Opinion
W.C. No. 3-896-932
December 5, 1995
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Gandy (ALJ) insofar as the ALJ denied her request for a change of physician. We affirm.
The ALJ's findings may be summarized as follows. In this case the claimant sustained compensable injuries to her neck and back in March 1988. Thereafter, she was conservatively treated by various physicians at the authorized medical provider, Rose Medical Center. Ultimately, one of these physicians, Dr. Rondinelli, determined that the claimant was at maximum medical improvement on June 20, 1991, and that she had a six percent whole person impairment.
Prior to her release by Dr. Rondinelli, the claimant sustained a non-work related injury in 1990. This injury aggravated the 1988 industrial injuries, and she was treated by Dr. Swan and Dr. Ravin. The treatments included injections, massage therapy and osteopathic manipulations.
In February 1994, the claimant sustained another work-related injury. This injury aggravated the claimant's prior injuries and she was treated by Dr. Gellrick of Rose Medical Center.
Dr. Gellrick referred the claimant to Dr. Reiss for an examination. Dr. Reiss suggested "aerobic and resistive conditioning" as a mode of treating the claimant's "cervical and lumbar strain." Dr. Reiss also stated that he disagreed with "some of the current treatment in the way of ongoing manipulation and injections," although he also stated that "occasional manipulation may indeed be useful."
The ALJ concluded that the claimant was in need of ongoing medical treatment as a result of the 1988 injury. However, he rejected the claimant's request that Dr. Ravin and Dr. Swan become the authorized providers for the 1988 injuries. Relying on the provision currently codified at § 8-43-404(5)(a), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.), the ALJ determined that the claimant failed to make a "proper showing" that she should have a change of physicians. In this regard, the ALJ stated at the conclusion of the hearing:
"With regard to the medical, I'm going to authorize an order continuing medical care pursuant to Grover in order to maintain her condition, but I'm not going to order a change of physician. Sounds to me like she's getting proper care at Rose so a change of physician is denied. But Grover meds are granted, and whatever they say at Rose that she needs she's to get to maintain her condition." (Tr. p. 48).
On review, the claimant contends that the ALJ's denial of her request for a change of physicians is not supported by the evidence and is contrary to applicable law. In support of this contention, the claimant cites the medical reports of Dr. Swan and Dr. Ravin in which they opine that the claimant needs the type of therapies which they are providing. The claimant also cites her own testimony that the therapies of Dr. Swan and Dr. Ravin relieve her symptoms and maintain her ability to work. We are not persuaded.
Section 8-43-404(5)(a) permits an ALJ to order a change in treating physicians "upon the proper showing." As the respondents point out, we have previously held that this statute grants the ALJ wide discretion in determining whether the circumstances justify a change in treating physicians. Mann v. City of Colorado Springs, W.C. No. 4-148-995, 4-169-965, June 21 1995; Carson v. Wal Mart, W.C. No. 3-964-079, April 12, 1993; Brenneman v. McDuff Electronics, W.C. No. 3-936-449, November 14, 1991.
An abuse of discretion exists only if the ALJ's order exceeds the bounds of reason, as where the ALJ misapplies the law or the pertinent findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. See Coates, Reid Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993). In determining whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence we must defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations and the plausible inferences which he drew from the evidence. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.); Monfort, Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993).
Here, the ALJ's written findings are sparse. However, when viewed in the context of his oral remarks, it is apparent that the ALJ credited the evidence, including the report of Dr. Reiss, which suggests that the claimant has been properly treated by the conservative therapies provided by the physicians at Rose Medical Center, and is not in need of the more aggressive and frequent treatments prescribed by Dr. Swan and Dr. Ravin. CAN-USA Construction, Inc. v. Gerber , 767 P.2d 765 (Colo.App. 1988) (reviewing body may consider oral findings in interpreting a written order). Moreover, the ALJ's ruling does not preclude the claimant from receiving treatment at the hands of Dr. Swan and Dr. Ravin, it merely requires that the Rose Medical Center physicians make an initial determination of whether to refer the claimant for such treatments.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the ALJ's denial of the request for a change of physicians constitutes an abuse of discretion. It is true that there is conflicting evidence, but the ALJ has resolved the conflicts against the claimant and we decline the claimant's invitation to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Monfort, Inc. v. Rangel, supra. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order, dated February 16, 1995, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEAL PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Dona HalseyNOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed December 5, 1995 to the following parties:
Virginia Greenwalt-Belmain, 14561 Tejon St., Broomfield, CO 80020
Department of Regulatory Agencies, % Division of Banking, Attn: Bea Gonzales, Personnel 1560 Broadway, #1550, Denver, CO 80202
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: C. Kriksciun, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
Ruth K. Irvin, Esq., 5353 Manhattan Cir., #101, Boulder, CO 80303
(For the Claimant)
By: ________________________