Opinion
No. 335840
06-13-2017
In re FLOYD.
UNPUBLISHED Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 16-001073-AS Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and SAAD and O'CONNELL, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order denying as moot her request that the court exercise superintending control over a probate court judge. The circuit court incorrectly reasoned that her request was moot, but ultimately reached the correct result. Therefore, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and her ex-husband had two minor children. After the divorce, the father had primary physical custody, and the parents shared legal custody. Further, the father remarried.
The father later died following a motorcycle accident. On the day of his death, plaintiff allowed the children to spend the night at their father's home with their step-mother. A few days later, plaintiff allowed the children to attend their father's funeral. Plaintiff also attended the funeral. Afterward, she attempted to take the children with her, but the children's step-mother and paternal grandparents denied plaintiff access to the children.
The grandparents then filed emergency petitions in the probate court seeking a temporary guardianship over the children. The probate court held a hearing on the petitions, and plaintiff attended without counsel. The probate court granted the petitions, appointing the grandparents as temporary guardians and scheduled a full guardianship hearing on the date that the temporary guardianships were set to expire.
Plaintiff then obtained counsel and filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the grandparents lacked standing because she never gave permission for the children to reside with them. See MCL 700.5204(2)(b). The probate court canceled the full guardianship hearing so that the grandparents could respond to plaintiff's motion.
MCL 700.5204(2)(b) authorizes the appointment of a guardian for an unmarried minor if the "parent or parents permit the minor to reside with another person and do not provide the other person with legal authority for the minor's care and maintenance, and the minor is not residing with his or her parent or parents when the petition is filed." --------
On the day that the temporary guardianships were set to expire, the grandparents filed a third-party custody action in the circuit court, relying on their status as guardians to give them standing to do so. See MCL 722.26b(1). Filing the third-party custody action stayed the probate court action pursuant to MCL 722.26b(4).
Plaintiff then requested an order of superintending control from the circuit court to compel the probate judge to decide in favor of her motion to dismiss. She alleged that the probate court failed to proceed according to law when it granted the grandparents temporary guardianships without deciding plaintiff's motion to dismiss. The circuit court denied plaintiff's request, finding the matter moot because the temporary guardianships had expired and the probate court proceedings had given way to the third-party custody case.
The circuit court then issued an ex-parte order in the custody case that awarded plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the children and awarded the grandparents grandparenting time.
At the time plaintiff filed this appeal, the third-party case was ongoing.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review de novo whether an issue is moot." Garrett v Washington, 314 Mich App 436, 449; 886 NW2d 762 (2016).
A "complaint for superintending control . . . is an original civil action designed to order a lower court to perform a legal duty." Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 259 Mich App 315, 346-347; 675 NW2d 271 (2003). We review de novo whether a court has a legal duty to perform an action. See Lockhart v Thirty-Sixth Dist Court Judge, 204 Mich App 684, 688; 516 NW2d 76 (1994). We review the denial of a petition for superintending control for an abuse of discretion. Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan, 259 Mich App at 346. A trial court abuses its decision when it makes a decision that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
Further, we will not reverse a trial court's ruling if the court reached the correct result for the wrong reason. Zimmerman v Owens, 221 Mich App 259, 264; 561 NW2d 475 (1997).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred when it found that her request for superintending control was moot. We agree. However, we conclude that the circuit court had other grounds to deny plaintiff's request for an order of superintending control.
A. MOOTNESS
Generally, trial courts do not decide moot issues. Leemreis v Sherman Twp, 273 Mich App 691, 703; 731 NW2d 787 (2007). "A case is moot when it presents only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights." B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998). A challenge to the validity of a prior, terminated order is not moot if the existence of the order impacts appellant's rights. See Hayford v Hayford, 279 Mich App 324, 325; 760 NW2d 503 (2008) (concluding that an appeal of an expired personal protection order was not moot because the order's existence threatened a gun maker's federal firearms license).
