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In re Gibson

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
Nov 7, 2002
CASE NO. 02-50440-RLJ-7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2002)

Summary

determining that a debt is prepetition even if it is not due or collected until after the bankruptcy filing

Summary of this case from In re U.S. Aeroteam, Inc.

Opinion

CASE NO. 02-50440-RLJ-7

November 7, 2002

Richard D. Ladd, Lubbock, TX, for debtor,

E. Scott Fros, JANE J. BOYLE, United States Office, Lubbock, TX, for Farm Service Agency

R. W. Casselberry, FULBRIGHT CASSELBERY, Lamesa, Texas, for The First National Bank of Lamesa


FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


Before the court is the issue of whether the United States of America, on behalf of its agencies the Farm Service Agency (FSA), successor agency to the Farmers Home Administration, and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) (collectively referred to as the "Government") is entitled to offset loan deficiency payments (LDPs) in the approximate amount of $18,000 which were applied for by the Debtors postpetition.

Apparently the Debtors made application, as opposed to the Chapter 7 Trustee, on the assumption that the LDP is a postpetition asset and, therefore, is not property of the estate under section 541 of the Code.

The issue is raised by the Government's motion to modify stay filed July 3, 2002. The Debtors, John David Gibson and Linda Gay Gibson, and the First National Bank of Lamesa (FNB) oppose the motion, contending that the Debtors' right to the LDPs is a postpetition right, thereby eliminating the right of offset under section 553 of the Code.

Section 553 of the Code provides that a bankruptcy filing "does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2002).

Findings of Fact

1. The parties submitted the issue to the court on stipulated facts, which such stipulations are attached hereto and incorporated as findings of fact.

2. If appropriate, the findings of fact shall be considered conclusions of law.

Conclusions of Law

3. The court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2002).

4. Bankruptcy Code section 553 governs the issue of setoff in bankruptcy: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2002). This provision does not create a right of setoff; rather, section 553 preserves a party's right to setoff if such right exists outside of bankruptcy. See In re Shortt, 277 B.R. 683, 688-89 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).

5. Section 553(a) has been construed to be permissive rather than mandatory, and "[a]pplication of section 553(a), when properly invoked before a court, rests in the discretion of that court, which exercises such discretion under the general principles of equity." Id. at 688 (internal quotation omitted).

6. As a threshold question, the court must determine whether the Government can offset the LDPs outside of bankruptcy. FNB argues that any right of setoff that arises under 7 C.F.R. § 1412.406 is inapplicable as such provision refers only to "contract payments." The court, however, notes section 1403.7, which provides that "[d]ebts due CCC may be collected by administrative offset from amounts payable by CCC." 7 C.F.R. § 1403.7(b) (2002). Section 1403.7 applies irregardless of whether the source of the governmental payment is the CCC or some other agency, or whether the holder of a claim against the debtor is the CCC or some other agency. See id. § 1403.7(j)-(k). Thus, section 1403.7 provides the applicable non-bankruptcy law by which the Government may offset the LDPs in this case. See Turner v. Small Bus. Admin., 84 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1996); Doko Farms v. United States, 956 F.2d 1136, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

In addition, the Government has a common law right of offset. See, e.g., McCall Stock Farms Inc. v. United States, 14 F.3d 1562, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

7. To establish a valid right of setoff under section 553, the movant must prove: (1) a debt owed by the creditor to the debtor which arose prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case; (2) a claim of the creditor against the debtor which arose prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case; and (3) the debt and the claim must be mutual obligations. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a); IRS v. Luongo (In the Matter of Luongo), 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2001). The party requesting setoff bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to setoff, including that the debtor's claim against such party arose prepetition. See Braniff Airways Inc. v. Exxon Co., 814 F.2d 1030, 1035 (5th Cir. 1987).

8. The issue here is whether the Government has met the first element, namely, whether the debt the Government owes Debtors arose prepetition. To arise prepetition, such debt must have been "absolutely owing" prepetition. See id. at 1036. See also Sherman v. First City Bank of Dallas (In the Matter of United Sciences of Am. Inc.), 893 F.2d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 1990). This does not mean that the debt must have been due prepetition. See In the Matter of Luongo, 259 F.3d at 334. Nor does it mean that the debtor must have initiated collection of the debt prepetition. See id. And it does not matter that such debt was contingent, unliquidated, or unmatured as of the date of filing. See id. at 334 n. 11; United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1433 (8th Cir. 1993); In the Matter of United Sciences of Am. Inc., 893 F.2d at 724. Rather, what matters is whether the liability accrued prepetition. See In the Matter of Luongo, 259 F.3d at 334; In re Young, 144 B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (Akard, J.)("The creditor's right of setoff may be asserted in a bankruptcy case even though at the time the petition is filed the debt is absolutely owing but not presently due, or where a definite liability has accrued but is as yet unliquidated"). Dependency on a postpetition event, such as the filing of an application, does not prevent the debt from arising prepetition, when all of the events necessary for liability have occurred prepetition. See id; Gerth, 991 F.2d at 1435.

