Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. C166144
BRUINIERS, J.
Appellant seeks review of a September 8, 2010 dispositional order of the juvenile court committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DJJ), with a maximum term of seven years, four months.
Assigned counsel has submitted a Wende brief, certifying that counsel has been unable to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also has submitted a declaration confirming that appellant has been advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court’s attention. No additional briefing has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.) We find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see also In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97.
Background
Appellant was first adjudicated a ward of the court on February 6, 2008, after admitting a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 496, receiving stolen property. A felony charge of auto theft (Veh. Code, § 10851) and misdemeanor charges of resisting arrest (§ 148) were dismissed.
All subsequent code references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The offense which served as the basis for appellant’s commitment to DJJ occurred on November 1, 2009. Desmond Suber reported to the Oakland Police Department that he had been carjacked at gunpoint, and that the gunman had threatened to “pop” him if he failed to cooperate. The following day Suber located his vehicle and advised police that he knew the person who had taken his car, but had originally been afraid to identify him because he did not want to be labeled as a “snitch.” He pointed out appellant, who was standing on a nearby apartment balcony, as the person responsible. When the officers attempted to detain appellant, he fled, but was taken into custody after jumping out an apartment window. Suber’s car keys were located on appellant’s person.
Appellant was charged by petition with the carjacking robbery of Suber, with an allegation of personal use of a firearm (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), with receiving stolen property (§ 496), and with a resisting arrest (§ 148). On November 17, 2009, an amendment to the petition was filed charging appellant with an additional three counts of attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664), alleged to have occurred on September 14, 2009, and a misdemeanor battery (§ 242) also on that date, and with another robbery (§ 211) which was alleged to have occurred on October 18, 2009.
At a jurisdictional hearing on December 15, 2009, the district attorney moved to amend the petition to amend the carjacking charge and related arming enhancement to a simple robbery count (§ 211) and the enhancement to an allegation under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant, represented by counsel, then admitted the amended allegations, with the remaining charges dismissed (with restitution as to those counts open). The court continued the minor as a ward of the court, ordered his continued detention at juvenile hall, and ordered a guidance clinic mental health evaluation.
At a dispositional hearing on March 19, 2010, the court placed appellant in a residential program, Rite of Passage (Sierra Ridge Academy). Appellant had three incident reports for assaulting peers in the program and was terminated from the Rite of Passage program on April 21, 2010, for assaulting another student. A supplemental wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subdivision (a) was filed seeking a more restrictive placement. The probation officer noted that this was appellant’s 14th referral, and that appellant had absconded from three prior court referred programs prior to his termination from Rite of Passage. On April 29, 2010, the court found that appellant had violated an order of the court and ordered his continued detention at juvenile hall.
On August 2, 2010, a supplemental wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions section 602, subdivision (a) was filed, alleging that appellant had, on July 22, 2010, assaulted another detainee at juvenile hall, and that the offense was a violation of his probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subdivision (a). At a hearing on August 20, 2010, the district attorney elected to proceed only on the probation violation, and withdrew the supplemental wardship petition. Appellant was represented by counsel. The court heard testimony from two juvenile custodial officers who witnessed the July 22 incident. Kenneth Owens testified that he observed appellant strike another juvenile detainee two or three times in the face with a closed fist, and that he had to use pepper spray to break up the ensuing fight. The court found that appellant had committed an assault, and that appellant had thereby violated his probation terms.
At the dispositional hearing on September 7, 2010, appellant was again represented by counsel. The probation department recommended placement in DJJ, noting his numerous incidents of violent behavior, including attacks on females, peers, and identified victims, and his four prior placement failures. The court found that despite reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal from his home, appellant’s welfare required that he be removed from the custody of his parents, and that continuance in the parents’ home was contrary to his welfare. The court further found appellant’s underlying offense qualified for commitment to DJJ under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), and that appellant’s mental and physical condition and qualifications were such as to render it probable that he would benefit from the reformatory educational discipline or other services provided by the DJJ. The court observed that appellant needed to be in a stable place that he could not leave in order to get the treatment he needed, and where his violent tendencies could be addressed. Appellant was committed to DJJ for a maximum term of seven years, four months, with credit for time served of 338 days.
In one of appellant’s prior offenses, he held a knife to the throat of a 13-year-old boy, demanding money. In another incident, he threw a 15-year-old girl to the ground, slapped and punched her in the face while demanding money, and took cash and a cell phone from her.
The court originally orally recited a maximum term of six years, but corrected its mistake on the record at a hearing on the following day. The commitment order recites the correct term.
On September 8, 2010, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the dispositional order.
Discussion
No arguable issue is presented as to the dispositional order made. By statutory mandate, the juvenile court must find a commitment to DJJ to be a probable benefit to the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734.) “The standard of review of juvenile court commitment decisions is well established. ‘The decision of the juvenile court or superior court may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion in its commitment of the minor. A reviewing court must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court, and such findings will not be disturbed on appeal when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 55, 59–60.) Our examination of the record indicates the requisite evidentiary support for the specific findings made by the trial court. (In re Robert D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 767, 773.)
“No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the Youth Authority unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734)
While appellant’s counsel was unable to find any arguable issues to present, she suggests as an issue that might arguably support an appeal. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744.) She invites the court to consider whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in permitting the district attorney to dismiss the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition relating to appellant’s July 22 assault, so that appellant’s last sustained petition would present an offense qualifying for DJJ commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b).
Welfare and Institutions Code section 733 provides in pertinent part that a ward of the juvenile court shall not be committed to DJJ if “[t]he ward has been or is adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to Section 602, and the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the offense is a sex offense set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the Penal Code.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 733, subd. (c).) In V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455 (V.C.), the court found it to be an abuse of discretion to permit dismissal (under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782) of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition already adjudicated by plea bargain in order to allow the prosecution to instead pursue a probation violation, based on the same conduct, for a DJJ eligible offense. (V.C., at pp. 1459, 1469.) Here, unlike V.C., the assault offense concurrently charged under the separate Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was not “admitted or found to be true by the court, ” and neither Welfare and Institutions Code section 733 nor V.C. have any application. We find no arguable issue.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Jones, P. J., Simons, J.