Opinion
No. 28175-2-III.
Filed: February 3, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 09-6-00104-1, Vic L. VanderSchoor, J., entered May 12, 2009.
Dismissed by unpublished opinion per Korsmo, J., concurred in by Kulik, C.J., and Brown, J.
S.M. appeals the Benton County Superior Court's decision to commit her to a 90-day Lesser Restrictive Alternative (LRA) consisting of outpatient mental health treatment. The LRA has long been served and the parties dispute whether the issue is moot. We conclude that the matter is moot and dismiss the appeal.
FACTS
S.M. has a long-standing history of psychotic and delusional behavior and has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The current case has its genesis in April 2009, when her brother called authorities because S.M. was behaving strangely in a parking lot and preventing people from entering their car.
She initially did not respond when spoken to and later experienced difficulty in answering questions. It appeared that she had not taken her medication for an extended period of time. She was detained because she was unable to care for her own basic needs and her family was unable to supervise her.
She was irritable and "hyper verbal" during her initial detention. She made delusional comments and stated that she needed to save the world. She was observed screaming at the ceiling. She was determined to be gravely disabled and committed for up to 14 days of inpatient mental health treatment.
She complied with treatment and improved during the 14-day commitment. The treatment providers petitioned for a 90-day LRA consisting of outpatient services to assure that S.M. remained on her medication and continued her recovery. Although notified of her right to have a jury trial, the record does not reflect that S.M. ever requested one. The court conducted a hearing on stipulated facts and approved the requested LRA.
S.M. then appealed to this court. The audio record of the hearing was inadvertently destroyed. The LRA was completed August 11, 2009.
It is unclear whether an LRA is an appealable order. In re Det. of C.M., 148 Wn. App. 111, 115, 197 P.3d 1233, review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1012 (2009). The issue was not raised by the parties or the court in this action.
ANALYSIS
S.M. presents challenges to the procedures and substance of her LRA hearing. Even though she has completed the LRA, S.M. also argues that the appeal is not moot because it impacts her future and, she alleges, presents issues of public importance.
The dispositive issue is whether this appeal should even be heard since S.M. has completed her 90-day commitment and cannot be granted any effective relief from that order. An appeal is moot where the court cannot grant effective relief. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). Nonetheless, an appellate court will consider a moot case when it is in the public interest to do so. Id. Factors to be considered include whether or not the matter is of a private or public nature, the need for guidance to public officials, and whether the problem is likely to recur. In re Det. of Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 377, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).
S.M. first argues that the case is not moot because it might have future impact on her. Specifically, she argues that the order will have an effect on her ability to possess guns and might be used against her in a subsequent mental health proceeding. Neither claim is persuasive. As the State points out, the unchallenged 14-day commitment led to a loss of the right to possess firearms. RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(ii); RCW 71.05.240(4). So, although an LRA order has the same effect, it imposes no additional disability in this case. Reversing the LRA would not change the fact that S.M. cannot possess firearms as a result of the earlier commitment order.
The LRA also does not impact S.M. should she be the subject of future mental health actions. She cites RCW 71.05.285 in support of her argument, but that statute does not aid her claim. The statute identifies historic facts that must be considered in deciding whether to order inpatient treatment or less restrictive alternative commitment. In pertinent part, the statute provides that a court shall give "great weight" to "a prior history or pattern of decompensation and discontinuation of treatment resulting in: (1) Repeated hospitalizations; or (2) repeated peace officer interventions. . . ." The statute does not rely on the outcome of prior hearings. Rather, the focus is on prior behavior that led either to hospitalization or police involvement. Outpatient treatment resulting from an LRA is simply not a fact that must be considered at a subsequent hearing.
Neither of her claimed disabilities will be affected if this court considers her LRA challenges. The only remaining basis for considering this appeal would be if it is in the public interest to do so.
We have noted previously that:
Cases involving mental health procedures, as both Cross and LaBelle demonstrate, frequently present exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The brief time frames involved in bringing a commitment case to trial, and the comparatively short duration of most commitment orders, mean that few cases will not be moot when considered by an appellate court. Nonetheless, the large number of commitment proceedings indicates that judicial resolution of problems that do arise is important to proper functioning of our mental health system.
In re Det. of C.M., 148 Wn. App. 111, 115, 197 P.3d 1233, review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1012 (2009).
S.M. argues that the "check box" procedure used in Benton County violates the Washington Supreme Court's decision in LaBelle and fails adequately to protect the right to a jury trial. She claims that these arguments present issues of public interest of enough significance to hear an otherwise moot appeal. We disagree.
The issue of jury waiver is clouded in this case by the loss of the trial court record. Waivers turn on specific factual findings related to the case. Whether or not there was a proper jury demand or a proper waiver simply cannot be decided upon this record. It may be of interest to S.M., but it does not amount to an issue of public importance.
S.M. argues from cases relating to waiver of a jury in criminal cases rather than in civil cases. We are not certain that authority is apropos in this setting.
The other basic argument is that the form used in entering findings in this case provided insufficient information specific to S.M., but was rather just a check box of boilerplate language of the type rejected in LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 218-219. We disagree. Preprinted findings that incorporate the testimony of expert witnesses, such as were used here, do not run afoul of LaBelle. In re Det. of P.S., 75 Wn. App. 571, 576, 879 P.2d 294 (1994), review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1015 (1995). This issue having already been decided, we do not believe the public interest requires revisiting the topic in this case.
Accordingly, this case is moot and we do not believe that there is any interest served in addressing the arguments S.M. presents here.
The appeal is dismissed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KULIK, C.J. and BROWN, J., concur.