Opinion
Case No. 17-3283 (LTS) (Jointly Administered) Case No. 17-4780 (LTS) Adv. Proc. No. 19-00298-LTS
2020-01-23
IN RE: The FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT and Management Board for Puerto Rico, as representative of The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., Debtor. In re: The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, as representative of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Debtor. Electrical Industry and Irrigation Workers Union (Utier), Petitioner, v. Eng. José F. Ortiz Vázquez and Electric Power Authority, Respondents.
GUILLERMO RAMOS LUIÑA, By: Guillermo Ramos Luiña, P. O. Box 22763, UPR Station, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00931, Counsel for Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego O'NEILL & BORGES LLP, By: Hermann D. Bauer, Carla García Benítez, Ubaldo M. Fernández, 250 Muños Rivera Ave., Suite 800, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, By: Martin J. Bienenstock, Stephen L. Ratner, Timothy W. Mungovan, Jonathan E. Richman, Eleven Times Square, New York, New York 10036, Counsel for the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, as representative of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
GUILLERMO RAMOS LUIÑA, By: Guillermo Ramos Luiña, P. O. Box 22763, UPR Station, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00931, Counsel for Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego
O'NEILL & BORGES LLP, By: Hermann D. Bauer, Carla García Benítez, Ubaldo M. Fernández, 250 Muños Rivera Ave., Suite 800, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, By: Martin J. Bienenstock, Stephen L. Ratner, Timothy W. Mungovan, Jonathan E. Richman, Eleven Times Square, New York, New York 10036, Counsel for the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, as representative of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S MANDAMUS PETITION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (B)(1) AND 12(B)(6)
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, United States District Judge Before the Court is Respondent Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Mandamus Petition Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Docket Entry No. 13 in Adv. Proc. No. 19-298-LTS, the "Motion") filed by the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the "Oversight Board") as representative of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA") pursuant to Section 315(b) of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). Petitioner Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego ("UTIER") filed an opposition to the Motion (Docket Entry No. 17, the "Opposition"). PREPA filed a reply (Docket Entry No. 18, the "Reply"). The Court has considered carefully all of the arguments and submissions made in connection with the Motion. Except to the extent specified in Section II, infra, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 2166.
All docket entry references are to entries in Adv. Proc. No. 19-298, unless otherwise specified.
PROMESA is codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. References to "PROMESA" section numbers in this opinion are to the uncodified version of the legislation.
For the following reasons, PREPA's Motion is granted in part pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and in part pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
I.
BACKGROUND
The following recitation of facts is drawn from UTIER's Petition (Docket Entry No. 1-2, the "Petition"), except where otherwise noted.
Plaintiff UTIER is a labor organization representing more than three thousand employees of PREPA. (Pet. ¶ 3.) PREPA filed its Title III petition pursuant to Section 304(a) of PROMESA on July 2, 2017. (Docket Entry No. 1 in Case No. 17-4780.) José F. Ortiz Vázquez ("Ortiz" and, together with PREPA, "Respondents") is the executive director of PREPA. (Pet. ¶ 4.)
On April 29, 2017, Puerto Rico enacted Act No. 26-2017, the Fiscal Plan Compliance Act. According to its Statement of Motives, the Act is intended to "provide[ ] for different measures that this Administration is taking in order to comply with the Fiscal Plan imposed under the provisions of PROMESA" and to "properly address the fiscal, economic, and budgetary crisis that Puerto Rico is undergoing." Fiscal Plan Compliance Act at 8, 27. To that end, Chapter 2 of Act No. 26-2017 recites that it "seeks to protect not only the jobs of thousands of public officials and employees of the Government of Puerto Rico, but also [Puerto Rico's] most vulnerable citizens" by "achiev[ing] additional savings" with respect to benefits and compensation for employees of agencies, instrumentalities, and public corporations of the government of Puerto Rico. Fiscal Plan Compliance Act § 2.03. Section 2.07 of Act No. 26-2017, 3 L.P.R.A. § 9477, which is titled "Uniform Employer Contribution to the Healthcare Plan of the Employees of Public Corporations," concerns contributions to employee healthcare plans and provides as follows:
As there is currently no official English translation of the codified statute, UTIER's Opposition draws quotations from the official English translation of the enacted bill, H.B. 938, 18th Leg. Assemb. (P.R. 2017) from Puerto Rico's Office of Legislative Services (see Opp. ¶ 3.1), and PREPA's Motion quotes, at different points, both that translation and PREPA's own certified translation of H.B. 938, which is attached as Exhibit A (Docket Entry No. 13-4) to the Declaration of Jonathan E. Richman in Connection with Respondent Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Mandamus Petition Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Docket Entry No. 13-3, the "Richman Declaration"). (See Mot. at 4 (quoting official translation); Mot. at 18 (quoting PREPA's certified translation).) Neither of the parties has asserted that there is any material difference between those translations in the context of the instant dispute. Accordingly, the Court relies upon the English translation from the Office of Legislative Services, which is available at Docket Entry No. 8536-23 in Case No. 17-3283.
