Opinion
W.C. No. 4-270-052
July 11, 2000
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Felter (ALJ) which denied and dismissed his claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. On June 29, 1995, the claimant suffered a work- related injury in Iowa. The respondents admitted liability for temporary and medical benefits. On December 6, 1996, the respondents filed an uncontested Final Admission of Liability for permanent partial disability benefits.
In January 1998, the claimant petitioned to reopen the issues of temporary disability and medical benefits. The respondents defended the petition on grounds the ALJ lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Iowa injury.
The claimant argued that he detrimentally relied on the respondents' payment of Colorado workers' compensation benefits and therefore, failed to file a workers' compensation claim in Iowa prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Under these circumstances, the claimant contends, the respondents are equitably estopped from denying the ALJ's subject matter jurisdiction.
Section 8-41-204, C.R.S. 1999, provides that where the claimant is injured outside Colorado, the ALJ lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim unless the claimant was hired or regularly employed in Colorado. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Howlington, 133 Colo. 583, 298 P.2d 963 (1956). The ALJ found the claimant was neither hired nor regularly employed in Colorado. Further, the ALJ determined that subject matter jurisdiction could not be established by estoppel. Therefore, the ALJ denied and dismissed the claim. The claimant timely appealed.
On appeal, the claimant does not dispute the ALJ's finding that he failed to fulfill the requirements for Colorado subject matter jurisdiction under § 8-41-204. The claimant also concedes that jurisdictional limits may not be waived. However, relying on Hildreth v. Director of Division of Labor, 520 P.2d 112 (1974), the claimant argues that we may order the ALJ to proceed on the merits of the petition to reopen without regard to the jurisdictional defect. The claimant also contends that unless the respondents are estopped from denying the ALJ's subject matter jurisdiction he has no remedy for his injuries. Therefore, in the interests of justice the claimant seeks reversal of the ALJ's order.
The ALJ's authority is strictly statutory and without subject matter jurisdiction the ALJ has no authority to act. See Reed v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d __(Colo.App. No. 99CA004, January 20, 2000); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 894 P.2d 54 (Colo.App. 1995); Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989. Further, courts have repeatedly held that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be acquired by waiver or estoppel. See Vieweg v. BF Goodrich Company 170 Colo. 71, 459 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1969) ; Industrial Commission v. Plains Utility Co., 127 Colo. 506, 259 P.2d 282 (1953); United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Colo. 280, 61 P.2d 1033 (1936 ); Hasbrouck v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 780 (Colo.App. 1984). Consequently, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and an ALJ who lacks jurisdiction over a claim cannot acquire subject matter jurisdiction even if it appears that the parties impliedly consented to the ALJ's jurisdiction. See Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 149 Colo. 558, 561, 370 P.2d 757, 759 (1962); Neoplan USA Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 778 P.2d 312 (Colo.App. 1989); Sanchez v. Straight Creek Constructors, 41 Colo. App. 19, 580 P.2d 827 (1978). Accordingly, the ALJ correctly concluded that the respondents could not be estopped from challenging his subject matter jurisdiction over the claimant's injury.
The claimant's arguments notwithstanding, Hildreth v. Director of Division of Labor, supra, does not compel a contrary result. In Hildreth, the former Industrial Commission reopened a claim for workers' compensation benefits but failed to resolve the claimant's entitlement to further benefits for over 11 years. The court remanded the matter for an order on the merits and concluded that it was time the Industrial Commission "forget about procedural and jurisdictional matters and get down to business."
It is unclear from Hildreth what "jurisdictional" issues were raised. In any case, whatever authority the Colorado Supreme Court has to nullify jurisdictional requirements, neither we nor the ALJ have similar authority. See Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 969 P.2d 817 (Colo.App. 1998) ; Lewis v. Scientific Supply Co., 897 P.2d 905 (Colo.App. 1995). Therefore, we are not persuaded that Hildreth allows us to expand the ALJ's subject matter jurisdiction on equitable grounds.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated January 20, 1999, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
____________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 1999. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed July 11, 2000 to the following parties:
Louis Gropengeiser, 6929 Black Rd., New Haven, IN 46774
Life Safety Systems, Inc., 1044 Elkton Dr., Colorado Springs, CO 80907-3528
Business Insurance Company, 2000 S. Colorado Blvd., #11500, P. O. Box 101630, Denver, CO 80250
Sally L. MacLuckie, Esq., 3515 S. Tamarac Dr., #200, Denver, CO 80237 (For Claimant)
Wayne E. Vaden, Esq., 3333 Quebec St., #6100, Denver, CO 80207 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy