Opinion
B338263
09-26-2024
In re ADRIAN FERNANDO GURROLA on Habeas Corpus
Edward H. Schulman for Petitioner. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS on petition for writ of habeas corpus. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA066930, Darrell S. Mavis, Judge. Petition granted.
Edward H. Schulman for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
SEGAL, J.
A jury convicted Adrian Fernando Gurrola on one count of first degree murder, three counts of attempted murder, one count of aggravated assault (assault by means of force likely to result in great bodily injury), and one count of felony cruelty to an animal (the murder victim's dog was also shot and killed), and found true related firearm and gang allegations, for Gurrola's role, as a 14-year-old juvenile, in a July 2005 gang shooting. The trial court sentenced Gurrola to an aggregate prison term of 206 years to life. We affirmed Gurrola's conviction, but directed the trial court to correct several sentencing errors that included imposing erroneous sentences on the attempted murder convictions, failing to calculate determinate and indeterminate terms separately and independently of each other, and imposing both a criminal street gang enhancement under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5), and a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). (People v. Gurrola (July 14, 2010, B215857) [nonpub. opn.] 2010 WL 2765065.)
Statutory references are to this code.
On January 24, 2011 the trial court resentenced Gurrola. Among other things, the trial court imposed two enhancements on Gurrola's assault conviction: a three-year enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) (personally inflicting great bodily injury) and a 10-year gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) (committing a violent felony for the benefit of a criminal street gang).
On September 14, 2018 the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations sent a letter to the superior court under former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (now section 1172.1), recommending the court recall Gurrola's sentence and resentence him on his aggravated assault conviction. Citing People v. Gonzalez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1325, the Secretary stated the trial court erred in imposing "sentence enhancements under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C)) because both sentence enhancements were based on the great bodily injury the defendant caused while committing the underlying offense."
In People v. Gonzalez, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 1325 the court held imposing enhancements under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), violated section 1170.1, subdivision (g), which provides: "'When two or more enhancements may be imposed for the infliction of great bodily injury on the same victim in the commission of a single offense, only the greatest of those enhancements shall be imposed for that offense.'" (Gonzalez, at p. 1329.)
On January 15, 2019 the trial court resentenced Gurrola. The court imposed but stayed execution of the term under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and reimposed the term under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C).
Meanwhile, on January 1, 2019, two weeks before the trial court resentenced Gurrola, the law changed. Effective that date, Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated "the transfer of juveniles accused of committing crimes when they are 14 or 15 years old, unless they are first apprehended after the end of juvenile court jurisdiction." (O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 89.) The new law "eliminated district attorneys' ability to request transfer hearing for 14 and 15 year olds, thereby returning California's minimum transfer age to 16." (B.M. v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 742, 753.)
"'As originally enacted, Proposition 57 [enacted in 2016] allowed prosecutors to move to transfer some minors as young as 14 from juvenile court to adult criminal court. [Senate Bill 1391], enacted in 2018, amended Proposition 57 to prohibit minors under the age of 16 from being transferred to adult criminal court.'" (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 993-994.)
From 2021 to 2023 Gurrola filed several petitions for writ of habeas corpus, claiming Senate Bill No. 1391 applied to him. He filed the most recent superior court petition on March 3, 2023. The People filed a response conceding Gurrola was 14 years old at the time of his crimes and stating they did not contest transferring the case to juvenile court for resentencing. The superior court, however, ultimately denied the petition on March 20, 2024. Gurrola filed a petition in this court on June 3, 2024.
Senate Bill No. 1391 applies to convictions that are not final. (People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 564; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 996.) Gurrola's conviction was final from January 24, 2011 to January 15, 2019. On that latter date, however, the trial court recalled his sentence and resentenced him. As the People concede, that meant his conviction was no longer final. (See People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163 ["once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence, whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate sentence"]; In re A.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 557, 560 ["[w]hen a court vacates a sentence, the judgment in that case becomes nonfinal for purposes of retroactively applying ameliorative laws"].)
When the trial court vacated Gurrola's sentence and resentenced him on January 15, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1391 had been in effect for two weeks. Therefore, as the People also concede, it applied to Gurrola on that date. (See In re A.M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 560 ["a judgment becomes nonfinal when a minor defendant sentenced as an adult prior to the electorate's passage of Proposition 57" has his or her sentence conditionally reversed on habeas, and "[s]uch a defendant is entitled to the benefit of ameliorative laws enacted since the imposition of [the] original sentence," which "includes Senate Bill No. 1391"]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 996 [Proposition 57 and Senate Bill No. 1391 apply "when a criminal court resentences a defendant as to all or part of a previously final sentence imposed on a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of his or her offense"]; People v. Hwang (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 358, 366 ["'resentencing under [former] section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) replaces the original sentence, the original sentence is no longer operative, and the finality of the original sentence is no longer material,'" so that the "'only sentence that matters after resentencing under [former] section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) is the new sentence, which is not final because a resentenced defendant can still obtain review from the California Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court'"].) Which means, as the People further concede, because Gurrola was 14 years old when he committed his crimes, the case must be transferred to the juvenile court. (See Ramirez, at pp. 996, 1000.)
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The sentence previously imposed is vacated. The superior court is directed to transfer the case to the juvenile court. The juvenile court is directed to treat Gurrola's convictions as juvenile adjudications and to impose an appropriate disposition.
We concur: MARTINEZ, P. J., STONE, J.