For example, the Fifth Circuit in Luongo permitted the IRS to offset a tax refund against its prepetition tax deficiency claim even though the debtor filed her application for the refund postpetition, because the debtor's right to the refund accrued prepetition. In the Matter of Luongo, 259 F.3d at 334-35. As of the petition date, all that remained was for the debtor to bring her action for the refund, but bringing such action postpetition did not mean that the IRS's obligation was a postpetition debt, since the IRS's obligation to the debtor accrued prepetition. See id. As explained by the court, "[a]s of December 31, 1997 all of the events necessary to establish [debtor's] tax liability for her 1997 tax year had occurred. The date she actually filed her return is not relevant in determining when the debt arose. . . . Thus, her bankruptcy petition having been filed on May 19, 1998, the overpayment (the debt owed the debtor by the creditor) arose prior to the commencement of the case." Id. at 334.
Similarly, in United States v. Gerth, the Eighth Circuit considered a motion by the Government to modify the stay in order to permit offset of the debt the Government owed a Chapter 12 debtor for conservation reserve program payments. 991 F.2d at 1429-30. The debtor argued that payments under the program were contingent on the Government's yearly appropriation of funds for the program. See id. at 1433. The Eighth Circuit held that "dependency on a postpetition event does not prevent a debt from arising prepetition. `The character of a claim is not transformed from prepetition to postpetition simply because it is contingent, unliquidated, or unmatured when the debtor's petition is filed.'" Id. at 1433-34, quoting Braniff Airways, 814 F.2d at 1036. Furthermore, the court noted that a debt can be absolutely owing prepetition even though that debt would never have come into existence but for the postpetition event. See Gerth, 991 F.2d at 1434, citing In re United Sciences of Am. Inc., 893 F.2d at 724. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit permitted the Government to offset the debt at issue event though such debt depended on postpetition events in order to be collectible, because "all transactions necessary for [the Government's] liability took place upon execution of the contract and entry of [debtor's] land into the program."
In In re Telephone Warehouse Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered whether a supplier's debt to the debtors was a prepetition or a postpetition obligation. 259 B.R. 64, 69 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). The debtors purchased cellular telephone goods from suppliers, and then sold such goods and cellular service contracts to the public. See id. at 66. As part of the debtors' agreements with the suppliers, the debtors were to receive a commission for each cellular activation. See id. Upon filing the petitions, the debtors owed the suppliers prepetition debts for goods purchased. See id. at 69. The suppliers sought to offset debts that they owed the debtors in the form of commission payments against the debtors' debts for goods. See id. However, the debtors argued that such commission payments were postpetition debts, because, pursuant to their contracts with the suppliers, commission payments were not due until 45 to 60 days after cellular activation so as to avoid paying commissions for customers who deactivated their services shortly after activation. See id. Thus, the debtors argued that commissions due it for activations in the two months preceding the filing were postpetition debts because such commissions were due postpetition, and because, until the expiration of the 45 to 60 day period, such commissions were not absolutely owing. See id. The court rejected this argument, holding that "the timing of payment does not affect when the obligation arose. The Debtors earned a commission when the phone was activated. That claim was contingent on the phone not being deactivated within the same month and was unliquidated (since the amount of commission could vary depending on the number of activations that month)." Id. The court therefore held that all of the events necessary for liability had occurred prepetition, and accordingly permitted the suppliers to offset their debts. See id.

9. Further guidance is provided by the Code's definitions. Section 553 permits setoff of a prepetition "debt." 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2002). Debt is defined as "liability on a claim." See id. § 101(12). Claim is defined as "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured. . . ." See id. § 101(5)(A). Thus, if Debtors had a prepetition right to the LDPs, the Government's debt is a prepetition debt.

