Opinion
No. 06-20-00073-CV
04-01-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF A.B., A CHILD
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 18C0519-CCL Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship brought by the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department), the County Court at Law of Bowie County entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights to A.B. pursuant to Section 161.001, subsections (b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), of the Texas Family Code, finding that termination was in the child's best interests and naming the Department as the child's permanent managing conservator.
To protect the confidentiality of the children involved, this Court will refer to all involved parties by fictitious names and the children by their initials. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(C)(2). A.B.'s Father's rights were also terminated by the court's order, but his rights are not at issue in this appeal.
On appeal, Mother argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under subsections (D), (E) and (O), that evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that termination was in the child's best interests, and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to extend the dismissal deadline.
We affirm the trial court's order because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show that termination of Mother's parental rights was justified under subsections (D) and (E), that termination was in the child's best interests, and that the trial court did not err in denying Mother's motion to extend the dismissal deadline.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Mother is the biological mother of A.B. and Addy. While Addy was the subject of a previous and related action by the Department and was initially part of this case, she was not a part of the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights in this case and is not the subject of the order being appealed. A.B., the child at issue in this case, was born in 2005.
On April 26, 2018, the Department filed a petition for the protection of a child, for conservatorship, and for termination of Mother's parental rights. Judy Townsend, a special investigative supervisor for the Department, got involved in the case because Mother had reported that A.B. and Addy "had been in a situation where there were drugs and aggravated sexual assault on [A.B.]." Townsend testified that, while Mother was in jail in Arkansas, she had left her children with her mother (Grandmother), who in turn often left the children with John Littleton, the man accused of assaulting A.B.
Although Mother confirmed that Grandmother had custody of the children, she claimed to have left them with her brother (Brother) while she was in prison. When she got out of jail, she learned that Brother had left the children with Grandmother. Mother admitted that she had been trafficked to Littleton by Grandmother when she was younger. The Department was aware that Grandmother and Littleton "were sex trafficking kids and also running drugs." Mother acknowledged that she had knowingly placed the children in dangerous circumstances.
There is no order in the record granting Grandmother any form of custody over the children. --------
A final hearing in the case was held on December 6, 2018. The trial court named a family friend of Mother's—whom we refer to as Neighbor—as permanent managing conservator of the children. The trial court also named Mother as possessory conservator, and the Department closed its case. Townsend testified that the Department soon learned that Neighbor had allowed the children to return to Mother's house and live with her. Neither Mother nor Neighbor informed the Department of the change. Also, as part of the Department's investigation, the Department required Mother to take a drug test, and she tested positive for methamphetamine.
Based on Mother's failed drug test and continuing concerns that she was exposing her children to the risk of sex trafficking, the Department removed the children from the care of Mother and Neighbor. The Department then filed an amended petition seeking to consolidate the action with the previous action involving A.B. and to terminate Mother's parental rights. The final termination hearing on the amended petition was held on September 17, 2020. The witnesses at that hearing included the Department workers Judie Townsend and Jasmine Turner, Mother, and Joey Elliott, the advocate coordinator for Bowie County Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA).
Turner testified that Mother failed to complete any of her court-ordered services, that she failed to appear for four out of her five psychological evaluation appointments, and that, while she had completed her psychological evaluation a week before the hearing, the results were still pending at the time of trial. Turner also testified that Mother was in and out of jail during the case, as the evidence showed that Mother was in two different jails from April 2020, through early July 2020. At the time of trial, Mother faced several charges in Cass County, including endangering A.B. and interfering with child custody, harboring a runaway in Bowie County, and aggravated robbery in Arkansas. Turner also testified that several of Mother's drug tests were positive for illegal drugs and that she failed to appear for drug testing from October 2019 through March 2020.
Mother testified that, since she was released from jail in July 2020, she had completed a drug assessment, a psychological evaluation, and about half of the required parenting classes. Mother also claimed that she had remained drug free "recently" and had not used drugs since being released from jail in July 2020.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the County Court at Law of Bowie County entered an order terminating Mother's parent's rights to A.B. pursuant to Section 161.001, subsections (b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), of the Texas Family Code, finding that termination was in the child's best interests, and naming the Department as the child's permanent managing conservator. Mother appealed from the trial court's order.
