Opinion
J-S79031-17 No. 1633 EDA 2017
12-20-2017
IN RE: ESTATE OF JANET MORANE APPEAL OF: JAY A. MORANE
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered April 24, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2010-0668 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Jay A. Morane, appeals from the order entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas Orphans' court, which denied his petition for a citation to show cause why Appellee, Stacy L. Morane ("Executrix"), should not file an accounting of the Estate of Janet Morane, Decedent. We affirm.
In its opinion, the Orphans' court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. Therefore, we have no need to restate them. We add Appellant filed a "Petition for Citation To Show Cause Why An Account Should Not Be Filed In Accordance With Section 3501.1 Of The PEF Code" on September 1, 2016. On April 24, 2017, the court denied Appellant's petition. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on May 24, 2017. The Orphans' court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed none.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER THE [ORPHANS'] COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE "PETITION FOR CITATION TO SHOW CAUSE WHY AN ACCOUNT SHOULD NOT BE FILED" WITHOUT A HEARING OR ACCOUNT?(Appellant's Brief at 4).
Our standard and scope of review are as follows:
Our standard of review of the findings of an [O]rphans' court is deferential.
When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans' [c]ourt, this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error and the court's factual findings are supported by the evidence. Because the Orphans' [c]ourt sits as the fact-finder, it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion.
However, we are not constrained to give the same deference to any resulting legal conclusions.
In re Estate of Whitley , 50 A.3d 203, 206-07 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[T]he Orphans' court decision will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in applying the correct principles of law.
[T]he Orphans' [c]ourt is a court of equity, [which means] that in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction conferred entirely by statute, it applies the rules and principles of equity.In re Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d 332, 334-35 (Pa.Super. 2016).
When examining the terms of a contract, "the language of the instrument should be interpreted in the light of the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the conditions existing when it was executed." Hart v. Arnold , 884 A.2d 316, 333 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695, 897 A.2d 458 (2006). "[T]he intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in the writing itself. When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the meaning of the contract is ascertained from the contents alone." Chen v. Chen , 586 Pa. 297, 307, 893 A.2d 87, 93 (2006). "If left undefined, the words of a contract are to be given their ordinary meaning." Kripp v. Kripp , 578 Pa. 82, 90, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (2004). Further, the court does not consider the disputed language in isolation, but will examine that language in the context of the entire instrument. Murphy v. Duquesne University Of The Holy Ghost , 565 Pa. 571, 591, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (2001).
The scope of a release "must be determined from the ordinary meaning of its language" and where releases "involve clear and unambiguous terms, the court need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties' understanding." Seasor v. Covington , 670 A.2d 157, 159 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 647, 683 A.2d 884 (1996). In certain cases, however, it is necessary to look beyond the plain meaning of the release. Vaughn v. Didizian , 648 A.2d 38 (Pa.Super. 1994). "Although a court will not relieve the parties of the effect of an improvident contract, it must not allow a 'rigid literalness' to be used to create an improvident contract for the parties contrary to their intent." Farrell v. Lechmanik , Inc., 611 A.2d 1322, 1323 (Pa.Super. 1992). Therefore, a court may also discern intent from the conditions and circumstances surrounding the execution of the release. Vaughn , supra at 40. Additionally, contracting parties are generally bound to their agreement "without regard to whether the terms were read and fully understood and irrespective of whether the agreements embodied reasonable or good bargains." Crispo v. Crispo , 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Section 3521 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries ("PEF") Code provides as follows:
§ 3521. Rehearing; relief granted20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3521.
If any party in interest shall, within five years after the final confirmation of any account of a personal representative, file a petition to review any part of the account or of an auditor's report, or of the adjudication, or of any decree of distribution, setting forth specifically alleged errors therein, the court shall give such relief as equity and justice shall require: Provided, That no such review shall impose liability on the personal representative as to any property which was distributed by him in accordance with a decree of court before the filing of the petition. The court or master considering the petition may include in his adjudication or report, findings of fact and of law as to the entire controversy, in pursuance of which a final order may be made.
Nevertheless, "equity courts may not rely solely on statutes of limitation in determining if a claim is timely." United Nat. Ins. Co. v. J.H. France Refractories Co., 542 Pa. 432, 441, 668 A.2d 120, 125 (1995). "[F]or an action in equity, the applicable statute of limitations is used only as a frame of reference to evaluate any purported delay in support of a claim of laches." Lipschutz v. Lipschutz , 571 A.2d 1046, 1051 (Pa.Super. 1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 601, 589 A.2d 692 (1990). "The doctrine of laches is an equitable bar to the prosecution of stale claims and is the practical application of the maxim[:] those who sleep on their rights must awaken to the consequence that they have disappeared." Fulton v. Fulton , 106 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa.Super. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The question of whether laches applies is a question of law; thus, we are not bound by the trial court's decision on the issue." Id.
Laches bars relief when the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action to the prejudice of another. Thus, in order to prevail on an assertion of laches, respondents must establish: a) a delay arising from petitioner's failure to exercise due diligence; and, b) prejudice to the respondents resulting from the delay.Id. (quoting In re Estate of Scharlach , 809 A.2d 376, 382-83 (Pa.Super. 2002)). "The question of laches itself, however, is factual...and is determined by examining the circumstances of each case." Fulton , supra at 131. Laches arises when a party's position or rights "are so prejudiced by length of time and inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim against him." Nilon Bros. Enterprises v. Lucente , 461 A.2d 1312, 1314 (Pa.Super. 1983).
Unlike the application of the statute of limitations, exercise of the doctrine of laches does not depend on a mechanical
passage of time. Indeed, the doctrine of laches may bar a suit in equity where a comparable suit at law would not be barred by an analogous statute of limitations. Moreover,
Fulton , supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). "In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied." Brodt v. Brown , 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961).[t]he party asserting laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from the lapse of time. Such evidence may include establishing that a witness has died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims.
"Equitable estoppel is a doctrine whereby a party will be bound by [its] representations if they are justifiably relied upon by another party." Northcraft v. Edward C. Michener Associates , Inc., 466 A.2d 620, 626 (Pa.Super. 1983). "Equitable estoppel arises when a party by acts or representation intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe that certain facts exist and the other justifiably relies and acts upon such belief, so that the latter will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts." Id.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable J. Brian Johnson, we conclude Appellant's issue on appeal merits no relief. The Orphans' court comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Orphans' Court Opinion, filed, June 5, 2017, at 5- 7) (finding: equity does not warrant hearing on Appellant's petition nor require Executrix to file formal accounting of estate administration that parties agreed was completed over four years ago; Appellant failed to set forth in his petition those errors Appellant could not have discovered when he signed Receipt, Release and Refunding Agreement ("Agreement"); each error or omission in Executrix's administration of estate, that Appellant alleged in his petition constitutes fraud, was discernible upon review of record when parties signed Agreement; if Appellant disagreed with Executrix's administration of Decedent's estate, Appellant could and should have declined to sign Agreement until his concerns were addressed and/or demanded Orphans' court audit; that Appellant failed to seek advice of counsel before he signed Agreement does not mean Executrix fraudulently induced Appellant to sign Agreement; further, Appellant's misunderstanding or failure to recognize legal significance of information that Executrix provided to Appellant when he signed Agreement does not mean Executrix fraudulently induced Appellant to sign Agreement; Appellant is bound by his prior approval of informal accounting of estate and discharge of Executrix through Agreement). The record supports the court's rationale, and we discern no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the Orphans' court's opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins this memorandum.
Judge Ott concurs in the result. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/20/2017
Image materials not available for display.