Opinion
No. 80534-7-I
06-15-2020
In re the Detention of: T.S., Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
— T.S. challenges the order revoking his less restrictive treatment under the Involuntary Treatment Act, arguing it exceeds the statutory maximum commitment period allowable for most restrictive treatment. We affirm.
Chapter 71.05 RCW. --------
FACTS
T.S. suffers from schizoaffective disorder. On June 27, 2019, T.S. stipulated to the entry of an order for involuntary treatment under less restrictive alternative conditions for 365 days. See RCW 71.05.320(7). The order was set to expire on June 26, 2020.
On August 21, 2019, a designated crisis responder filed a petition to revoke the less restrictive order (LRO), alleging T.S. failed to comply with several of the LRO's conditions. After hearing testimony from a clinical supervisor and a social worker, the court found T.S. violated the LRO. It revoked the LRO, remanding T.S. to inpatient treatment "for a period not to exceed 365 days from June 27, 2019"—in other words, the remaining 10 months of the LRO.
T.S. appeals.
ANALYSIS
T.S. argues the order revoking the LRO exceeded the statutory maximum commitment period. T.S. contends while RCW 71.05.320(7) allows a court to enter an LRO of up to 365 days for any person previously committed for intensive inpatient treatment in a state hospital, RCW 71.05.320(1)(c) only permits involuntary commitment in an inpatient setting for up to 180 days. The State contends the duration of T.S.'s commitment is governed by RCW 71.05.590(4)(d), not by RCW 71.05.320(1)(c). The State has the better argument here.
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo, giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute's language. In re Det. of R.H., 178 Wn. App. 941, 948, 316 P.3d 535 (2014). "'As civil commitment statutes authorize a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.'" Id. (quoting In re Det. of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996)).
Under RCW 71.05.590(1), an agency or facility designated to monitor or provide services under an LRO may petition to revoke the LRO. If a petition to revoke is filed and, as a result, the court orders detention for inpatient treatment, "the treatment period may be for no longer than the period authorized in the original court order." RCW 71.05.590(4)(d).
Here, the original court order—the LRO—required that T.S. remain under court supervision under less restrictive conditions for 365 days from June 27, 2019. The challenged order remanded T.S. to most restrictive treatment for the same amount of time as the LRO it revoked—"for a period not to exceed 365 days from June 27, 2019." It did not exceed the treatment period authorized in the original court order and, therefore, did not violate RCW 71.05.590(4)(d).
T.S. argues the court should harmonize RCW 71.05.590(4)(d) with the time limit of RCW 71.05.320 and limit the period of more restrictive treatment to 180 days, even when based on a revoked LRO. This argument is inconsistent with the plain language of RCW 71.05.590(4)(d) and would render a portion of that provision meaningless. We must construe statutes to give effect to all of the language and cannot construe them in a way that results in unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. Mason v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 166 Wn. App. 859, 870, 271 P.3d 381 (2012). The interpretation T.S. advances violates this rule of statutory construction.
Relying on In re Detention of R.H., T.S. argues commitment orders can never exceed 180 days, and if the State wants to commit someone for longer than 180 days, it should file a new petition and bear the burden of proving a statutory basis for involuntary commitment. But R.H. did not arise in the context of a revocation proceeding under RCW 71.05.590.
In that case, R.H. challenged his initial 180-day commitment after being found incompetent to stand trial. R.H., 178 Wn. App. at 943-45. R.H. contended the court lacked statutory authority under RCW 71.05.320(1) to commit him for 180 days, arguing the maximum he could be committed based on a finding of grave disability under former RCW 71.05.280(4) was 90 days. Id. at 943. The court agreed. Id. at 949.
We concluded that under RCW 71.05.320(1), a court could order a person "to be involuntarily committed for up to 180 days only if 'the grounds set forth in [former] RCW 71.05.280(3) are the basis of commitment.'" Id. at 948-49 (quoting RCW 71.05.320(1)). Former RCW 71.05.280(3) allowed for the longer period of commitment when an individual had committed a felony, had charges dismissed based on incompetency, and had presented a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts. Id. at 949. But R.H. was involuntarily committed under former RCW 71.05.280(4); the State withdrew its request for commitment under RCW 71.05.280(3). Id. The court concluded that because R.H.'s commitment was based on former RCW 71.05.280(4), the superior court lacked the authority under RCW 71.05.320(1) to order him committed for up to 180 days. Id.
R.H. is distinguishable because that case did not involve the statutory period of commitment after the revocation of a 365-day LRO. Nor did it involve the statutory language at issue here. T.S.'s commitment was based on RCW 71.05.590(4), not RCW 71.05.320. By passing RCW 71.05.590(4), the legislature specifically authorized an order of commitment exceeding 180 days. R.H. is thus inapplicable.
Because the order revoking T.S.'s less restrictive treatment did not exceed the treatment period authorized in the original court order, we conclude T.S. has failed to show error.
Affirmed.
/s/_________ WE CONCUR: /s/_________ /s/_________