Opinion
07-22-00277-CV
01-19-2023
IN THE MATTER OF D.L.T.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 11584-2-JV, Honorable Matthew H. Hand, Presiding
Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Judy C. Parker Justice.
Appellant, D.L.T., appeals the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of this case to a criminal district court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02. D.L.T. asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it waived jurisdiction and transferred the proceedings to district court for criminal prosecution because the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding of probable cause due to D.L.T.'s claim to have acted in self-defense. We affirm the waiver of jurisdiction and order of transfer.
We refer to appellant by his initials in order to protect his privacy. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(j).
Further references to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to "section" or "§ ."
Background
When D.L.T. was fifteen years old, he was referred to the juvenile court for the offenses of murder and manslaughter. In its second amended petition, the State asked the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and transfer D.L.T.'s case to criminal district court. See § 54.02. The petition alleged that D.L.T. (1) intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Deandre Graham by discharging a firearm in his direction (murder) and (2) recklessly caused Graham's death by discharging a firearm in his direction (manslaughter).
As required by section 54.02(d), the juvenile court ordered a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of D.L.T., his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense, including a psychological evaluation. See § 54.02(d). After the evaluations were complete, the juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the State's motion to transfer, and received the following testimony.
The parties stipulated to the following: the testimony of Dr. Steven Schneider, the court-appointed psychologist, would be consistent with his report; D.L.T. was fifteen years old at the time of the offenses and sixteen years old at the time of the hearing; and no adjudication hearing has been conducted.
On the morning of March 30, 2022, Amarillo Police Lieutenant Norman Fisher responded to a shooting at an Amarillo apartment complex. When Fisher arrived, he discovered that a man identified as Deandre Graham had been shot twice in the upper torso and was deceased. The suspect, D.L.T., had left the scene. During his investigation, Fisher spoke with Chrystyne Sims, the mother of one of Graham's children. Sims and her children lived in the apartment where Graham was shot. According to Sims, Graham lived in a different apartment in the same complex.
Sims's daughter, A.S., and D.L.T. had been to Graham's apartment several hours before the shooting. D.L.T. was looking for a place to spend the night because his aunt had kicked him out of her home. A.S. and D.L.T. left Graham's apartment briefly. When they returned, D.L.T. discovered that a handgun he had in his backpack was missing. A.S., her sister, H.S., and D.L.T. searched for the gun. After locating the gun in Graham's apartment, D.L.T., A.S., and H.S. returned to Sims's apartment. D.L.T. was upset that Graham had taken his gun and he decided to go back to Graham's apartment. While at Graham's apartment this time, D.L.T. disabled Graham's security cameras before returning to Sims's apartment to sleep.
Between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m., Sims received a phone call from Graham that he was coming to her apartment. Graham was upset that D.L.T. had tampered with his security cameras and he wanted D.L.T. to fix the cameras. Immediately before Graham arrived, Sims woke up D.L.T. and told him that Graham was coming over. When Graham knocked on Sims's door, she told D.L.T. to hide. D.L.T. took his handgun from underneath his pillow and hid in the bathtub. Sims opened the door and told Graham that D.L.T. was not there, but Graham pushed past her and headed into the bedroom area. Sims told Graham that D.L.T. had a gun to which Graham responded, "I don't give a f***. He's going to fix my s***." Sims heard a gunshot and saw D.L.T. jump over Graham's body and run out of the apartment. Prior to the gunshots, neither Sims nor A.S. heard any arguing or signs of a physical struggle between D.L.T. and Graham. Graham was unarmed at the time he was shot. The autopsy determined that Graham died from a gunshot wound to the chest.
Sims told Fisher she heard one gunshot, but A.S. said there were two gunshots. D.L.T. admitted to Dr. Schneider that he pulled the trigger twice.
