Summary
In Matter of Estate of Beabout, 136 Ohio St. 412, 26 N.E.2d 211; In Matter of Estate of Blue, 67 Ohio App. 37, 32 N.E.2d 499.
Summary of this case from In re Estate of HedgesOpinion
No. 27611
Decided March 20, 1940.
Executors and administrators — Schedule of debts — Section 10509-119, General Code — Overruling exceptions to an item final, when — Validity of claim cannot be challenged by exceptions to final account, when.
1. Under the provisions of Section 10509-119, General Code, the finding and order of the Probate Court overruling exceptions to an item contained in the schedule of debts involving a claim upon which the Probate Court is authorized by these provisions to act, are final as to parties filing exceptions or otherwise voluntarily entering their appearance, subject only to the right of review or to be opened up for fraud, collusion or mistake.
2. The validity of a claim against an estate cannot be challenged by exceptions of a legatee to the final account of an administrator when such claim had theretofore been allowed and paid following a hearing by the Probate Court and a valid order overruling the exceptions of such legatee to the claim when duly presented in the schedule of debts, no appeal having been taken from the order overruling the exceptions or any action instituted to set the same aside on the ground of fraud, collusion or mistake.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of Franklin county.
This case originated in the Probate Court of Franklin county and involves the administration of the estate of Elizabeth Beabout (Ault), who died testate March 20, 1937.
During the administration of that estate, one Gertrude Creamer duly filed with the administrator a claim in the sum of $6,000 for services claimed to have been rendered for the decedent. The administrator subsequently allowed the claim in the sum of $4,000, and included it in the schedule of debts filed by him in the Probate Court of Franklin county pursuant to and in accordance with the statutory requirements.
Dr. A.A. Peasley, a legatee under the will, excepted in writing to the schedule of debts filed by the administrator, for the reason that the estate was not indebted in any way to Gertrude Creamer and the payment of her claim would defeat his legacy. Upon the hearing of such exception, the following entry was made by the judge of the Probate Court, October 13, 1937:
"This cause came on this day for hearing on the exceptions filed by A.A. Peasley to the administrator's allowance of the claim of Gertrude Creamer for the sum of $4,000 against the above-named estate; and upon hearing the evidence as to said exceptions, and being fully advised, the court does overrule said exceptions, without determining the merits.
"The court further adjudges and decrees, without determining the merits, that said claim is in due and proper form and was legally sworn to and duly presented to the administrator on July 23, 1937, within four months from the date of his appointment; that said administrator duly received said claim, and allowed the same in the amount of $4,000.
"It is further adjudged and decreed that if said claim is found upon a determination of the merits to be a valid claim against said estate, said claim shall be classed among other claims presented within four months from the date of the appointment of the administrator and which have been allowed by said administrator."
No appeal was taken from this finding, and no bond was filed to require the administrator to reject the claim of Gertrude Creamer. The schedule of debts was later allowed and confirmed by the Probate Court on December 28, 1937. Thereafter, on January 12, 1938, the claim was paid in part, which payment, together with the discharge of other valid claims, exhausted the funds in the estate, and the administrator filed his first and final account.
Exceptions were then filed to this account by Peasley, and a hearing was held. Objection was made both to the payment to Gertrude Creamer and the allowance of extra compensation to the administrator and his counsel. The administrator moved to dismiss the exceptions, on the grounds that since no appeal was taken from the entry overruling the exceptions to the schedule of debts, and the administrator was not requisitioned in accordance with Section 10509-135, General Code, issue as to the validity of such claim could not be made by exceptions to the final account of the administrator. There being insufficient funds to satisfy the Creamer claim, the legatee would, of course, not be concerned in the allowance of compensation to the administrator. The court sustained the motion of the administrator and on April 7, 1938, dismissed the exceptions of the appellant.
Upon appeal, the Court of Common Pleas sustained the motion to dismiss the exceptions, and that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The case is before this court for review by reason of the granting of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. James B. Yaw and Mr. Harry Kohn, for appellant, A.A. Peasley.
Messrs. Gibbs Gibbs and Mr. James A. White, for appellee, V.H. Gibbs, administrator.
There is but one question of law presented by the record in this case; that is whether the validity of a claim against an estate may be challenged by exceptions of a legatee to the final account of an administrator notwithstanding such claim theretofore had been allowed and paid following a hearing upon and overruling of the exceptions of the legatee to such claim presented in the schedule of debts duly filed, from which there had been no appeal or further proceeding relative thereto.
The provisions of the statutes governing the procedure in the Probate Court relative to the matters involved in this controversy are to be found in Section 10509-118 et seq., General Code. A schedule of claims, debts and liabilities against an estate is required to be filed and hearing upon exceptions thereto is authorized. The provisions of Section 10509-119, General Code, are in part as follows:
"At the hearing the executor or administrator and any witness may be examined under oath. The court shall have power to affirm, modify or reverse the action of the executor or administrator as to any item contained in the schedule of debts, excepting action on claims on which suit has already been brought, or which have been referred to referees, or which have been disallowed by requisition; and may dispose of any other matters properly raised by exceptions without the intervention of a jury.
"Subject to the right of review, and to be opened up for fraud, collusion or mistake, the finding and order of the court shall be final as between parties who have filed exceptions or otherwise voluntarily entered their appearance."
It is to be observed that authority is conferred upon the Probate Court to affirm, modify or reverse the action of the executor or administrator as to any item except as to claims on which suit has been brought or which have been referred to referees or which have been disallowed by requisition. These provisions afford a method for a prompt hearing and disposition of contested claims and evidence the very laudable purpose and intent to expedite the settlement of estates. Issue was made by the filing of exceptions to the schedule of debts and the proceeding thereupon became adversary in character. The action of the court thereon is expressly made final as to the parties specified in the statute, subject, of course, to the right of review provided in subsequent sections, as to anyone who files exceptions to such schedule of debts or who otherwise voluntarily enters his appearance.
It is quite apparent, however, that the method of procedure thus provided is not excluscive. An heir or creditor objecting to the allowance and payment of any claim clearly has the option to proceed in the manner provided by Section 10509-135, General Code, which authorizes the filing of "a written requisition on the administrator or executor, to disallow and reject a claim presented for allowance * * *." If a bond, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the probate judge, conditioned as therein required, is entered into, "the claim shall be rejected by such administrator or executor." Then, under the provisions of Section 10509-136, General Code, the holder of such rejected claim must bring action to enforce it in the manner and within the time prescribed.
The claim, the validity of which is here challenged, is not in either of the classes enumerated in Section 10509-119, General Code, which the Probate Court is expressly precluded from considering upon exceptions to the schedule of debts. No suit had been brought upon it; it had not been referred to a referee; and it had not been disallowed upon requisition. Hence, when Peasley, the legatee, sought the benefit of the remedy provided by Section 10509-119, General Code, and the court overruled his exceptions, the finding and order of the court was final unless there was fraud, collusion or mistake. None has been claimed, and no appeal was taken. These statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous. If the results of their application are unsatisfactory, the power of amendment or repeal is in the legislative branch of the government.
It is contended that the order of the Probate Court is not a final order by reason of its disclaimer of a purpose to decide the question of the validity of the claim upon its merits. It is to be observed, however, that the court by its order clearly and expressly overruled the exceptions Under the specific terms of the statute governing this procedure, that was a final order upon the issue made by the exceptions to the claim contained in the schedule of debts. There having been no appeal from that order as authorized by Section 10509-120, General Code, the exceptor is bound thereby. The administrator paid the claim in question and proceeded with the settlement of the estate. The same issue as to the validity of that claim cannot be again made by the same party and heard upon exceptions to the final account. Finding no error in the action of the Court of Appeals, its judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., DAY, ZIMMERMAN, WILLIAM, MYERS and HART, JJ., concur.