II. Standard of Review
"The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions." In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). "Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning 'the care, custody, and control of their children.'" Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at trial." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). This Court is required to "engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to support the termination of parental rights." Id. (quoting A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500). "[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent." Id. (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20)).
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). "'Clear and convincing evidence' is that 'degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.'" Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). "This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the evidence." Id.
"In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven." In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). "We assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted." Id. (citing J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).
"In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing." Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). "We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine 'whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the . . . allegations.'" Id. (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002)))). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). In making this determination, we must undertake "an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)).
"Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, 'the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount.'" Id. (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994))) (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003)). "A child's emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights." Id. (quoting In re C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)).
"Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. at 923 (quoting In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (quoting A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362) (citing In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.))). Even so, in In the Interest of N.G., the Texas Supreme Court held that due process demands that we review the evidence supporting findings under grounds D and E when they are challenged on appeal because termination of parental rights under these grounds "may have implications for . . . parental rights to other children." In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019). As a result, we focus our analysis on grounds D and E.
III. Sufficient Evidence Supports Termination Under Ground D
In her first point of error, Mother contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights under ground D.
Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code permits termination if the parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). "Under this section, we must examine the time before the children's removal to determine whether the environment itself posed a danger to the child's physical or emotional well-being." In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.). "A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of, but disregards." In re N.B., No. 06-12-00007-CV, 2013 WL 1605457, at *9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). "[S]ubsection (D) permits termination [of parental rights] based on a single act or omission [by the parent]." In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d at 797; see In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). "[A]busive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of a child's home can produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a child." In re B.E.T., No. 06-14-00069-CV, 2015 WL 495303, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re B.R., 822 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied)).
Mother admitted that she had been involved in a robbery and "a lot of drug activity" and that she faced charges in Louisiana for "drugs and also prostitution" before the Department removed the children and petitioned for termination of Mother's parental rights in this case. Townsend testified that Mother told her "about the drugs" she had used, about her being a victim of child sex trafficking at the hands of Grandmother and Littleton, and about how dangerous her lifestyle was. Although Mother testified that, when she was incarcerated, she left her children with Brother, the trial court was free to disbelieve her claim and believe Townsend's testimony that Mother knowingly placed her children with Grandmother despite the dangers and potential dangers she posed to the children's well-being. See In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)). Even though Mother reported the abuse that A.B. suffered, considering the entire record, the court could have reached a firm belief that Mother's own actions or omissions created or allowed the environment in which the abuse took place.
Based on the totality of the evidence presented and the fact that "illegal drug use by a parent . . . supports the conclusion that the [child's] surroundings endanger their physical or emotional well-being," we find the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's ground D finding. Id. (citing In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)); see N.B., 2012 WL 1605457, at *10. Accordingly, we overrule this point of error.
IV. Sufficient Evidence Supports Termination Under Ground E
In her second point of error, Mother argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights under ground E.
Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code allows for termination if the parent has engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). "'Endanger' means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize." Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d 358, 367 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). "It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury." L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923. "Under subsection (E), it is sufficient that the child's well-being is jeopardized or exposed to loss or injury." Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367). "Further, termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission. Instead, a 'voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.'" Id. (quoting Perez v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (citing In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.))); see Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 366-67.
"[Subsection E] refers only to the parent's conduct, as evidenced not only by the parent's acts, but also by the parent's omissions or failures to act." In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); see N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 366-67. "The conduct to be examined includes what the parent did both before and after the child was born." S.K., 198 S.W.3d at 902; see N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367. "To be relevant, the conduct does not have to have been directed at the child, nor must actual harm result to the child from the conduct." In re Z.M., 456 S.W.3d 677, 686 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (quoting Perez v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)); see E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367.
