Opinion
Nos. 44221-0-I, 45781-1-I, 45821-3-I, and 45020-4-I.
Filed: June 4, 2001. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County, No. 98-4-01196-1, Hon. Donald Haley, February 9, 1999, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Byron D. Coney, 1047 Belmont Place East, Seattle, WA 98102-4426.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Michael Regeimbal, 22220 Marine View Dr S, Des Moines, WA 98198.
Counsel for Respondent Intervenor(s), Chris R. Youtz, Sirianni Youtz, Ste 3410, 701 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-7032.
Sindy Ryan appeals several orders of the trial court in connection with the administration of a trust created by the will of her father, Alfred Sutter. Primarily at issue is whether the trial court erred by permitting Sutter's surviving spouse, as income beneficiary and co-trustee, to invade the trust principal without Sindy's approval as co-trustee. Also at issue is whether the trial court erred by failing to give notice to the trust remaindermen or hold an evidentiary hearing before granting the surviving spouse's petition for sale of the family residence and distribution of assets.
We hold that the trial court properly ordered the distribution of assets because the trust terms authorized the invasion of principal, as necessary, to further the expressly stated purpose of providing for the surviving spouse's care, support, and comfort. We also hold that the contingent remainder beneficiaries were not entitled to notice or an evidentiary hearing prior to the trial court's decision on the petition for sale.
There being no other meritorious issues on appeal, we affirm all orders.
Alfred Sutter died in February 1998, survived by his second wife, Sharon Sutter, and four adult children from a prior marriage, including Sindy Sue Ryan. In his will, Sutter created a trust to provide for the `care, support, comfort and medical needs' of his wife Sharon during her lifetime. Upon her death, the trust was to terminate and any remaining assets would go to Sindy and her siblings. Sutter appointed his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Sindy, as co-personal representatives and co-trustees.
Clerk's Papers at 3.
After Sutter's death, a dispute arose between Sharon and Sindy over the distribution of income and principal under the trust. Claiming expenses in excess of the trust income, Sharon sought the distribution of additional income and principal. She also wanted to sell the family's Kirkland residence and invest the proceeds. When Sindy would not agree, Sharon petitioned the court for an order approving the distribution of estate assets and the sale of the residence.
The trial court granted Sharon's motion, and ordered the trustees to sell the home. The court also directed that Sharon receive a lump sum distribution from the trust principal to pay past due expenses and attorney fees, as well as a minimum monthly payment to meet her ongoing expenses. Sindy appealed, and also filed a motion to supersede and stay the trial court's decision ordering the sale of the house and distribution of estate assets. This Court denied Sindy's motion, and our Supreme Court denied her petition for discretionary review. While that petition was still pending, the trial court held Sindy in contempt for failing to comply with its order to sell the house and distribute assets.
On Sharon's motion, the trial court also issued an `order for sale of real property by negotiation' authorizing her to sell the house. To stay the sale, Sindy filed a supersedeas bond, which the trial court later vacated. In its order vacating the bond, the trial court ordered that Sindy be estopped `from filing any future bond to preclude the sale of the Kirkland residence.' Roughly one month later, Sharon notified the trial court that she had sold the property, and the court later entered orders confirming the sale and approving attorney fees. Sindy filed another supersedeas bond, which the court again vacated.
Clerk's Papers at 228.
Clerk's Papers at 352.
Several days later, Sindy filed yet another supersedeas bond. Shortly thereafter, the trial court issued an order directing that A.G. Edwards, an intervening party in this appeal, invest the proceeds of the sale. Sindy appeals these various orders. Testamentary Intent Sindy argues that her father's will requires both co-trustees to agree to any invasion of principal, and that the trial court thus erred by ordering the distribution and sale of trust assets without her approval. She is mistaken.