10. LDPs are payments earned in times of depressed commodity prices. See In re Otto Farms Inc., 247 B.R. 757, 758 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2000). They are intended to help make up the difference between current prices and the CCC loan rates. See id. In order to be eligible for an LDP, a producer must:

(1) Comply with all of the upland cotton loan eligibility requirements in accordance with this subpart;

(2) Agree to forgo obtaining such loans;

(3) File a request for payment for a quantity of eligible cotton in accordance with § 1427.5(a) on Form CCC-Cotton AA, Form CCC-709, or other form approved by CCC;

(4) Provide warehouse receipts or, as determined by CCC, a list of gin bale numbers for such cotton showing, for each bale, the net weight established at the gin;

(5) Provide classing information for such quantity in accordance with § 1427.9; and

(6) Otherwise comply with all program requirements.

7 C.F.R. § 1427.23(b) (2002). The producer must satisfy several other requirements, relating to timing, quality of cotton, and packaging and storage of cotton. See id. § 1427.5(a)-(d). Finally, the producer must own the beneficial interest in the cotton. See id. § 1427.5(e). If the producer has satisfied all of the requirements, the producer is entitled to an LDP calculated by multiplying the applicable quantity of crop by the amount by which the loan rate determined for a bale of cotton exceeds the adjusted world price, as determined by the CCC, as of the date that the producer applies for the LDP. See id. § 1427.23(c)-(d).

11. Debtors stored their cotton during November and December of 2001, several months before their bankruptcy filing. Debtors' cotton met the quality and packaging requirements set forth by the Government. Debtors owned the beneficial interest in the cotton. The Debtors met all of the LDP requirements prepetition, save for the filing of an application. The record is silent regarding the applicable prices of cotton, and, therefore, whether Debtors would have received any LDPs or the amount of any such LDPs. However, because Debtors met all the LDP program requirements prepetition, Debtors' right to an LDP accrued prepetition: all that remained was Debtors' decision to exercise such right.

The parties' stipulations include, as an exhibit, a document from the United Gin Company. This document lists the cotton that forms the basis of the LDP. This document further lists the dates on which Debtors stored their cotton, along with the weight of each storage and, presumably, grading classifications. As this document shows that all of Debtors' cotton was stored before the bankruptcy was filed, the Debtors could not have modified timing, quality of cotton, packaging, and storage of cotton after the cotton was already stored, as Debtors had no further access to this cotton. Thus, the court concludes that all LDP program requirements relating to the physical qualities of the cotton were met prepetition.

12. Applying for the LDPs postpetition does not in and of itself render the Government's liability a postpetition debt; Debtors' right to an LDP accrued prepetition. See In the Matter of Luongo, 259 F.3d at 334.

13. Debtors argue that the LDP program is different from most government programs whereby farmers enter into prepetition contracts with the government and, therefore, the government and farmers have mutual prepetition contractual obligations to each other. Specifically, Debtors argue they were under no obligation to place their cotton in the LDP program. They had the option of selling their cotton on the open market. They argue that their entitlement to the LDP was dependent on the average world price of cotton and their decision to place their cotton in the program, which decision was made postpetition (by submitting their application). Their right to the LDP, it is argued, could not have become fixed until the day they actually filed their application because only then would the average world price of cotton be known.

14. That the Government's liability to Debtors depended on Debtors' decision to place their cotton in the LDP program and on the adjusted world price of cotton makes the Government's liability to Debtors contingent and unliquidated. The critical factor is whether the Debtors' right to an LDP accrued prepetition. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2002); § 101(12); § 101(5)(A); Sherman v. First City Bank of Dallas (In the Matter of United Sciences of Am. Inc.), 893 F.2d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that debt from debtor to bank in the form of chargebacks to the debtor's account for credit card transaction rescissions was prepetition debt, even though customers rescinded transactions postpetition and the bank therefore charged-back postpetition, because a customer's right to rescind and thereby the bank's right to chargeback accrued at the time the customer made a purchase, even though such customer exercised his right to rescind postpetition).

15. Characterizing the LDP as a non-contractual obligation does not resolve the question in the Debtors' (and FNB's) favor. Many cases that address farm program payments conclude that, because prepetition contracts create prepetition rights and obligations, dependency on a postpetition event does not negate such prepetition obligations. See, e.g., Farmers Home Admin. v. Buckner (In re Tuttle), 218 B.R. 137, 147-48 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998). While Debtors were not contractually obligated to place their cotton in the LDP program, to hold that this factor distinguishes the present case from the applicable case law misses the point of the LDP program: the LDP is a governmental entitlement. By enacting the LDP program, the Government became liable to eligible producers. Such liability is contingent on eligible producers opting to enter the LDP program. The Government was under a prepetition obligation to Debtors under the LDP program, contingent on Debtors' exercise of their entitlement to the LDP. The Code defines claim as a "right to payment." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2002). The Code does not mandate that Debtors' right to payment arise from a contract.