In this case, the probate court's expired, temporary guardianship order continued to impact plaintiff's parental rights. The grandparents relied on the probate court's order granting them status as temporary guardians in order to file their third-party action in the circuit court. A "guardian or limited guardian of a child has standing to bring an action for custody of the child" under the Child Custody Act. MCL 722.26b(1). The grandparents' filing of the third-party custody action stayed their probate court proceeding and caused the probate court order to "continue in force until superseded by a circuit court order." MCL 722.26b(4). In the third-party custody case, plaintiff had to defend her custodial rights to her children. Further, the circuit court and the grandparents encroached upon plaintiff's decisions concerning where her children live, where her children attend school, and whether and when to allow the children to have time with the grandparents. Because the probate court's temporary guardianship order continued to impact plaintiff's parental rights, the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff's challenge to the grandparents' standing to seek the temporary guardianship order became moot.
B. OTHER GROUNDS TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT FOR SUPERINTENDING CONTROL
However, the circuit court had three other grounds to deny plaintiff's complaint for superintending control.
First, plaintiff's complaint for superintending control sought more than what an order of superintending control can properly deliver. A complaint for superintending control is "designed to order a lower court to perform a legal duty." Shepherd Montessori Ctr, 259 Mich App at 346-347. Specifically, this civil action is designed to compel a lower court to undertake a ministerial act, such as directing a court to "hear and rule upon" a motion, People v Paille #1, 383 Mich 605, 607; 178 NW2d 469 (1970), hold a trial, Genesee Co Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 123; 215 NW2d 145 (1974), or sign a document, In re Mattison, 117 Mich App 642, 645; 324 NW2d 114 (1982). The action does not allow a superintending court to "substitute its judgment or discretion for" the lower court. People v Flint Muni Judge, 383 Mich 429, 432; 175 NW2d 750 (1970). Stated differently, a superintending court cannot direct a lower court how to decide a substantive legal issue. See id.
In this case, plaintiff asked the circuit court to order the probate court to either "grant the motion to dismiss for lack of standing and order that the two minor children . . . be returned to Plaintiff" or treat the complaint for superintending control as an emergency application for leave to appeal and then grant the same relief. However, the circuit court could not compel the probate court to grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss or order the children returned to her care via an order for superintending control. See id.
Second, an order of superintending control would not authorize the probate court to disregard MCL 722.26b(4). MCL 722.26b(4) states that "[u]pon the filing of a child custody action brought by a child's guardian or limited guardian, guardianship proceedings concerning that child in the probate court are stayed until disposition of the child custody action."
In this case, plaintiff acknowledges on appeal that the grandparents' "filing of a third party custody action divested the Probate Court of jurisdiction to rule on the Motion to Dismiss" pursuant to MCL 722.26b(4). Further, plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that an order of superintending control would authorize the probate court to disregard the stay, resume probate court proceedings, and comply with an order of superintending control to perform a legal duty. Therefore, plaintiff abandoned this claim. See VanderWerp v Plainfield Charter Twp, 278 Mich App 624, 633; 752 NW2d 479 (2008).
Third, plaintiff had another adequate legal remedy to resolve her objections to the grandparents' standing. "Superintending control is an extraordinary remedy." In re Credit Acceptance Corp, 273 Mich App 594, 598; 733 NW2d 65 (2007), aff'd 481 Mich 883 (2008). To receive such a remedy, a plaintiff must establish that she is "otherwise without an adequate legal remedy." Id. Relatedly, a "complaint for superintending control must be dismissed" if "an appeal is available." MCR 3.302(D)(2).
In this case, plaintiff could have moved to dismiss the circuit court case without prejudice so as to lift the automatic stay of MCL 722.26b(4) and allow the probate court to reach and decide her motion to dismiss. Doing so would grant plaintiff the relief she sought or an appealable order. If the circuit court denied her motion to dismiss, plaintiff could appeal immediately, see MCR 7.203(B)(1), or as of right after the case came to a final order, see MCR 7.203(A)(1). If the circuit court granted her motion to dismiss the third-party custody case, the case would have returned to the probate court for a ruling on plaintiff's motion to dismiss the temporary guardianship petitions. A probate court order granting plaintiff's motion would have ended those proceedings and prevented the reactivation of the third-party custody action. If the probate court denied plaintiff's motion, she could appeal immediately, see MCR 5.801(D), or as of right after the case came to a final order, see MCR 5.801(B)(1) and (C); MCR 7.203(A)(2).
Therefore, the circuit court had other grounds to deny plaintiff's request for an order of superintending control, and we will not reverse the circuit court's order. See Zimmerman, 221 Mich App at 264.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell