Opinion
No. 105,338.
2012-06-29
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Jack Voyl BAUM, Deceased.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Richard T. Ballinger, Judge. Mark G, Ayesh and Ray E. Simmons, of Ayesh Law Offices, of Wichita, for appellant/cross-appellee Estate of Jack Voyl Baum. Ted E. Knopp, of Ted E. Knopp, Chartered, of Wichita, for appellee/cross-appellant Larry's Trailer Sales & Service, LLC.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Richard T. Ballinger, Judge.
Mark G, Ayesh and Ray E. Simmons, of Ayesh Law Offices, of Wichita, for appellant/cross-appellee Estate of Jack Voyl Baum. Ted E. Knopp, of Ted E. Knopp, Chartered, of Wichita, for appellee/cross-appellant Larry's Trailer Sales & Service, LLC.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., McANANY and ATCHESON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Larry's Trailer Sales & Service, LLC (Larry's), filed a claim against the Estate of Jack Voyl Baum, deceased (the Estate), in the amount of $46,658.06, alleging that Baum personally owed Larry's for services rendered during his operation of OK Transfer & Storage, a sole proprietorship. The Estate denied liability, alleging that the services were rendered to OK Transfer & Storage, Inc., a now defunct corporation. The Estate further claimed that even if the Estate had been liable, Larry's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found tht the Estate was liable for the services rendered by Larry's and that the statute of limitations had been tolled by payments made on Baum's account. The court ultimately granted judgment in favor of Larry's in the amount of $26,144.90, holding that Larry's was not entitled to the entire amount requested because it failed to present evidence that interest was contemplated by the parties' agreement. The Estate appeals the district court's judgment in favor of Larry's, while Larry's cross-appeals the district court's denial of its request for interest.
Facts
Baum operated a sole proprietorship under the name of OK Transfer & Storage, Let Us Move It. In the late 1950's, Baum entered into an oral agreement to obtain goods and services from Larry's. In 1975, Baum formed the corporation OK Transfer & Storage, Inc. Although payments made to Larry's after the incorporation were made by corporate check in the name of OK Transfer & Storage, Inc., the name and title on the account—OK Transfer & Storage—remained unchanged.
Beginning in 2005, the corporation fell behind in making payments to Larry's. In 2007, Larry's began requiring the corporation to pay for services at the time they were rendered. By the end of 2007, the account still had a balance of nearly $46,000, which included finance charges. In 2008, Larry's received notification that OK Transfer & Storage, Inc., was liquidating its assets and that it was not able to pay the monies owed to Larry's.
On February 16, 2009, Baum died testate, and his will was admitted to probate. On August 10, 2009, Larry's filed a petition for allowance and classification of demand against Baum's estate, alleging that it was due a net balance of $43,985.74, which included an 18% interest charge. Larry's later amended the balance due to $45,658.06. In response, the Estate sought to dismiss Larry's demand, claiming that because Larry's failed to answer the Estate's requests for admissions issued during discovery, they were deemed admitted and extinguished Larry's claim because they established that there was no account in Baum's name and that Baum never personally guaranteed any indebtedness of OK Transfer & Storage, Inc.
At an evidentiary hearing, the district court heard argument and testimony from both parties and ultimately granted judgment in favor of Larry's. The court found that Baum's failure to notify Larry's in 1975 that Baum no longer was operating as a sole proprietorship, but as a representative of OK Transfer & Storage, Inc., meant the open account remained that of Baum's doing business as OK Transfer & Storage, which in turn meant the Estate was liable for the debt. With that said, the court denied Larry's request for interest on the debt because Larry's failed to show that interest was contemplated by the parties' agreement. In the end, the court concluded that Larry's was entitled to $26,144.90, plus costs of the action.
Analysis
The Estate presents two points of error on appeal. First, the Estate argues the district court erred in finding Baum personally liable for the debt owed to Larry's on the OK Transfer & Storage account. Second, the Estate argues that even if Baum had been liable, the district court erred in failing to find that Larry's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Larry's cross-appeals from the district court's decision finding Larry's was not entitled to interest on the debt. We address each of the issues presented in turn.
