Opinion
No. 326895
10-22-2015
In re K. HARMON, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Kent Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 13-051091-NA
Before: TALBOT, C.J., and BECKERING and GADOLA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right from an order terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter based on his voluntary release of those rights. We affirm.
Respondent-father states that he released his parental rights pursuant to MCL 710.29(7), which required the court to make a best-interest determination. However, respondent-father voluntarily released his parental rights under the Juvenile Code, MCL 712A.1 et seq., not under the Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 et seq. The distinction is that under the Adoption Code, a parent voluntarily initiates proceedings while under the Juvenile Code, the state acts as the initiator. In re Jackson, 115 Mich App 40, 51; 320 NW2d 285 (1982). Although the Juvenile Code does not contain a provision governing the voluntary release of parental rights, a parent may consent to termination under the Juvenile Code by admitting that there exists a statutory basis for termination and that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477-478; 484 NW2d 672 (1992). Parental consent does not transfer the proceeding from the Juvenile Code to the Adoption Code. Id. at 478. --------
Respondent-father's sole argument on appeal is that termination of his parental rights was not in the best interests of his daughter. Generally, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in a child's best interest. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review a trial court's best-interest determination for clear error. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). In this case, however, the trial court did not make any explicit findings regarding the child's best interests because respondent-father consented to termination. When a respondent consents to termination of his parental rights, the trial court is not required to articulate a statutory basis supporting termination. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992). We see no reason why a trial court would be required to articulate a best-interest finding under the same circumstances.
Further, respondent-father admitted in his plea colloquy and in a signed amendment to the termination petition that he had reached the "difficult and loving conclusion" that termination of his parental rights was in his daughter's best interests. Because "[a] party may not take a position in the trial court and subsequently seek redress in an appellate court that is based on a position contrary to that taken in the trial court," respondent-father's best-interest argument is waived on appeal. Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 587-588; 760 NW2d 300 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, respondent-father is not entitled to reversal of the order terminating his parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Michael F. Gadola