Mother admitted to Townsend that she was "unsure" if she would be able to provide a "safe and stable lifestyle for the children." Townsend, who believed that Mother's lifestyle and course of conduct endangered A.B.'s physical or emotional well-being, testified:
It's just been a continuous cycle. There's been multiple reports. I know that [Mother] had been arrested for prostitution and drug offenses. She ended up -- one of her friends ended up getting actual custody of [Addy and A.B.] and then the kids got returned back to her, and it was just the same situations where there was drugs and prostitution and other things that were going on with her child which caused them to come back into care again.
Turner testified that, during this case, Mother had been "in and out of jail" in Miller County, Arkansas, and Cass County, Texas. Mother admitted that she was incarcerated in Miller County from April 2020 through June 2020 and in Cass County from June 2020 to July 2020. She also confirmed that she was facing charges and possible incarceration in Bowie County, Texas, for harboring a runaway, in addition to several counts of endangering A.B. and interfering with child custody. "While we recognize that imprisonment, standing alone, is not conduct [that] endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child, 'intentional criminal activity which expose[s] the parent to incarceration is relevant evidence tending to establish a course of conduct endangering the emotional and physical well-being of the child.'" L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 924 (quoting In re A.W.T., 61 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (per curiam) (citing Allred v. Harris Cty. Child Welfare Unit, 615 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.))).
It is apparent from the record that Mother has struggled with drug addiction both prior to and during the Department's case. "[C]onduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. Drug use and its effect on a parent's life and h[er] ability to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct." J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d at 848 (quoting N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367-68); see J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 n.4; In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 52 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) ("Evidence of illegal drug use or alcohol abuse by a parent is often cited as conduct which will support an affirmative finding that the parent has engaged in a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the child."). "Because it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned, illegal drug use may support termination under section 161.001(1)(E)." Walker v. Tex. Dep't Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617-18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (citing Vasquez v. Tex. Dep't Protective & Regulatory Servs., 190 S.W.3d 189, 195-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) ("terminating parental rights despite there being no direct evidence of parent's continued drug use actually injuring child")).
Here, Turner testified that A.B. told her that, during this case, she and Mother used marihuana together, even though Mother denied ever using drugs with A.B. Mother submitted to eight drug tests during this case, and the results "ranged between negative and positive." At the outset of this case, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. Turner testified that Mother failed to appear for drug testing in October, November, and December 2019, and January, February, and March 2020. Mother was then incarcerated from April through July 2020, and even though she had been in prison for three months, her hair-follicle test was positive for methamphetamine.
Considering these facts in addition to those discussed in our ground D analysis, we find that the trial court had ample evidence before it to conclude that Mother's history of drug use and stints of incarceration were not likely to subside and that she, therefore, exhibited a "voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct" that endangered A.B.'s physical or emotional well-being. L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting Perez v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (citing In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.))). Accordingly, we overrule this point of error.
Due to our ruling that the evidence supporting termination under grounds D and E was legally and factually sufficient, we need not address Mother's challenge to the evidence supporting termination under Ground O.
V. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Finding that Termination was in A.B.'s Best Interests
In her fourth point of error, Mother argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that termination of her parental rights was in A.B.'s best interests.
A. The Holley Factors
"There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child's best interest." In re J.A.S., Jr., No. 13-12-00612-CV, 2013 WL 782692, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 28, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). "Termination 'can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.'" In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)).
In determining the best interests of the child, courts consider the following Holley factors:
(1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.Id. at 818-19 (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976)); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b). Further, we may consider evidence used to support the grounds for termination of parental rights in the best-interest analysis. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
B. Analysis
A.B. was a teenager at the time of trial, and Elliott believed that she was mature enough to understand the proceedings. The evidence showed that Mother and A.B. were bonded to and loved one another, and Elliott testified that A.B. loved Mother. Nevertheless, Elliott testified that, while A.B. asked that the Department "be gentle" about it because she was worried about Mother's feelings, A.B. "really wanted" Mother's parental rights terminated. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of termination.
