Opinion
February 7, 2001
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On October 5, 2000, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, the Department, filed a petition to terminate the parental right of the above-mentioned children. Respondent Mother, Maria I. has alleged that the Department has denied her visitation since 1999. She therefore seeks a court order compelling regular visits between her and her son Mark.
I. Procedural History
In August 1998, the Department filed neglect petitions and sought an Order of Temporary Custody alleging that Mark W., Nino I. and Elana H. were neglected in that the children were both denied proper care and attention and also were allowed to live in conditions injurious to their well being. That order was confirmed on August 28, 1998. The children were adjudged neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Department. Subsequently that commitment was extended.
Mark W., the son of Maria I. and Mark W., was born on January 1991. Nino I., the son of Maria I. and Barnard Powell, was born on June 1992. Elana H., the daughter of Maria I. and Gentress H. was born on September 1993.
On October 5, 2000 the Department filed a Motion for Extension of Commitment and Review of Permanency Plan wherein the Department recommended the termination of all parental rights. On that same date, the Department filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. However, the parties agreed that the Department should continue its efforts to reunify Respondent Mother and her children. Unfortunately, despite existing court orders, Respondent Mother has not seen her son since November 1999 and now has requested relief from this court.
Although the Department did not file any memorandum of law, during oral argument the Department contended that this court has "limited" jurisdiction only and therefore is without authority to provide the relief requested. Specifically, the Department asserted that juvenile courts exist merely to accommodate the litigation requirements of the Department of Children and Families. The Department further opined that this court's jurisdiction was confined by the issues presented in the Department's various petitions. Finally the Department suggested that Respondent Mother had an adequate administrative remedy and, therefore, her request for court ordered visitation should be denied.
II. Legal Analysis
The Department of Children and families filed neglect petitions and sought an Order of Temporary Custody on behalf of the above-mentioned children. That petition was adjudicated on August 28, 1998 in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Judicial District of Waterbury. Subsequently the Department filed motion for extension of commitment and review of permanency plan in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Judicial District of Waterbury. Finally the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Judicial District of Waterbury. It now contends that this court does not have jurisdiction to enforce its previously ordered visitation schedule.
The instant proceedings are not the first time the Department sought relief in this court. Beginning as early as 1995, the Department filed a series of neglect petitions, all involving the same children. Each was adjudicated accordingly.
Contrary to the Department's argument, this court is one of general jurisdiction. "Jurisdiction has to do with the authority or power of a court to hear and decide `the cause of action presented to it and its source is the constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is created.'" Haigh v. Haigh, 50 Conn. App. 456, 717 A.2d 837 (1998), quoting Second Injury Fund v. Lupachino, 45 Conn. App. 324, 343, 695 A.2d 1072 (1997)." A juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction separate and distinct from the Superior Court. State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 331, 537 A.2d 483 (1988). To the contrary, a juvenile court's jurisdiction is codified in Connecticut General Statutes 51-164s. That statute provides:
The superior court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute. All jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon and exercised by the court of common pleas and the juvenile court prior to July 1, 1978 shall be transferred to the superior court on July 1, 1978."
See Southington `84 Association v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc., 237 Conn. 758, 769, 678 A.2d 968 (1996). State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. at 331-32. Indeed, "the chief court administrator is empowered . . . to assign any judge of the Superior Court at any time to any division of the Superior Court, State v. Kelly, 206 Conn. at 328-29. Simply stated, this is a court of general jurisdiction.
Part of this court's responsibilities includes resolution of issues involving the care and safety of children. Connecticut General Statutes 46b-121 provides in relevant part:
Juvenile matters include all proceedings concerning uncared-for, neglected or dependent children and youth and delinquent children within this state, termination of parental fights of children committed to a state agency, matters concerning families with service needs and contested termination of parental rights transferred from the probate court . . . . In such juvenile matters, the superior court shall have authority to make and enforce such orders directed to parents . . . guardians, custodians or other adult persons owing some legal duty to a child or youth therein, as it deems necessary, or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of a child or youth subject to its jurisdiction or otherwise committee to or in the custody of the commissioner of children and youth services. Said court shall also have authority to grant and enforce injunctive relief, temporary or permanent in all proceedings concerning juvenile matters.
See generally In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 195 Conn. 344, 367-69, 488 A.2d 790 (1985); In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 659, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). This court's inherent statutory authority also includes the ability to enforce court orders.
In the present case, this court entered a series of orders beginning in May 2000 wherein the Department was required to provide Respondent mother and her children with weekly visits. The Department never sought to modify those orders. This court order's would be rendered null and void if the Department could unilaterally terminate visitation.
Contrary to the Department's suggestion during oral argument, juvenile courts do not exist merely to assist the Department of Children and Families. That agency is simply one litigant. All other litigants are allowed equal access to the court.
The "adjudication of neglect that results in custody by [the Department] is neither final nor irrevocable." In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 195 Conn. 344, 367, 488 A.2d 790 (1985); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). Here Respondent Mother seeks to enforce a valid court order. The hearing requested by Respondent Mother would provide her the opportunity to establish that a need for familial visits still exists.
During oral argument, the Department suggested that Respondent Mother should seek administrative review of the Department's termination of her visits with Mark. Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 17a-15 provides in part:
(a) The commissioner shall prepare and maintain a written plan for care, treatment and permanent placement of every child and youth under his supervision, which shall include but not be limited to a diagnosis of the problems of each child or youth, the proposed plan of treatment services and temporary placement and a goal for permanent placement of the child or youth, which may include reunification with the parent, long-term foster care, independent living, transfer of guardianship or adoption. The child's or youth's health and safety shall be the paramount concern in formulating the plan.
(b) The commissioner shall at least every six months, review the plan of each child and youth under his supervision for the purpose of determining whether such plan is appropriate and make any appropriate modifications to such plan.
The fact that there may be parallel avenues of relief does not preclude Respondent Mother's reliance upon the jurisdiction of this court. It is generally accepted that when law provides an adequate administrative remedy, it should be exhausted. Connecticut Life Health Insurance Guaranty Association v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 357, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977). In the present case, however, the Department seeks this court's jurisdiction, and concomitantly the full force and effect of this court's orders, in its efforts to terminate Respondent Mother's parental rights. Part of that effort includes the Department's request that this Court approve a permanency plan which includes reunification. The department cannot request approval of this permanency plan while simultaneously requiring Respondent Mother to challenge a key component of that plan in a separate procedure.
III. Conclusion
Respondent Mother having properly invoked the jurisdiction this court, her request for a hearing to enforce court ordered visitation is hereby ordered granted.
Julia DiCocco Dewey, Judge