1. Personal Liability
In its first point of error, the Estate argues the facts upon which the district court relied in concluding Baum was personally liable for the debt owed to Larry's on the OK Transfer & Storage account are not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. More specifically, the Estate asserts the district court blatantly ignored two key pieces of evidence introduced at trial. The Estate contends this evidence undermines the court's factual findings to the extent that a reasonable person would no longer accept the court's findings as supported by substantial competent evidence. The evidence to which the Estate refers is (1) Larry's admission prior to trial that it did not have an account bearing Baum's name and (2) Larry's long-standing knowledge that Baum was acting as a representative for the corporation and not as a sole proprietor. A. Admission
The Estate served several requests for admission on Larry's during the discovery phase of this litigation, including a request to admit that “Larry's Trailer Sales & Services, LLC does not have an account in the personal name of the decedent, Jack Voyl Baum.” Based on Larry's failure to respond or otherwise object to this statement, the Estate asserts that Larry's has admitted the truth of this statement pursuant to K.S.A. 60–236 and that the district court's factual findings directly conflict with this admission. But we find the issue of whether Larry's admitted the truth of this statement is immaterial to the court's factual findings. This is because there is no dispute that the account at issue here was in the name of OK Transfer & Storage and not Baum's personal name. Thus, even if Larry's was deemed to have admitted this fact, it does nothing to contradict Larry's argument that Baum was individually responsible for services rendered on the OK Transfer & Storage account. B. Larry's receipt of corporate checks
Although conceding that Baum never expressly notified Larry's that it was dealing with a corporate entity and not with Baum as a sole proprietor, the Estate argues that payment to Larry's by corporate check over the course of several decades was sufficient to provide Larry's with actual knowledge of this fact, which effectively relieves Baum of any liability on the contract.
We begin our analysis with a brief review of the agency law that is relevant to the issue presented. An agent who fails to disclose the existence of the agency or the identity of the principal is personally liable in his or her contractual dealings with third parties. The underlying rationale is that “a third-party creditor, who has agreed to look to the individual for payment rather than some unknown and undisclosed principal, is entitled to rely on the personal liability of the individual to whom credit was extended.” Hill & Company, Inc. v. O'Malley, 15 Kan.App.2d 709, 715, 817 P.2d 660 (1991). Consistent with this rationale, the agent bears the entire burden of making this disclosure and the third party with whom the agent deals has no duty to inquire whether the agent is acting for another or to discover the existence of the agency or the identity of the principal. Thus, it is not sufficient to relieve the agent from liability on the contract that the third party has knowledge of facts and circumstances which would, if reasonably followed by inquiry, disclose the identity of the principal. With that said, if the third party with whom the agent contracts on behalf of an undisclosed principal has actual knowledge of the agency and the identity of the principal, the agent will be relieved from liability on the contract, whether the agent himself or herself makes disclosure or the third party acquires the knowledge from some other source. Lentz Plumbing Co. v. Fee, 235 Kan. 266, 270–71, 679 P.2d 736 (1984).
“Whether or not the fact of the agency and the name of the principal were disclosed or known to the third party so as to protect the agency from personal liability on the transaction is essentially a question of fact which depends upon the circumstances surrounding a particular transaction.” Lentz Plumbing Co., 235 Kan. at 271. Consequently, our standard of review is whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence and sufficient to support the district court's conclusions of law. Substantial competent evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might regard as sufficient to support a conclusion. Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, 65, 199 P.3d 1251 (2009). An appellate court has unlimited review of conclusions of law. American Special Risk Management Corp. v. Cahow, 286 Kan. 1134, 1141, 192 P.3d 614 (2008).
The district court made its legal conclusion that Baum was personally liable for the debt owed to Larry's on the OK Transfer & Storage account based on the following findings of fact:
• Baum entered into an oral agreement with Larry's for goods and services on an open account;
• The oral agreement was made in the 1950's and continued up to and including all times relevant to this matter;
• Baum caused a corporation OK Transfer & Storage, Inc., to be formed in or around 1975;
• No notice was provided by Baum or the corporation to Larry's that Baum was no longer acting as a proprietor and was instead acting in a representative capacity for the corporation;
• The corporation made no credit applications to its customers or suppliers and continued to order goods and services from Larry's on the sole proprietorship account of Jack Baum;
• The corporation provided no notice that it was ordering goods and services solely for its own account and not for the account of Jack Baum;
• After the incorporation, the corporation and its officers, specifically Jack Baum, Ted Baum, and Larry Baum, as well as some of the corporation's truck drivers, were authorized to purchase goods and services on the account of Jack Baum;
• Each service request represented by an unpaid invoice was made by the corporation and its officers on the account of Jack Baum;
• After the incorporation, payments on the account of Jack Baum were made by corporate check;
• Most invoices submitted by Larry's on the account of Jack Baum were not signed by anyone for, or on behalf of, Jack Baum; and
• The parties had an oral contract, which was confirmed by written memorandums in the form of invoices and payments in the ordinary course of dealing. Neither party withdrew from the oral contract during the relevant time period.
The district court clearly found Baum did not affirmatively provide notice to Larry's that it was dealing with a corporate entity. Nevertheless, the court made no specific finding as to whether Larry's had actual knowledge of this fact.
“Although the trial court should state the controlling facts in its decision [citation omitted], where the court fails to do so and the litigants fail to object, the trial court is presumed to have found all facts necessary to support the judgment, and omissions in findings will not be considered on appeal. [Citation omitted.]” United Proteins, Inc. v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 259 Kan. 725, 731, 915 P.2d 80 (1996).
The Estate did not object below and, in fact, does not complain on appeal that the district court failed to make any necessary factual findings. The court's judgment was that the Estate was liable for the debt. Presuming that the court found all facts necessary to support the judgment, the only question is whether substantial competent evidence supports a factual finding that Larry's had no actual knowledge it was transacting business with a corporate entity under oral contract after Baum caused OK Transfer & Storage, Inc., to be formed in or around 1975. Based on the facts set forth below, we find the answer to this question is “yes.”
Baum did not provide notice to Larry's that it was dealing with a corporate entity instead of a sole proprietorship. The open account was maintained by Larry's as that of Jack Baum doing business as “OK Transfer & Storage.” The account being sued upon was the account of Jack Baum doing business as “OK Transfer & Storage.” Larry Kratzke, the owner and operator of Larry's, testified that Larry's would not have performed work on credit for a corporation without a credit application and personal guarantee from the corporation's stockholders. Larry's never received a credit application from OK Transfer & Storage, Inc.
Moreover, the company held itself out to the public under the unincorporated trade name “OK Transfer & Storage” and did not use any words or abbreviations to indicate corporate status. See Kansas Milling Co. v. Ryan, 152 Kan. 137, 145–46, 102 P.2d 970 (1940) (A corporation cannot use a trade name, but must use its actual name as contained in the articles of incorporation); K.SA. 17–6002(a)(1) (providing alternative, but mandatory, words or abbreviations to indicate corporate status: “ ‘association,’ ‘church,’ ‘college,’ ‘company,’ ‘corporation,’... ‘co.,’ ‘corp.,’ ‘inc.’ “ among others). Both after the incorporation in 1975 and after the alleged retirement of Jack Baum in 1987, Larry's performed and charged work on the account of Jack Baum for vehicles that were painted with the logo and name of the unincorporated proprietorship of Jack Baum: “OK Transfer & Storage.” The sign at the company's corporate headquarters displays the unincorporated name “OK Transfer.” As recently as 2008, Larry's sold, delivered, and then recovered from the company a new trailer which displays the unincorporated name of “OK Transfer & Storage.” Given these facts, we find substantial competent evidence supports a finding that Larry's did not know Jack Baum was no longer operating as a sole proprietor under the name “OK Transfer & Storage.” By continuing to represent itself to Larry's as “OK Transfer & Storage,” the business maintained its appearance as an unincorporated continuation of the sole proprietorship originally operated by Baum.