16. The Debtors' decision, made postpetition, to apply for the LDPs, does not alter the Government's prepetition obligation. At most, it renders the Government's debt contingent on Debtors' decision to exercise their right. It does not matter that the Government's debt was contingent on a postpetition occurrence, so long as the obligation arose prepetition. See In the Matter of Luongo, 259 F.3d at 334; In re Young, 144 B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).

17. The relationship of the loan rate for placing cotton in the loan to the adjusted world price for cotton, and the application of such factors to the LDP, affects the amount of the LDPs and, at most, renders the LDPs, as a prepetition obligation, contingent and unliquidated. The amount of the LDP cannot be calculated until actually applied for; however, "[w]here an obligation exists prior to bankruptcy, it is irrelevant that the exact amount of liability will not be determined until after the bankruptcy petition was filed." Moratzka v. United States (In the Matter of Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 59 (D. Minn. 1986). Accord Buske v. McDonald (In re Buske), 75 B.R. 213, 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)(Akard, J.).

18. In Matthieson, a case which has been followed in this court and in most other courts, the district court permitted the government to offset deficiency payments. In the Matter of Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 59-60. The government, by contract with the debtors, agreed to pay the debtors a deficiency payment if the final deficiency calculation would be greater than zero. See id. at 58. "Such deficiency payment was to be based upon a predetermined formula and was dependent upon the end-of-the-year market prices. Consequently, the deficiency payments were due on or about April 1, 1985. Under the formula, it was possible that any particular deficiency payment might have been zero. Subsequent to enrollment in the program, but prior to April 1, 1985, the debtors . . . filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7." Id. The court found that, even though the ultimate deficiency payment may have been zero, the government had obligated itself prepetition to pay a deficiency payment if certain criteria were met. See id. at 59-60. That such criteria could not have been determined prepetition did not alter the government's obligation, and, consequently, its right to setoff. See id.

19. Similarly, in this case, Debtors could have placed their cotton in the LDP program prepetition and would have then had a right to LDP payments. That the LDPs might have been zero does not alter their prepetition right to LDPs, nor does it alter the Government's obligation under the LDP program. See id.

20. The Debtors and FNB stipulate that FNB's prepetition security interest covers the LDP payments. They must therefore concede that under section 552 of the Code the LDPs constitute proceeds of the Debtors' prepetition cotton crop. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) and (b). It would be anomalous to concede the validity of FNB's lien but deny the Government's right of setoff. It would also be inequitable.

Section 552(a) provides that "except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). Subsection (b) provides, in pertinent part, that "if the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, or profits of such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring, or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law. . . ." Id. § 553(b).

21. As the court concludes that the LDPs satisfy the requirement of establishing a prepetition debt owed by the Government to the Debtors, the Government's right of setoff is preserved. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a). The court will therefore grant relief to the Government on its motion.

The motion requested relief from the stay to allow the Government to offset against the LDPs. There is no equity in the LDPs and, given this is a Chapter 7 proceeding, the LDPs are certainly not necessary to an effective reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

22. If appropriate, these conclusions of law shall be considered findings of fact.

STIPULATIONS RELATING TO MOTION OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO MODIFY STAY TO AUTHORIZE SETOFF AND RESPONSES OF THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAMESA AND DEBTORS TO SUCH MOTION

TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. JONES, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

NOW COME The United States of America ("Movant") and The First National Bank of Lamesa ("Bank") and John David Gibson and Linda Gay Gibson ("Debtors") and make and file these stipulations and hereby agree and stipulate as follows:

1. These stipulations shall be utilized by the Court for all purposes related to the hearing now scheduled for August 26, 2002, at 1:30 P.M. on the motion filed by Movant in the above proceeding to modify stay and authorize setoff. All matters contained in these stipulations shall be deemed to be conclusively established for all purposes related to such hearing.

2. Debtors filed their petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on April 9, 2002.

3. This Court has jurisdiction of this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 and 1334 and 11 U.S.C. § 362.

4. Movant is the holder of a claim against Debtors in the amount of $77,177.81. Such claim is based on one loan made to Debtors in the amount of $107,680.00. Such loan is evidenced by a Promissory Note dated March 30, 1979, and two rescheduling Notes dated June 11, 1986, and August 19, 1988, respectively, copies of which are attached to Movant's Motion to Modify Stay filed herein on July 3, 2002, as Exhibits A, B and C, and such copies are incorporated herein by reference. Movant has made no assignment of its claim. 5.