The Executive and Legislative Branches shall identify additional savings and resources to prevent adversely affecting the employees' contributions to the payment of the healthcare plan. If the projected savings of the Fiscal Plan are not achieved, the difference shall be offset through a program to match the Government's contributions to the healthcare plan. Only then, as of July 1st, 2018, every official or government employee, whether union or nonunion, who works for any Public Corporation, except for the University of Puerto Rico, shall be entitled to an employer contribution to be determined by the Fiscal Plan Compliance Committee using as a basis the metrics established in the Fiscal Plan, but in no case said contribution shall be less than the one hundred dollar ($100)-employer contribution established by law for Central Government employees. [The Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority ("FAFAA") ] may negotiate and reach agreements on an insurance coverage that is less expensive with private insurers or public coverage to be selected by the employees of the Government as Sole Employer or by agency or groups of agencies. Any reduction in the employer contribution to the healthcare plan shall require FAFAA to offer a less expensive insurance coverage to said government employees. However, every employee, or dependent thereof, of a public corporation who is currently enrolled in the healthcare plan and who suffers from a preexisting catastrophic, chronic, or terminal illness shall continue to receive the employer contribution in effect for his healthcare plan, without any change, for the term he remains in the public service.
Fiscal Plan Compliance Act § 2.07.
On January 21, 2018, Puerto Rico enacted Act No. 28-2018, the Special Leave for Employees with Serious Diseases of a Catastrophic Nature Act. Article 2(c) of Act No. 28-2018 contains a list of conditions that are defined as "Serious Illness[es] of a Catastrophic Nature," and Article 3 provides for "Special Leave" that certain public sector employees with such illnesses may use. (Docket Entry No. 13-3.)
There is no official English translation of Act No. 28-2018 or of the codified statutory text, 29 L.P.R.A. § 508 et seq. A certified translation of Act No. 28-2018 is attached as Exhibit B to the Richman Declaration (Docket Entry No. 13-5).
On September 30, 2018, the Oversight Board certified the fiscal year 2019 budget for PREPA (the "Budget"). (Mot. at 5 & n.3.) The Budget allocates $120,888,000 for PREPA's pension and benefits. (Exhibit C to the Richman Declaration, Docket Entry No. 13-6.) On December 28, 2018, Ortiz circulated a memorandum (the "December 28, 2018 Memorandum") to PREPA's employees announcing modifications to the health insurance plans available to PREPA's employees (the "Benefits Modifications"). (Pet. ¶ 6; Exhibit E to the Richman Declaration.) The December 28, 2018 Memorandum further stated that PREPA had selected Triple-S Salud Inc. ("Triple-S") as its health plan administrator. (Pet. ¶ 7.) In the December 28, 2018 Memorandum, Ortiz asserted that the Benefits Modifications were necessary in light of PREPA's fiscal challenges and in order to comply with the certified fiscal plan and Budget applicable to PREPA pursuant to PROMESA. (Pet. ¶ 6.) According to UTIER, the changes announced and implemented by Respondents substantially affected the coverage, copayments, deductibles, and employer contributions under PREPA's employee health plans, including such features for employees and dependents of employees suffering from catastrophic, chronic, or terminal illnesses. (Pet. ¶¶ 7, 8, 14, 15.) In particular, the Petition alleges, PREPA employees and their dependents who suffer from preexisting catastrophic, chronic, or terminal illnesses "now pay substantially higher sums than those paid prior to implementing the measure announced in, and unilaterally implemented pursuant to, the December 28, 2018 Memorandum ...." (Pet. ¶ 15.)