But the Estate argues that payment to Larry's by corporate check over the course of several decades proves that Larry's had actual knowledge it was transacting business with the corporate entity, which necessarily precludes a finding by this court that substantial competent evidence supports a lack of actual knowledge. We are not persuaded by this argument. As a preliminary matter, the Estate provides no evidence that Larry's was aware the checks submitted by the company were issued from a bank account drawn on a corporate account, let alone evidence that as a result of these checks Larry's actually knew it was transacting business with the corporate entity. Even if we broadly construe the Estate's argument as one asserting that payment by corporate check provided Larry's with a reason to know or a reason to investigate further into the legal status of the party to the contract, this argument already has been considered and rejected by our court in Hill & Company, Inc., 15 Kan.App.2d at 715.
In the Hill & Company, Inc. case, Hill agreed to furnish plumbing equipment and supplies to O'Malley on a credit basis. At the time the parties entered into the agreement, O'Malley was operating as a sole proprietor and established an individual credit line account with Hill. O'Malley later incorporated his plumbing business as O'Malley Plumbing, Inc. No written evidence was provided to Hill of the incorporation, and the evidence was conflicting as to whether O'Malley orally notified Hill of the incorporation. Hill indicated that it would not extend credit to a corporation without first requiring that the principal owner and shareholder sign a personal guarantee of the corporate debts. O'Malley did not sign such a guarantee. O'Malley Plumbing, Inc., later filed for bankruptcy, leaving an unpaid balance of $6,172.97 on its account with Hill. Hill sued O'Malley personally for the amount. The district court dismissed Hill's petition based on a legal finding that Hill had notice of the incorporation. In so dismissing the court relied on 11 checks O'Malley had used to pay Hill over the years, which each bore the name “ ‘O'Malley Plumbing, Inc.’ “ 15 Kan.App.2d at 710–11.
On appeal, this court reversed the district court's decision finding that Hill was informed of O'Malley's corporate status simply by accepting the checks which bore the corporate name. Specifically, the court held that “the mere addition of the term ‘Inc.’ or ‘Corp.’ on company checks by itself does not constitute actual notice of incorporation to a third-party creditor who has dealt with the debtor in an individual or partnership capacity.” 15 Kan.App.2d at 714.
The Estate attempts to distinguish the present case from Hill & Company, Inc. by noting that the services requested and the payments made on the account spanned more than 30 years, a longer time period than that in Hill & Company, Inc. But nothing in Hill & Company, Inc.'s holding suggests that payments made for a longer period of time would act to provide notice of incorporation to a third-party creditor. Indeed, the Hill & Company, Inc. court noted that checks cannot be considered proof of notice as a matter of law but can be considered along with other evidence by the trier of fact. 15 Kan.App.2d at 716.
There was no other evidence presented here to indicate that Larry's was ever notified of the incorporation or that Baum would no longer be responsible as the principal on the account. Indeed, the record reflects that the business continued to hold itself out as an unincorporated business, and Baum continued to deal with creditors and accept responsibility for the account.
The Estate also asserts for the first time on appeal that Larry's could not have relied on Baum's credit in extending credit to the corporation because Kratzke operated the business as a sole proprietorship until September 21, 1995, and there was no evidence presented to show that Kratzke subsequently assigned the account to Larry's Trailer Sales & Services, LLC. The Estate claims that Kratzke extended credit to Baum, d/b/a OK Transfer & Storage, while Larry's extended credit to the corporation.
The Estate failed to raise this issue for consideration by the district court, and it does not suggest that an exception applies which would warrant this court entertaining the argument for the first time on appeal. See In re Estate of Broderick, 286 Kan. 1071, 1082, 191 P.3d 284 (2008), cert. denied555 U.S. 1178 (2009) (discussing exceptions to general rule that new legal theory may not be asserted for first time on appeal). In any event, the Estate's argument lacks merit, as Kratzke testified that Larry's would not have extended credit to a corporation without first having obtained a credit application and that no new credit was ever extended to OK Transfer & Storage, Inc.
In sum, we find the facts upon which the district court relied in concluding Baum was personally liable for the debt owed to Larry's on the OK Transfer & Storage account are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
2. The Statute of Limitations
In its second point of error, the Estate argues the record contains no evidence, let alone substantial competent evidence, to support the district court's conclusion that Larry's cause of action for breach of an oral contract was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. More specifically, the Estate asserts: (1) OK Transfer & Storage breached the oral contract on January 5, 2006; (2) the statute of limitations expired on January 5, 2009; (3) Larry's did not file its petition against the Estate until August 10, 2009, which was over 7 months after the statutory deadline expired; and (4) there are no facts to justify tolling this statute of limitations deadline.
