Opinion
No. 10-20-00237-CV
05-28-2021
IN RE H&S HOKE RANCH, LLC
Bill Youngkin, Youngkin & Doss PLLC, Bryan, Amanda G. Taylor, Scott K. Field, Butler Snow LLP, Austin, for Appellant/Relator. Derek Cook, Harper Estes, Lynch Chappell & Alsup PC, Midland, P Jacob Paschal, Haney Moorman & Paschal PC, Huntsville, Shannon E. Keefe, Thomas J. Forestier, Winstead, PC, Houston, William Griffis, McCleskey Hariger Brazill & Graf LLP, San Angelo, for Appellees/Respondent.
Bill Youngkin, Youngkin & Doss PLLC, Bryan, Amanda G. Taylor, Scott K. Field, Butler Snow LLP, Austin, for Appellant/Relator.
Derek Cook, Harper Estes, Lynch Chappell & Alsup PC, Midland, P Jacob Paschal, Haney Moorman & Paschal PC, Huntsville, Shannon E. Keefe, Thomas J. Forestier, Winstead, PC, Houston, William Griffis, McCleskey Hariger Brazill & Graf LLP, San Angelo, for Appellees/Respondent.
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Neill, and Visiting Justice Rose[]
The Honorable Jeff Rose, Visiting Justice, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
TOM GRAY, Chief Justice
H&S Hoke Ranch, LLC seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to set aside an order denying its plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer pursuant to Section 21.002 of the Property Code. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.002. We will conditionally grant mandamus relief.
Breviloba, LLC instituted an action for condemnation in the county court at law because it was seeking to build a pipeline across Hoke Ranch's property. The action became judicial in nature when Hoke Ranch filed its objections to the award granted by the commissioners. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.018. During the proceedings, Hoke Ranch also filed counterclaims against Breviloba independent of its challenge to the condemnation award asserting damages in excess of $13 million including a claim for trespass with a resulting remedy of ownership for the portion of the pipeline built on Hoke Ranch's property of $4,018,523. Hoke Ranch's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer alleged that because the amount in controversy for its counterclaims exceed the county court at law's jurisdictional limit, the case should be transferred in its entirety to the district court. Breviloba does not dispute that the counterclaims seek damages in amounts that exceed the jurisdiction of the county court at law but contends that the county court at law has jurisdiction over the counterclaims as part and parcel of the eminent domain proceeding. Breviloba also contends that mandamus is not the appropriate mechanism for Hoke Ranch to challenge the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer.
We note this is a far different remedy than the damages that Hoke Ranch would be paid as a result of the taking of its property as a result of an eminent domain proceeding. SeeState v. Carpenter , 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 979 (Tex. 1936) ; see also Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.042.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is warranted only when the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator has no other adequate remedy. In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd. , 603 S.W.3d 53, 56-57 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding). In order to establish its right to a writ of mandamus, Hoke Ranch has the burden to prove both of these requirements. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co. , 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary and unreasonable or is made without regard for guiding legal principles or supporting evidence. In reNationwide Ins. Co. of Am. , 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). "Similarly, a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly." Id. ; see alsoIn re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) ("[A] trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts." (quotingWalker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) )).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000) ; see alsoIn re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n , 307 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. 2010) ("A judgment is void if rendered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction."). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any point during the proceeding. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black , 392 S.W.3d 88, 103 (Tex. 2012). Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law that we review de novo. City of Houston v. Rhule , 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam).
"If an eminent domain case is pending in a county court at law and the court determines that the case involves an issue of title or any other matter that cannot be fully adjudicated in that court, the judge shall transfer the case to a district court." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.002. Hoke Ranch argues that because its counterclaims implicate ownership and exceed the court's jurisdictional limits, the counterclaims are a "matter that cannot be fully adjudicated in that court." We agree.
Counterclaims, whether permissive or compulsory, must be within the trial court's jurisdiction. Smith v. Clary Corp. , 917 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). A counterclaim is not within the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction when the amount in controversy exceeds the maximum jurisdictional limit of the court. Smith , 917 S.W.2d at 798.
Generally, a trial court does not lose jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim that is properly within its jurisdictional limits simply because a defendant files a counterclaim that exceeds the court's jurisdictional limits. SeeThomas v. Long , 207 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Tex. 2006) ("[I]t is proper for a trial court to dismiss claims over which it does not have subject matter jurisdiction but retain claims in the same case over which it has jurisdiction."). However, in this circumstance where the counterclaims cannot be fully adjudicated by the county court at law, the Property Code requires a different procedure; that is, the county court at law is statutorily required to transfer the case to the district court, which has concurrent jurisdiction of eminent domain proceedings with the county court at law and also has jurisdiction of counterclaims over which the county court at law does not. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.002 ; see alsoIn re Riley , 339 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Tex. App.—Waco 2011).
