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In re Flores

United States Bankruptcy Court, Ninth Circuit
Jan 17, 2012
No. 10-61121-ASW (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012)

Opinion


In re: LUIS RAMIREZ FLORES AND BERTHA OROPEZA FLORES, Chapter 13, Debtors. No. 10-61121-ASW. United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. California. January 17, 2012.

MEMORANDUM DECISION FOLLOWING EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING DEBTORS' MOTION TO AVOID LIEN OF SANTA CRUZ COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION

ARTHUR S. WEISSBRODT, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the motion ("Motion") by debtors Luis Ramirez Flores and Bertha Oropeza Flores ("Debtors") to determine the value and status of the second priority deed of trust held by creditor Santa Cruz Community Credit Union ("SCCCU") against the Debtors' primary residence located at 517 Marnell Avenue, Santa Cruz, California (the "Property"). Debtors seek a determination that SCCCU's second deed of trust is not secured in any amount and thus may be treated as unsecured in Debtors' chapter 13 plan. SCCCU opposes the Motion. Debtors are represented by Jason Vogelpohl, Esq. Of Central Coast Bankruptcy, Inc. SCCCU is represented by Thomas Caudill, Esq. Of The Law Offices of Thomas Caudill.

An evidentiary hearing on the Motion was held on September 6, 2011, and the matter has been submitted for decision. At the evidentiary hearing, Debtors called Michael J. Wilson ("Wilson"), an appraiser, as a witness. SCCCU called Bruce McGuire ("McGuire"), an appraiser, as a witness.

This Memorandum Decision constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

I.

FACTS

Debtors commenced this case by filing a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 26, 2010. Debtors' main asset is the Property. Two deeds of trust have been recorded on the Property. The senior obligation and first deed of trust on the Property is held by EMC Mortgage ("EMC"). The junior obligation and second deed of trust is held by SCCCU (" SCCCU's Lien").

On the bankruptcy petition date, the amount owing to EMC was no more than $561,904.56. On April 4, 2011, Debtors filed the Motion. On April 13, 2011, SCCCU filed an objection to the Motion. The hearing, initially held on July 26, 2011, was continued to September 6, 2011 for an evidentiary hearing.

At the September 6, 2011 hearing, each party offered an expert witness to opine as to the value of the Property at the time of Debtors' bankruptcy petition. Both experts prepared written reports and those reports were entered into evidence. Direct testimony was submitted by declaration, with cross-examination, re-direct, and re-cross-examination taken at the evidentiary hearings. Debtors' expert witness Michael J. Wilson is a certified appraiser of real property working as a real estate appraiser primarily in Monterey County, but also working in San Benito County, Santa Clara County, and Santa Cruz County. SCCCU's expert witness Bruce McGuire is a certified appraiser of real property. Both appraisers were qualified to testify as experts concerning the value of the Property.

Wilson holds a license from the State of California to conduct real estate appraisals. Wilson was first an Appraiser Trainee on January 30, 2004. Wilson was then a licensed Residential Appraiser on July 7, 2006 before being licensed as a Certified Residential Appraiser in April 2009. Wilson has received over 220 hours of local and online instruction from various approved continuing education providers with the State of California, Office of Real Estate Appraisers. Wilson testified that Wilson appraises roughly one-hundred and twenty properties per year, but has only appraised ten properties in Santa Cruz County - none of which were on the east side of Santa Cruz where the Property is located. Debtors asked Wilson to determine the market value of the Property as of the petition date, October 26, 2010.

Wilson testified that Wilson believed the fair market value of the Property was $550,000.00 as of October 26, 2010. Wilson based that conclusion upon a sales comparison analysis of five comparable properties. A sales comparison approach to value is based upon an analysis of comparable properties within the same neighborhood in light of factors such as the real estate market of the particular neighborhood, the school systems, and the dwelling's characteristics including square footage, age, and condition.