There appears to be no dispute between the parties that, in the absence of tolling, Larry's did not file its petition against the Estate until after the statutory deadline expired. Instead, the issue in dispute is whether the facts of this case justify tolling the statute of limitations deadline.
The statute of limitations for a cause of action based upon an oral contract is 3 years. K.S.A. 60–512(1). Pursuant to K.S.A. 60–520(a), however, payment on a debt owed as the result of an oral contract tolls this statute of limitations. Gorrill v. Goff, 148 Kan. 765, 769, 84 P.2d 953 (1938). A payment to toll the statute must be made under such circumstances as to amount to an acknowledgment of an existing liability. O'Malley v. Frazier, 274 Kan. 84, 88, 49 P.3d 438 (2002). In this case, the district court concluded as a matter of law that Larry's claim against the Estate was not barred by the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the court failed to make any findings of fact with regard to whether payments made on the debt in this case tolled the statute of limitations.
As noted above, when the court fails to state the controlling facts in its decision and the litigant fails to object, the court is “presumed to have found all facts necessary to support the judgment, and omissions in findings will not be considered on appeal .” United Proteins, Inc., 259 Kan. at 731. Here, the Estate did not challenge the adequacy of the court's factual findings. Given we must presume that the court found all facts necessary to support its determination that Larry's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, we must determine whether substantial competent evidence supports a factual finding that the statute of limitations was tolled by payments made to Larry's on the outstanding debt.
In support of its contention that the payments in this particular case did not toll the statute of limitations, the Estate relies on the following quote from Frazier:
“ ‘A payment, to toll the statute, must be made under such circumstances as to amount to an acknowledgment of an existing liability. [Citation omitted.] Such acknowledgment must be distinct, unequivocal, and without qualification [citation omitted], and it must be made by the obligor against whom the statute is sought to be tolled, or by someone at his direction. [Citation omitted.]’ “ (Emphasis added.) 274 Kan. at 88 (quoting Elmore v.. Fanning, 85 Kan. 501, 504 117 P. 1019 [1911] ).
Although conceding that payments were made to Larry's on the account in question during the 3 years immediately preceding the lawsuit, the Estate relies on the italicized language above to argue that those payments do not toll the statute of limitations. Specifically, the Estate argues that in order to toll the statute, the quoted language requires there be direct evidence that Baum, the obligor, personally instructed an employee in his company to make the payments to Larry's on his behalf. The Estate insists that in the absence of direct evidence that Baum personally instructed each and every one of the payments made, we must presume the payments do not amount to an acknowledgement by Baum that he owed on an existing liability.
We find the Estate's interpretation of the legal standard in Frazier is too restrictive. As a preliminary matter, a plain reading of the language upon which the Estate relies does not support such an interpretation. And even if it did, a legal principle permitting only direct evidence to satisfy the applicable standard of proof improperly forecloses the court from considering circumstantial evidence in rendering a decision.
“ ‘In order for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to sustain a finding in a civil case, such evidence need not rise to that degree of certainty which will exclude any and every other reasonable conclusion. It suffices that such evidence affords a basis for a reasonable inference by the court or jury of the occurrence of the fact in issue, although some other inference equally reasonable might be drawn therefrom.’ [Citation omitted].” Kuxhausen v. Tillman Partners, 291 Kan. 314, 320, 241 P.3d 75 (2010).
To that end, the circumstantial evidence in this case provides a sufficient basis from which to draw a reasonable inference that the payments at issue were made under circumstances amounting to an acknowledgment by Baum that he owed on an existing liability. Specifically, there are facts to show that Baum, by and through his course of dealing with Larry's over the years, intended the payments at issue be made on his behalf to the account upon which he owed an existing liability. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223 (1979) (“[1] A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to an agreement which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. [2] Unless otherwise agreed, a course of dealing between the parties gives meaning to or supplements or qualifies their agreement.”).
Notably, we already have determined substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that Baum was personally liable for the debt owed to Larry's on the OK Transfer & Storage account at all times relevant to this action. Based on this determination, we necessarily conclude the following findings of fact made by the district court also are supported by substantial competent evidence.