The interpretation of a will or trust instrument is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. The primary duty of this Court when interpreting a will or trust instrument is to determine the intent of the testator. If possible, this Court will determine the testator's intent at the time of the will's execution from the language of the will itself. In determining the intent of the testator, this Court should consider the will in its entirety, and give effect to every part. Where the testator's intent is ambiguous, we may admit extrinsic facts and circumstances to explain the language of the will. The terms of a will or trust instrument are ambiguous if they are `susceptible [to] more than one meaning.' Whether such an ambiguity exists is a question of law. Here, Sindy argues that her father's will expressly requires that both she and Sharon agree to any invasion of the trust principal, and that the trial court thus erred by ordering the sale of the home and distribution of funds without her consent. For support, she points first to the following provision of the will:
In re Estate of Curry, 98 Wn. App. 107, 112-13, 988 P.2d 505 (1999), review denied, 140 Wn.2d 1016 (2000); In re Estate of Rehwinkel, 71 Wn. App. 827, 829, 862 P.2d 639 (1993) (citing In re Estate of Lee, 49 Wn.2d 254, 257, 299 P.2d 1066 (1956)). See also Burch v. George, 7 Cal.4th 246, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 866 P.2d 92, 96, (1994) ("The interpretation of a will or trust instrument presents a question of law unless interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict therein.").
Curry, 98 Wn. App. at 113; Rhay v. Johnson, 73 Wn. App. 98, 103, 867 P.2d 669 (1994).
In re Estate of Price, 73 Wn. App. 745, 754, 871 P.2d 1079 (1994) (citing In re Estate of Bergau, 103 Wn.2d 431, 435-36, 693 P.2d 703 (1985)).
Price, 73 Wn. App. at 754 (citing Bergau, 103 Wn.2d at 435-36).
Price, 73 Wn. App. at 754 (citing Bergau, 103 Wn.2d at 436).
Waits v. Hamlin, 55 Wn. App. 193, 200, 776 P.2d 1003, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1025 (1989).
Waits, 55 Wn. App. at 200.
1. A primary purpose of this Trust, during the lifetime of my wife, SHARON, is to provide for her care, support, comfort, and medical needs as may be required from time to time. To this end, my Trust may maintain as an asset any real property owned by me or by my wife and me being used at the time of my death as a home or residence; and, may be so maintained and utilized for the use of my wife during her lifetime for such period as she shall desire, or shall be deemed by my Trustee(s) to be in the best interest thereof. The Trust is authorized to expend from income or principal, amounts necessary for regular required maintenance, repair, real estate taxes and insurance as may be deemed appropriate and necessary for preservation and use of the property as a home for my said wife.
Clerk's Papers at 3.
Sindy deconstructs this paragraph in great detail, ultimately arguing that it does not `grant [Sharon] the right she claims to have principal disbursed to her on her assertion that she needs it.' Sindy notes that the will identifies providing for Sharon only as `a primary purpose' of the trust, rather than the sole or exclusive purpose. Because her father presumably created the trust for the additional purpose of providing for his grown children upon Sharon's death, Sindy argues that he did not intend to allow Sharon to invade the trust principal without his daughter's consent.
Amended Brief of Appellants at 39.
Sindy's arguments on this point are unconvincing. Because the will expressly identifies the `primary purpose' of the trust as providing for the care of his surviving spouse, any intent on Sutter's part to provide for his children was clearly secondary. In fact, the will specifically contemplates the possibility that there will be no trust estate remaining following Sharon's death. It states that the `[t]rust shall terminate upon the death of my wife, and the remaining Trust Estate, if any, shall be distributed in equal shares to my children.'
Clerk's Papers at 4 (emphasis added).
Sindy also relies on the following language as evidence that her father intended her to have control over Sharon's access to the trust assets:
Trust assets may be utilized for the care, maintenance, support, and health needs of my said wife, in such amounts and for such purposes as shall be deemed, in the sole discretion of my Trustee(s) appropriate in the circumstances.
Clerk's Papers at 4.
Sindy argues that `Trustee(s)' is plural, and that this sentence thus clearly authorizes Sharon to reach the trust principal only if she can persuade Sindy to agree to such a distribution. Sharon, in contrast, argues that the parentheses around the `s' in `Trustee(s)' mean that Sutter intended to authorize one trustee acting alone, or both co-trustees acting together, to invade the trust principal.