Two days after the shooting, D.L.T. turned himself in to the police claiming he acted in self-defense. In his psychological evaluation, D.L.T. told Dr. Schneider that he heard Graham banging on the apartment door and knew that Graham forced himself into the apartment. Graham opened the bathroom door where D.L.T. was hiding in the bathtub. As Graham pulled the shower curtain back, he grabbed D.L.T.'s shirt and was pulling on it when D.L.T. shot Graham. After the second shot, Graham stopped pulling on D.L.T.'s shirt and fell. Sims told D.L.T. to leave the apartment and he left.
Potter County juvenile probation officer Aaron Brummer evaluated D.L.T.'s case and testified to his history in the juvenile system. In March of 2021, D.L.T. was adjudicated for the offenses of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and evading arrest in a motor vehicle. He was placed on probation and assigned to the Constructive Living Unit, a residential treatment program provided by the Youth Center of the High Plains, for nine months. After D.L.T. was released from the residential program, his probation was modified and he was discharged to his mother's residence. Two months later, D.L.T.'s probation was again modified due to a physical altercation between D.L.T. and his mother. D.L.T began living with his aunt in early 2022. D.L.T. was still on juvenile probation when he shot and killed Graham. According to Brummer, D.L.T. will age out of the juvenile system in twenty months. Brummer has worked with D.L.T. the last two years and, during that time, D.L.T.'s misbehavior has escalated. D.L.T. has been referred to juvenile probation for eleven alleged offenses in Potter County, including six felonies. Brummer opined that the juvenile justice system does not have adequate rehabilitative resources to offer D.L.T. Brummer agreed with the psychological evaluation that D.L.T. is defiant and has anti-social behaviors that manifest a desire to defy authority. Both Brummer and Dr. Schneider recommended that D.L.T. be certified as an adult.
Following the hearing, the juvenile court judge determined probable cause existed to believe D.L.T. committed the offenses of murder and manslaughter as alleged, made written findings under section 54.02(f), and signed a waiver of jurisdiction and order of transfer to criminal district court. See § 54.02(h). D.L.T. timely filed this accelerated appeal of the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction and order of transfer. See § 56.01(c)(1)(A), (h).
By his appeal, D.L.T. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the probable cause finding that he committed murder or manslaughter, and contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it waived its jurisdiction and transferred the proceedings to district court for criminal prosecution.
Applicable Law
In Texas, juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving delinquent conduct by children between 10 and 17 years old. §§ 51.02(2)(A), 51.04(a). As relevant here, a court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction as to a child who is at least 14 years old when he is alleged to have committed a first-degree felony offense of murder, or a child who is at least 15 years old when he is alleged to have committed a second-degree felony offense of manslaughter, and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning the offenses. § 54.02(a)(2). To support waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to a criminal district court, the juvenile court also must determine, after a full investigation and a hearing, that (1) "there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged" and (2) "because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child [,] the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings." Id. § 54.02(a)(3). At the transfer hearing, the State has the burden to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance of the evidence that waiver of the juvenile's court's jurisdiction is appropriate. In re A.K., No. 02-20-00410-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 3499, at *51-52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In making the decision to transfer, the juvenile court considers (1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person; (2) the sophistication and maturity of the child; (3) the record and previous history of the child; and (4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court. § 54.02(f). "The factors in Section 54.02(f) are nonexclusive factors . . . and any combination of these criteria may suffice to support a waiver of jurisdiction and transfer." In re C.O., No. 02-21-00235-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 9982, at *11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Dec. 16, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
When a child engages in conduct that would be considered criminal if committed by an adult, it is called "delinquent conduct," which includes, among other things, the violation of "a penal law of this state or of the United States punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail." § 51.03(a)(1).
Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile court's findings of fact regarding a waiver and transfer determination under traditional evidentiary-sufficiency principles. In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d 467, 478-79 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not reject it. In re S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, then the evidence is legally sufficient. Id. Under a factual sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence presented to determine if the juvenile court's finding conflicts with the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Id. We review the waiver of jurisdiction and transfer decision for an abuse of discretion. Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
Analysis
In his sole issue, D.L.T. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the probable cause finding that he committed murder or manslaughter, and contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it waived its jurisdiction and transferred the proceedings to district court for criminal prosecution. More specifically, D.L.T. asserts that while the undisputed evidence at the certification hearing was that he caused the death of Graham, there was equally compelling evidence to establish that he acted in self-defense. As such, the homicide was justified and D.L.T. was not culpable for Graham's death.