After incorporating in 1975, neither Jack Baum nor OK Transfer & Storage affirmatively provided notice to Larry's that it was ordering goods and services solely for its own account and not for the account of Jack Baum. After incorporating, the corporation made no credit applications to its customers or suppliers and continued to order goods and services from Larry's on the sole proprietorship account of Jack Baum. Specifically, the corporation and its officers—Jack Baum, Ted Baum, and Larry Baum—as well as some of the corporation's truck drivers, purchased goods and services on the account of Jack Baum at all times relevant to this action. After 1975, each service request represented by an unpaid invoice was made by the corporation and its officers on the account of Jack Baum and payments on the account of Jack Baum were made by corporate check.
We believe the facts set forth above, which reflects a course of dealing between the parties spanning decades, provide a sufficient basis from which to draw a reasonable inference that after incorporation in 1975—including but not limited to the 3 years immediately preceding this lawsuit—Jack Baum authorized the officers and employees of the corporation to purchase goods and services on his account and, having received the benefit of the bargain, thereafter distinctly, unequivocally, and without qualification acknowledged the payments by corporate check for those goods and services were made on the account for which he remained personally liable. For this reason, we find substantial competent evidence to support a finding that payments made in the 3 years immediately preceding this lawsuit effectively tolled the statute of limitations and, in turn, substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding that Larry's claim against the Estate was not barred by the statute of limitations.
3. Cross–Appeal
Larry's request for judgment contemplated an award of prejudgment interest at a rate of 18% per year. In denying this request, the court explained Larry's was not entitled to interest on the debt because interest was not included on the invoices or otherwise contemplated by the parties. On appeal, Larry's claims the court should have awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 10% per year under K.S.A. 16–201.
The standard of review regarding an award of interest is a matter of judicial discretion subject to reversal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. See Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 283 Kan. 911, 925, 157 P.3d 1109 (2007). An abuse of discretion may be found if the district court's decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations or legal standards. City of Mulvane v. Henderson, 46 Kan.App.2d 113, 118, 257 P.3d 1272 (2011) (citing State v. Woodward, 288 Kan. 297, 299, 202 P.3d 15 [2009] ).
In Blair Constr., Inc. v. McBeth, 273 Kan. 679, 689, 44 P.3d 1244 (2002), our Supreme Court explained the rule relating to prejudgment interest:
“In Kansas, the general rule is that prejudgment interest is allowable on liquidated claims. [Citation omitted.] ‘A claim becomes liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which such amount is due are fixed and certain or when the same become definitely ascertainable by mathematical calculation.’ [Citations omitted.] However, the fact that a good-faith controversy exists as to whether the party is liable for the money does not preclude a grant of prejudgment interest. [Citations omitted.]”
Larry's contends that because the accounting it presented at trial was undisputed, the court should have awarded interest at the statutory rate of 10% per year under K.S.A. 16–201. The Estate concedes that if this court affirms the district court's ruling, Larry's is entitled to statutory interest.
K.S.A. 16–201 provides in relevant part: “Creditors shall be allowed to receive interest at the rate often percent per annum, when no other rate of interest is agreed upon, for any money after it becomes due.” Thus, the statute recognizes that parties may agree upon a rate of interest; if the parties do not so agree, the statute provides for a 10% interest rate.
The district court correctly found that the invoices—the only written documentation of the parties' agreement—did not list or otherwise contemplate an interest charge. However, because there was no dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due or the date it was due, the claim was liquidated. “ ‘[I]f a claim is liquidated, prejudgment interest must be awarded.’ “ Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Vann, 20 Kan.App.2d 635, 641–42, 890 P.2d 1242 (1995). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by failing to award Larry's statutory interest under K.S.A. 16–201, and the case must be remanded to the district court for a calculation of interest consistent with this holding.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court's decision finding the Estate liable for the services rendered by Larry's, we affirm the district court's decision finding that the statute of limitations did not preclude Larry's claim, we reverse the district court's decision finding that Larry's was not entitled to prejudgment interest, and we remand for a calculation of interest due and owing.