care. Mother could not articulate M.A.A.'s special education needs either. Mother just stated that M.A.A. was "delayed and . . . wore a diaper." Mother did not know what kind of education services M.A.A. needed to be receiving at school, which was concerning to Clark.

Clark stated M.A.A. required a higher level of care than other children, and he was not receiving that higher level of care while living with mother. DFPS sought to terminate mother's and father's parental rights to M.A.A. because mother could not provide a safe and stable home for M.A.A. and mother and father could not "take care of him."

DFPS intended to place M.A.A. with a relative. DFPS had located a fictive kin family member as a potential placement for M.A.A. and had completed a home study on that relative. Clark noted that, at one point during the termination case, M.A.A. had been placed with father's sister, Laura. When Laura tested positive for narcotics use, M.A.A. was removed from her home, and placed in another foster home. The potential relative placement for M.A.A. was now with Laura's sister-in-law, Samantha. Samantha was willing to adopt M.A.A. When Clark spoke to M.A.A. about Samantha, M.A.A. told her that Samantha visited Laura's home frequently while M.A.A. was living with Laura. M.A.A. knew Samantha, her husband, and her children, and he called her "Tia Samantha." Based on the progress that M.A.A. had made while in DFPS's care, Clark believed that there would be nothing preventing M.A.A. from being adopted.

Samantha testified that she had interacted with M.A.A. "a few times" and M.A.A. knew her.

As to A.M.V., Clark stated that when A.M.V. entered DFPS's care, there was a concern about the condition of A.M.V.'s teeth because he had numerous cavities. While in DFPS's care, A.M.V.'s cavities were fixed, and he began receiving routine dental examinations. Clark also explained that while in mother's care, A.M.V., who would have been in pre-kindergarten before his removal, had "just stopped" attending school. A.M.V. did not have intellectual delays when he entered DFPS's care.

As to N.A.V., Clark stated that she was "not on target" when she entered DFPS's care. N.A.V. was three years old when she was removed from mother's care. She did not have intellectual delays, but she was still drinking out of a bottle and was not potty trained. Additionally, N.A.V. had numerous cavities, and she required multiple dental appointments to address her dental hygiene issues. While in DFPS's care, N.A.V. stopped using a bottle and was potty trained.

As to J.A.V., Clark testified that he had not been taken to the dentist while in mother's care. DFPS was also unable to determine whether J.A.V. had ever received immunizations because there was no "paperwork or anything to reflect that he had received his shots." J.A.V., who was almost two years old when he entered DFPS's care, was not potty trained. J.A.V. did not have intellectual delays when he entered DFPS's care.

J.A.V. received his required immunizations while in DFPS's care.

According to Clark, neither A.M.V., N.A.V., nor J.A.V. had any mental health, educational, or behavioral issues that would prevent them from being adopted. A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V. were placed in a foster home together, but there was not any space in the home for M.A.A. Clark noted that DFPS was looking to potentially place all four children, or at least A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V., with the mother's aunt and uncle. A home study was conducted on the aunt and uncle, which DFPS was in the process of reviewing. The home study did not reveal any major concerns.

Clark stated that if DFPS could not place the children with relatives, it would seek to find another adoptive home for the children.

Clark also testified that after the children were removed from mother's care, mother was ordered to complete a Family Service Plan ("FSP"). As part of her FSP, mother was required to participate in all court hearings and permanency conferences, complete a psychosocial evaluation and follow all recommendations, including participating in individual therapy, complete a psychiatric evaluation, attend and complete parenting classes, maintain stable employment, and find and maintain stable housing. Mother completed the psychosocial evaluation, psychiatric evaluation, individual therapy, and parenting classes. Mother was also asked to participate in family therapy with M.A.A., which she did until those sessions were "paused" due to the COVID-19 pandemic. But mother had not maintained stable employment or housing.

See In re Landstar Ranger, Inc., No. 06-20-00047-CV, 2020 WL 5521136, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 15, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (noting "[a]s a result of the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 13, 2020, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued a disaster proclamation certifying that COVID-19 posed an imminent threat of disaster for all counties in the state of Texas[, and] . . . Governor Abbott instituted health protocols, such as minimizing in-person contact, maintaining six feet between individuals, and suggesting that people wear masks when in the presence of other individuals").

As to mother's housing, Clark explained that mother had not demonstrated that she was able to care for the children and provide them with a safe environment in which to live. For a period of time while the termination case was pending, mother did not have a place to live. Clark did visit one home—an apartment—where mother was living, but mother moved out of the apartment after about a month. That apartment was "bare," but clean. At the time of trial, mother no longer lived at the apartment because her roommate's mother moved in and mother did not feel safe in the home. In 2019, DFPS and Clark attempted to assist mother in obtaining housing, but mother did not provide Clark with the documentation that Clark needed to help mother.

Clark also testified that on the night before the second day of trial, mother sent Clark a text message with the address of mother's new home. Mother was living in the home of a friend, and Clark was told that it was "not a long-term placement" because mother was still looking for her own apartment. Clark attempted to visit mother's new home, but no one answered the door or Clark's telephone call. Mother's car was in the driveway at the time, as were two other cars. Clark stayed at the home for about forty minutes waiting to see if anyone would answer the door, but no one did. According to Clark, mother had not established that she had obtained and maintained stable housing.

Mother told Clark that she had difficulty securing an apartment in her name because she had pending criminal charge for a felony offense.

As to mother's employment history, Clark stated that mother had not maintained stable employment during the termination case; instead, she had been employed at "several [different] jobs." In August 2020, mother reported to Clark that she was working at a warehouse and a nightclub, but the payroll stubs that mother provided to Clark were illegible. Mother also stated that "she was in orientation for an insurance company call service." At some point during the termination case, mother reported to Clark that she was not working due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the second day of trial, mother provided Clark with legible payroll stubs which showed that mother had been employed from July 2020 to September 2020 as a cashier at a convenience store.

Clark also testified that mother lost her job at a Valero convenience store around the time that the COVID-pandemic began.

Clark stated that mother had visited the children while they were in DFPS's care. At the beginning of the termination case, mother's visits with the children were twice a month, but mother's visitation was later increased. Clark had observed a bond between the children and mother, and mother had brought food to the children at three of her visits, beginning in March 2020. Mother had not brought the children clothes or gifts to any of the visits.

Clark further testified that mother was charged with a felony offense. Mother also had previously been involved with DFPS before the current termination case. In 2014, mother was investigated for "unsanitary home conditions" and because one of the children "fell through a glass table" while in mother's care. In 2015, DFPS investigated mother because it received allegations of inappropriate care in mother's home. In 2018, there was an investigation of mother related to M.A.A.'s physical care after there were "numerous reports about him having accidents . . . at school," wearing diapers, and defecating on himself.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(b), (d) (abandoning child constitutes state jail felony offense); see also id. § 12.35(a) ("[A]n individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony shall be punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or less than 180 days.").

According to Clark, mother's parental rights to the children should be terminated because she could not provide them with a safe and nurturing environment. Although mother had participated in the services required by her FSP, she had not addressed the reasons that the children had come into DFPS's care. The children deserved a permanent placement so that they could thrive and be nurtured and successful.

As to father, Clark stated that father had known that he had a child, M.A.A., even before the termination case began. But Clark did not know if father had access to the child while M.A.A. was in mother's care, although she believed that father had met M.A.A. in the past. Clark stated that father was in his "mid 30s," and he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. Father told Clark that he was not taking medication for his schizophrenia. Father lived with his mother and was not able to take care of himself. Father's mother was his guardian, and father's mother told Clark that there had been formal guardianship proceedings with a probate court. Father's mother also provided Clark with "a letter from the guardianship stating that she was the guardian for [father]." But father's mother had not given Clark anything to show that she had "decision[-]making capacity over" father.

In another portion of her testimony, Clark stated that father did not know that he was the father of M.A.A. until the child was removed from mother's care.

According to Clark, father was not living with mother at the time the children were removed from mother's care, and father did not do anything to cause the children to enter DFPS's care. Clark described father as the "non-offending parent" of M.A.A.

Father was ordered to complete an FSP, and according to Clark, father was aware of the services that he was required to complete under his FSP. As part of his FSP, father was asked to submit to DNA testing, provide proof of employment, and sign a release of information form. Father completed the required DNA testing, provided documentation of supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits, which was sufficient to meet the proof of employment requirement, provided documentation that he resided with his mother, and signed a release of information form. According to Clark, DFPS asked father to participate in a psychiatric evaluation, which father did not do. DFPS received notice from the Harris Health System that father "was not being compliant with the recommendations or the evaluations."

The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of father's FSP, which was dated July 16, 2019. Clark testified that the July 16, 2019 FSP only required father to submit to DNA testing, which father did. Clark also noted that father did not sign the July 16, 2019 FSP. The trial court also took judicial notice of father's amended FSP, which was dated October 2, 2019 and in the trial court's file. Clark stated that father was at the hearing when the amended FSP was filed.

Clark stated that DFPS was seeking to terminate father's parental rights to M.A.A. because father did not follow "the recommendations of the psychiatrist" at Harris Health System, but Clark did not provide any additional details. According to Clark, "[t]he only service [from father's FSP] that he [was] not currently in compliance with [was] his psychiatric evaluation and being in compliance with his medication." Clark also testified, however, that father was not required to complete a psychosocial evaluation as one of his FSP requirements.

Clark noted that DFPS did not facilitate any visitations between father and M.A.A. during the termination case. But when M.A.A. was placed with father's sister, Laura, for a period of time in 2020, M.A.A. had "virtual visits" with father. Father had formed a bond with M.A.A., and they also spent time together supervised. M.A.A. knew that father was his father, and to Clark's knowledge, father had never done anything during his visits with M.A.A. that would have endangered the child.

See In re A.K.P., No. 04-20-00305-CV, 2021 WL 356900, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting parent's visitation with child was limited to virtual visits after COVID-19 pandemic began).

Clark further testified that father came to court "on several occasions" related to the termination case. And Clark had a meeting with father, father's mother, and father's sister at father's home during the termination case.

Child Advocates Representative Arguelles

Child Advocates Inc. ("Child Advocates") representative Erika Arguelles testified that mother's parental rights to the children and father's parental rights to M.A.A. should be terminated so that the children could be placed in a safe and stable environment where their basic needs could be met.

Child Advocates had not been able to verify mother's current living arrangement, and no one from Child Advocates had visited the home that mother was living in at the time of trial. Someone from Child Advocates had visited mother at her friend's home a couple months before trial. Arguelles stated that the friend's home was not a long-term living situation for mother.

As to M.A.A., Arguelles stated that he had special needs. Arguelles testified that she did not believe that mother would be able to care for M.A.A.'s needs if he were returned to her care because M.A.A. needed a higher level of care than mother had shown that she was able to provide. While in DFPS's care, M.A.A.'s attitude and speech had improved. M.A.A.'s ability to feed and bathe himself had improved as had his ability to brush his own teeth. Arguelles stated that M.A.A. had made significant progress while in DFPS's care. As to the other children, according to Arguelles, A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V. had become more confident and affectionate while in DFPS's care.

Arguelles testified that the children needed more than love and affection from mother. They needed educational support, medical support, and someone to teach them life skills such as doing their own hair, brushing their teeth, and using utensils to eat. Mother had failed to teach the children such things when they were in her care. Arguelles did not think that either mother or father had demonstrated an ability to care for the children. But Arguelles also stated that she had never met father.

Mother

Mother testified that the children were removed from her care on May 24, 2019. At the time the children were removed, mother was depressed because several of her family members had passed away between April 2, 2018 and May 24, 2019. Mother attributed the condition of her home at the time of the children's removal to her depression.

Mother stated that she had received an FSP and she agreed to complete the requirements of her FSP. Mother believed that she had complied with her FSP. Mother completed her parenting classes. From her parenting classes, mother learned that when she feels sad, she can "speak with somebody," and when she needs help with the children, she can ask. Mother also learned not to yell and to listen to the children. And she learned to "[b]e[] there" for the children, to "provid[e] for them," and to "giv[e] them what they need." Mother also completed individual therapy, which addressed the depression mother had been experiencing. Mother stated that she was not depressed at the time of trial and she thought she could handle her depression in a better way than she had in the past should it return. Mother said she would talk to her best friends and her family members if she experienced "signs of sadness."

Mother testified that she was not required to participate in any substance abuse treatment because she had never used narcotics and her narcotics-use testing results were negative.

The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of mother's Certificate of Completion for her parenting classes.

The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of mother's Certificate of Completion for individual therapy.

