Opinion
No. COA14–739.
01-20-2015
In the Matter of D.C.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gerald K. Robbins, for the State. Reece & Reece, by Mary McCullers Reece for juvenile-appellant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gerald K. Robbins, for the State.
Reece & Reece, by Mary McCullers Reece for juvenile-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Where the trial court failed to make findings of fact that the payment of restitution was in the best interests of the juvenile and that the juvenile had the ability to pay restitution, this portion of the order is reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order containing the required findings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 16 September 2013, a Wake County juvenile court counselor filed a petition alleging that D.C., a juvenile, was delinquent for committing the offense of injury to real property. The petition alleged that D.C. broke the rear window of a house by throwing a rock through it. Prior to trial, D.C. filed a “motion for finding of no restitution,” in which he argued: (1) that he did not have the ability to pay restitution because he was thirteen and unable to obtain legal employment; and (2) that he did not qualify for a referral to the Haven House Restitution program because he had already received the maximum number of referrals to the program. The trial court conducted a hearing on 15 January 2014, and entered an adjudication order holding D.C. to be delinquent. In its disposition order, the trial court extended D.C.'s probation for three months and ordered him to pay $300 in restitution.
D.C. appeals.
II. Arguments
D.C. argues, and the State concedes, that the trial erred by ordering D.C. to pay $300 in restitution within three months without making a finding of fact that restitution was in D.C.'s best interest and without considering whether D.C. had the ability to pay.
After adjudicating a juvenile delinquent, a trial court may:
[r]equire restitution, full or partial, up to five hundred dollars ($500.00), payable within a 12–month period to any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of the offense committed by the juvenile. The court may determine the amount, terms, and conditions of the restitution.... [H]owever, the court shall not require the juvenile to make restitution if the juvenile satisfies the court that the juvenile does not have, and could not reasonably acquire, the means to make restitution.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2506(4) (2013).
“This Court has consistently ‘endors[ed] the discriminate and prudent use of restitution in juvenile cases' but has cautioned that ‘compensation of victims should neverbecome the only or paramount concern in the administration of juvenile justice.’ “ In re Heil, 145 N.C.App. 24, 31, 550 S.E.2d 815, 821 (2001) (quoting In re Register, 84 N.C.App. 336, 339, 352 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1987) ). This Court has also held that “[a] requirement that a juvenile make restitution as a condition of probation must be supported by the record and appropriate findings of fact which demonstrate that the best interest of the juvenile will be promoted by the enforcement of the condition.” In re D.A.Q.,214 N.C.App. 535, 537–38, 715 S.E.2d 509, 511 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court has reversed orders of restitution where the trial court failed to consider or make findings as to (1) the juvenile's ability to pay, or (2) whether restitution was in the juvenile's best interest. Heil, 145 N.C.App. at 32–33, 550 S.E.2d at 821–22 ; see also In re Z.A.K., 189 N.C.App. 354, 362, 657 S.E.2d 894, 899 (2008) (reversing and remanding a restitution order where the trial court failed to make a finding that restitution was in the juvenile's best interest).
In the instant case, the trial court's disposition order fails to contain any of the required findings. The only finding made by the trial court is that “JUVENILE IS TO PAY RESTITUTION OF $300.00. VICTIM[']S ADDRESS IS [ ].” The order also specified that D.C. was to pay the restitution within three months. The trial court's oral findings of fact are similarly deficient. After ordering restitution, the trial court stated “I'm ordering that restitution be paid ... in the amount of $300. Still going to leave [the victim] out somewhat.” Nothing in the trial court's order, nor its oral findings of fact, demonstrates that the trial court considered whether restitution was in D.C.'s best interest or whether he had the ability to pay. Accordingly, we reverse the disposition order of the trial court to the extent that it orders D.C. to pay restitution and remand it to the trial court for entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact. The adjudication and disposition orders are otherwise affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Judges ELMORE and DILLON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Opinion
Appeal by juvenile from orders entered 15 January 2014 by Judge Vinston M. Rozier in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 December 2014.