Even assuming that sentence is ambiguous, arguably placing the invasion of principal at the discretion of both co-trustees, the trial court did not err by ordering the sale of the home and the distribution of trust principal. The trial court has `full and ample power and authority to administer and settle the affairs and the estates of all deceased persons' and `all trusts and trust matters.' The Legislature has similarly empowered the court `to proceed with such administration and settlement in any manner and way that to the court seems right and proper, all to the end that [such] matters may be administered and settled by the court.' The trial court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to construe the will, thereby resolving the dispute between the co-trustees.
RCW 11.96.020(1) (2) (Repealed by laws 1999, ch. 42, § 637). See RCW 11.96A.020.
RCW 11.96.020(3) (Repealed by laws 1999, ch. 42, § 637). See RCW 11.96A.020(2).
In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the intent of the testator is controlling. RCW 11.12.230 directs that `[a]ll courts and others concerned in the execution of last wills shall have due regard to the direction of the will, and the true intent and meaning of the testator, in all matters brought before them.' Reading Sutter's will as a whole, it is clear that his overriding intent was to provide for his surviving spouse during her lifetime.
To that end, the trust terms expressly authorize discretionary payments to Sharon from the corpus of the trust to provide for her `care, maintenance, support and health needs.' In her petition, Sharon sought a distribution of assets for these precise purposes. Specifically, she sought lump sum payments of $20,445 to meet past due expenses, which included tax and credit card debt, medical expenses, and attorney fees. She also requested a distribution of principal in the amount of $8,700 to make necessary repairs on her condominium, which is also held in trust. In addition, she asked that the court approve a minimum monthly payment of $4,350 to meet her itemized non-discretionary expenses, and $940 for discretionary purposes. The trial court determined that Sharon needed the amounts requested to provide for her care, maintenance, support and health needs. The trust expressly authorized payment of such expenses, and Sharon has not shown any error on the trial court's part in interpreting the instrument to carry out the trust purpose. Sharon also petitioned the court for an order directing the sale of the family home.
Clerk's Papers at 4.
The trial court granted her request, and the record indicates that Sharon later sold the home for $275,000. The investment firm of A.G. Edwards has since invested the proceeds. Because the home has long since been sold and the proceeds invested, Sindy's appeal is moot to the extent that she appeals from various court orders regarding the sale of the home.
In any event, Sindy has not shown how its sale has adversely affected her interests as a contingent beneficiary. As a court commissioner noted in a prior ruling in this case, `the sale of the house does not deprive the estate of assets; it simply changes the asset from real estate to cash available for investment.' Sindy simply has not shown how the trial court exceeded its authority or otherwise erred by construing the will to carry out the trust's primary purpose, which is to care for Sharon during her lifetime. To interpret the will as Sindy urges, thereby allowing her to unilaterally deny Sharon's requests for financial help in meeting her expenses, would frustrate the trust's primary purpose and Sutter's overriding intent to provide for his wife's `care, support, comfort, and medical needs.' The court properly ordered the sale of the home and the distribution of assets to carry out the purpose of the trust.
Clerk's Papers at 150.
Clerk's Papers at 3.
Notice to Contingent Beneficiaries
Sindy argues that the trial court erred by ordering the sale of the home and distribution of assets without first giving notice to the trust remaindermen or holding an evidentiary hearing. She is mistaken. Although Sharon does not identify the statute pursuant to which she filed her petition, she appears to have done so under RCW 11.96.070. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that A person with an interest in or right respecting the administration, settlement, or disposition of an interest in a trust or in the estate of [a] deceased person may have a judicial proceeding for the declaration of rights or legal relations under this title including but not limited to the following:
Repealed by laws 1999, ch. 42, § 637. See RCW 11.96A.080.
(b) The ordering of the personal representatives or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity;
(c) The determination of any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including without limitation questions of construction of wills and other writings.'