5. Debtors entered into a Production Flexibility Contract ("PFC") with the Commodity Credit Corporation ("CCC") through the Dawson County Farm Service Agency ("FSA") Office on April 6, 1999. A true copy of said PFC is attached to Movant's said motion and marked Exhibit D. Such PFC is incorporated herein by reference. Such PFC was executed before the filing of the petition in this bankruptcy case.

6. Debtors are entitled to receive approximately $4,432.00 in program payments under said PFC.

7. Bank is the owner of a claim against Debtors as evidenced by, among other notes, three Promissory Notes, one dated June 25, 2001, in the original principal amount of $42,666.00, one dated December 31, 2001, in the original principal amount of $11,000.00 and one dated May 21, 1999, in the original principal amount of $43,000.00. As of the date of the filing of the petition in this bankruptcy case, the balance owed to Bank upon the portion of such claim evidenced by such notes was the total sum of $45,460.90.

8. The claim of Bank against Debtors evidenced by the above mentioned Promissory Notes has at all times material hereto been secured by a duly perfected first priority security interest in all of Debtors' crops, government checks, insurance and all general intangibles, including all bales of cotton grown by Debtors during the crop year 2001, as well as the proceeds from the sale of such cotton, and the government Loan Deficiency Payments ("LDP's") and any other government payments payable in connection with such cotton.

9. Bank filed its Motion for Relief From Automatic Stay in this case and this Court, by Order signed on June 10, 2002, terminated the automatic stay as to Bank and thereby authorized Bank to foreclose its security interest as to Debtors' cotton and the government payments payable in connection with such cotton. Bank has, since the date of such Order, foreclosed its security interest as to Debtors' cotton and applied the proceeds from the sale of such cotton in partial payment of Bank's claim, but there remains unpaid and still owing upon such three notes a sum of money in excess of the sum of money evidenced by the Loan Deficiency Payments which are in controversy in this proceeding.

10. Bank and Debtors do not oppose or contest the Movant's motion insofar as it seeks to offset the Production Flexibility Contract payments in the approximate amount of $4,432.00 which are owed to Debtors, so that such payments are not in issue in this case.

11. On May 17, 2002, Debtors, acting by and through John D. Gibson, applied for a Loan Deficiency Payment relating to 157 bales of cotton produced by Debtors as a portion of their 2001 cotton crop. Such bales of cotton and such Loan Deficiency Payment were subject to Bank's perfected security interest, but Movant contends that it has a right of setoff as to such LDP's which is superior to the security interest of Bank. Such LDP's total the approximate sum of $18,000.00. A copy of such application is attached hereto and incorporated herein.

12. On May 17, 2002, at the time of Debtors' application for the LDP's, the average world price of cotton ("AWP") was such an amount that it entitled Debtors to receive LDP's totaling approximately $18,000.00.

13. Debtors had not applied for any LDP's related to the 157 bales of cotton in question prior to the date of such application on May 17, 2002.

REPRODUCE LOCALLY OPTION TO PURCHASE AND SALES CONTRACT CERTIFICATION LDP Number Loan Number The undersigned producer(s) ("Producer") has requested a price support loan or loan deficiency payment (LDP) from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). With respect to the commodity which will be the subject of such price support loan, or LDP, the Producer certifies that; (1) the Producer has had beneficial interest in the commodity and has not lost such interest before filing the LDP application or loan application; (2) the Producer did not enter into any written option to purchase or any written contract for sale, with respect to the commodity to sell, deliver, or market the commodity, before such price support loan or LDP was requested; (3) the Producer did not enter into a verbal option to purchase or verbal contract for sale, except as noted below; (4) no payment with regard to such commodity was received before such price support loan or LDP was requested. The Producer understands that this certification is subject to review by CCC to determine that no option to purchase contract for sale, or payment was applicable to the commodity. If any option to purchase, contract for sale, or payment is later negotiated while the commodity is pledged for collateral for a price support loan, the producer agrees to notify the County CFSA Office of such event and to provide a copy of such option or contract to the County CFSA Office for review. Upon such notification, CCC shall review such option to purchase and Contract for sale for a determination of the dale beneficial interest would be considered to have been lost. By signing this certification, the Producer warrants and agrees that the making of any fraudulent representation may render the Producer subject to criminal prosecution under Federal law, and will result in the refund by the producer of any amounts paid as the result of the fraudulent representation, plus interest. Terms and Conditions of Verbal Contract:

Signature of Producer Date Signature of Producer Date

This program or activity will be conducted on a nondiscriminatory basis without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex. marital status, or disability.