On April 24, 2019, UTIER commenced the instant proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Puerto Rico (the "Commonwealth Court"). UTIER alleges that Respondents have failed to execute two duties imposed by Section 2.07 of Act No. 26-2017. (Pet. ¶¶ 16-18.) First, PREPA and Ortiz allegedly failed to "identify additional savings and resources to prevent adversely affecting the employees' contributions to the payment of the healthcare plan." Fiscal Plan Compliance Act § 2.07. The Court will refer to this clause of Section 2.07 as the "Savings Provision." Second, Respondents allegedly failed to ensure that employees and their dependents who suffer from preexisting catastrophic, chronic, or terminal illnesses "shall continue to receive the employer contribution in effect ... without any change ...." Fiscal Plan Compliance Act § 2.07. The Court will refer to this clause as the "Preexisting Conditions Provision." UTIER petitioned the Commonwealth Court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents to comply with those provisions. (Pet. at 6.)
The Petition and the Opposition also contain several references to Act No. 28-2018, and UTIER alleges that Respondents have violated Act No. 28-2018. (See, e.g., Petition at 6 (requesting that the Court "order [Respondents] to comply immediately with the ministerial duties provided in Article 2.07 of Law 26-2017 and Law 28-2018"). Although not stated directly in its pleadings, UTIER's contention appears to be that Respondents have failed to comply with Act No. 28-2018 insofar as persons suffering from the conditions designated by Act 28-2018 as "Serious or Catastrophic Diseases" have not been afforded the protection of Act 26-2017's Preexisting Conditions Provision. (See Petition ¶ 13; Opp. ¶ 3.1 n.1.)
On May 8, 2019, PREPA removed the proceeding to this Court. (Notice of Removal , Docket Entry No. 1.)
II.
DISCUSSION
PREPA seeks dismissal of the Petition pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A court presented with motions to dismiss under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) should ordinarily decide jurisdictional questions before addressing the merits. Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 149 (1st Cir. 2002). The party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving the existence of appropriate grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction. Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007). The Court also has an independent duty to assess whether it has subject matter jurisdiction of an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ; FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990).
A. Rule 12(b)(1) : Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Section 106(e) of PROMESA provides that "[t]here shall be no jurisdiction in any United States district court to review challenges to the Oversight Board's certification determinations under this [Act]." 48 U.S.C.A. § 2126(e) (West 2017). "Although PROMESA grants the Oversight Board exclusive authority to certify fiscal plans and ‘also insulates the Oversight Board's certification determinations ... from challenge by denying all federal district courts jurisdiction to review such challenges,’ Section 106(e) does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to entertain all conceivable litigation touching on certified documents." Rosselló Nevares v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.), 330 F. Supp. 3d 685, 694 (D.P.R. 2018) (quoting Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.), 297 F. Supp. 3d 269, 283-84 (D.P.R. 2018) ), aff'd, 945 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2019).
PREPA argues that the relief sought by UTIER would require PREPA to make payments greater than the certified Budget would allow. PREPA contends that the Petition therefore constitutes a "back-door attack" on the Oversight Board's certification of the Budget, of which the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Section 106(e) of PROMESA, 48 U.S.C. § 2126(e). (Mot. at 15-16.) PREPA notes that PROMESA grants the Oversight Board sole discretion to certify whether a fiscal plan includes an estimate of revenue and expenditures, 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1)(A), and to determine whether a budget is compliant with a fiscal plan, 48 U.S.C. § 2142(e). PREPA further argues that, insofar as UTIER contends that the certified Budget is not binding because its noncompliance with Act 26-2017 renders the revenue and expenditure estimates on which it relies violative of the PROMESA Section 201(b)(1)(A) requirement that such estimates in Fiscal Plans be based on "applicable laws," the Petition attacks a component of certification and thus the Oversight Board's certification determination. (Reply at 13.)
The Motion also briefly references Section 207 of PROMESA, 48 U.S.C. § 2147, in connection with PREPA's jurisdictional argument. (Mot. at 17.) Section 207 prohibits the territorial government from issuing, modifying, or redeeming debt without the Oversight Board's approval. It may be that the Oversight Board's implicit argument is that forcing an unapproved increase in actual expenditures above the certified budgeted amount is tantamount to forcing incurrence or modification of debt as well as an attack on the certification of the lower amount, but the Court will not engage in any further effort to discern the reason for the brief citation to Section 207 because that PROMESA provision does not address jurisdictional issues.
UTIER contends that Section 106(e) "only precludes ‘an action seeking review of the Oversight Board's determination that a plan or budget meets the requirements for certification or is compliant with particular aspects of PROMESA Section 201(b)’ " (Opp. ¶ 5.2 (quoting Rosselló Nevares, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 695 ).) According to UTIER, the relief it seeks in the Petition does not challenge the propriety of the Oversight Board's certification determination, but rather challenges the legal effect of the documents certified by the Oversight Board. (Opp. ¶ 5.2.)