Wilson's report contained five comparable properties. The sales price of the Wilson comparables ranged from $500,035 to $639,000. Wilson's comparable properties were located from.21 to 1.25 miles away from the Property. Three of the five properties were sold before Debtors' bankruptcy petition date. Comparable number four sold on November 16, 2010 - shortly after Debtors' bankruptcy. Comparable number five's sale is listed as pending in Wilson's report, meaning that whether the property actually closed escrow and, if so, when, and at what price, is unknown.

At the evidentiary hearing, Wilson was cross-examined regarding several aspects of his report. First, counsel for SCCCU confirmed with Wilson that only three of Wilson's five comparable properties had closed escrow before the date of Debtors' bankruptcy petition. Wilson verified that comparable properties four and five had not closed escrow prior to October 26, 2010. Wilson explained that common-appraisal practice when given a retroactive appraisal assignment is to include properties that were in contract before the effective date, but that closed escrow within thirty to forty-five days after the effective date. Comparable number four closed escrow on November 16, 2010 - twenty-one days after the date of Debtors' bankruptcy petition. As noted above, Wilson testified that Wilson did not know at the time Wilson submitted Wilson's appraisal report, nor at the time of the evidentiary hearing, whether comparable number five ever closed escrow.

Counsel for SCCCU also inquired as to Wilson's use of $55 per square foot when adjusting for the gross living area variance between the Property and Wilson's comparable properties. Wilson explained that Wilson had consulted two Santa Cruz appraisers who were familiar with the area - Dave Becrera and Laura Bishop. Wilson testified that Bishop suggested Wilson use $55-$75 per square foot when making adjustments and that $75 per square foot would be used for extremely high-end properties. Wilson also testified that Becrera suggested that Wilson use $60-$65 per square foot.

SCCCU's expert witness Bruce McGuire is a California Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser. McGuire has been an appraiser for over thirty-six years and estimates that McGuire has appraised thousands of properties during that time. McGuire was a Deputy Assessor in Santa Cruz County for ten years and has been a California State Probate Referee for Santa Cruz County since 1998. McGuire testified that McGuire believed the fair market value of the Property was $595,000.00 as of October 26, 2010. McGuire based that conclusion upon a sales comparison analysis of six comparable properties. McGuire emphasized in McGuire's Declaration that McGuire's valuation is conservative for the following reasons: (1) in 2010 and prior to October 26, 2010, there were three sales on the same street as the Property for $595,000, $650,000 and $770,000, respectively; (2) McGuire did not adjust for the Property's upgraded and remodeled granny unit; and (3) McGuire did not adjust for any increase in the value of the Property derived from the Property's two separate units.

The sales prices of McGuire's comparable properties ranged from $573,000 to $720,477 and were sold between February 17, 2010 and August 17, 2010. All of McGuire's comparable properties were listed as sold before the date of Debtors' bankruptcy petition in McGuire's report. The comparable properties were located from.02 to 1.27 miles away from the Property.

At the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Debtors asked McGuire about McGuire's criticism of Wilson's lack of knowledge of Santa Cruz's Accessory Dwelling Unit ("ADU") Program. McGuire testified that Wilson was not familiar with the ADU program, and that the existence of Santa Cruz City building permits have an impact on the value of the property. For example, McGuire explained that McGuire's comparable number one has a legal ADU, which would affect the value for comparable number one.

Counsel for Debtors also inquired as to McGuire's use of the property located at 503 Marnell Avenue (McGuire's comparable number six) as a comparable property. The reason for the inquiry was that McGuire's comparable number six is roughly forty-six percent smaller than the Property. McGuire explained that comparable number six is located four houses-from the Property and that, because location is the. most important factor when searching for comparable properties, McGuire thought that comparable six was still a very good indicator of the Property's value. McGuire also explained that, despite being forty-six percent smaller than the Property, comparable number six sold for $595,000 on March 19, 2010, roughly seven months prior to the petition date. This is the exact same figure used for McGuire's appraisal of the Property.