RCW 11.96.070(1).
Although Sindy had actual notice of the proceedings in this case, she argues that most of her siblings `have never been [on] notice of the attack on their interests.' Assuming, without deciding, that Sindy has standing to assert this claim on her siblings' behalf under this statute, this claim is too conclusory and suspect in light of the extensive history of litigation in this case. We see no violation of this statute on the record that is before us.
Evidentiary Hearing
`A petition for a declaration of rights under RCW 11.96.070 is in the nature of a declaratory judgment.' Accordingly, `[a]ll issues of fact in any judicial proceeding under this title shall be tried in conformity with the requirements of the rules of practices in civil actions' Sindy relies on this portion of RCW 11.96.130, to support her argument that the trial court erred by denying her requests for an evidentiary hearing. She argues that such a hearing was necessary to resolve a number of `factual' issues, including the meaning of the will language, the legitimacy of Sharon's claimed expenses and attorney fees, and the value of the residence.
In re Estate of Stockman, 59 Wn. App. 711, 712 n. 1, 800 P.2d 1141 (1990).
RCW 11.96.130 (Repealed by Laws 1999, ch. 42, § 637). See RCW 11.96A.100.
The initial issue before the trial court was one of trust interpretation, which is a question of law. The court may admit `[e]xtrinsic evidence of surrounding facts and circumstances to explain the language of a will when uncertainty arises as to the testator's true intention.' But the court may not consider extrinsic evidence "`for the purpose of proving intention as an independent fact, or of importing into the will an intention not expressed therein.'" Here, the trust instrument clearly expressed Sutter's intent to provide an income for the benefit of his surviving wife.
Curry, 98 Wn. App. at 112-13.
Curry, 98 Wn. App. at 113 (citing Bergau, 103 Wn.2d at 436).
Curry, 98 Wn. App. at 113 (quoting In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 467-68, 494 P.2d 238, review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1009 (1972)).
Because Sutter's intent was clear from the instrument, the court had no need to resort to extrinsic evidence by way of an evidentiary hearing to interpret the trust instrument. Sindy relies on In re Estate of Stockman, for the proposition that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to resolve certain factual issues. There, this Court held that the trial court erred by determining that real property involved in a probate proceeding `was the separate property of the deceased husband, without taking testimony from the parties involved.' But Stockman does not disapprove of the procedure used by the trial court in this case. To the extent that this case involved certain factual issues regarding the amount and propriety of Sharon's claimed expenses, the trial court did not err by resolving those issues based on the record before it. Sharon submitted a detailed listing of her expenses, and Sindy submitted an accounting of the various charges against the estate. The trial court did not err by relying on those documents and other information before it to resolve any factual issues.
59 Wn. App. 711, 712, 800 P.2d 1141 (1990).
Stockman, 59 Wn. App. at 711-12.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Sindy's requests for an evidentiary hearing. Sindy also argues that the court erred by denying her requests for oral argument under King County Local Rule 7(b)(2). She asserts that KCLR 7(b)(2), which provides that the court rule on all nondispositive motions without oral argument, implicitly requires that the court hold oral argument for all dispositive motions. She is incorrect. Oral argument is not a due process right. KCLR 7(b)(2) simply does not mandate oral argument for dispositive motions. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying her requests for oral argument. Remaining Issues
Hanson v. Shim, 87 Wn. App. 538, 551, 943 P.2d 322 (1997), review denied, 134 Wn.2d 1017 (1998).
Sindy identifies several more issues and assignments of error, but provides no supporting argument in her brief. Under RAP 10.3(a)(5), she must provide `argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record.' Because she has failed to do so, we need not consider her remaining arguments.
RAP 10.3(a)(5); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992); Bryant v. Palmer Coking Coal Co., 86 Wn. App. 204, 216, 936 P.2d 1163, review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1022 (1997).
We affirm all the orders identified in the notice of appeal.
CONCURRING: MARLIN J APPELWICK, SUSAN R. AGID.