UTIER's insistence that this adversary proceeding does not challenge the Oversight Board's certification determinations is inconsistent with its position that subsections 201(b)(1)(A) and (B) of PROMESA render Commonwealth law supreme over inconsistent provisions of a certified fiscal plan or budget. (Opp. ¶¶ 6.2-6.4.) UTIER is correct that Section 201(b)(1) states that a fiscal plan "shall ... provide for estimates of revenues and expenditures in conformance with agreed accounting standards and be based on ... applicable laws" and "ensure the funding of essential public services." 48 U.S.C.A. § 2141(b)(1)(A), (B) (West 2017). Additionally, Section 202 of PROMESA provides that a budget must be compliant with the applicable fiscal plan. 48 U.S.C. § 2142(c)(1) (Governor's proposed budget must be compliant); § 2142(d)(1) (Legislature's adopted budget must be compliant). However, PROMESA places discretion as to whether a fiscal plan meets the requirements of Section 201(b) and whether a budget is compliant with a fiscal plan—and therefore whether such a budget and such a plan shall be certified—in the discretion of the Oversight Board. Id.; see also Rosselló Nevares, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 698-700 (describing the fiscal plan and budget development and certification process).
Thus, to the extent that the Petition seeks to challenge the Oversight Board's determination that the Budget is compliant with a fiscal plan which meets the requirements of Section 201(b)(1), it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, to the extent that the Petition asks that Respondents be directed to comply with duties imposed by a Commonwealth statute and plausibly alleges that such compliance is inconsistent with PREPA's certified Budget, the Court must evaluate the parties' merits arguments. The Court now turns to whether the Petition states a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) : Failure to State a Claim
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court accepts as true the non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint and makes all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Miss. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2008). The court may consider "documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; ... official public records; ... documents central to plaintiffs' claim; [and] documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Id. at 86 (citation omitted). The complaint must allege enough factual content to nudge a claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
The Motion asserts several grounds for dismissal of the Petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Among other arguments, PREPA contends that issuance of a writ of mandamus is inappropriate because UTIER has not exhausted other avenues of relief that are available to it. "The writ of mandamus is a privileged, extraordinary civil-law remedy." Purcell Ahmed v. Pons Nunez, 129 D.P.R. 711, 714 (P.R. Jan. 22, 1992) (citing Dávila v. Gen'l Supervisor of Elections, 82 P.R.R. 257 (1960)). Thus, "it is not sufficient for the petitioner to have a clear right to what he requests and that the respondent have the corresponding duty to permit the exercise of that right. It is a ‘high prerogative’ writ, as stated in the law creating the same[,] 32 L.P.R.A. § 3421, and the courts must necessarily weigh all the attendant circumstances in determining whether or not the writ should issue ...." Diaz Gonzalez v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 2 P.R. Offic. Trans. 245, 250-51, 102 D.P.R. 195 (P.R. Apr. 22, 1974) (quoting Dávila, 82 P.R.R. at 276). The writ of mandamus is "the appropriate remedy for compelling performance of a duty allegedly imposed by law ... when there is no other adequate remedy at law." Hernandez Agosto v. Romero Barcelo, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 508, 521 (P.R. 1982) (citing Dávila, 82 P.R.R. 257).
The Motion asserts several other grounds for dismissal of the Petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). PREPA argues that the statutory duty which UTIER seeks to enforce is not "ministerial" in nature and therefore cannot be enforced by a writ of mandamus. (Mot. at 8-10.) PREPA also argues that UTIER's claims are barred by Section 305 of PROMESA, 48 U.S.C. § 2165. (Mot. at 11-15.) PREPA additionally contends that Section 2.07 is preempted by Section 4 of PROMESA, 48 U.S.C. § 2165, to the extent it is inconsistent with PROMESA, the Budget, or PREPA's contract with Triple-S. (Mot. at 17-19.) Because the Court holds that dismissal is appropriate for other reasons, it will not address these alternative grounds for dismissal.
