Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. JV060002
Parrilli, J.
Appellant James H. appeals from a juvenile court order that denied him presumed father status of Felicia O. in a dependency proceeding. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Denise V. is the mother of Felicia O., born in June 2003, and Natasha H., born in September 2004. Appellant James H. is the presumed father of Natasha.
On January 3, 2006, the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (the department) filed separate petitions for the children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), against Denise and appellant based on the poor living conditions provided to the children. At the time the children were taken into protective custody, they had been living with Denise in a hotel room. Appellant was living at the same hotel but in a separate room.
At a hearing held the day after the filing of the petitions, Denise indicated that David O. had signed a POP (Paternity Opportunity Program) form at the hospital with respect to Felicia and at some point he had welcomed the child into his home and held himself out to the world as the child’s father, thereby entitling David O. to presumed father status. Even though he was not Felicia’s biological father, appellant objected to the court declaring David O. to be the child’s presumed father, arguing that he had received Felicia into his home and held her out as his own child. The court did not resolve the issue of Felicia’s paternity and continued the matter.
In its March 21, 2006, report to the court, the department included a POP computer printout from Humboldt County Family Support unit indicating that David O. had signed a paternity declaration on the day Felicia was born, but no order of support had been issued. At a court hearing on that date, appellant’s counsel objected to the use of the printout on the grounds of the best evidence rule and double hearsay, noting that the printout did not indicate that David O. actually signed the POP declaration, and counsel did not know who inputted the information and whether it was accurate. The department’s counsel replied that the original POP declaration was never produced, and that she always got the printout from family support. Counsel indicated that she supposed she could subpoena the actual POP declaration, but those declarations were not normally given to the department. The court did not rule on appellant’s objection, but continued the matter for a hearing.
The department later submitted a report indicating that the original POP form was sent to Sacramento, where the information was inputted in the Computer Assisted Support Enforcement System (CASES) database of the statewide Family Support computer system. The signed POP form was not kept in the county, and the POP printout was regularly supplied to the child welfare system and the court regarding the information known to the state.
On March 22, 2006, appellant filed requests for de facto parent status, presumed father status, and a paternity inquiry regarding Felicia. In a declaration, appellant asserted that Felicia had lived with him and he was responsible for the child’s day-to-day care from January 1, 2004 to December 29, 2005. While living with the child, appellant “played all day with her, woke up in the middle of the night for her feedings, changed her diapers, fed her, bathed her, provided food and medicine for her, attended to her when she cried, and in every respect provided for her day to day.” Appellant asserted he loved both children, and considered them his own; Felicia called appellant “her Jimmy,” and always treated him as “daddy.” Appellant had received the child into his home and held her out to be his natural child.
At the March 27, 2006, jurisdictional hearing, the court sustained the allegations in the petitions regarding both children. Because there was no proof that David O. had been served with appellant’s requests regarding Felicia’s paternity, the court did not make a paternity finding as to Felicia and the matter was continued for disposition. Before the dispositional hearing, David O. wrote his criminal attorney a letter opposing appellant’s attempt to secure presumed father status as to Felicia.
At the April 25, 2006, dispositional hearing, the court declared both children dependents of the court, found that it would be detrimental to return them to Denise and appellant, and ordered reunification services relating to Natasha for both Denise and appellant. The court ordered reunification services relating to Felicia for Denise only and again postponed the determination of Felicia’s paternity.
On August 17, 2006, the court held a hearing on appellant’s requests relating to the paternity of Felicia. The court indicated it had read the previous documents submitted on the issue. Appellant’s counsel relied on Family Code, section 7611, subdivision (d), and submitted the matter on appellant’s declaration and counsel’s memorandum of points and authorities that had been previously filed with the court.
Family Code section 7611, provides, in relevant part: “A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets . . . any of the following subdivisions: . . . (d) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”
David O. testified that he was currently living at “a program” at a rescue mission. He knew Felicia’s birth date, but testified she was born in 2001. He was not aware the child was born in 2003, and believed she was four at the time of the hearing. He had met Denise a few years before the child’s birth. For two years before Felicia’s birth, he had an “on-and-off” relationship with Denise. Focusing specifically on the period nine months before the child’s birth, David indicated he was living with Denise at a rescue mission when Denise became pregnant. They were sharing the same room, but there were times when they did not spend the night together. They were together for a couple of months after Denise became pregnant and then they broke up. David continued to live at the mission program. He went to Denise’s doctor’s appointments during the pregnancy, he was present when Felicia was born, and he brought diapers from the program he attended for the child until she was six or seven months old. After the birth, Denise and Felicia lived in a woman’s program. David was not then able to take care of the child because he was living at another program that did not allow children. After he completed any chores and classes in his own program, David spent a lot of time with Felicia. He saw the child every day until Denise was expelled from her program. After Denise left her program, David was not able to locate them but he later learned that they were staying at an apartment, and he visited a couple of times. In November 2003 David went to prison for a probation violation based on an underlying felony sex offense conviction for which he was required to register as a sex offender. He had not seen the child since she was five months old. Nor had he talked to Denise since that time.
