Opinion
F042410.
11-14-2003
In re FREDDIE M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FREDDIE M., Defendant and Appellant.
Marisa Nayfach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Clayton S. Tanaka and David A. Rhodes, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, A.P.J., Levy, J., and Dawson, J.
A petition was filed on November 5, 2002, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging defendant Freddie M. unlawfully took a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count one), received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a), count two), left the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a), count three), and drove without a drivers license (Veh. Code, § 12500, count four). On November 14, 2002, Freddie entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit counts one and three. Counts two and four, as well as an allegation of drug possession in a petition unrelated to the instant action, would be dismissed.
The juvenile court found count one to be a felony and count three to be a misdemeanor. The maximum term of confinement on counts one and two is three years two months. Freddie was placed on probation and ordered to serve one year in a boot camp program. On December 30, 2002, Freddie admitted he violated the terms of his probation by failing to obey the orders of the boot camp staff. On February 4, 2003, the juvenile court committed Freddie to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for three years two months, the maximum period of confinement.
On appeal, Freddie contends the court violated Penal Code section 654 by aggregating his convictions for unlawfully taking a vehicle and leaving the scene of an accident because both offenses arose from the same criminal transaction.
FACTS
On November 1, 2002, Freddie took a Ford Escort without the owners permission.[] The car was unlocked with the keys in the ignition. Freddie was involved in a car accident as he was driving down Belmont Avenue in Fresno. As Freddie was backing up the Escort, he struck another car and then left the scene of the accident. The victim of the car accident followed Freddie to a residence on Clay Street. Freddie was later arrested at the residence by a police officer. Freddie was carrying the key to the Escort in his shoe. Freddie waived his Miranda rights and admitted the offenses to the police officer.[]
Because Freddie admitted the allegations at an early stage of the proceedings, the facts are derived from the probation officers detention hearing memorandum.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
DISCUSSION
Freddie contends the juvenile court erred in aggregating his two-month term for leaving the scene of an accident with his conviction for unlawfully taking a vehicle. Freddie argues the taking of the vehicle and the ensuing accident constituted an indivisible transaction and that he can only be punished once under Penal Code section 654.[]
Respondent argues that Freddie is estopped from raising this argument on appeal because California Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b) states that by agreeing to a specified prison term, a defendant who is sentenced to that term or to a shorter one abandons any claim that a component of the sentence violates section 654 unless an objection is lodged at the time the agreement is recited on the record. The validity of this rule of court was recognized by the California Supreme Court in People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294-297. The problem with applying the waiver doctrine to the instant action, however, is that the maximum period of confinement was not noted in the record as being a term of the plea agreement. Thus, rule 4.412(b) has no application in the instant action.
In People v. Howell (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 787, 788-789, the defendant was charged in one judicial district with drunk driving and in another judicial district with a violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) for hitting another vehicle and leaving the scene of the accident without providing the victim of the hit-and-run with proper identifying information. The Howell court acknowledged at the beginning of its analysis that the hit-and-run and drunk driving incidents were part of a single course of conduct. (People v. Howell, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 788.) The Howell court, however, held that the continuous course of conduct was divisible. The Howell court reasoned that the offense of hit-and-run was consummated when the defendant hit the victims automobile and fled the scene. The drunk driving offense, which was observed after the hit-and run incident, was attributable to the defendants later conduct. (Id. at p. 792.)
We find the Howell case dispositive of the instant action. Though the offense here was not drunk driving but unlawfully taking a vehicle, the criminal intent in taking the automobile is separate from Freddies later car accident and his failure to stop and provide the victim of the car accident with the information required by Vehicle Code section 20002.[] Accordingly, we reject Freddies contention that he suffered improper dual punishment for having his violation of Vehicle Code section 20002 aggregated with his conviction for unlawfully taking a vehicle.
We do not reach the issue of whether or not Freddies accident constituted an act of violence which acts as an exception to the bar against dual punishment. (See People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1784.)
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.