Counsel for Debtors also asked McGuire about the variance between McGuire and Wilson's living area adjustment figures. Wilson used $55 per square foot when making adjustments while McGuire used $100 per square foot. McGuire explained that McGuire used the Building Residential Technique to calculate the his $100 per square foot figure. The Building Residential Technique subtracts the value of the land from the total value of the property to determine the value of the actual home, and then divides the resulting value by the square footage. McGuire's Declaration also explains that as part of McGuire's review of Wilson's appraisal, McGuire contacted Bercera - the same individual that Wilson consulted - and McGuire and Bercera went through the adjustment calculation. McGuire and Bercera came up with $105.00 per square foot.

Lastly, counsel for Debtors asked McGuire why a $30,000 time adjustment was made for comparable number six, which was sold on March 29, 2010, and comparable number five, which was sold on March 19, 2010, while a $25,000 adjustment was made for comparable number one, which was sold on March 26, 2010. McGuire was not able to explain the discrepancy.

II.

ANALYSIS

Debtors' Motion requests this Court to determine the value and status of SCCCU's Lien as wholly unsecured and void. Debtors contend that because the fair market value of the Property on the bankruptcy petition date was less than the debt secured by EMC's first priority trust deed, SCCCU's Lien was wholly unsecured at the time of the bankruptcy. SCCCU opposes the Motion arguing the fair market value of the Property exceeded EMCs first priority lien; thus SCCCU's second priority trust deed was at least partially secured and entitled to the "antimodification" provision of Bankruptcy Code section 1322(b) (2).

Debtors seek to value SCCCU's Lien on the Property based on Bankruptcy Code section 506(a)(1), which states:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest... is less than the amount of such allowed claim.

11 U.S.C. § 506 (a)(1). If the Court finds SCCCU's Lien to be wholly unsecured, as Debtors contend, then SCCCU is not the "holder of a secured claim" whose rights are subject to the "antimodification" protection of Bankruptcy Code section 1322(b)(2). Zimmer v. PSB Lending Coporation (In re Zimmer) , 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002). The consequence of such a finding is that Debtors could provide for SCCCU's claim through Debtors' chapter 13 plan as a general unsecured claim, rather than a secured claim. Zimmer , 313 F.3d at 1227. Conversely, if the Court finds SCCCU's Lien to be secured by even $1.00, the "antimodification" protection of Bankruptcy Code section 1322(b)(2) applies and the claim must be paid as a secured claim and cannot be modified by Debtors' chapter 13 plan.

Bankruptcy Code section 506(a) (1) instructs that when a court is requested to determine the value of collateral, "such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property..." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). When the debtors intend to stay in their house, the proper valuation of the house under Bankruptcy Code section 506(a) is the fair market value. Taffi v. United States of America (In re Taffi) , 96 F.3d, 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1996). The fair market value is not the "replacement" value because the house is not being replaced. Neither is it the "foreclosure" value because no foreclosure is intended in the chapter 13 plan. Taffi , 96 F.3d at 1192. The fair market value is "the price which a willing seller under no compulsion to sell and a willing buyer under no compulsion to buy would agree upon after the property has been exposed to the market for a reasonable time." Taffi , 96 F.3d at 1192. Debtors intend to stay in the Property, cure the loan owed to EMC, and treat SCCCU as a general unsecured creditor.

For purposes of granting or denying the Motion, this Court does not need to determine the exact value of the Property. In re Serda , 395 B.R. 450 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2008). The Court only needs to determine whether or not the value of the Property at the time of Debtors' bankruptcy petition was greater than, equal to, or less than the amount of the senior secured debt owed to EMC. Serda , 395 B.R. at 453. Here, the amount owing to the first deed of trust holder was no more than $561,904.56 on the bankruptcy petition date.