David told “other people” and his “family” that Felicia was his daughter. He could not assume responsibility for the child because he was a sex offender, but he planned to financially support the child if he got a job. Since his release from prison, he has been in a program but he had not attempted to see Felicia because he did not know where she was. He wanted to become involved in his daughter’s life and asked the court to make a finding that he was the child’s “legal father.” When asked if he understood that Felicia’s “legal father” might be required to provide child support, David replied he had already received child support papers.
David had never seen the child’s birth certificate, and when asked if his name was on it, appellant’s counsel objected on the ground that the question called for hearsay. The court did not specifically rule on the objection, but noted it could take judicial notice that David O.’s name appeared on the certificate because the records reflected that he signed the POP declaration and the child had his name. Without further objection, David testified he signed “a certificate” at the time the child was born.
Appellant testified that at the time of the hearing, he was then in jail for violating a probationary term that had been imposed for “petty theft with a prior.” He became involved with Denise and Felicia, when the child was five or six months old in November or December 2003. He first stated he and Denise had actually lived together from about January 2003 to April 2004, but on further questioning, he agreed that they lived together from sometime in December 2003 to April of 2005, except for the last six months. He continued to see and care for the children every day after he and Denise moved into separate hotel rooms. Appellant financially supported both children with his “SSI and other odd jobs.” He admitted that since Denise became involved with him, she also had other friends who supported the children “a little.” But, appellant was around the whole time and both children called him “dad.”
Appellant also testified that for approximately six months after Natasha was born, he and Denise and the children lived with appellant’s mother and stepfather. Appellant told his mother and stepfather something along the lines that Felicia was his “stepdaughter” or “stepdaughter figure.” Appellant described the situation as both children were his, but Felicia was not his by blood but in every other way she was his.
At the time the children were taken into custody, appellant was not living with Denise and the children; appellant was living mainly at the hotel in a different room. He had been living in a separate room for about six months to a year. He was aware of the children’s living conditions at the time they were detained by the department. He tried to get the children’s room cleaned up but the other residents in the room would not do anything. There were five people, including appellant, living in his room. He brought the children into his room for a night or two every once in a while. His room was cleaner “but not by much.” Before the children were detained, appellant participated in voluntary services through the department for both children. Since the children’s detention and until his current arrest, appellant was involved in the services provided by the department in connection with both children. During a previous period of incarceration for 80 days, appellant had started a parenting class. He had not had the time to participate in a mental health assessment. Since the children had been detained, appellant visited the children every visit that he could.
After argument by appellant’s counsel, the court ruled that appellant should be deemed Felicia’s de facto parent, having established a relationship with the child because he was Natasha’s father. The court, however, denied appellant’s request to be declared Felicia’s presumed father. The court noted that the evidence did not establish that appellant had taken the child into his home in that at times he merely lived in close proximity to the child, and he had acknowledged that the child was his stepdaughter, which was not the same as holding the child out as his own child. Additionally, although appellant knew that both children were in a bad situation, he did not act to protect them by attempting to assume custody, albeit the court acknowledged that appellant testified he was not in a position to do so. The court also noted that appellant’s counsel had not attempted to set aside the POP declaration by David O., which declaration had been known to everyone since the filing of the petition. Finally, in analyzing whether or not appellant had welcomed the child into his home and openly and publicly acknowledged paternity, the court noted that appellant’s answers to questions were not consistent.
Appellant appeals the August 17, 2006, order denying him status as Felicia’s presumed father.
After the August 17, 2006, hearing, there was some confusion as to whether the court’s ruling resolved David O.’s status. On November 2, 2006, the court granted David O.’s request to be elevated to the status of Felicia’s presumed father. We deferred to this time the department’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the court’s minute orders of October 30, 2006, and November 2, 2006, addressing David O.’s motion seeking a ruling on his status as Felicia’s presumed father. We now grant the unopposed request for judicial notice of the court’s minute orders. (See In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 166 [court took judicial notice of postjudgment minute order - “an objective document, the validity and accuracy of which is undisputed”].) We note that neither the department nor David O. argue that appellant’s appeal has been rendered moot by these later orders.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s challenge to the juvenile court’s refusal to grant him presumed father status does not warrant reversal.