Mother also participated in visits with the children during the termination case, and the amount of time she was allowed to spend with the children increased over time. At visits, mother hugged the children, kissed the children, and played with them. Mother took pictures with the children, and at the most recent visit before the second day of trial, mother brought each of the children a toy and a drink as a little surprise. Mother stated that the children were receptive to her affection, and they were affectionate with her.

As to her employment, mother testified that she had three jobs while the termination case was pending. At the time of the children were removed from her care, mother was working at a Valero convenience store as a lead cashier. Mother had that job for six years before her employment was terminated. According to mother, she lost her job because the convenience store was "bought out by another owner" and her "hours dropped drastically to five hours a week." This prompted mother to look for a new job in October 2019. Mother was unable to find a job for two weeks, but she was then hired to do housekeeping at a hotel. She worked full-time at the hotel—from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.—until June 2020. She lost her job when her "hours stopped drastically." Mother found another job "with [an] insurance agent." Mother stated that she worked "with [the] insurance agent" "until the end of June [2020]," but she was "let go from that job because of the [COVID-19] pandemic." At that same time, mother had a second job as a cashier at a Circle K convenience store. According to mother, at the time of trial, she was an assistant manager at the Circle K convenience store, and she had given her payroll stubs to the DFPS caseworker.

As to her living situation after the children's removal from her care, mother stated that she had obtained a stable home for the children to return home to, but she had failed to provide DFPS with a lease agreement for the home. Mother acknowledged that maintaining stable housing and providing documentation of stable housing was a requirement of her FSP. Mother stated that she had changed living situations three times during the termination case, and she agreed that multiple housing changes did not reflect stability. When asked if she could provide the children with a stable home, mother stated that she had been having difficulty obtaining a stable home.

Mother also testified that, at the time of trial, she believed that she was living in a safe place for the children. The trial court admitted into evidence photographs of the home where mother was living. Mother stated that the home had a kitchen, a living room, and three and a half bedrooms. Mother cooked and had snacks—cookies and bread—in the kitchen. Mother had her own bedroom, and she had clothes at the home for the children. The owner of the home, Margarita, also had her own bedroom in the house. Margarita and her two daughters slept in the same bedroom. If the children were returned to her care, mother planned to share a bedroom with N.A.V., and she planned to have M.A.A., A.M.V., and J.A.V. share a bedroom. Mother still wanted to get her own place to live.

According to mother, the children needed a healthy and safe environment. And they needed stable housing and a stable parent to be cared for properly. The children also needed food, clothing, and "family time," and if the children were returned to her care, she would provide that for them. As to M.A.A., mother testified that if M.A.A. was returned to her care, she would play with him, "[t]ake him to his highchair," and "[a]lways be there for him." As to A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V., mother intended to "[b]e[] active with them," play with them, and "do[] family activities with them." For family activities, they could decorate a card or create drawings that could be hung up; they could also play outside, go to the playground or the park, or play soccer. If the children were returned to her care, mother intended to take the children to school, pick them up from school, and help them with their homework. She would only work when the children were in school.

Mother noted that she had been involved with DFPS before the current termination case. In 2018, DFPS became involved with the children based on an allegation of physical neglect of M.A.A. by mother. At the time, M.A.A. was wearing diapers and urinating on himself. Mother acknowledged that this same type of neglect was involved in this termination case. In 2015, DFPS was involved with the children based on an allegation of physical neglect of M.A.A. by mother, and in 2014, DFPS was involved with the children based on another allegation of physical neglect of M.A.A. by mother. Mother stated that DFPS had been involved with her and the children because of mother's own actions. Mother acknowledged that she had a pending criminal charge for the felony offense of abandoning a child.

Mother asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer further questions related to the pending criminal charge. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

According to mother, when the children were previously in her care, they were not exposed to narcotics, she was not abusive to the children, and she did not engage in assaultive conduct toward the children. She also took M.A.A. to a doctor at Texas Children's Hospital whenever she was "authorized to take him." Mother acknowledged that M.A.A. had stopped wearing diapers while in the care of DFPS, and if M.A.A. had received "proper care" while in mother's custody, "he could have been at th[at] place in his life a lot earlier."

Mother also testified that when M.A.A. was in her care, she participated in five Admission, Review, and Dismissal ("ARD") meetings related to M.A.A.'s special education needs. The last ARD meeting that mother attended for M.A.A. was in April 2019 before the children were removed from her care. From the ARD meetings, mother learned "how to help [M.A.A.] with his special needs" and "[h]ow to do[] . . . educational stuff where [M.A.A.] c[ould] learn a little bit more." For instance, related to mathematics, mother could help M.A.A. with math problems by using beans, pencils, or crayons.

Mother stated that she did not want her parental rights to the children terminated, and she believed the children would be hurt if her parental rights were terminated because they loved her and she was "basically the only thing they[] [had ever] had." Mother stated that other than securing her own home to live, she believed that she had done everything that DFPS had asked her to do.

As to father, mother stated that father had met M.A.A. a couple of days after the child was born, and she allowed father to visit M.A.A. Mother would take M.A.A. over to see father. M.A.A.'s visits with father stopped when the child turned three years old because father disappeared. At the time, mother did not know where father was. When M.A.A. was either seven or eight years old, his visits with father resumed.

Mother's FSP

The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of mother's FSP. The FSP stated that mother had shown that she was "struggling to find adequate care for her children while at work and [she was] unable to keep her home clean and safe for [the] children to stay." The children were "caught wandering alone with no supervision and no clothes." Mother also had failed to show that she had the necessary parenting skills to care for the children, especially M.A.A., who had special needs or "mental delays." Mother did not have a support system.

Mother's FSP was not signed by mother. The trial court, in a July 16, 2019 status hearing order, found that mother had reviewed her FSP and had been advised that unless she was willing and able to provide the children with a safe environment, even with the assistance of her FSP, within the reasonable period of time specified in her FSP, her parental and custodial duties and rights would be subject to restriction or to termination or the children would not be returned to her. The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the July 16, 2019 status hearing order.

As to M.A.A., the FSP stated that when M.A.A. entered DFP's care, he had been diagnosed with encopresis and wore a diaper. His hygiene was a major concern. M.A.A. had also been diagnosed with ADHD, and he attended special education classes at school. There was a concern about M.A.A.'s emotional state due to his mental health issues and encopresis. The FSP did not list any specific needs or concerns related to A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V.

The FSP listed DFPS's concerns related to mother, including that she was unable to provide a safe living environment for the children due to the condition of her home at the time of the children's removal; there was a possibility that she could be incarcerated for a period of time "due to her [c]hild [e]ndangerment [criminal] charge[]" because she had left the children home alone; and she would "continue the maltreatment pattern with her children."

Mother's FSP required her to acquire and maintain, for more than six months, a legal form of employment and provide documentation in the form of payroll stubs to the DFPS caseworker; attend, participate in, and complete parenting classes and provide a certificate of completion to the DFPS caseworker; participate in a psychosocial evaluation to address her emotional needs and follow all recommendations from the evaluation; acquire and maintain stable housing for more than six months and provide a copy of a lease agreement or mortgage in mother's name to the DFPS caseworker; and attend all court hearings, permanency conference meetings, and family visits. By completing the requirements of her FSP, DFPS hoped that mother would "understand the importance of cleaning her home" and learn about parenting a child "with mental health issues . . . to help stop [mother's] maltreatment pattern."

Father's FSP

Father's July 16, 2019 FSP stated that DFPS had not been able to locate father and he was not active in M.A.A.'s life at the time that M.A.A. was removed from mother's care. DFPS did not believe that father had been supporting M.A.A. DFPS was unable to determine if father had a safety network or community support because it had not yet located father. The FSP did state that father was the "non[-]offending parent" and DFPS "ha[d] no concerns."

The July 16, 2019 FSP was not signed by father. The trial court, in the July 16, 2019 status hearing order, found that father had not reviewed the FSP and had not been advised that unless he was willing and able to provide M.A.A. with a safe environment, even with the assistance of his FSP, within the reasonable period of time specified in his FSP, his parental and custodial duties and rights would be subject to restriction or termination or M.A.A. would not be returned to him.

As to M.A.A.'s specific needs, the FSP stated that M.A.A. had encopresis that caused him to defecate on himself and he had developmental delays. M.A.A. attended special education classes at school. M.A.A., before his removal from mother's care, was very bonded with mother and his siblings. Since being removed from mother's care, M.A.A. experienced difficulties in "trying to adjust."

The July 16, 2019 FSP only required father to participate in DNA testing to determine if he was M.A.A.'s father.

The trial court took judicial notice of father's amended FSP dated October 2, 2019. In the October 2, 2019 amended FSP, DFPS stated that it had found father and he was the "non[-]offending parent." Father reported that his mother and his sister were his support system. The amended FSP listed, as father's "[r]equired action[s]," that father to participate in DNA testing, sign a release of information form to allow DFPS to have access to father's mental health records, inform the DFPS caseworker where he received psychiatric treatment so that she could request records, provide proof of employment or proof of his receipt of SSI benefits, acquire and maintain stable housing for more than six months and provide a copy of a lease agreement or mortgage in father's name to the DFPS caseworker, and refrain from engaging in "illegal criminal activities."

The October 2, 2019 amended FSP was not signed by father.

August 2020 Permanency Report

The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the August 2020 permanency report filed by DFPS. As to the history of the termination case, the report stated that on January 14, 2019, DFPS received a referral alleging physical neglect of J.L. and M.A.A. by mother. J.L. had poor hygiene and an odor. J.L. had been wearing the same clothes for more than a month, and her hair did not appear to be washed. J.L. lacked parental supervision as to her hygiene and had not bathed in more than a week. Her fingernails were dirty. J.L. was withdrawn at school and did not participate as much as she should; her grades were being affected. J.L. should have been "performing at a much higher level" but she lacked self-confidence. M.A.A. also exhibited similar problems with his hygiene, and his body odor was very strong. He appeared to lack parental support related to his personal hygiene and the "washing [of his] clothes."

The report also stated that on May 24, 2019, DFPS received another referral alleging neglectful supervision and physical neglect of the children by mother. On that day, an individual called law enforcement officers because the children were outside wandering alone without mother. Law enforcement officers responded to mother's home. Mother was not there and was "nowhere to be found." The condition of mother's home was deplorable. The home contained decomposing food, and there was garbage everywhere. "[S]omething [was] caked on the floor," which officers believed was either feces or old food. One of the younger children was sitting under trash and "old tacos." When mother did return home, she stated that she had gone to the grocery store. She did not have an explanation for the condition of her home. Law enforcement officers arrested mother for the offense of "child endangerment" and immediately took her into custody. The children were placed into the care of DFPS.

As to the current status of the children, the report stated that M.A.A. was in the fifth grade and attending elementary school. M.A.A. attended special education classes at school and was receiving speech therapy. M.A.A. liked to play video games, go to the park, and play with his cousins. M.A.A. participated in family functions and church activities. Initially, M.A.A. was placed in a foster home, but he was moved to be placed in the home of father's sister, Laura. M.A.A. was then removed from Laura's home after she tested positive for narcotics use. He was placed in another foster home where he had been living for a little over a month at the time of trial. M.A.A. was sad to leave Laura's home, but he was adjusting to his new foster home. While in DFPS's care, M.A.A. received medical and dental examinations. M.A.A. was scheduled to start therapy, which had been placed on hold because of the COVID-19 pandemic, so that he could develop life skills.

The report also noted that M.A.A. had been diagnosed with an unspecified intellectual disability, ADHD, encopresis, and child neglect. M.A.A. took medication for his ADHD. To help M.A.A., his doctor recommended a stable and nurturing living environment for M.A.A. M.A.A.'s caregiver should consult with his school regarding his intellectual disabilities and monitor M.A.A.'s emotional and behavioral functioning. M.A.A. also needed to be taught basic self-control strategies and effective communication skills.

The report stated that A.M.V. was in the first grade and attending elementary school. A.M.V. did not require any supportive educational services or special education classes. He did not have educational issues at the time of the report. His school performance in kindergarten was described as "[g]ood." A.M.V. was a sweet child, very social, and very affectionate. He liked to watch YouTube and play with Legos. A.M.V. participated in family functions and church activities. During the summer, he went to church camp. A.M.V. was first placed in a foster home, but after about a year he was moved to be placed in Laura's home. A.M.V. was removed from Laura's home after about two months and placed in a new foster home where he had been living for a little over a month before trial.