D.L.T. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the determination that, because of the seriousness of the offenses alleged or his background, the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings. See § 54.02(a)(3).
In evaluating a determination of probable cause, we consider whether there are sufficient facts and circumstances to support a prudent person's belief that the accused child committed the offense. See In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d 354, 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The probable-cause standard "requires more than mere suspicion but less evidence than needed to support a conviction or support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence." In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Courts apply a "totality-of-the-circumstances analysis" to determine probable cause. Manuel v. State, 481 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). The transfer hearing is comparable to a criminal probable cause hearing and the court need not resolve evidentiary conflicts beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Matter of K.B.H., 913 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ). At a transfer hearing, the juvenile court is the sole judge of credibility and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of the witnesses' testimony. In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 709.
Under Texas law and as relevant to this case, a person commits the offense of murder if he intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(2). A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Id. § 19.04(a).
In support of its findings that probable cause exists to believe that D.L.T. committed the offenses of murder and manslaughter, the juvenile court heard testimony from Amarillo Police Lieutenant Fisher that he responded to a shooting at an Amarillo apartment complex. When Fisher arrived, he found that Graham had been shot twice in the upper torso. Graham died at the scene. The autopsy confirmed the gunshot wounds as the cause of death. Multiple witnesses identified D.L.T. as the person who shot Graham. Additionally, D.L.T. admitted to shooting Graham both when he turned himself in to the police and when he underwent a psychological evaluation with Dr. Schneider. Fisher also testified that the act of pointing and discharging a loaded firearm in the direction of another person was reckless and clearly dangerous to human life.
D.L.T. does not dispute that he shot and killed Graham. Instead, he contends that he shot Graham in self-defense. A claim of self-defense is a justification defense.
To accede to D.L.T.'s argument would sanction an adjudicatory hearing to determine D.L.T.'s guilt or innocence. That is not the purpose of the transfer hearing. See § 54.02(a)(3); In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ("the objective of a certification hearing is not to determine ultimate guilt or innocence, but rather to determine if there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offense alleged."). A juvenile transfer proceeding is not a trial on the merits. In re P.A.C., 562 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ). At a transfer hearing, the juvenile court makes a probable cause determination in a non-adversarial preliminary hearing. See § 54.02(a)(3); In re D.W.L., 828 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ.); In re R.D.G., No. 07-21-00010-CV, 2022 Tex.App. LEXIS 569, at *4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 26, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that waiver of the juvenile court's jurisdiction is appropriate. Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 40-41. The juvenile court does not consider guilt or innocence; rather, it considers only whether the juvenile's and society's best interests would be served by maintaining custody of the child in the juvenile system or by a transfer to a district court for trial as an adult. Lopez v. State, 196 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd); In re D.M., 611 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ) (juvenile court proceeding was not an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether juvenile committed the act on which the State predicated its motion). Whether a justification defense is warranted is a fact question to be resolved by a trial on the merits or an adjudication, not at a preliminary hearing.
Crediting evidence favorable to the probable cause finding and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not, there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that a prudent person would be justified in believing that D.L.T. committed murder or manslaughter as alleged by the State. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's findings of probable cause. See In re C.C., 930 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tex. App.- Austin 1996, no pet.) ("Probable cause exists where there are sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe the suspect committed the offense."). Likewise, considering all the evidence presented, the juvenile court's probable cause finding is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. See id. Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court's probable cause finding is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
Further, we cannot say that the juvenile court's decision was arbitrary or made without reference to guiding rules. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction and transfer the proceedings to the criminal district court. See In re C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 864.
Conclusion
We overrule D.L.T.'s sole issue and affirm the juvenile court's order of waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to the criminal district court.