Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0243
05-29-2019
IN RE D.O.
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Kara Crosby, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for State Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender By Susan C L Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JV20180441
The Honorable Lori B. Jones, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Kara Crosby, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for State Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender
By Susan C L Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred. ESPINOSA, Judge:
¶1 D.O. appeals from the restitution order entered in his juvenile proceeding. He argues the juvenile court, in determining the restitution amount, improperly failed to consider his ability to pay the full amount before his eighteenth birthday. We affirm.
¶2 In 2018, D.O. admitted having possessed a firearm and having committed aggravated criminal damage and attempted burglary. The juvenile court placed him on a twelve-month probation term and ordered that he pay $7,031.55 in restitution. This appeal followed.
¶3 Restitution in juvenile cases is governed by A.R.S. § 8-344. The purpose of the statute, like all "restitution statutes generally[,] is to make the victim whole." In re Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, ¶ 27 (App. 2002). A court is permitted, however, to award less than full restitution after considering "the nature of the offense and the age, physical and mental condition and earning capacity of the juvenile." § 8-344(A). We will not disturb a juvenile court's restitution order absent an abuse of discretion, In re Erika V., 194 Ariz. 399, ¶ 2 (App. 1999), but we review de novo the court's interpretation of a statute, Andrew R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 453, ¶ 16 (App. 2010).
¶4 On appeal, D.O. argues a juvenile court must consider the juvenile's ability to pay any restitution before reaching majority and, thus, is prohibited from considering the juvenile's potential earning capacity past his or her eighteenth birthday. He asserts the court is instead limited to evaluating restitution based only on the juvenile's "present earning capacity." As he seems to recognize, however, his position is contrary to Arizona case law. This court has affirmed a $6,000 award entered only three days before a juvenile's eighteenth birthday. See In re Kristen C., 193 Ariz. 562, ¶¶ 12-16 (App. 1999). And, as the state points out, we have also affirmed an award based on the juvenile's future ability to pay. In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JV-503009, 171 Ariz. 272, 275 (App. 1992).
To the extent D.O. argues the juvenile court did not consider his ability to pay any restitution before turning eighteen, the record demonstrates otherwise—the court noted that D.O. would likely be able to find work. --------
¶5 Additionally, nothing in the statutory text expressly limits a juvenile court's evaluation of the minor's ability to pay to the present or even the immediate future. See § 8-344(A). And, § 8-344(F), which states a restitution order "does not expire" until fully paid and allows it to be reduced to a civil judgment, demonstrates the legislature contemplated that a juvenile's responsibility for restitution could continue into adulthood. See In re Kristen C., 193 Ariz. 562, ¶ 14 (observing civil judgment gives victim "a means of collection that does not depend on the court's supervisory authority over juvenile probationers").
¶6 D.O. suggests, however, that the scope of restitution must be limited because juvenile proceedings are focused on rehabilitation and not punishment, like criminal proceedings for adults. This distinction is not persuasive. Restitution is not punitive in either context. See In re Kristen C., 193 Ariz. 562, ¶ 14; State v. Steffy, 173 Ariz. 90, 94 (App. 1992).
¶7 D.O. also cites cases addressing the mental development of juveniles and their limited ability to conform their conduct to adult standards or appreciate the consequences of that conduct. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-73 (2012) (addressing juvenile development and natural life sentences); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272-73 (2011) (discussing development of minors in context of police questioning). Nothing about the mental maturity of juveniles precludes a restitution award for which the juvenile may continue to be responsible in adulthood. Nor do these cases stand for the general proposition that juveniles should not pay fully for the consequences of their conduct. See In re Kristen C., 193 Ariz. 562, ¶ 14 (noting "end result" of restitution award "is not unfair punishment, but rather accountability for unlawful conduct").
¶8 The restitution award is affirmed.