I have beneficial interest in this cotton as of this date.

UNITED GIN COMPANY (UNITED01) 05/17/02 LDP Bale Listing 18103617 — JOHN D. GIBSON ASCS number 103617

Warehouse Gin Storage Net Loan Receipt # Bale # Date Gr Lf St Mic Str Unf XM Wgt Rate

1149125 1149125 11/27/01 31 3 34 4.2 25.2 80 483 52.1500 1149126 1149126 11/27/01 31 3 33 4.0 26.0 79 483 49.1000 1149127 1149127 11/27/01 31 3 35 3.2 31.6 79 485 50.0000 1149128 1149128 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.3 27.9 80 491 50.8000 1149129 1149129 11/27/01 31 3 33 3.2 29.0 79 480 44.2500 1149130 1149130 11/27/01 32 3 33 3.1 30.4 79 475 43.1500 1149131 1149131 11/27/01 42 3 34 3.1 29.2 79 f 494 43.5500 1149164 1149164 11/27/01 31 3 33 3.3 28.2 80 455 47.1000 1149165 1149165 11/27/01 41 3 34 3.2 30.0 79 463 47.1500 1149166 1149166 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.1 30.7 80 494 48.9000 1149167 1149167 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.1 30.6 79 483 48.5500 1149168 1149168 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.1 30.5 79 485 48.5500 1149169 1149169 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.2 29.4 80 491 48.3000 1149170 1149170 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.1 31.8 81 11 484 46.7000 1149171 1149171 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.2 30.3 79 11 485 46.0500 1149172 1149172 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.2 30.8 79 11 505 46.3500 1149173 1149173 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.3 30.0 80 498 50.2500 1149174 1149174 11/27/01 41 4 34 3.3 30.2 80 494 49.7000 1149175 1149175 11/27/01 41 4 34 3.4 30.3 80 496 49.7000 1149176 1149176 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.3 29.5 79 505 49.9000 1149177 1149177 11/27/01 41 4 34 3.3 30.2 79 495 49.3500 1149178 1149178 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.3 29.9 79 508 49.9000 1149179 1149179 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.3 29.3 80 506 49.9500 1149180 1149180 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.4 31.1 80 11 476 48.3500 1149181 1149181 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.4 29.4 79 499 49.6000 1149182 1149182 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.3 30.1 79 501 49.9000 1149183 1149183 11/27/01 31 3 33 3.3 28.1 81 489 47.1000 1149184 1149184 11/27/01 31 4 34 3.4 30.1 79 390 49.9000 1149185 1149185 11/27/01 31 3 34 3.4 28.0 79 391 50.4500 1149287 1149287 12/07/01 31 3 34 3.6 29.3 80 470 52.9500 1149288 1149288 12/07/01 31 3 33 3.4 29.1 79 11 471 44.5500 1149289 1149289 12/07/01 31 4 34 3.4 29.2 79 488 49.6000 1149290 1149290 12/07/01 31 3 33 3.5 27.7 79 514 48.9000 1149291 1149291 12/07/01 31 3 34 3.5 28.6 80 500 52.9500 1149292 1149292 12/07/01 31 3 34 3.4 28.9 80 522 50.8000 1149293 1149293 12/07/01 31 3 34 3.5 28.0 79 514 52.6000 1149491 1149491 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.5 29.8 80 488 49.5500 1149492 1149492 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.5 28.8 80 488 49.2500 1149493 1149493 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 28.4 81 493 52.9500 1149494 1149494 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 30.2 80 502 53.2500 1149495 1149495 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.4 31.8 80 486 51.4000 1149496 1149496 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.6 30.6 80 492 53.5500 1149497 1149497 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 30.0 81 496 53.2500 1149498 1149498 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 31.1 80 510 53.5500 1149499 1149499 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 30.1 79 500 52.9000 1149500 1149500 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.4 28.8 80 494 50.8000 1149501 1149501 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.4 31.2 80 485 51.4000 1149502 1149502 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.3 29.2 80 11 488 48.6000 1149503 1149503 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.4 28.6 79 492 46.7500 1149504 1149504 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.4 29.5 79 501 50.7500 1149505 1149505 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.3 27.5 80 11 498 44.9000 1149506 1149505 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.4 27.7 81 501 50.8000 1149507 1149507 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.4 29.5 80 489 