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In re D.C.

Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Feb 2, 2017
NO. 01-16-00843-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 2, 2017)

Opinion

NO. 01-16-00843-CV

02-02-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF D.C. AND D.B., CHILDREN


On Appeal from the 314th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2015-00003J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, T.B., attempts to appeal from the trial court's interlocutory Order Setting Hearing and Appointment of Guardian/Attorney Ad Litem. Because the trial court's interlocutory order is not a final appealable judgment and the trial court rendered a final decree terminating appellant's parental rights, we construe appellant's notice of appeal as an appeal of the trial court's final decree terminating her parental rights to her minor children. See Perry v. Cohen, 271 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (stating all interlocutory orders are subsumed by final judgment). We dismiss the appeal.

An appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights is an accelerated appeal. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 109.002(a), 263.405(a) (West 2014). In an accelerated appeal, absent a motion to extend time under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, "the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is strictly set at twenty days after the judgment is signed, with no exceptions . . . ." In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. 2005); see TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). If a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal is timely filed, the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is extended by fifteen days, to thirty-five days after the judgment is signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Filing a motion for new trial does not extend the appellate deadlines in an accelerated appeal. See K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927, 928; In re R.B.M., 338 S.W.3d 755, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

Because the trial court signed the final decree on January 14, 2016, appellant's notice of appeal was due by February 3, 2016. Appellant, proceeding pro se, filed her notice of appeal on October 21, 2016, which was 281 days after the decree was signed. Hence, appellant's notice of appeal was untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b), 26.3; K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927.

On November 10, 2016, we notified appellant that her appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless she filed a written response by November 24, 2016 showing how this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a) (allowing involuntary dismissal of case after notice). On November 17, 2016, appellant filed a response, but did not show how this Court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); see K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927 (holding that untimely notice of appeal failed to invoke jurisdiction of appellate court); R.B.M., 338 S.W.3d at 756, 758 (dismissing appeal in parental termination case for want of jurisdiction when notice of appeal was untimely). We dismiss all pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland.


Summaries of

In re D.C.

Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Feb 2, 2017
NO. 01-16-00843-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 2, 2017)
Case details for

In re D.C.

Case Details

Full title:IN THE INTEREST OF D.C. AND D.B., CHILDREN

Court:Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas

Date published: Feb 2, 2017

Citations

NO. 01-16-00843-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 2, 2017)