Debtors bear the initial burden of-proof of overcoming any presumption established by the stated value in the secured creditor's proof of claim. Serda , 395 B.R. at 454. The secured creditor has the ultimate burden of persuasion to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the value of the collateral which secures its claim. In re Southmark Storage Associates Ltd. Partnership , 130 B.R. 9, 10 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).

Both parties' expert witnesses used the sales comparable method to estimate the fair market value of the Property at the time of Debtors' bankruptcy petition. The hearing on the matter lasted roughly three hours wherein both experts testified. The Court considered all the evidence admitted at trial, including the testimony of both experts. In addition, the Court prepared its own statistical analysis based solely upon the appraisal reports submitted by the two experts. (Attached as Exhibits 1-4).

The Court does not imply that the fair market value of any property is purely a statistical calculation, but it recognizes that such analysis can be instructive when confronted with conflicting and multifaceted data.

A. SCCCU's Motion in Limine

On August 26, 2011, SCCCU filed a written motion in limine to exclude the expert opinion testimony of Debtors' expert appraiser Wilson. SCCCU's motion argues that Wilson is not an expert appraiser as to property values in the Santa Cruz area because: (1) by Wilson's own admission, Wilson has never undertaken a residential appraisal in the specific area where the Property is located; (2) since 2006, Wilson has appraised approximately ten properties in Santa Cruz County; (3) Wilson is not familiar with the East Santa Cruz area; and (4) Wilson had not heard of the Santa Cruz ADU Program - which is unique to Santa Cruz in connection with residential properties - prior to submitting Wilson's appraisal.

Debtors opposed SCCCU's motion, arguing that Wilson has been a certified residential appraiser since-April 2009, is in good standing with the Office of Real Estate Appraisers, and has received over 220 hours of local and online instruction from various approved continuing education providers with the State of California Office of Real Estate Appraisers. Debtors argued that if SCCCU believes that Wilson's ignorance of Santa Cruz's ADU Program is relevant, SCCCU may cross-examine Wilson at the evidentiary hearing.

As explained in the Bankruptcy Evidence Manual by Judge Barry Russell:

The admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 requires that two preliminary determinations be made by the court. Rule 104(a). First, the court must decide whether expert testimony could assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. The court may be required as an aspect of this inquiry to determine whether a sufficiently reliable body of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge has been developed. Second, the court must also determine whether the witness called is properly qualified to give the testimony sought. The witness may be qualified as an expert on the bases of either knowledge, skill, experience or education or a combination thereof. Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean , 213 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2000) (Expert opinion evidence in affidavit form could properly be considered on motion for summary judgment.); In re Moyer , 421 B.R. 587 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. 2007) (Expert testimony will assist trier of fact, as required for it to be admissible, if it concerns matters that are beyond understanding of lay persons. Burden of laying proper foundation for admission of expert testimony is on party offering the expert. Admissibility of expert testimony must be shown by preponderance of evidence.).

Hon. Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, §702:1 (2011 ed.). The Bankruptcy Evidence Manual further explains:

Once a witness has qualified as an expert by the Court, the lack of strong qualifications affects the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. In re 3dfx Interactive, Inc. , 389 B.R. 842 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (Even uncontradicted expert testimony is not necessarily conclusive. Court may decline to accept an expert's opinion, in whole or in part, and may reject an expert's opinion based upon its conclusions regarding the expert's credibility). It is for the trier of fact to determine the weight to be given to the testimony of an expert witness. In re Piece Goods Shops Co., L.P. , 188 B.R. 778 Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1995) (plan proponents' expert's testimony given greater weight than objector's expert due to experience and knowledge of relevant facts); Matter of 1616 Reminc Ltd. Partnership , 9 B.R. 679 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); In re Lona , 393 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (Bankruptcy court may simply disregard the testimony of any witness whom it finds not to be credible, and bankruptcy court's credibility determinations are given due regard on appeal).

Id. at § 702:2.