While in DFPS's care, A.M.V. had medical, vision, and dental examinations. As to A.M.V.'s needs, his doctor recommended that A.M.V. be monitored for depression, sad mood, emotional withdrawal, and behavioral difficulties. According to his doctor, play therapy and art therapy could be helpful. A.M.V. was scheduled to start to start therapy, which had been placed on hold because of the COVID-19 pandemic, so that he could develop life skills.

The report noted that A.M.V. had been diagnosed with child neglect, "[u]pbringing away from parents," and "[d]isruption of family." His doctor recommended that A.M.V. have a safe and stable living environment and routine medical and dental examinations. His caregiver should monitor him for any behavioral changes and consult a therapist with any concerns.

As to N.A.V., the report stated that she was four years old and attending pre-kindergarten at an elementary school. N.A.V. was going to be assessed to determine if she needed speech therapy. She liked to play with toys and watch Mickey Mouse cartoons. N.A.V. was first placed in a foster home and then moved to another home to be placed with her siblings. She had been in her current foster home since December 2019. While in DFPS's care, N.A.V. had medical, vision, and dental examinations. N.A.V. did not require any therapeutic services at the time of trial.

The reported noted that N.A.V. had been diagnosed with child neglect. Her doctor recommended a stable and nurturing living environment for N.A.V. and routine medical and dental examinations. Her caregiver should engage N.A.V. in educational games to promote her developmental progress and work with N.A.V. to enhance her speech skills.

The report stated that J.A.V. was two years old. He had a great appetite and liked to play with toys. He was active and walked around following the other children. J.A.V. enjoyed family functions and social activities. J.A.V. was first placed in a foster home and then moved to another foster home to be with his siblings. J.A.V. had been in his current foster home since December 2019. While in DFPS's care, J.A.V. had medical, vision, and dental examinations. J.A.V. had been diagnosed with child neglect. His doctor recommended a stable and nurturing living environment for him as well as routine medical and dental examinations.

According to the report, mother had maintained contact with DFPS. Mother had attended all court hearings, permanency conference meetings, and visits with the children. Mother had two-hour visits with the children twice a month. Mother tested negative for narcotics use in December 2019.

The report also noted that mother had completed her psychosocial evaluation on July 8, 2019. The evaluation recommended that she complete a psychiatric evaluation and parenting classes. It also recommended that mother maintain a stable and sanitary living environment, secure a stable income, and have supervised visitation with the children. Mother completed her parenting classes, and DFPS received a completion certificate on October 1, 2019. Mother had not maintained stable housing during the termination case, and at the time the report was written, in August 2020, DFPS did not know mother's address. The reported stated that mother was unemployed.

As a result of her psychosocial evaluation, mother was diagnosed with an unspecified adjustment disorder, "other circumstances related to child neglect," and "encounter for mental health services for perpetrator of parental child neglect." Mother's psychiatric evaluation was completed on October 1, 2019, and mother was diagnosed with depression, allergic asthma, and adjustment disorder. The evaluation recommended that mother participate in individual therapy. Mother attended five individual therapy sessions and was successfully discharged from individual therapy. Her completion certificate was signed on November 18, 2019. Mother also participated in several family therapy sessions with M.A.A. in early 2020, but those sessions were suspended because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

As to father, the report stated that he had submitted to DNA testing and was confirmed to be M.A.A.'s father. Father had psychiatric issues and had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. His psychiatrist stated that father was not taking his prescribed medication for his schizophrenia. Father lived with his mother, completed his release of information form as required, and received SSI benefits.

Child Advocates Report

The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of an August 2020 Court Report by Child Advocates (the "Child Advocates report"). The Child Advocates report stated that it would be in the best interest of the children for the parental rights of mother and father to be terminated. The report stated that termination would be in the best interest of the children because M.A.A. had special needs and had been diagnosed with an unspecified intellectual disability, ADHD, encopresis, and child neglect; N.A.V. and J.A.V. were less than six years old and N.A.V. had been diagnosed with a speech delay; A.M.V. had been diagnosed with child neglect; mother had been arrested for and charged with the felony offense of abandoning a child with the intent to return; DFPS had received multiple referrals related to the children; mother had been identified as the perpetrator of harm to the children; mother had failed to provide proof of stable housing and stable employment; mother could not provide the children with adequate health and nutritional care; and M.A.A. and A.M.V. had been placed in the home of father's sister, Laura, but had to be removed after Laura tested positive for cocaine and marijuana use in 2020.

According to the report, as part of the termination case, mother was required to maintain stable housing for more than six months and provide a lease agreement in her name for her home; acquire and maintain employment for more than six months; participate in a psychosocial evaluation and a psychiatric evaluation; attend parenting classes and visitation with the children; participate in individual therapy and family therapy; and report for random narcotics-use testing. Mother completed her psychosocial evaluation, psychiatric evaluation, parenting classes, and individual counseling. Mother had not provided proof of stable housing or a stable income. Mother had moved four times during the termination case. Mother was diagnosed with depression, allergic asthma, and adjustment disorder.

Father, as part of the termination case, was required to participate in DNA testing and a psychiatric evaluation. He was also required to secure and maintain employment and housing. Father had participated in DNA testing.

As to the children, the Child Advocates report stated that in December 2019, N.A.V. and J.A.V. were placed in the same foster home with M.A.A. and A.M.V. In March 2020, M.A.A. was placed with father's sister, Laura, until she tested positive for narcotics use in July 2020. Thereafter, M.A.A. was placed in a new foster home and his foster parents were meeting his needs. A.M.V. had been in the same foster home since May 2020. The children appeared comfortable and safe in their respective placements.

The report further stated that individual therapy and medication management had been recommended for M.A.A. M.A.A. participated in individual therapy and speech therapy. At school, M.A.A. attended special education classes because of an intellectual disability. M.A.A. took medication for his ADHD. Art and play therapy had been recommended for A.M.V. N.A.V. could have a speech delay.

Standard of Review

A parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody, and management" of her children is a constitutional interest "far more precious than any property right." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "the interest of [a] parent[] in the care, custody, and control of [her] children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] Court." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has concluded that "[t]his natural parental right" is "essential," "a basic civil right of man," and "far more precious than property rights." Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal quotations omitted). Consequently, "[w]e strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent." In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012).

Because termination of parental rights is "complete, final, irrevocable and divests for all time that natural right . . . , the evidence in support of termination must be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent's rights." Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. Clear and convincing evidence is "the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007; see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Because the standard of proof is "clear and convincing evidence," the Texas Supreme Court has held that the traditional legal and factual standards of review are inadequate. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-68.

In conducting a legal-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights case, we must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, is such that the fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore the burden of proof. Id. at 266. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we "must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so," and we "should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible." In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). But this does not mean we must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Because of the heightened standard, we must also be mindful of any undisputed evidence contrary to the finding and consider that evidence in our analysis. Id. If we determine that no reasonable trier of fact could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, we must hold the evidence to be legally insufficient and render judgment in favor of the parent. Id.

In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights case, we must determine whether, considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and contradicting the finding, a fact finder reasonably could have formed a firm conviction or belief about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore the burden of proof. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002). We should consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

Mother's Appeal

In her first and third issues, mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to the children because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that she engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being and termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2).

In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, DFPS must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children. See id. § 161.001(b). Both elements must be established, and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the children as determined by the trier of fact. Id.; Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). "Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child[ren]'s best interest." In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).

A. Endangering Conduct

In her first issue, mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that she engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being because there was "no record of a continuing course of endangerment," mother's decision to leave "a 13-year-old in charge of the [c]hildren in her absence [was] not abandonment or neglect of supervision," there was "no continuing course of endangerment regarding the circumstance of the felony charged by the police," "[a]ll of the issues of the . . . referral [were] addressed and corrected" by mother, mother "had an excellent employment record prior to" the termination case, mother attended visits with children and had a bond with them, and mother and the children had benefitted from their involvement with DFPS. (Emphasis omitted.)

A trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren]" and termination is in the best interest of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2). Within this context, endangerment encompasses "more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment." Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Instead, "endanger" means to expose the children to loss or injury or to jeopardize their emotional or physical health. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Walker v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

We must look at a parent's conduct standing alone, including her actions or omissions. In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). It is not necessary to establish that a parent intended to endanger the children. See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996). But termination of parental rights requires "more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required." In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d at 205. The specific danger to the children's well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct, even if the conduct is not directed at the children and they suffer no actual injury. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). Courts may consider parental conduct that did not occur in the children's presence. In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617.

Allowing children to live in unsanitary conditions supports a finding that the parent has endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being. See In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at *15-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); D.K., Sr. v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-13-00816-CV, 2014 WL 1910337, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin May 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re A.T., 406 S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013 pet. denied); see also In re P.E.W., 105 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) ("[A] child's exposure to continually unsanitary living conditions . . . may prove endangerment."). The children "need not develop or succumb to a malady due to th[e] [unsanitary] conditions before it can be said that" they were endangered. In re P.E.W., 105 S.W.3d at 777; see also Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (endangerment encompasses "more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment," but endangering conduct need not be directed at children and children need not suffer injury).

Further, parental neglect can be as dangerous to the children's well-being as direct abuse and neglecting the children's physical condition constitutes endangerment. In re S.B., 597 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied); see also In re E.L.C., No. 05-20-00373-CV, 2020 WL 5494415, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent's neglect of one child can support finding of endangerment); In re G.H., No. 02-17-00193-CV, 2017 WL 4683925, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 19, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence sufficient to support finding parent engaged in conduct that endangered child's physical and emotional well-being where parent provided unsanitary home and failed to ensure child was clean); In re P.E.W., 105 S.W.3d at 777 ("[A] child's . . . continued uncleanliness . . . may prove endangerment."). And neglecting the children's medical and dental needs endangers the children. See In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 852 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); In re H.M.O.L., Nos. 01-17-00775-CV, 01-17-00776-CV, 2018 WL 1659981, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent's failure to provide appropriate medical care may constitute endangering conduct for purposes of Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E)); see also In re E.W., Nos. 14-19-00666-CV, 14-19-00724-CV, 2020 WL 742327, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re K.S.O.B., No. 01-18-00860-CV, 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A child's basic needs include routine medical and dental care."). A parent's failure to protect or supervise her young children also endangers the children's physical or emotional well-being. See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269-70; In re A.D.M., No. 01-16-00550-CV, 2016 WL 7368075, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent endangered one-year-old child by leaving her home alone).

Several months before the children were removed from mother's care, DFPS received a referral alleging physical neglect of J.L. and M.A.A. by mother. J.L., who was in the fourth grade at the time, exhibited poor hygiene. She had been wearing the same clothes for at least a month, her hair did not appear to be washed, her fingernails were dirty, and she seemed to have gone an extended period of time without bathing. Mother had not been supervising J.L.'s hygiene, despite her young age. J.L.'s poor hygiene had led to her being isolated at school and withdrawn, and her academics were being affected. See In re E.L.C., 2020 WL 5494415, at *9 (parent's neglect of one child can support finding of endangerment); Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (evidence of how parent treated another child is relevant).

M.A.A., who was ten years old at the time, had similar problems with his personal hygiene. His "body smell" was "very strong," and it appeared that he did not have mother's support "when it c[ame] to washing [his] clothes and maintain[ing] proper hygiene." M.A.A. had been diagnosed with encopresis—"a condition known as fecal soiling by a child over the age of four." He wore a diaper that smelled "very dirty and bad." See In re E.L.C., 2020 WL 5494415, at *9 (parent's neglect of one child can support finding of endangerment); In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *13 ("[T]he children's own uncleanliness constitutes indicia which may prove endangerment." (internal quotations omitted)). Mother reported to DFPS Investigator Simon that M.A.A.'s hygiene issues were because she worked long hours. Mother also stated that M.A.A. did not always want to bathe, and it was hard for mother to bathe him. J.L. reported that, despite her young age, she helped M.A.A. bathe and brush his teeth.

When DFPS Investigator Grice visited mother's home in April 2019, the home was not clean. There were eggs on the kitchen floor and toys on the floor in the living and dining rooms. There were gnats and flies in the dining room and kitchen. In the master bedroom, where the children were, Grice saw trash on the floor, "such as paper, empty Cheetos bags, toys, clothes, shoes, crumbs of chips and food, empty bottles of water and juice boxes, and uncooked ramen noodles opened from the package." There were brown stains smeared on the walls in the home.

On May 24, 2019, DFPS received another referral alleging neglectful supervision and physical neglect of the children by mother. On that day, an individual called law enforcement officers after the children were seen "outside wandering alone" without mother. When law enforcement officers arrived at mother's home, she was not there and "the conditions of the home were deplorable." Law enforcement officers found "decomposing food and garbage everywhere" and food stains on the walls in the home. There was "something caked on the floor which may have been feces or food or both." One of the children "was found sleeping on the floor underneath a pile of rotting tacos and trash." The children were dirty, alone, and one of them was not clothed. Mother was gone for more than two hours, and when she eventually returned home, she did not have an explanation for the unsanitary conditions of her home.

When Grice arrived at mother's home on May 24, 2019, "multiple flies swarmed out of the house." In the dining room, Grice saw "a huge pile of trash that included[] plastic bags, spoiled food, food trays, garbage bags, and empty pizza boxes and egg cartons along with clothes on the dining room table, food crumbs, and hazardous and unsanitary debris." In the kitchen, Grice saw empty food plates and milk cartons. The kitchen sink was "very filthy with stains and unclean dishes piled on top of each other." The kitchen stove was stained with previously-cooked food, and a dirty skillet, a can of hair product, and trash were on the stove and surrounding it. In the living room, there were three big garbage bags and a broken "baby pack n play" that was filled with empty boxes and trash. The wooden floors in the living room and dining room were stained. The walls and blinds in the living room "had a brownish liquid stain [on them] that appeared as if liquid had been thrown." Near the fireplace, Grice saw "corn nibbles [sic], juice stains[,] and dirt along with three large black garbage bags filled with trash." One of the bags was ripped and trash had fallen out.

As Grice proceeded through mother's home, flies and gnats were everywhere. The walls in the hallway by the bedrooms had feces smeared across them. The first bedroom was filled with boxes, a baby crib that was partially put together, cups, and paper. Another bedroom had clothes and shoes lying on the floor as well as food crumbs on the carpet. The bathroom smelled, and "a huge pile of diapers" and trash were by the bathtub. There were also food crumbs and cups on the floor. The master bedroom was completely filled with toys, shoes, clothes, spoiled food that was embedded in the carpet, and a dirty mattress with no sheets on it. The room also had a pile of trash with dirty diapers, empty drink cartons, food trays, and dried ramen noodles. The bathroom attached to the master bedroom was filled with flies, gnats, dirty clothes, food crumbs, potato chip bags, plastic cups, shoes, and dirty diapers. The sink was "completely stained with leftover burnt corn." The closet in the master bedroom was filled with overflowing clothes baskets and more clothes on the floor. In Grice's opinion, the condition of mother's home was deplorable and the home was not a suitable living environment for the children.

The trial court admitted into evidence photographs of the home at the time the children were removed from mother's care. The photographs show a large amount of trash and debris throughout the entire home as well as unclean surfaces in multiple rooms. DFPS caseworker Clark testified that the photographs showed food and trash all over the home.

As to the condition of the children when they entered DFPS's care, there was a concern about the condition of M.A.A.'s teeth. Mother had not taken M.A.A. for regular dental examinations. He also had not had his annual medical examination for 2019. M.A.A. had special needs, and he had been diagnosed with ADHD and took medication for it. DFPS was not able to confirm that M.A.A. had been receiving special education services while in mother's care, and mother was not able to articulate M.A.A.'s special education needs. Mother just stated that he was "delayed." She did not know what kind of education services that M.A.A. needed to be receiving at school.

Mother stated that she took M.A.A. to a doctor at Texas Children's Hospital whenever she was "authorized to take him."

According to mother, when M.A.A. was in her care, she participated in five ARD meetings related to M.A.A.'s special education needs. The last ARD meeting that mother attended for M.A.A. was in April 2019 before the children were removed from mother's care. From the ARD meetings mother learned "how to help [M.A.A.] with his special needs" and "[h]ow to do[] . . . educational stuff where [M.A.A.] c[ould] learn a little bit more."

M.A.A. also had encopresis—meaning that he was "unable to control his bowel movements" and defecated on himself. But mother could not provide a medical explanation for his condition. When M.A.A. entered DFPS's care, he was wearing a diaper every day. M.A.A. stopped wearing a diaper while in the care of DFPS, and mother acknowledged that if M.A.A. had received "proper care" while in her custody, then "he could have been at th[at] place in his life a lot earlier."

When A.M.V. entered DFPS's care, there was a concern about the condition of A.M.V.'s teeth because he had numerous cavities. While in DFPS's care, A.M.V.'s cavities were fixed, and he began receiving routine dental examinations. Although A.M.V. would have been in pre-kindergarten at the time he was removed from mother's care, he had "just stopped" attending school while in mother's care.

When N.A.V. entered DFP's care, she was "not on target." At the time, N.A.V. was three years old, was still drinking out of a bottle, and was not potty trained. N.A.V. also had numerous cavities, and she required multiple dental appointments to address her dental hygiene issues.

Finally, when J.A.V. was in mother's care, he had not been taken to the dentist. DFPS was also unable to determine whether J.A.V. had ever received immunizations because there was no "paperwork or anything to reflect that he had received his shots." When J.A.V. was found by the EMTs on May 24, 2019—the day he was removed from mother's care—he was naked. The EMTs cleaned his feet because they were "completely dirty." They also put a diaper on J.A.V. and wrapped a sheet around him because he did not have any clothes.

All of the children were diagnosed with child neglect shortly after they entered DFPS's care.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that mother engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). And, viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that mother engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical and emotional well-being. See id.

Further, we conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed evidence in favor of finding that mother engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical and emotional well-being. And any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that mother engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical and emotional well-being.

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that mother engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being. See id.

We overrule mother's first issue.

Having held that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that mother engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being, we need not address mother's second issue in which she asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that she failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 (only one predicate finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) necessary to support judgment terminating parental rights); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

B. Best Interest of Children

In her third issue, mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children because mother had a strong bond with the children, mother demonstrated a strong work ethic and that she could provide for the children, mother lived in a suitable home, mother could perform "whatever services or monitoring that [DFPS] deem[ed] necessary," "DFPS ha[d] [not] yet . . . complete[d] two home studies for relative placement[s]," and DFPS had "failed to provide evidence sufficient [to establish] a continuing course of endangerment." (Emphasis omitted.)

The best-interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the children. See In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). It is presumed that the prompt and permanent placement of the children in a safe environment is in their best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d at 383.

There is also a strong presumption that the children's best interest is served by maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Thus, we strictly scrutinize termination proceedings in favor of the parent. In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.).

In determining whether the termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children, we may consider several factors, including: (1) the desires of the children; (2) the current and future physical and emotional needs of the children; (3) the current and future emotional and physical danger to the children; (4) the parental abilities of the parties seeking custody; (5) whether programs are available to assist those parties; (6) plans for the children by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the proposed placement; (8) the parent's acts or omissions that may indicate that the parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for the parent's acts or omissions. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. We may also consider the statutory factors set forth in Texas Family Code section 263.307. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 n.29 (Tex. 2018); In re C.A.G., No. 01-11-01094-CV, 2012 WL 2922544, at *6 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

These factors are not exhaustive, and there is no requirement that DFPS prove all factors as a condition precedent to the termination of parental rights. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see also In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.) ("[T]he best interest of the child does not require proof of any unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors."). The absence of evidence about some of the factors does not preclude a fact finder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the children's best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

The same evidence of acts and omissions used to establish grounds for termination under section 161.001(b)(1) may also be relevant to determining the best interest of the children. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interest of the children. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); see also Cuellar v. Flores, 238 S.W.2d 991, 992 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1951, no writ) (trial court "faces the parties and the witnesses, observes their demeanor and personality, and feels the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record").

1. Children's Desires

When the parental rights of mother were terminated, M.A.A. was twelve years old, A.M.V. was six years old, N.A.V. was four years old, and J.A.V. was three years old. None of the children directly expressed their desires as to returning to mother's care, yet no evidence was presented indicating that M.A.A. desired termination of his relationship with mother. See In re J.E.M.M., 532 S.W.3d 874, 886-87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 410-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (no evidence that children did not want to be returned to parent's care). Generally, when children, like A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V., are too young to express their desires, this factor is considered neutral. See In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

There is evidence that mother and the children were bonded, and mother attended visits with the children throughout the termination case. See In re A.J.A.R., No. 14-20-00084-CV, 2020 WL 4260343, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (bond between parent and child important consideration); but see In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) ("A child's love for their parent is a very important consideration in determining the best interest of the child[ren], although it cannot override or outweigh evidence of danger to the child." (internal quotations omitted)); In re D.R.L., No. 01-15-00733-CV, 2016 WL 672664, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 18, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[E]ven where a child is attached to a parent, . . . [her] desire to be returned to the parent [is] not . . . dispositive of the best[-]interest analysis, especially if the parent has engaged in conduct dangerous to the child's well-being." (internal quotations omitted) (second, fourth, and fifth alterations in original)). There is also evidence that the children were doing well in DFPS's care and had significantly improved after being removed from mother's care. See In re L.M.N., No. 01-18-00413-CV, 2018 WL 5831672, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering evidence of children doing well after removal when discussing children's desires).

2. Current and Future Physical and Emotional Needs and Current and Future Physical and Emotional Danger

a. Condition of Home

The children need a safe and stable home. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a) (prompt and permanent placement of child in safe environment presumed to be in child's best interest); In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (parent who lacks ability to provide child with safe and stable home is unable to provide for child's emotional and physical needs); Adams v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (in children's best interest to be raised in consistent, stable, and nurturing environment). Multiple individuals stated that the children needed a stable and nurturing home environment in which to live. But there is no evidence in the record that mother is able to provide the children with a safe and stable home. See In re P.S., No. 02-16-00458-CV, 2017 WL 1173845, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (children's basic needs include safe and stable home environment); see also Adams, 236 S.W.3d at 280 (parent's history of failing to provide children with "stable and nurturing environment" demonstrated termination of parental rights in best interest).

When DFPS Investigator Grice visited mother's home in April 2019, the home was not clean. There were eggs on the kitchen floor and toys on the floor in the living and dining rooms. There were gnats and flies in the dining room and kitchen. The master bedroom, where the children were, had trash on the floor, "such as paper, empty Cheetos bags, toys, clothes, shoes, crumbs of chips and food, empty bottles of water and juice boxes, and uncooked ramen noodles opened from the package." There were brown stains smeared on the walls in the home. Grice informed mother that the condition of the home was not acceptable, and it needed to be rectified.

On May 24, 2019—the day the children were removed from mother's care—law enforcement officers found "the conditions of [mother's] home [to be] deplorable." There was "decomposing food and garbage everywhere," food stains on the walls in the home, and "something caked on the floor which may have been feces or food or both." One of the children "was found sleeping on the floor underneath a pile of rotting tacos and trash." The children were dirty, alone, and one of them was not clothed.

When Grice entered mother's home that same day, "multiple flies swarmed out of the house." In the dining room, Grice saw "a huge pile of trash that included[] plastic bags, spoiled food, food trays, garbage bags, and empty pizza boxes and egg cartons along with clothes on the dining room table, food crumbs, and hazardous and unsanitary debris." The kitchen contained empty food plates and milk cartons, and the kitchen sink was "very filthy with stains and unclean dishes piled on top of each other." The kitchen stove was stained with previously-cooked food, and a dirty skillet, a can of hair product, and trash were on the stove and surrounding it. In the living room, there were three big garbage bags and a broken "baby pack n play" that was filled with empty boxes and trash. The wooden floors in the living room and dining room were stained. The walls and blinds in the living room "had a brownish liquid stain [on them] that appeared as if liquid had been thrown." Near the fireplace, there were "corn nibbles [sic], juice stains[,] and dirt along with three large black garbage bags filled with trash." One of the bags was ripped and trash had fallen out.

As Grice proceeded through the home, flies and gnats were everywhere. The walls in the hallway by the bedrooms had feces smeared across them. The first bedroom was filled with boxes, a baby crib that was partially put together, cups, and paper. Another bedroom had clothes and shoes lying on the floor as well as food crumbs on the carpet. The bathroom smelled, and "a huge pile of diapers" and trash were by the bathtub. There were also food crumbs and cups on the floor. The master bedroom was completely filled with toys, shoes, clothes, spoiled food that was embedded in the carpet, and a dirty mattress with no sheets on it. The room also had a pile of trash with dirty diapers, empty drink cartons, food trays, and dried ramen noodles. The bathroom attached to the master bedroom was filled with flies, gnats, dirty clothes, food crumbs, potato chip bags, plastic cups, shoes, and dirty diapers. The sink was "completely stained with leftover burnt corn." The closet in the master bedroom was filled with overflowing clothes baskets and more clothes on the floor. According to Grice, the home was not a suitable living environment for the children. Mother did not have an explanation for the unsanitary conditions of her home. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(12)(D) (in determining whether parent willing and able to provide child with safe environment, considering whether parent demonstrates adequate parenting skills, such as ability to provide "a safe physical home environment"); In re A.L., 545 S.W.3d 138, 148 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (home's unsanitary and unsafe conditions relevant to emotional and physical needs of child and emotional and physical danger to child).

DFPS caseworker Clark testified that mother had not demonstrated that she could provide a safe and stable home for the children. For a period of time while the termination case was pending, mother did not have a place to live. At one point, Clark visited an apartment where mother was living during the termination case, but mother moved out of the apartment after about a month. That apartment was "bare," but clean. At the time of trial, mother no longer lived at the apartment because her roommate's mother moved in and mother did not feel safe in the home. Mother told Clark that she had difficulty securing an apartment in her name because she had pending criminal charge for a felony offense.

On the night before the second day of trial, mother sent Clark a text message with the address of mother's new home. Mother was living in the home of a friend, but mother told Clark that it was "not a long-term placement" because mother was still looking for her own apartment. Clark attempted to visit mother's new home, but no one answered the door or Clark's telephone call even though mother's car was in the driveway at the time. Clark stayed at the home for forty minutes waiting to see if anyone would answer the door, but no one did.

As to her living situation, mother testified that she had obtained a stable home for the children to return home to, but she had failed to provide DFPS with a lease agreement for her home. Mother stated that she had changed living situations three times during the termination case, and she agreed her multiple housing changes did not reflect stability. When asked if she could provide the children with a stable home, mother stated that she was having difficulty obtaining a stable home. See In re I.V.H., No. 01-19-00281-CV, 2019 WL 4677363, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 26, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of the child." (internal quotations omitted)).

The trial court admitted into evidence photographs of the home where mother was living at the time of trial. Mother stated that the home had a kitchen, a living room, and three and a half bedrooms. Mother cooked and had snacks—cookies and bread—in the kitchen. Mother had her own bedroom, and she had clothes at the home for the children. The owner of the home, Margarita, also had her own bedroom in the house. Margarita and her two daughters slept in the same bedroom. Mother planned to share a bedroom with N.A.V., and she planned to have M.A.A., a twelve-year-old, A.M.V., a six-year-old, and J.A.V., a three-year-old, share a bedroom. Mother stated that she still wanted to get her own place to live, indicating that mother did not consider her living arrangement with Margarita to be long-term or permanent.

b. Children's Needs

The children's basic needs include medical and dental care. See In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19; In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 288 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); In re P.S., 2017 WL 1173845, at *9. In deciding that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children, the trier of fact may consider evidence that a parent neglected to seek appropriate medical and dental treatment for her children. See In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19; In re J.R.W., No. 14-12-00850-CV, 2013 WL 507325, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 12, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(12)(A), (F) (in determining whether parent willing and able to provide child with safe environment, considering whether parent demonstrated adequate parenting skills, such as providing health care and understanding children's needs). Likewise, the trier of fact may infer from a parent's past inattention to her children's medical and dental needs that such inattention will continue in the future. See K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19; In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 205-06 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); In re J.R.W., 2013 WL 507325, at *9; see also In re B.K.D., 131 S.W.3d 10, 17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (fact finder may infer that past conduct endangering child's well-being may recur in future if child returned to parent). Evidence of how a parent has treated another child is relevant to the best-interest analysis. See In re C.R., No. 01-17-00725-CV, 2018 WL 1161810, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724.

We must also consider the children's ages and any particular physical or mental vulnerabilities of the children when evaluating the children's needs. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1), (12)(F); see also In re D.D.M., No. 01-18-01033-CV, 2019 WL 2939259, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Evidence of this factor generally demonstrates what the children's physical needs are, specifically any special physical needs, and whether the parent seeking custody [is] willing and able to meet those needs.").

Before the children were removed from mother's care, the children's older sister, J.L., a fourth grader at the time, exhibited poor hygiene. She was seen wearing the same clothes for at least a month, her hair did not appear to be washed, her fingernails were dirty, and she seemed to have gone an extended period of time without bathing. It did not appear that a parent had been supervising J.L.'s hygiene, despite her young age. J.L.'s poor hygiene had led to her being isolated at school, she did not participate much in school, and she was withdrawn. J.L.'s academics were being affected by her poor hygiene. See In re C.R., 2018 WL 1161810, at *7 (evidence of how a parent has treated another child is relevant); see also Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724.

Before his removal, M.A.A., who was ten years old at the time, had similar problems with his personal hygiene. His "body smell" was "very strong," and it appeared that he lacked "parent[al] support when it c[ame] to washing [his] clothes and maintain[ing] proper hygiene." M.A.A., despite his age, still wore diapers which smelled "very dirty and bad." Mother reported that M.A.A.'s hygiene issues were because she worked long hours. J.L. reported that she, despite her young age, helped M.A.A. bathe and brush his teeth.

Mother admitted to DFPS Investigator Grice that M.A.A. did not always want to bathe and it was hard for her to bathe him. Mother had transferred J.L. and M.A.A. away from their previous school because she had received complaints about their smell.

2019 was not the first time that DFPS became involved with mother and the children. In 2018, there was a DFPS investigation of mother related to M.A.A.'s physical care after there were "numerous reports about him having accidents . . . at school," wearing diapers, and defecating on himself. In 2015, DFPS was involved with the children based on an allegation of physical neglect of M.A.A. by mother, and in 2014, DFPS was involved with the children based on another allegation of physical neglect of M.A.A. by mother. Mother stated that DFPS had been involved with her and the children because of mother's own actions.

Although the children did not appear to have bruises or scratches on them at the time they were removed from mother's care, J.A.V., who was one year old at the time, was found naked in mother's home, and the EMTs had to clean his feet because they were "completely dirty." The EMTs also put a diaper on J.A.V. and wrapped a sheet around him because he did not have any clothes. One of the children was found sleeping under trash in mother's home on the day the children were removed from mother's care. See In re R.M.V., No. 10-11-00298-CV, 2012 WL 4761580, at *13 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 4, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evidence of past neglect can be used to measure parent's future conduct).

Further, when M.A.A. entered DFPS's care, there was a concern about the condition of his teeth. Mother had not taken M.A.A. for regular dental examinations. He also had not had his annual medical examination for 2019. See In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (trier of fact can infer from parent's past inattention to child's medical needs that such inattention will continue in future); In re R.M.V., 2012 WL 4761580, at *13.

M.A.A. had special needs, and he required a higher level of care than other children which he had not been receiving while living with mother. He was diagnosed with ADHD, and he took medication for it. M.A.A. had also been diagnosed with encopresis—meaning that he was "unable to control his bowel movements" and defecated on himself. Mother could not provide a medical explanation for his condition. See In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (trier of fact can infer from parent's past inattention to child's medical needs that such inattention will continue in future). Although M.A.A. wore a diaper every day while in mother's care, while in DFPS's care, M.A.A. improved and he stopped wearing a diaper. He had fewer accidents, and he became more social. M.A.A.'s doctor attributed the improvement in M.A.A.'s health to the child having a consistent routine as well as stability in the home.

M.A.A. attended special education classes at school because of an intellectual disability. When M.A.A. entered DFPS's care, DFPS was not able to confirm that he had been receiving special education services while in mother's care. Mother was not able to articulate M.A.A.'s special education needs either. She just stated that he was "delayed and . . . wore a diaper." She did not know what kind of education services M.A.A. needed to be receiving at school.

While in DFPS's care, M.A.A. was diagnosed with an unspecified intellectual disability.

At the time of trial, M.A.A. was participating in speech therapy, and he was scheduled to start therapy so that he could develop life skills. M.A.A.'s doctor recommended a stable and nurturing living environment for M.A.A. and that his caregiver monitor M.A.A.'s emotional and behavioral functioning. M.A.A. needed to be taught basic self-control strategies and effective communication skills.

When A.M.V. entered DFPS's care, there was a concern about the condition of A.M.V.'s teeth because he had numerous cavities. See In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (trier of fact can infer from parent's past inattention to child's medical needs that such inattention will continue in future); In re R.M.V., 2012 WL 4761580, at *13. While in DFPS's care, A.M.V.'s cavities were fixed, and he began receiving routine dental examinations. Further, while in mother's care, A.M.V. had "just stopped" attending pre-kindergarten. A.M.V. did not have intellectual delays and did not require any supportive educational services or special education classes. A.M.V.'s doctor recommended that he have a safe and stable living environment and routine medical and dental examinations. He also needed to be monitored for depression, sad mood, emotional withdrawal, and behavioral difficulties. Play therapy and art therapy could be helpful for A.M.V. A.M.V. was scheduled to start therapy so that he could develop life skills.

When N.A.V. entered DFPS's care, she was "not on target." At the time, N.A.V. was three years old, still drinking out of a bottle, and not potty trained. N.A.V. also had numerous cavities, and she required multiple dental appointments to address her dental hygiene issues. See In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (trier of fact can infer from parent's past inattention to child's medical needs that such inattention will continue in future); In re R.M.V., 2012 WL 4761580, at *13. While in DFPS's care, N.A.V. stopped using a bottle and was potty trained. N.A.V. was going to be assessed to determine if she needed speech therapy because she could have a speech delay. N.A.V.'s doctor recommended a stable and nurturing living environment for N.A.V. and routine medical and dental examinations. Her caregiver needed to engage N.A.V. in educational games to promote her developmental progress and work with N.A.V. to enhance her speech skills.

J.A.V. had not been taken to the dentist while in mother's care. DFPS was also unable to determine whether he had ever received immunizations because there was no "paperwork or anything to reflect that he had received his shots." See In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (trier of fact can infer from parent's past inattention to child's medical needs that such inattention will continue in future); In re R.M.V., 2012 WL 4761580, at *13. J.A.V., who was almost two years old when he entered DFPS's care, was not potty trained. J.A.V. did not have intellectual delays. J.A.V.'s doctor recommended a stable and nurturing living environment for him and routine medical and dental examinations.

According to Child Advocates representative Arguelles, the children needed more than love and affection from mother. They needed educational support, medical support, and someone to teach them life skills such as doing their own hair, brushing their teeth, and using utensils to eat. Mother had failed to teach the children such things when they were in her care.

c. Criminal Charge

Criminal activity which exposes a parent to the potential for incarceration is relevant to the trial court's best interest determination. See In re A.P., No. 13-20-00258-CV, 2020 WL 6789040, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (criminal activity constitutes evidence of endangering conduct); In re B.H., No. 01-10-00415-CV, 2011 WL 4501940, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (father's indictment for felony offense relevant to determination of emotional and physical danger to child now and in future); In re AWT, 61 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (concluding "criminal activity which exposed the parent to incarceration [was] relevant evidence tending to establish a course of conduct endangering the emotional and physical well[-]being of the child"); see also In re F.M.A., No. 04-16-00318-CV, 2016 WL 4379456, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 17, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (arrests and incarcerations relevant to best interest determination). And a fact finder may measure a parent's future conduct by her past conduct and determine that it is in the children's best interest to terminate her parental rights. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 226 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied).

Further, in a civil case, including a termination-of-parental-rights case, a fact finder may draw an adverse inference against a party who pleads the Fifth Amendment. See In re Z.C.J.L., Nos. 14-13-00115-CV, 14-13-00147-CV, 2013 WL 3477569, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Tex. Cap. Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); see also In re S.A.P., 459 S.W.3d 134, 146 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) ("This rule has been applied in suits for parental termination."). Refusal to answer questions about a pending criminal charge by asserting the privilege against self-incrimination is relevant evidence from which the trier of fact in a civil action may draw whatever inference is reasonable under the circumstances. In re Moore, 153 S.W.3d 527, 534 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).

At the time of trial, mother was charged with the felony offense of abandoning a child. See B.C. v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 446 S.W.3d 869, 874-75 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (in addressing best interest, considering children removed from parent's care due to neglect and parent convicted of offense of child abandonment); In re R.M.V., 2012 WL 4761580, at *11, *14 (considering parent's indictment for offense of child abandonment or endangerment of child in discussing best interest). The indictment alleged that, on or about May 24, 2019, mother "unlawfully, having custody, care and control of [A.M.V.], a child younger than fifteen years of age . . . , intentionally abandon[ed] [A.M.V.] . . . under circumstances that exposed [A.M.V.] to an unreasonable risk of harm, namely le[aving] [A.M.V.] alone in the apartment for two hours and with the intent to return for [A.M.V.], and [mother] did not voluntarily deliver [A.M.V.] to a designated emergency infant care provider under [s]ection 262.302, Texas Family Code." See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(b), (d) (abandoning child constitutes state jail felony offense). An individual found guilty of a state jail felony offense shall be punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or less than 180 days. See id. § 12.35(a). Mother asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer further questions related to the charged felony offense. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; In re A.B., 372 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) ("A party may invoke h[er] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding if [s]he reasonably fears that the answer sought might incriminate h[er]."); see also In re A.H., No. 02-17-00222-CV, 2017 WL 5180785, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 9, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parents' invocation of privilege against self-incrimination produced evidence against them).