Appellant sought to establish he was Felicia’s presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). “To obtain the benefit of section 7611, subdivision (d), the man must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the two elements necessary to invoke the presumption are present, i.e., reception into the man’s home and an open and public acknowledgment of paternity. [Citation.] Thus, the burden of proof rested on [appellant] to demonstrate the existence of these two elements. It was for the trial court to determine whether these foundational facts were established by a preponderance of evidence. [Citation.]” (Miller v. Miller (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 111, 117 (Miller).)
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.
In reviewing the juvenile court’s ruling that appellant’s evidence did not establish the foundational facts required to invoke the section 7611, subdivision (d), presumption, we “must review the facts most favorably” to the order, “drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in favor of the order.” (Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 117-118.) “We do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the whole record to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent.” (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.)
Appellant argues that because it was not contradicted that he lived with Felicia for over a year and he testified that he treated her as if she was his own daughter by caring for her on a daily basis while she lived with him, the juvenile court was required to conclude that he was the child’s presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d). We disagree.
Appellant’s reliance on the uncontradicted nature of his testimony is misplaced. “Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn. We must accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the [trier of fact’s] findings and decision, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citations.] [¶] We emphasize that the test is not the presence or absence of a substantial conflict in the evidence. Rather, it is simply whether there is substantial evidence in favor of the respondent. If this ‘substantial’ evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld. As a general rule, therefore, we will look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the successful party, and disregard the contrary showing. [Citations.] In short, even if the judgment . . . is against the weight of the evidence, we are bound to uphold it so long as the record is free from prejudicial error and the judgment is supported by evidence, which is ‘substantial,’ that is of ‘ “ponderable legal significance,” ’ ‘ “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) “If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion. [Citations.]” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874.)
Despite appellant’s testimony, the juvenile court was not required to find that he established the foundational facts of taking Felicia into his home and holding her out as his own child. Appellant’s testimony regarding the amount of time he cohabited with Denise and the two children was unclear and contradictory. Even assuming appellant had lived with Felicia for over a year, the court reasonably found that Felicia had lived with appellant because appellant was cohabiting with Felicia’s mother, and after Natasha’s birth, Felicia lived with appellant because appellant was living with his own daughter and Felicia’s mother. (See Miller v. Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 [stepfather did not meet requirement of taking child into his home where the presence of child was the result of stepfather living with child’s mother]; In re Spencer W., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1651 [purported biological father did not receive the child into his home but instead mother permitted father to reside in her home and father’s residence with child was not demonstrative of commitment to child but reflected father acted out of personal convenience and self-interest].) Appellant asserted that he cared for the child on a day to day basis despite living in a separate hotel room. But, when the department detained the child, she was found wearing only a diaper, had a cough, and matted and dirty hair, in an unheated, trash- and insect-filled room with approximately six adults. Although appellant’s hotel room was somewhat better than the one in which the child lived with Denise, he had only taken the child to his room “[f]or a night or two every once in a while.” Appellant challenges the juvenile court’s reliance on his testimony that he considered Felicia his stepdaughter and not his daughter, his failure to seek to set aside David O.’s paternity declaration, and his failure to assume custody of the children despite being aware of the condition of Denise’s hotel room. However, the juvenile court did not rely on appellant’s testimony and failures as a basis to rebut any presumption arising under section 7611, subdivision (d), “but rather to evaluate whether appellant had shown the level of diligent commitment required to attain rights.” (In re Spencer W., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1654, fn. 4.) The juvenile court reasonably concluded that appellant’s conduct was no more than in the nature of a loving stepparent, who took care of Felicia while he cared for his own child, Natasha, but that he did not otherwise show any commitment to assume full parental responsibilities for her by taking custody or being financially responsible for Felicia. The cases cited by appellant are factually distinguishable and do not warrant a different result.
We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not err in rejecting appellant’s request to be declared Felicia’s presumed father. In light of our determination, we need not address appellant’s argument regarding David O.’s request to be declared the child’s presumed father.
DISPOSITION
The August 17, 2006, order denying the request of James H. for presumed father status of Felicia O. is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Pollak, J.