As for the second and third Holley factors, the evidence indicated that A.B. needed "a lot of therapy," including special counseling due to having been sexually assaulted. Turner testified that A.B. frequently ran away from the Department and had used illegal drugs prior to her current placement. Elliott testified that, before entering the treatment center, A.B. was "rebellious, belligerent, [and] angry," but, after she spent some time there, "you [could] hardly even recognize" her because she was "healthy, bright-eyed[, and] engaging." At the time of the hearing, A.B. was passing all of her school classes, participating in counseling, and "talking about hopes and dreams" for her future. Townsend and Turner agreed that Mother was unable to properly care for A.B., and they testified that Mother's drug use and poor life choices would continue to endanger the child. We find that the second and third Holley factors favor termination.
Next, Mother's criminal history, failure to complete the family service plan, possible use of drugs with A.B., use of drugs during the pendency of the case, and charges pending against her demonstrated a lack of parental abilities and showed that her relationship with A.B. was not a proper one. Although there were several programs to assist Mother, she did not begin to engage or participate in those programs until the month before the termination hearing. Even though she claimed to be drug free at the time of the hearing, she tested positive for methamphetamine just two months earlier. Therefore, we find the fourth, fifth, and eighth Holley factors weigh in favor of termination.
Mother's plans for A.B. and herself were nebulous, at best. At the time of the hearing, she was living with a friend, but Turner had concerns about him because he was an alcoholic, and the children had seen him drink heavily. To address the concerns, Mother was on the waiting list to receive government housing. However, there was no evidence that Mother had obtained employment or made plans for transportation. Moreover, due to the pending charges against her, she faced the prospect of being incarcerated again. In contrast, A.B. was in a placement where she was "doing very well," and she did not want to "return back into the situation or the type of lifestyle" she had with her Mother. A.B. wanted a "fresh start" with an adoptive placement that the Department has already identified for her. We find that the sixth and seventh factors weight in favor of termination.
After weighing the Holley factors, we find the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding.
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Mother's Request for an Extension of the Dismissal Deadline
In her final point of error, Mother contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to extend the dismissal deadline and continue the final hearing.
A trial court may grant a 180-day extension of the dismissal deadline in a suit filed by the Department to terminate a parent-child relationship on a showing that "extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b). "We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny an extension of the dismissal date under an abuse of discretion standard." In re A.S., No. 12-16-00104-CV, 2016 WL 5827941, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied)). The focus on granting this extension "is on the needs of the child, whether extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary custody of the Department, and whether continuing such is in the best interest of the child." Id. at *2 (citing A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d at 604).
The final hearing in this case was set for September 17, 2020, which was also the one-year dismissal date under Section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code. On September 15, 2020, Mother filed an unverified motion for continuance and extension of the dismissal date. She argued that the dismissal date should be extended because having been "released from custody in July," she was still under house arrest, and an extension would give her an opportunity to complete the service plan. A.B.'s attorney ad litem opposed the motion, citing A.B.'s need for permanency. The trial court denied Mother's motion.
"Failure to begin complying with a family service plan until several weeks before trial does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance when the requirements necessary to obtain the return of the child were known well in advance of that time." O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d at 42. Here, Mother admitted that she "had been in jail for a number of months" while the case was pending and had been "unable to work services under the plan." "[W]hen a parent, through her own choices, fails to comply with a service plan and then requests an extension of the statutory dismissal date in order to complete the plan, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the extension." A.S., 2016 WL 5827941, at *2. Mother's inability to complete services due to her confinement was "not [an] extraordinary circumstance[]" but was instead "the consequence[] of [poor] choices." In re C.J.B., No. 05-19-00165-CV, 2019 WL 3940987, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Due to Mother's missed and failed drug tests during the case, her inability to complete the service plan, her criminal convictions, and her history of endangering A.B., the trial court could have determined that Mother failed to show how granting the extension would have been in A.B.'s best interests. Section 263.401's "clear preference is to complete the process within the one-year period. . . . Because the statutory language prefers finality to suit and because we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying [the] extension," we overrule this point of error. A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d at 604-05.
VII. Conclusion
Having found legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings that grounds for termination were present, that termination of Mother's parental rights was in A.B.'s best interests, and that the trial court did not err in denying Mother's request to extend the dismissal deadline, we affirm the trial court's order.
Ralph K. Burgess
Justice Date Submitted: February 11, 2021
Date Decided: April 1, 2021