Mother's FSP listed DFPS's concerns related to mother, including that there was a possibility that she could be incarcerated for a period of time "due to her [c]hild [e]ndangerment [criminal] charge[]" because she left the children home alone.

3. Parental Abilities, Plans for Children, Stability of Proposed Placement, Availability of Assistance, Parent's Acts or Omissions

Much of the evidence discussed above is also relevant to mother's parental abilities, the plans for the children, the stability of the proposed placements, and mother's acts and omissions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

a. Supervision of Children

On May 24, 2019, DFPS received a referral alleging, in part, neglectful supervision of the children by mother. On that day, law enforcement officers were called to mother's home after the children were seen "outside wandering alone" without mother. At the time, M.A.A. was eleven years old, A.M.V. was five years old, N.A.V. was three years old, and J.A.V. was one year old. J.A.V. was found naked and not wearing a diaper.

Although M.A.A. was eleven years old, he had special needs and an intellectual disability.

When officers arrived at mother's home, mother was not there. Mother eventually returned to the home and told officers that she had gone to the grocery store. Although mother stated that she had only left the children for about thirty or forty-five minutes, a neighbor told officers that mother had been gone for at least two hours that day. Law enforcement officers found one of the younger children "sleeping on the floor [of mother's home] underneath a pile of rotting tacos and trash." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(12)(C) (in determining whether parent willing and able to provide child with safe environment, considering whether parent demonstrates adequate parenting skills, such as "supervision consistent with the child's safety"); In re A.J.B., No. 10-18-00274-CV, 2018 WL 6684808, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[Y]oung children are particularly vulnerable if left in the custody of a [caregiver] who is unable or unwilling to protect them or attend to their needs because they have no ability to protect themselves."); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 886 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (parent's poor judgment may be considered in discussing child's best interest); In re C.M.W., No. 01-02-00474-CV, 2003 WL 579794, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (children's basic needs include appropriate supervision).

Mother reported that she needed help taking care of the children because she had a hectic work schedule. Mother did not have a support system. Mother was arrested on May 24, 2019 for the felony offense of abandoning a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(b), (d) ("A person commits [the] offense if, having custody, care, or control of a child younger than 15 years, [s]he intentionally abandons the child in any place under circumstances that expose the child to an unreasonable risk of harm.").

b. Ability to Care for Children

Mother testified that the children needed food, clothing, and "family time," and if the children were returned to her care, she would provide that for them. As to M.A.A., mother testified that if M.A.A. was returned to her care, she would play with him, "[t]ake him to his highchair," and "[a]lways be there for him." As to A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V., mother intended to "[b]e[] active with them," play with them, and "do[] family activities with them." For family activities, they could decorate a card or create drawings that could be hung up; they could also play outside, go to the playground or the park, or play soccer. Mother intended to take the children to school, pick them up from school, and help them with their homework.

However, as detailed above, the record shows that mother had failed to demonstrate an ability to practice good hygiene with respect to the children or the ability to provide the children with necessary medical and dental care and appropriate clothing. See, e.g., In re L.W., 2019 WL 1523124, at *22 (in discussing parental abilities, considering mother's failure to seek appropriate medical treatment for child); K.N.M. v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00284-CV, 2018 WL 4087730, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in addressing parental abilities, considering parent's failure to take child to medical appointments). After being removed from mother's care, each of the children was diagnosed with child neglect. See In re Z.T., No. 12-18-00078-CV, 2018 WL 4474050, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in discussing best interest of child, considering child's diagnosis of "child neglect"); In re L.A.D.-L., No. 04-17-00802-CV, 2018 WL 2418451, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

On the day that the children were removed from mother's care, they were found dirty and alone.

For instance, on the day J.A.V. was removed from mother's care, he was found naked and without a diaper. The EMTs had to clean the child's feet because they were "completely dirty," and they wrapped a sheet around J.A.V. Further, before the children's removal, there were repeated issues with M.A.A.'s and J.L.'s clothing being unclean. J.L. appeared to have worn the same clothes for at least a month.

The record also shows that mother had failed to help the children achieve certain developmental and educational milestones, and mother had not sought to help the children develop life skills. See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (trial court may measure parent's future conduct by past conduct); In re B.L.M., No. 2-07-214-CV, 2008 WL 1867141, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence sufficient to support best-interest finding where children did not know how to feed themselves and "had no concept of how to brush their teeth"). As Child Advocates representative Arguelles explained, the children needed more than love and affection from mother. They needed educational support, medical support, and someone to teach them life skills like doing their own hair, brushing their teeth, and using utensils. The record shows that the children need a higher level of care than mother has shown herself able to provide to the children.

For example, when N.A.V. entered DFPS's care she, at three years old, was still using a bottle and not potty trained. She was "not on target."

Mother was not able to articulate M.A.A.'s special education needs and merely told DFPS that the child was "delayed." She also did not know what kind of education services M.A.A. needed to be receiving at school.

In contrast, while in DFPS's care, the children's lives have improved significantly. The children received routine medical, dental, and vision examinations, and their dental issues that existed at the time of removal were treated. The children appeared comfortable and safe in their respective placements.

While in DFPS's care, M.A.A. stopped wearing a diaper, and he had fewer accidents. M.A.A.'s doctor attributed the improvement in M.A.A.'s health to the child having a consistent routine as well as stability in his home. M.A.A.'s attitude also improved, and he became more social. M.A.A. received special education services at school while in DFPS's care. He participated in individual therapy and speech therapy, and his speech improved. M.A.A.'s ability to feed himself, bathe himself, and brush his own teeth also improved. M.A.A. was scheduled to start therapy so that he could develop life skills. M.A.A. made significant progress while in DFPS's care.

As to A.M.V., although he had "just stopped" attending pre-kindergarten while in mother's care, at the time of trial he was attending elementary school, and his performance in school was "[g]ood." A.M.V. had become more confident and affectionate while in DFPS's care. A.M.V. was scheduled to start therapy so that he could develop life skills.

While in DFPS's care, N.A.V. had stopped using a bottle and was potty trained. N.A.V. attended pre-kindergarten at an elementary school. J.A.V. received his required immunizations while in DFPS's care. He had a great appetite, was active, and walked around following the other children.

c. Plans for Children and Stability of Proposed Placement

At the time of trial, the children were comfortable and safe in their respective foster placements. As to permanent placements, DFPS sought to have the children placed with relatives. For M.A.A., DFPS had completed a home study on a relative, Samantha, and it intended to place M.A.A. with Samantha. Samantha was willing to adopt M.A.A. When DFPS caseworker Clark spoke to M.A.A. about Samantha, M.A.A. told her that Samantha visited the home of a previous placement frequently, he knew Samantha, her husband, and their children, and he called her "Tia Samantha." Samantha testified that she had interacted with M.A.A. and he knew her. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a); In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (stability of proposed placement important consideration in addressing whether termination of parental rights in children's best interest); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ("The goal of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a compelling . . . interest.").

For A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V., DFPS had completed a home study on mother's aunt and uncle, which DFPS was in the process of reviewing. The home study did not reveal any major concerns. There was a possibility that M.A.A. could be placed with the aunt and uncle as well. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a); In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d at 356; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118.

Clark did not believe that A.M.V., N.A.V., and J.A.V. had any mental health, educational, or behavioral issues that would prevent them from being adopted. And with the progress M.A.A. had made while in DFPS's care, Clark believed that there would be nothing preventing M.A.A. from being adopted. If the children could not be permanently placed with relatives, DFPS planned to find another adoptive home for the children. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013) ("lack of evidence about [specific] definitive plans for [the] permanent placement and adoption" of children not dispositive in best-interest analysis; we examine entire record to determine best interest when DFPS is "unable to identify with precision the child[ren's] future home environment" (internal quotations omitted)); In re T.C., No. 01-17-00497-CV, 2018 WL 4126600, at *26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("[T]he fact that [the child] is not currently in a long-term or permanent placement is not a dispositive fact.").

Mother acknowledged that the children needed a healthy and safe environment in which to live. And they needed stable housing and a stable parent to be cared for properly. But as discussed above, the record shows that mother's new home, which she notified DFPS caseworker Clark about on the night before the second day of trial, did not appear to be a long-term living situation for mother. No one from DFPS nor Child Advocates was given an opportunity to visit mother's new home. Clark testified that mother had not demonstrated that she could provide the children with a safe environment and she had not maintained stable housing as required by her FSP. See In re A.K.T., No. 01-18-00647-CV, 2018 WL 6423381, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent's inability to provide stable home supports finding that termination of parental rights in best interest of child); In re G.R., No. 07-16-00277-CV, 2016 WL 6242829, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting parent unable to maintain steady employment or housing during termination case in considering stability of potential placement with parent); In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (parent's failure to comply with FSP's requirements to maintain stable housing and employment supported trial court's best-interest finding). Mother admitted that she had difficulty obtaining a stable home and her multiple housing changes during the case did not reflect stability. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a); In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d at 356; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. Further, even if mother had obtained stable housing right before trial, a recent improvement in mother's potential ability to provide a safe and stable home for the children is not sufficient to avoid termination of her parental rights. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009); In re B.D.M., No. 02-13-00388-CV, 2014 WL 1510131, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).

At the time the children were removed from her care, mother's home was not safe and stable. See In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at *22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in addressing parental abilities, plans for children, and stability of proposed placement, considering unsanitary living conditions of mother's home at time children were removed from her care). And for a period of time while the termination case was pending, mother did not have a place to live and did not accept DFPS caseworker Clark's attempt to assist mother in obtaining housing. Although mother did live in an apartment at some point during the case—which Clark and a Child Advocates representative visited—that apartment was bare, and mother moved out after only a month due to safety concerns.

d. Ability to Provide for Children

Mother acknowledged that the children needed to have a stable parent to be cared for properly. But the record shows that mother had difficulty maintaining stable employment throughout the termination case; instead, mother had been employed at "several [different] jobs." Mother reported to DFPS caseworker Clark that at one point she was working at a warehouse and a nightclub and also that "she was in orientation for an insurance company call service." Before the second day of trial, mother provided Clark with a legible payroll stub which showed that mother had been employed from July 2020 to September 2020 at a convenience store. Clark testified that mother had not maintained stable employment as required by her FSP. See In re K.J.G., No. 04-19-00102-CV, 2019 WL 3937278, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent's failure to maintain stable and continuous employment as required by FSP supports termination of parental rights); In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d at 752 (parent's failure to comply with his FSP's requirements to maintain stable housing and employment supported trial court's best-interest finding); see also In re G.R., 2016 WL 6242829, at *6 (noting parent unable to maintain steady employment or housing throughout termination case in considering stability of potential placement with parent).

Mother testified that she had three jobs during the termination case, but there were also periods of time when she was unemployed. She was working at a Valero convenience store as a lead cashier when the children were removed from her care. But mother lost that job when her hours were reduced. Mother later found a job at a hotel, but she lost that job when her "hours stopped drastically." Mother found another job "with [an] insurance agent," but she did not work there for very long because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Mother stated that at the time of trial she was an assistant manager at a convenience store.

Mother attributed her previous inability to properly care for the children and maintain a sanitary home to her being overwhelmed, working multiple jobs and long hours, and not having a support system on which to rely.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). And viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See id. We further conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed evidence in favor of finding that termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children or any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination is in the best interest of the children.

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See id.

We overrule mother's third issue.

C. Sole Managing Conservator

In her fourth issue, mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that the appointment of DFPS as the sole managing conservator of the children was in the children's best interest because mother was employed and had secured a suitable home for the children and mother was able to provide permanency and a safe stable environment for the children.

We review conservatorship decisions for an abuse of discretion. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007); In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616; In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d at 55. Thus, in reviewing a trial court's conservatorship decision for an abuse of discretion, we examine whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); see also In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d at 55 ("To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, the appellate court must decide whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles, that is, whether its decision was arbitrary or unreasonable."). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence or so long as some evidence of substantive and probative character supports its decision. In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d at 55.