Here, the motion in limine is based not on Wilson's expertise as an appraiser per se, but rather due to Wilson's relative inexperience in appraising residential property where Debtors' residence is located. Such concerns have been taken into account in the weight that this Court accords Wilson's testimony. Accordingly, SCCCU's motion in limine is denied.

B. Presumption of Value

As noted above, Debtors' expert, Wilson, analyzed five comparable properties that were located between.21 and 1.25 miles from the Property. Three of the properties Wilson included in Wilson's report were sold before October 26, 2010 - the date of Debtors' bankruptcy petition. Wilson's comparable number four closed escrow on November 16, 2010. Wilson testified that Wilson did not know whether Wilson's comparable number five had closed escrow as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. Based on these comparable properties, Wilson concluded that the Property had a fair market value of $550,000 on the petition date. Debtors have presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of value within SCCCU's claim.

C. Living Area Adjustment Value

One of the primary issues discussed at the evidentiary hearing was the discrepancy between the figures used for Wilson and McGuire's living area adjustments. When using a sales comparison approach to formulate an appraisal value, the appraiser selects recent sales of comparable properties and then makes adjustments to account for differences between the two properties that might account for different sales prices. For example, if a property that sold one day prior to the effective date was identical to the subject property except that the subject property's home possessed twice the square footage as the earlier sold property, the appraiser would make an adjustment to the earlier sold property's sale price to account for the smaller home size. While the earlier sold property may have sold for $500,000, an appraiser might value the subject property at $600,000 because of the larger home size.

These examples are purely made-up. They have no basis in reality for purposes of the instant dispute.

Here, Wilson chose to use a living area adjustment value of $55 per square foot. Wilson, who admitted to being unfamiliar with the Santa Cruz area, called two local appraisers to ask what an appropriate living area adjustment value might be. Wilson testified that one of the appraisers, Laura Bishop, suggested Wilson use an adjustment value of $55-75 per square foot with the $75 value representing extremely high-end property. Wilson also testified that the other appraiser, Dave Becrera, suggested Wilson use an adjustment value of $60-65 per square foot. Wilson testified that Becrera later told Wilson that Becrera knew of McGuire and told Wilson that McGuire's use of $100 per square foot was on the high side.

McGuire chose to use a living area adjustment value of $100 per square foot. In coming to this value, McGuire used the Building Residential Technique - a mathematical formula used at the Appraisal Institute to arrive at the square foot adjustment for sales price for square foot. The Building Residential Technique subtracts the value of the land from the total value of the property to determine the value of the actual home, and then divides the resulting value by the square footage.

In McGuire's Declaration, McGuire explained that McGuire went through the adjustment calculation with Becrera and came up with $105.00 per square foot. McGuire also stated at trial that Becrera told McGuire that Becrera did not give Wilson a specific range of values to use for Wilson's appraisal - rather Becrera directed Wilson to a webpage.

The Court finds McGuire's use of $100 per square foot more persuasive than Wilson's use of $55 per square foot. McGuire was able to demonstrate to the Court exactly how McGuire arrived at the $100 figure through a mathematical analysis. The Court also considered McGuire's statement that the Appraisal Institute uses the Building Residential Technique through the Appraisal Institute's course work and text books to become a designated SRA or MAI - professional designations given by the Apprisal Institute. Further, no evidence was used to show that McGuire's use of $100 was inappropriate. Lastly, McGuire's statement in McGuire's Declaration that a $55 per square foot adjustment was the adjustment used in Santa Cruz approximately two decades ago supported the use of a higher adjustment value.

D. Analysis of Comparable Properties

Another major issue presented at trial was each appraiser's selection of comparable properties and the appraisal of the Property derived from those comparable properties' values. In analyzing each appraiser's comparable properties, the Court performed its own statistical analysis. (See Exhibits 1-4).

Wilson used five comparable properties. The average distance of the comparable properties from the Property is.66 miles. The average adjusted sales price of the comparable properties is $558,107 and the median adjusted sales price of the comparable properties is $550,000. Excluding properties with an unknown close of escrow date, the average adjusted sales price is $572,625 and the median adjusted sales price is $558,750.

As the Court found McGuire's $100 per square foot figure to be more persuasive than Wilson's $55 per square foot figure when making living area adjustments, the Court also analyzed Wilson's comparable properties using a $100 per square foot adjustment. Using the $100 per square foot adjustment, the average adjusted sales price for Wilson's comparable properties is $569,140 while the median adjusted sales price is $552,200. Using the $100 per square foot adjustment and excluding properties with an unknown close of escrow date, the average adjusted sales price is $579,250 and the median adjusted sales price is $557,550.

McGuire used six comparable properties. The average distance of the comparable properties from the Property is.52 miles. The average adjusted sales price is $672,430 and the median adjusted sales price is $696,550. No properties closed escrow after the date of Debtors' bankruptcy petition and McGuire used a $100 per square foot-figure when making living area adjustments, so no further calculations were necessary.:

In sum, using an adjustment value of $100 per square foot when making living area adjustments, and excluding properties with an unknown close of escrow date, Wilson's average adjusted comparable sales price is $17,345.44 greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust and Wilson's median adjusted comparable sales price is $4,354.56 less than the value of EMC's first deed of trust. Using the same restrictions, McGuire's average adjusted comparable sales price is $110,525.44 greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust and McGuire's median adjusted sales price is $134,645.44 greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust. Using the same restrictions and including the comparable properties used by both Wilson and McGuire, the average adjusted sale price is $72,253.44 greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust and the median adjusted sales price is $89,095.44 greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust.

No evidence was presented at trial that persuaded the Court that any of the properties with known close of escrow dates was an inappropriate comparable property, and the Court has found that McGuire's use of $100 per square foot for making living area adjustments is more persuasive than Wilson's $55 per square foot figure. Therefore, the fact that, excluding properties with an unknown close of escrow date and using a $100 figure when making living area adjustments, the average and median adjusted sales values for Wilson and McGuire's combined comparable properties are greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust suggests that the value of the Property is greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust.

E. McGuire's Comparable Property Number Six

In addition to the Court's calculations, the Court also found McGuire's comparable property number six to be independently persuasive. At trial, McGuire testified that location is the most important factor used when selecting comparable properties. Comparable number six is four houses away from the Property. This close proximity controls for factors affecting home values that might otherwise be unaccounted for.

McGuire's comparable property number six sold on March 29, 2010 for $595,000 - despite the fact that comparable number six has 1, 364 fewer square feet of gross living area than the Property. In other words, comparable number six sold for $45,000 more than Wilson's appraisal of the Property despite being roughly half the size of the Property and having two fewer bedrooms and one less bathroom. The only other adjustment made to comparable six that might account for the greater sales price was the time of sale. When making adjustments for time, Wilson adjusted down 3.25% for Wilson's comparable number two which sold on March 19, 2010, and McGuire adjusted down $30,000 for the same property. Even disregarding the differences in size and number of bedrooms and bathrooms between McGuire's comparable number six and the Property, Wilson's time adjustment would yield an adjusted value of $575,662.50 for McGuire's comparable number six and McGuire's time adjustment would yield an adjusted value of $565,000. Both values are greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust, which suggests that the value of the Property is significantly greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust. In sum, the fact that comparable number six sold for $595,000 on March 29, 2010 was very persuasive evidence to the Court.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the evidence admitted at hearing and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds McGuire's appraisal to be more accurate than Wilson's appraisal. McGuire was able to show statistically that a $100 per square foot figure was appropriate when making gross living area adjustments. Additionally, the Court's statistical analysis of Wilson and McGuire's comparable properties suggests that the value of the Property as of the date of Debtors' bankruptcy petition was greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust. Lastly, McGuire's comparable property number six, which is four houses down from the Property and has roughly half the living area, two fewer bedrooms and one fewer bathroom than the Property, sold for over $40,000 more than the value of EMC's first deed of trust. The Court therefore finds that the value of the Property as of the date of Debtors' bankruptcy petition was greater than the value of EMC's first deed of trust

For the foregoing reasons, Debtors' Motion to determine the value and status of SCCCU's Lien as wholly unsecured and void is denied. The Court finds that the value of the Property was greater than the amount secured by the first deed of trust. Accordingly, SCCCU's secured claim is at least partially secured and is entitled to the protection of Bankruptcy Code section 1322(b)(2). Counsel for SCCCU shall prepare a proposed form of order, serve it on counsel for Debtors, and submit it to the Court.

Exhibit 1

Bruce McGuire's Comparables (for SCCCU) Proximity to the Close of Close of Escrow Comparable Comparable Price Using Gross Building Area Comparable Address of Comparable Subject Property Escrow Pre-Petition? Price Adjustment of $100 per square foot #1 310 Marnell Avenue 0.17 3/26/2010 YES $691,900 $691,900 #2 201 Marnell Avenue 0.34 2/17/2010 YES $573,600 $573,600 #3 365 Gault Avenue 0.59 7/16/2010 YES $720,477 $720,477 #4 87 Hagermann 0.72 8/17/2010 YES $631,000 $631,000 #5 124 Caledonia Street 1.27 3/19/2010 YES $701,200 $701,200 #6 503 Marnell Avenue 0.02 3/29/2010 YES $716,400 $716,400

Exhibit 2

Michael J. wilson's Comparables (for Debtors) Proximity to the Close of Close of Escrow Comparable Comparable Price Using Gross Building Comparable Address of Comparable Subject Property Escrow Pre-Petition? Price Area Adjustment of $100 per square foot #1 365 Fairmont Avenue 0.21 2/1/2010 YES $567,500 $552,200 #2 124 Caledonia Street 1.25 3/19/2010 YES $639,000 $671,000 #3 201 Marnell Avenue 0.34 2/25/2010 YES $550,000 $530,900 #4 121 San Juan Avenue 0.43 11/16/2010 YES $534,000 $562,900 #5 129 Belmont Street 1.07 unknown NO $500,035 $528,700

Exhibit 3

Average Proximity to Average Median Average Sales Price Excluding Properties Median Sales Price Excluding Properties Appraiser the Subject Propertry Sales Price Sales Price with unknown Close of Escrow Date with Unknown Close of Escrow Date Bruce McGire 0.52 $672,430 $696,550 $672,430 $696,550 Michael J. Wilson 0.66 $558,107 $550,000 $572,625 $558,750

Exhibit 4

Average Sales Price Median Sales Price Average Sales Price Excluding Median Sales Price Excluding Average Proximity to Using Gross Building Using Gross Building Properties with Unknown Close Properties with Unknown Close Appraiser the Subject Property Area Adjustment of Area Adjustment of of Escrow Date and Using Gross of Escrow Date and Using Gross $100 per square foot $100 per square foot Building Area Adjustment of Building Area Adjustment of $100 per square foot $100 per square foot Bruce McGuire 0.52 $672,430 $696,550 $672,430 $696,550 Michael J. Wilson 0.66 $569,140 $552,200 $579,250 $557,550 Both Appraisers 0.58 $625,480 $631,000 $635,158 $651,000


Summaries of

In re Flores

United States Bankruptcy Court, Ninth Circuit
Jan 17, 2012
No. 10-61121-ASW (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012)
Case details for

In re Flores

Case Details

Full title:In re: LUIS RAMIREZ FLORES AND BERTHA OROPEZA FLORES, Chapter 13, Debtors.

Court:United States Bankruptcy Court, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Jan 17, 2012

Citations

No. 10-61121-ASW (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012)