47.4000 1149508 1149508 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.5 28.0 78 494 48.8000 1149509 1149509 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.3 28.2 80 498 47.1000 1149510 1149510 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.4 27.9 80 495 47.1000 1149511 1149511 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.6 30.3 79 493 52.9000 1149512 1149512 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 30.0 80 505 53.2500 1149513 1149513 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.6 32.1 80 508 53.5500 1149514 1149514 12/08/01 31 4 35 3.4 29.0 80 493 51.2500 1149515 1149515 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.5 28.6 79 498 48.9000 1149516 1149516 12/08/01 31 4 34 3.6 29.6 80 517 52.4000 1149517 1149517 12/08/01 31 4 34 3.5 29.0 80 495 52.1000 1149518 1149518 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.4 29.1 80 501 50.8000 1149519 1149519 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 28.9 81 498 52.9500 1149520 1149520 12/08/01 31 3 34 3.5 29.2 80 502 52.9500 1149521 1149521 12/08/01 31 3 33 3.4 29.7 81 509 47.4000 1149699 1149699 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.6 29.9 80 11 416 52.5000 1149700 1149700 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.5 30.8 81 11 438 50.5000 1149701 1149701 12/11/01 31 4 35 3.4 30.4 81 11 491 49.3500 1149702 1149702 12/11/01 41 4 36 3.5 31.9 81 11 488 51.4000 1149703 1149703 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.5 30.9 80 11 511 51.3500 1149704 1149704 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.5 29.9 80 11 483 50.2000 1149705 1149705 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.4 32.1 82 11 458 49.2000 1149706 1149706 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.5 30.7 81 11 472 50.5000 1149707 1149707 12/11/01 31 4 35 3.5 30.4 81 11 523 51.5000 1149708 1149708 12/11/01 31 4 35 3.4 32.0 81 11 511 49.6500 1149709 1149709 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.4 30.2 81 11 523 50.3500 1149710 1149710 12/11/01 31 4 35 3.5 29.3 82 11 510 51.2000 1149711 1149711 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.4 31.0 80 11 532 50.6500 1149712 1149712 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.4 29.4 81 11 468 48.6000 1149713 1149713 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.5 29.5 80 11 520 51.0500 1149714 1149714 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.7 30.3 81 11 500 51.2500 1149715 1149715 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.5 29.9 81 11 515 51.0500 1149716 1149716 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.4 31.8 81 11 485 49.2000 1149717 1149717 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.6 30.0 81 11 508 51.0500 1149718 1149718 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.5 29.1 81 11 499 50.7500 1149719 1149719 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.4 29.6 81 11 503 50.3500 1149720 1149720 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.4 29.3 80 11 487 50.0500 1149721 1149721 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.6 27.8 81 11 505 49.9000 1149722 1149722 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.4 31.2 79 11 474 48.8500 1149723 1149723 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.6 29.9 80 11 515 51.0500 1149724 1149724 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.5 31.6 81 11 508 52.8000 1149725 1149725 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.4 30.3 81 516 51.1000 1149726 1149726 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.5 31.5 81 11 492 52.8000 1149727 1149727 12/11/01 21 3 35 3.4 29.6 81 510 52.7000 1149728 1149728 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.4 29.9 80 511 51.1000 1149729 1149729 12/11/Ol 31 3 35 3.3 30.5 80 11 517 50.6500 1149730 1149730 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.3 31.7 81 512 51.4000 1149731 1149731 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.4 30.4 81 11 531 48.0500 1149732 1149732 12/12/01 32 4 34 3.3 28.6 79 508 46.9000 1149733 1149733 12/12/01 31 4 34 3.3 29.4 81 11 510 47.750. 1149734 1149734 12/12/01 31 4 34 3.3 30.1 80 11 497 48.0500 1149735 1149735 12/11/01 32 4 34 3.3 31.4 80 11 515 45.6500 1149736 1149739 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.2 29.4 79 11 507 44.9000 1149737 1149737 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.3 27.0 80 11 516 47.7500 1149738 1149738 12/11/01 31 4 35 3.3 32.2 32 499 51.8500 1149739 1149739 12/11/01 32 3 33 3.4 31.2 81 11 506 44.1000 1149740 1149740 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.4 29.5 81 502 51.1000 1149741 1149741 12/11/01 32 3 34 3.3 30.0 80 507 49.0500 1149742 1149742 12/11/01 32 4 34 3.4 31.7 82 11 510 45.6500 1149743 1149743 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.4 30.0 80 505 50.2500 1149744 1149744 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.4 30.1 80 11 503 48.0500 1149745 1149745 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.4 28.8 81 11 514 50.0500 1149746 1149746 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.3 31.9 82 11 521 49.2000 1149747 1149747 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.3 29.5 80 512 50.2500 1149748 1149748 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.3 30.7 81 11 504 48.3500 1149749 1149749 12/11/01 31 4 34 3.2 28.8 82 11 508 45.2500 1149750 1149750 12/12/01 31 4 34 3.3 29.7 80 11 492 48.0500 1149751 1149751 12/12/01 31 4 35 3.4 29.8 81 507 51.5500 1149752 1149752 12/12/01 31 4 34 3.2 30.0 80 11 492 45.5500 1149753 1149753 12/12/01 31 3 35 3.2 30.3 81 11 508 47.8500 1149754 1149754 12/12/01 32 3 34 3.3 29.5 81 486 49.0500 1149755 1149755 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.2 29.1 79 11 508 45.7500 1149756 1149756 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.3 29.2 81 11 490 48.6000 1149757 1149757 12/11/01 31 3 33 3.2 28.1 79 11 509 42.0500 1149758 1149758 12/11/01 31 4 35 3.3 31.2 81 11 501 49.6500 1149759 1149759 12/11/01 31 3 35 3.1 30.2 81 11 503 47.8500 114976C 1149760 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.2 29.6 81 11 482 46.4000 1149761 1149761 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.1 29.6 81 11 502 46.4000 1149762 1149762 12/11/01 31 3 34 3.3 29.3 80 513 50.8000 1149891 1149891 12/12/01 32 3 35 3.2 30.3 81 435 47.6000 1149892 1149892 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.2 28.8 80 11 465 46.1000 1149893 1149893 12/12/01 31 3 35 3.3 30.5 81 483 52.8500 1149894 1149894 12/12/01 32 3 35 3.3 30.3 81 488 50.1000 1149895 1149895 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.2 29.8 81 489 48.6000 1149896 1149896 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.3 29.2 80 11 462 48.6000 1149897 1149897 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.3 29.6 80 415 51.1000 1149898 1149898 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.2 29.8 80 464 48.6000 1149899 1149899 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.4 28.5 80 11 501 48.6000 1149900 1149900 12/12/01 31 4 34 3.2 30.6 81 11 535 45.8500 1149901 1149901 12/12/01 31 3 35 3.1 31.4 81 11 512 48.1500 1149902 1149902 12/12/01 31 4 35 3.2 28.7 81 517 48.7500 1149903 1149903 12/12/01 41 3 35 3.2 29.4 81 486 48.4500 1149904 1149904 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.2 30.0 79 511 48.2500 1149905 1149905 12/12/01 31 4 34 3.1 29.6 81 500 47.7500 1149906 1149906 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.2 30.0 80 11 514 46.4000 1149907 1149907 12/12/01 32 3 34 3.2 29.5 80 11 494 44.3500 1149908 1149908 12/12/01 32 3 35 3.2 29.6 81 11 519 45.4000 1149909 1149909 12/12/01 31 3 34 3.2 30.4 80 11 526 46.4000 1149910 1149910 12/12/01 32 4 35 3.2 29.1 80 11 526 43.5000 1149911 1149911 12/12/01 32 3 35 3.2 29.1 79 11 500 44.7500 1149912 1149S12 12/12/01 32 4 34 3.1 29.5 81 11 505 42.8500 1149913 1149913 12/12/01 32 5 34 3.2 30.3 80 482 42.9500 1149914 1149914 12/12/01 31 4 34 3.1 30.0 80 11 492 45.5500 1149915 1149915 12/12/01 32 3 34 3.1 29.0 79 11 421 43.7000 1149916 1149916 12/12/01 31 4 35 3.2 30.5 80 11 506 47.1500 * 157 77689


Summaries of

In re Gibson

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
Nov 7, 2002
CASE NO. 02-50440-RLJ-7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2002)

determining that a debt is prepetition even if it is not due or collected until after the bankruptcy filing

Summary of this case from In re U.S. Aeroteam, Inc.
Case details for

In re Gibson

Case Details

Full title:IN RE: JOHN DAVID GIBSON AND LINDA GAY GIBSON, DEBTORS

Court:United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas

Date published: Nov 7, 2002

Citations

CASE NO. 02-50440-RLJ-7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2002)

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