An order terminating the parent-child relationship divests the parent of all legal rights and duties with respect to her children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b); In re A.L.J., No. 01-19-00251-CV, 2019 WL 4615826, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). A parent with no legal rights and duties with respect to her children lacks standing to attack the portion of the trial court's order appointing DFPS as the sole managing conservator of the children. See A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9.

Here, we have overruled mother's complaint that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to the children. Thus, the trial court's termination order divested mother of her legal rights and duties related to the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b); In re A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9; In re D.K.W., Jr., No. 01-17-00622-CV, 2017 WL 6520439, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Having no legal rights and duties with respect to the children, we hold that mother lacks standing to challenge the portion of the trial court's order appointing DFPS as sole managing conservator of the children. See In re A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9 ("Mother does not have standing to challenge the portion of the order appointing [DFPS] as permanent managing conservator of the children because any alleged error could not injuriously affect her rights."); In re D.K.W., Jr., 2017 WL 6520439, at *5.

We overrule mother's fourth issue.

Father's Appeal

In his first and fourth issues, father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights to M.A.A. because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the child's physical and emotional well-being and termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2).

As stated above, in order to terminate the parent-child relationship, DFPS must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See id. § 161.001(b). Both elements must be established, and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Id.; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. "Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362.

A. Endangering Conduct

In a portion of his first issue, father argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the child's physical and emotional well-being because the evidence supporting the trial court's finding "consists solely of [DFPS's] assertion th[at] father was not adequately treating his mental illness, which raised a safety concern." (Emphasis omitted.)

When a party presents multiple grounds for reversal, an appellate court should first address those issues that would afford the party the greatest relief. See Bradleys' Elec., Inc. v. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co., 995 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1999); In re A.A.H., Nos. 01-19-00612-CV, 01-19-00748-CV, 2020 WL 1056941, at *7 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Because legally insufficient evidence requires a rendition of judgment in favor of the party raising the challenge, we must address a legal-sufficiency challenge first. See In re A.A.H., 2020 WL 1056941, at *7 n.4; In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

A trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child" and termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2). Within this context, endangerment encompasses "more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment." Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Instead, "endanger" means to expose the child to loss or injury or to jeopardize his emotional or physical health. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 616.

We must look at a parent's conduct standing alone, including his actions or omissions. In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d at 205. It is not necessary to establish that a parent intended to endanger the child. See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 270. But termination of parental rights requires "more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required." In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125; see also In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d at 205. The specific danger to the child's well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct, even if the conduct is not directed at the child and the child suffers no actual injury. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 738. Courts may consider parental conduct that did not occur in the child's presence. In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426; Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617.

A parent's mental instability may contribute to a finding that the parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered a child's physical or emotional well-being. See In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723-26. And a parent's failure to properly take medication to treat his mental health issues may also endanger a child's emotional or physical well-being. See In re P.H., 544 S.W.3d 850, 858 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (considering parent's refusal to treat her mental health as factor in endangerment analysis); In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) ("Untreated mental illness can expose a child to endangerment, . . . and is a factor the court may consider."); In re L.L.F., No. 02-11-00485-CV, 2012 WL 2923291, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent's failure to take medication to treat mental health issues endangered child's emotional or physical well-being). Further, a parent's failure to appreciate the need for treatment to combat his history of mental instability allows a fact finder to infer that his mental health issues would likely recur and further jeopardize a child's well-being in the future. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 367; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 741.

Father had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, but he reported to DFPS caseworker Clark that he did not take medication to treat his mental health issues. The August 2020 permanency report stated that father had psychiatric issues, had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and father had not been taking the medication prescribed by his psychiatrist to treat his schizophrenia.

Clark did testify that to her knowledge father had not done anything during his supervised visits with M.A.A. to directly endanger the child, but a parent need not intend to endanger his child through his conduct nor does the parent need to engage in endangering conduct that is directed at his child. See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 270; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Further, a parent's endangering conduct need not occur in the child's presence, and the child need not suffer actual injury for the evidence to support termination of the parent-child relationship. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426; Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 738; see also In re A.P., 2020 WL 6789040, at *6 (trial court may consider parent's conduct occurring outside child's presence).

A parent's lengthy absence from a child's life may also constitute conduct that endangers the child's emotional well-being and may indicate that the parent-child relationship is not a proper one. See T.L. v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-19-00382-CV, 2019 WL 5779913, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 6, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also In re A.P., 2020 WL 6789040, at *7 (parent's absence from child's life created emotional vacuum in child's life and supported trial court's finding of endangerment); In re B.B., No. 2-08-403-CV, 2009 WL 1270668, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent's history of disappearing from her children's lives caused children to experience instability). And a fact finder may infer that a parent's lack of contact with his child and absence from the child's life endangered the child's emotional well-being. See T.L., 2019 WL 5779913, at *4; In re M.D.M., 579 S.W.3d 744, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).

The record shows that father met M.A.A. a couple of days after the child was born, and mother allowed father to visit M.A.A. Mother would take M.A.A. over to see father. However, when M.A.A. was three years old, his contact with father stopped because father disappeared, and mother did not know where father was. Father did not reenter M.A.A.'s life until years later.

To the extent that father argues that he could not have engaged in conduct that endangered M.A.A. because he was "unaware he was the father of [M.A.A.]," DFPS caseworker Clark and mother both testified that father knew he had a child, M.A.A., even before the termination case began and father had met the child in the past, including right after M.A.A. was born. Nevertheless, a father need not know that he is a child's father in order to engage in a course of conduct that endangers the child and supports an endangerment finding. See In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied); In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (knowledge of paternity not "a prerequisite to a showing of a parental course of conduct which endanger[ed] a child"); In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190, 198 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) ("A father's conduct prior to the establishment of his paternity can be considered under [Texas Family Code] section 161.001[(b)](1)(E).").

Although in another portion of her testimony, Clark stated that father did not know that he was the father of M.A.A. at the time the child was removed from mother's care, the trial court, as the fact finder, was free to accept or reject all or part of the testimony of any witness. See In re A.R., No. 02-18-00311-CV, 2019 WL 1186963, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 14, 2019, pet. denied).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that father engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered M.A.A.'s physical and emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding that father engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the child's physical and emotional well-being. See id.

We overrule this portion of father's first issue.

Having held that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding that father engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered M.A.A.'s physical and emotional well-being, we need not address father's second issue in which he asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of the child. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 (only one predicate finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) necessary to support judgment terminating parental rights); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Additionally, due to our disposition below, we need not address the portions of father's first and second issues in which he asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the child's physical and emotional well-being and that he failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of M.A.A. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O). This is because, even were we to sustain these factual-sufficiency challenges raised by father in his first and second issues, father would not be granted any more relief related to the termination of his parental rights than we have afforded him below. See In re A.A.H., Nos. 01-19-00612-CV, 01-19-00748-CV, 2020 WL 1056941, at *18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Because we reverse the portion of the trial court's order terminating father's parental rights to M.A.A. and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial after concluding that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding as to father, see infra, we do not run afoul of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019), by not considering whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that father engaged, or knowingly placed M.A.A. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered the child's physical and emotional well-being. See In re D.L.W.W., 2020 WL 7517612, at *10 n.36; In re D.T., Nos. 07-19-00071-CV, 07-19-00072-CV, 2019 WL 3210601, at *5 n.6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 16, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(b)(E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 237, 239 (only when appellate court "affirms the termination" of parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(E) must it address both legal and factual sufficiency of evidence "to support [a] section 161.001(b)(1)([E]) . . . finding[] as [a] ground[] for termination").

We also need not address father's third issue related to Texas Family Code section 161.001(d). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(d) ("A court may not order termination . . . based on the failure by the parent to comply with a specific provision of a court order if a parent proves by a preponderance of evidence that . . . [he] was unable to comply with [the] specific provisions of the court order; and . . . [he] made a good faith effort to comply with the order and the failure to comply with the order [was] not attributable to any fault by the parent.").

B. Best Interest of M.A.A.

In his fourth issue, father argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A. because the "[t]estimony [r]egarding [b]est [i]nterest[] [w]as [l]argely [c]onclusory and [n]ot [p]robative," there was no evidence "establishing [that father] was unable to provide an appropriate placement" or that M.A.A. "had ever been hurt, injured, or neglected by . . . father," there were "no facts suggesting [that M.A.A. was] bonded with a foster parent to justify terminating . . . father's parental rights," M.A.A. was not residing in an adoptive placement at the time of trial, and father and M.A.A. had "developed a bond[] and [a] healthy relationship." (Emphasis omitted.)

In determining whether termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A., we consider the same best-interest factors discussed previously in relation to the termination of mother's parental rights to the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 n.29; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72; In re C.A.G., 2012 WL 2922544, at *6 & n.4; In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. Although the absence of evidence about some of the factors does not preclude a fact finder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child's best interest, a lack of evidence on one factor cannot be used as if it were clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of parental rights. See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 808; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 122. The presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will generally not support a finding that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest. In re D.L.W.W., No. 01-20-00507-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2020 WL 7517612, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2020, no pet.); In re R.H., No. 02-19-00273-CV, 2019 WL 6767804, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re A.W., 444 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied).

We remain mindful that there is a strong presumption that the child's best interest is served by maintaining the parent-child relationship, and we must strictly scrutinize termination proceedings in favor of the parent. In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d at 822; In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647.

Initially, we note that there is very little evidence about father in the trial record. See In re G.C., No. 02-17-00259-CV, 2018 WL 547784, at *25-27 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence insufficient to support best-interest finding while noting "little evidence" presented at trial related to best interest). DFPS did not call father as a witness to testify at trial. Our focus is on whether the termination of father's parental rights would advance M.A.A.'s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 127.

Child Advocates representative Arguelles never even met father during the termination case.

1. M.A.A.'s Desires

When the parental rights of father were terminated, M.A.A. was twelve years old, but the record does not contain any direct evidence of his desires related to father. Yet, no evidence was presented indicating that M.A.A. desired termination of his relationship with father. See In re J.E.M.M., 532 S.W.3d at 886-87; see also In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 410-11 (no evidence that children did not want to be returned to parent's care).

There is evidence that M.A.A. knows that father is his father and that father had visits with M.A.A. when the child was young. Further, during the termination case, when M.A.A. was placed with father's sister in 2020, father had "virtual visits" with M.A.A. and they spent time together supervised. Father formed a bond with M.A.A., and there is no evidence that father ever did anything during his visits with M.A.A. that would have endangered the child. See In re G.M.M., No. 01-20-00159-CV, 2020 WL 5048140, at *16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence factually insufficient to support best-interest finding and noting lack of evidence that parent's relationship with child was inappropriate or that child was adversely affected by contact with parent); Yonko v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 196 S.W.3d 236, 244-45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (when evidence of parent's failures is not overwhelming, child's love for parent and bond between child and parent weighed against termination of parental rights); see also In re A.J.A.R., 2020 WL 4260343, at *7 (bond between parent and child important consideration). We note that DFPS never attempted to facilitate any visitation between father and M.A.A. during the termination case; any visits between father and M.A.A. occurred in this case because of the proactive actions of father and father's family. See In re C.T.E., 95 S.W.3d 462, 469 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (considering parent's efforts to set up visitation with children in holding evidence factually insufficient to support finding that termination of parental rights in children's best interest). There is no evidence that DFPS tried to stop the visits between M.A.A. and father.

2. Current and Future Physical and Emotional Needs

a. Condition of Home

A child needs a safe and stable home. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a) (prompt and permanent placement of child in safe environment presumed to be in child's best interest); In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d at 60 (parent who lacks ability to provide child with safe and stable home is unable to provide for child's emotional and physical needs); Adams, 236 S.W.3d at 280 (in children's best interest to be raised in consistent, stable, and nurturing environment). Here, there is no evidence that father's home is not stable. In fact, DFPS presented very little evidence at trial about father's home.

Father lived with his mother, who is his guardian, and father provided the required documentation to show that he resided with his mother. There is no evidence that father lived anywhere else during the termination case. Cf. In re A.A.A., 265 S.W.3d 507, 517-18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (evidence parent moved frequently supported finding that termination of parental rights in child's best interest). DFPS caseworker Clark met with father, father's mother, and father's sister at father's home during the termination case, but she did not provide details about the condition of father's home. She was not questioned about the condition of father's home at trial. See In re R.I.D., 543 S.W.3d 422, 427-28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (DFPS could not establish that "parent ha[d] demonstrated an inability to provide [a] child with a safe environment" where "[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence of [parent's] living conditions" and "no evidence about [parent's] conduct in his home").