Breviloba argues that Hoke Ranch has not established that it has no adequate remedy by appeal and thus mandamus is inappropriate. "The adequacy of an appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments." In re Team Rocket, L.P. , 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (citingIn re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) ). Balancing these interests, it has been held that "mandamus relief is appropriate to ‘spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’ " In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found. , 315 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex. 2010) (quotingIn re Prudential , 148 S.W.3d at 136 ). We have previously held that Property Code Section 21.002's transfer provision is mandatory. SeeIn re Riley , 339 S.W.3d at 221. Having concluded that the county court at law in which the case is pending does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Hoke Ranch's counterclaims because Hoke Ranch alleges an amount in controversy in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the county court at law, mandamus relief is appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings in the county court at law.
Therefore, we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its order denying Hoke Ranch's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer signed by the trial court on August 17, 2020 and to grant the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer the case to the district court within twenty-one days of this opinion. A writ will issue only if the trial court fails to act in accordance with this opinion. The order granting the emergency stay entered by this Court on September 9, 2020 is hereby lifted.
(Justice Neill dissenting)
DISSENTING OPINION
JOHN E. NEILL, Justice
H&S Hoke Ranch, LLC (Hoke) seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to set aside an order denying its plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer. Because I would deny the petition for writ of mandamus, I respectfully dissent.
Breviloba, LLC filed an eminent domain action in the county court at law to acquire pipeline easements across Hoke's property. Hoke filed counterclaims alleging damages in excess of $200,000. After two years of litigation and a few adverse rulings from the trial court, Hoke sought a transfer of the case to the district court. It is from the trial court's order denying the transfer that Hoke seeks relief.
Section 25.0003 of the Government Code provides that:
(c) In addition to other jurisdiction provided by law , a statutory county court exercising civil jurisdiction concurrent with the constitutional jurisdiction of the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in:
(1) civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $200,000, excluding interest, statutory or punitive damages and penalties, and attorney's fees and costs, as alleged on the face of the petition;
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0003 (c) (Emphasis added).1
Section 25.0003 specifically provides the jurisdiction granted to statutory county courts, subject to certain specific limitations, and "in addition to other jurisdiction provided by law." For those cases where jurisdiction is not otherwise provided by law, the limits of Section 25.0003 apply. Therefore, the limits on the amount in controversy set out in Section 25.0003 of the Texas Government Code apply only to civil cases in which jurisdiction is not otherwise provided by law. In eminent domain actions, Section 21.001 of the Texas Property Code provides the "other jurisdiction" envisioned in Section 25.0003. Section 21.001 states that "district courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.001. Section 21.001 of the Texas Property Code provides the county court at law jurisdiction over eminent domain actions without limitation as to the amount in controversy. As a result, the jurisdictional limits of Section 25.0003 of the Texas Government Code do not control the eminent jurisdiction created by Section 21.001 of the Texas Property Code.
Section 21.002 of the Texas Property Code provides:
If an eminent domain case is pending in a county court at law and the court determines that the case involves an issue of title or any other matter that cannot be fully adjudicated in that court, the judge shall transfer the case to a district court.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.002. There is no issue of title in this proceeding. Hoke argues, and the majority agrees, that because its' counterclaims are in excess of the trial court's jurisdictional limits, the counterclaims are a "matter that cannot be fully adjudicated in that court." I disagree. As previously discussed, Section 21.001 of the Texas Property Code provides the county court at law with jurisdiction of eminent domain cases without limitation as to the amount in controversy. Therefore, this case does not involve a matter that cannot be fully adjudicated in the county court at law. The Legislature could have included language in Section 21.002 specifically providing that eminent domain cases with an amount in controversy over $200,000 shall be transferred to the district court, but chose not to do so. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose, and those excluded must be presumed to have been likewise excluded. In re A.A.G. , 303 S.W.3d 739, 740 (Tex. App. — Waco 2009, no pet.).
In reading Sections 21.001 and 21.002 of the Texas Property Code and Section 25.0003 of the Texas Government Code together, a finding that the county court at law has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court on eminent domain cases without limitation or jurisdictional amount qualifier gives effect to all provisions. To find otherwise allows litigants to do exactly what Hoke did in this case, wait and see how the trial court rules on certain issues and, if those rulings are unfavorable, file a counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount to have the case removed to the district court. This interpretation would allow a type of "forum shopping" the legislature has gone great lengths to prevent in other causes of action.
Because I agree with the trial court's order denying Hoke's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer, I would deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Because the Court conditionally grants the petition for writ of mandamus, I respectfully dissent.