Here, UTIER has failed to adequately plead a claim for which "there is no other adequate remedy." Peña v. Flores, 58 P.R.R. 773, 774 (1941) (English translation attached as Exhibit H to the Richman Declaration); see also Alvarez de Choudens v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 3 P.R. Offic. Trans. 326, 335-36, 103 D.P.R. 235 (P.R. 1975) ("The appropriateness of the issuance of the mandamus is also doubtful because intervener, petitioner therein, did not exhaust the remedies available at law."). UTIER alleges in the Petition that the affected employees and dependents are now required "to pay substantially higher sums than those paid" under PREPA's prior plan. (Pet. ¶ 15.) PROMESA incorporates mechanisms for asserting claims, including assertions of rights to payment, against Title III debtors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) (defining "claim"); 501(a) (providing that creditors may file proofs of claim); 503(a) (providing that entities may file requests for payment of administrative expenses for, inter alia, "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate"). Assuming arguendo that Section 2.07 provides PREPA's employees and their dependents with enforceable rights to certain benefits that PREPA has been unwilling or unable to provide to them, UTIER has failed to plead any basis for concluding that affected individuals lack adequate means to protect their rights by asserting financial claims against PREPA.
In its Opposition, UTIER concedes that mandamus relief is unavailable where an adequate alternative remedy exists (Opp. ¶ 3.7) and fails to provide any basis for concluding that procedures provided by PROMESA are inadequate to provide appropriate relief. UTIER nonetheless contends that no adequate remedy exists because neither Act No. 26-2017 nor Act No. 28-2018 specifically provides an alternative remedy. (Opp. ¶ 3.8-3.9 ("[N]either Law 26-2017 nor Law 28-2018 establish an appeals process to which UTIER members could resort in order to challenge Defendants' actions.").) However, the absence of a specific alternative remedy in these statutes is not determinative of the availability of the mandamus remedy. The extraordinary nature of the of mandamus remedy requires that the Court's consideration of the availability of alternative remedies transcend the contours of specific substantive statutes, and it is the petitioner's burden to demonstrate that no adequate alternatives exist. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) ("To ensure that mandamus remains an extraordinary remedy, petitioners must show that they lack adequate alternative means to obtain the relief they seek."); Wilson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 671 F.2d 673, 679 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is apparent to us that this ‘extraordinary’ statutory remedy [mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 ]... is inappropriate ... because an alternative remedy—through administrative proceedings and § 405(g) review—was available.").
UTIER has not cited any authority for the proposition that the availability of an alternative remedy does not preclude the writ of mandamus where the available alternative remedy is not provided by the same statute that a petitioner seeks to enforce. And while the Court's research has not uncovered case law directly addressing the issue, UTIER's argument is inconsistent with case law in which courts have determined that mandamus was unavailable where a petitioner's claimed underlying substantive right was derived from a source other than the statute that provided an adequate alternative remedy. See, e.g., In re City of Fall River, Mass., 470 F.3d 30, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2006) (denying mandamus petition for failure to exhaust Administrative Procedure Act remedies with respect to challenge of regulations as inconsistent with Pipeline Safety Act of 1979); Burgos v. Milton, 709 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that court lacked mandamus jurisdiction of action for breach of contract against IRS because Tucker Act provided ability to seek relief in Court of Federal Claims); 1610 Corp. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding that plaintiff's ability to pursue action for breach of contract against HUD and local housing authority in Court of Federal Claims pursuant to Tucker Act precluded maintenance of mandamus action in district court). Furthermore, the formal distinction proffered by UTIER would be inconsistent with the equitable principles that courts must consider in determining whether issuance of the writ is appropriate. See Petition of Henneman, 137 F.2d 627, 631 n.5 (1st Cir. 1943) ("Although the remedy by mandamus is at law, its allowance is controlled by equitable principles ....") (quoting United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 359, 53 S.Ct. 614, 77 L.Ed. 1250 (1933) ); In re Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[A] writ of mandamus is an exceptional remedy .... In this context, equity informs the court's discretion."); see also Diaz Gonzalez, 2 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 250-51, 102 D.P.R. 195 (stating that courts must "weigh all the attendant circumstances in determining whether or not the writ should issue") (quoting Dávila, 82 P.R.R. at 276).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that UTIER has failed to demonstrate the lack of available alternative remedies that is an essential predicate for mandamus relief and thus has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Petition is therefore dismissed in all respects.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, PREPA's Motion is granted, and the Petition is dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) insofar as it is premised on the assertion that PREPA's certified Budget fails to comply with PROMESA Section 201(b)(1), and the Petition is dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in all other respects. This Opinion and Order resolves Docket Entry No. 13 in Adv. Proc. No. 19-298. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this adversary proceeding.
SO ORDERED.