Mother testified that father disappeared when M.A.A. was about three years old, but she also stated that father had returned when M.A.A. was about seven or eight years old. DFPS presented no evidence to show that current father's living arrangement was unstable or that father had again disappeared after he and M.A.A. had bonded.

b. M.A.A.'s Needs

The record is clear that M.A.A. has special needs, and he required a higher level of care than other children which he had not been receiving while living with mother. However, there is no evidence that father had access to M.A.A. while he was in mother's care. Father was not living with mother at the time M.A.A. was removed from mother's care, and DFPS caseworker Clark described father at trial as the "non-offending parent." See In re A.J.A.R., 2020 WL 4260343, at *7 (nothing in record suggested children's behavioral issues resulted from father's conduct). DFPS "ha[d] no concerns" about father. See In re B.C.H., No. 09-18-00437-CV, 2019 WL 1940758, at *14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence factually insufficient to support best-interest finding where "there was no risk of foreseeable harm if the court allowed [parent] to retain her rights" (internal quotations omitted)).

There is also no evidence about father's knowledge of M.A.A.'s needs or his inability to meet those needs. See In re D.D.M., 2019 WL 2939259, at *6 (DFPS presented no evidence that parent could not meet child's special needs). Wholly lacking from the record is evidence that termination of father's parental rights would improve the outlook for M.A.A.'s needs. See In re J.E.M.M., 532 S.W.3d at 887; see also In re L.C.L., 599 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. filed) (no evidence parent failed to provide for children's physical and emotional needs or that she could not provide for their needs in future). DFPS, in its FSP, did not request that father participate in parenting classes or take any actions to better understand the specific needs of M.A.A. The fact that a child has special needs does not automatically mean that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child. See In re L.C.L., 599 S.W.3d at 88 ("[T]he existence of the [children's] disorders and disabilities [does not] constitute evidence of [parent's] inability to provide for the children's emotional or physical needs."); In re J.E.M.M., 532 S.W.3d at 887-88.

Here, the record reveals that M.A.A. needs stability in his life and M.A.A. and father formed a relationship and a bond. And there is no evidence that M.A.A.'s emotional and physical needs would be sacrificed or that M.A.A. would be negatively affected by contact with father in a possessory conservator role with supervised visits. See In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 125, 127-28.

Father did not challenge the portion of the trial court's order appointing DFPS as M.A.A.'s managing conservator. See In re R.L., Nos. 01-16-00851-CV, 01-16-00852-CV, 01-16-00875-CV, 2017 WL 1496955, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A managing conservator is a person or entity who, by court order, has been awarded custody of a child[,] . . . may determine the child's primary residence[,] . . . [and] has nearly sole authority to make decisions for the child." (internal citations omitted)).

3. Current and Future Physical and Emotional Danger

There is no evidence that father ever physically harmed M.A.A., and DFPS caseworker Clark testified that, to her knowledge, father had never done anything during his visits with M.A.A. that would have endangered the child. See In re A.J.A.R., 2020 WL 4260343, at *8-9 (holding evidence factually insufficient to support best-interest finding where there was no evidence parent caused injury to children); In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d at 414 (record did not contain evidence that parent acted aggressively or violently toward children, abused children, or exposed children to physical danger); In re J.P., No. 02-10-00448-CV, 2012 WL 579481, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence factually insufficient to support finding that termination of parental rights in child's best interest where grounds for terminating parent's rights did not involve allegations of physical or sexual abuse of child by parent).

There is also no evidence that father was aware of the unsanitary conditions in which M.A.A. was living before his removal from mother's care. And there is no evidence that father knew of the hygienic issues, medical issues, and dental issues that M.A.A. experienced while in mother's care. DFPS "ha[d] no concerns" about father and characterized father as the "non-offending parent" in this case. See In re C.D.L.R., No. 13-19-00008-CV, 2019 WL 2608776, at *2, *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg June 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence insufficient to establish non-offending parent engaged in endangering conduct). Although there is evidence in the record that father was diagnosed with schizophrenia and did not take his prescribed medication, DFPS presented no evidence that M.A.A. would suffer physical and emotional danger if father's parental rights remained intact, particularly if father had only a possessory conservator role. See In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at 734 (holding evidence factually insufficient to support best-interest finding where parent suffered from bipolar disorder and had not been adequately medicated, but in visits with children, parent did not display signs of mental health disability); In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 363 (mental illness alone is not grounds for terminating parent-child relationship); Maxwell v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00242-CV, 2012 WL 987787, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). There is also no evidence that M.A.A.'s emotional and physical interests would be sacrificed or that M.A.A. would be negatively affected by contact with father in a possessory conservator role with supervised visits. See In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 125, 127-28.

4. Parental Abilities

DFPS presented no evidence of father's parental abilities or lack thereof. DFPS caseworker Clark testified that father's mother was father's guardian, but she also stated that father's mother had not ever shown her anything indicating that father's mother had "decision[-]making capacity over" father. See In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 113 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (in discussing best interest of child, noting parent's mental illness or disability, without more, are not grounds for terminating parent-child relationship); Maxwell, 2012 WL 987787, at *9 (mental incompetence and mental illness alone are not grounds for terminating parent-child relationship). Father's guardianship did not prevent father from attending court proceedings during the termination case. See In re D.L.W.W., 2020 WL 7517612, at *18 (considering parent's attendance at court hearings in holding evidence factually insufficient to support best-interest finding).

In one conclusory word, Clark responded, "[n]o," when asked whether father was "able to take care of himself," but Clark did not provide any context or detail to support her statement. See In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) ("[C]onclusory testimony, such as the caseworker's, even if uncontradicted does not amount to more than a scintilla of evidence."); see also City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2009) (opinion is conclusory "if no basis for the opinion is offered[] or the basis offered provides no support"); Arkoma Basin Expl. Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Tex. 2008) (witness cannot "simply state a conclusion without any explanation" or ask trier of fact to just "take [her] word for it" (internal quotations omitted)). A single statement without context provides insufficient evidence to support a finding that termination of father's parental rights was in M.A.A.'s best interest. See Flanz v. Farias, 662 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ) (concluding single statement without context provides insufficient evidence to support finding).

Significantly, DFPS did not offer father the opportunity to participate in any meaningful services, like it did with mother, if DFPS believed that father's parental abilities were lacking. Cf. TEX. DEP'T OF FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS. HANDBOOK § 5521.2 ("The goal of the service plan is to develop a strategy for the parent to eliminate or reduce identified threats to the child's safety and risk of future abuse or neglect."), § 6242.5 ("[T]he tasks and services in the plan must encourage contact, visitation, and other relationship-building activities that may include parent's attendance at medical appointments, school events, or other activities involving the child."). There is no evidence that M.A.A.'s physical and emotional interests would be sacrificed or that M.A.A. would be negatively affected by contact with father in a possessory conservator role with supervised visits. See In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 125, 127-28.

For instance, mother's FSP required her to attend, participate in, and complete parenting classes and provide a certificate of completion to the DFPS caseworker; participate in a psychosocial evaluation to address her emotional needs and follow all recommendations from the evaluation, including participating in individual therapy; attend all court hearings, permanency conference meetings, and family visits. By completing the requirements of her FSP, DFPS hoped that mother would learn "the importance of cleaning her home" and learn about parenting a child "with mental health issues . . . to help stop [her] maltreatment pattern."

5. Availability of Assistance and Parent's Acts or Omissions

"In determining the best interest of the child in proceedings for termination of parental rights, the [fact finder] may properly consider" whether a parent complied with "the court-ordered service plan for reunification with the child." In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d at 355; see In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249. As part of his FSP, father was asked to submit to DNA testing, provide proof of employment or proof of his receipt of SSI benefits, sign a release of information form to allow DFPS to access his mental health records, inform the DFPS caseworker where he received psychiatric treatment so that she could request his records, acquire and maintain stable housing for more than six months and provide a copy of a lease agreement or mortgage in father's name to the DFPS caseworker, and refrain from engaging in "illegal criminal activities." Father completed the requirements of his FSP. See In re A.J.A.R., 2020 WL 4260343, at *8 ("[W]e consider the evidence that [parent] completed the 'vast majority' of the service plan for purposes of the best-interest analysis."); In re D.D.M., 2019 WL 2939259, at *7 (father completed his FSP); In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d at 835 (parent's compliance with certain FSP requirements weighed in his favor and against termination of parent-child relationship). Although DFPS caseworker Clark stated that DFPS had required father to participate in a psychiatric evaluation and take medication for his schizophrenia, which Clark stated he did not do, that requirement is not listed in either father's July 16, 2019 FSP or the October 2, 2019 amended FSP.

DFPS did not present any evidence that father engaged in "illegal criminal activities."

The trial court took judicial notice of the October 2, 2019 amended FSP.

6. Plans for M.A.A. and Stability of Proposed Placement

At the time of trial, M.A.A. was comfortable and safe in his foster placement. However, there is also evidence that M.A.A. was sad about being removed from the home of father's sister, Laura, and was still adjusting to his new foster placement. As to M.A.A.'s permanent placement, DFPS sought to have M.A.A. placed with another one of father's relatives—Samantha, the sister-in-law of Laura, father's sister. DFPS had completed a home study on Samantha, and when DFPS caseworker Clark spoke to M.A.A. about Samantha, M.A.A. told her that Samantha was at a previous placement's home frequently, he knew Samantha, her husband, and their children, and he called her "Tia Samantha." Samantha testified that she had interacted with M.A.A. and the child knew her. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a); In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d at 356 (stability of proposed placement important consideration in addressing whether termination of parental rights in children's best interest); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118 ("The goal of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a compelling . . . interest."). Although DFPS caseworker Clark testified that Samantha was willing to adopt M.A.A., there is no evidence in the record that Samantha would not be willing to provide M.A.A. with a safe environment in which to live if father's rights to M.A.A. were not terminated. See In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at 732 (noting relative could provide safe environment for child regardless of whether parent's rights were terminated). Further, there is no evidence that M.A.A.'s stability in his proposed placement would be negatively affected by contact with father in a possessory conservator role with supervised visits. See In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 125, 127-28.

Significantly, DFPS must support its allegations against a parent, including its allegation that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of a child, by clear and convincing evidence; conjecture or a preponderance of evidence is not enough. See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 808-10; see also In re R.H., 2019 WL 6767804, at *4; In re A.W., 444 S.W.3d at 693 (presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will generally not support finding that termination of parental rights was in child's best interest); Toliver v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 101 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (DFPS had burden to rebut presumption that best interest of child was served by keeping custody with natural parent). DFPS must meet this high evidentiary burden because of the presumption that the child's best interest is served by maintaining the parent-child relationship and the constitutional rights of the parent involved in such a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. In re E.C.A., No. 01-17-00623-CV, 2017 WL 6759198, at *9, *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re R.W., No. 01-11-00023-CV, 2011 WL 2436541, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 16, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54 ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. . . . If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections . . . .").

Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A. See id.

Evidence supporting termination under the grounds listed in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) can be considered in support of a finding that termination is in a child's best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002) (holding same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds and best interest). Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, as we must when conducting a legal-sufficiency review, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of M.A.A. See id.; see also In re A.A.H., 2020 WL 1056941, at *7 n.4 (because legally insufficient evidence requires rendition of judgment in favor of party raising challenge, we must address it); In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d at 315.

We sustain this portion of father's fourth issue.

Conclusion

We reverse the portion of the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of father as to M.A.A. and remand that portion of the case to the trial court for a new trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4(c); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 347. We affirm the remaining portions of the trial court's order terminating mother's parental rights to the children and appointing DFPS as the children's sole managing conservator.

Father did not challenge the portion of the trial court's order appointing DFPS as M.A.A.'s sole managing conservator. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 612-13 (Tex. 2007).

Julie Countiss

Justice Panel consists of Justices Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, and Guerra.

In re M.A.A.

Summary

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Background

Standard of Review

Mother's Appeal

A. Endangering Conduct

B. Best Interest of Children

C. Sole Managing Conservator

Father's Appeal

A. Endangering Conduct

B. Best Interest of M.A.A.

Conclusion

In re M.A.A.

In re M.A.A.

Case Details

Citations

Citing Cases

In re M.A.A.

Summary

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Background

Standard of Review

Mother's Appeal

A. Endangering Conduct

B. Best Interest of Children

C. Sole Managing Conservator

Father's Appeal

A. Endangering Conduct

B. Best Interest of M.A.A.

Conclusion

In re M.A.A.

In re M.A.A.

Case Details

CitationsCopy Citation

Citing Cases

Citations