Opinion
W.C. No. 4-549-828
November 7, 2003
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Muramoto (ALJ) which denied and dismissed a claim for benefits against respondent Shea Homes (Shea). The claimant contends that neither the law nor the evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Shea is exempt from statutory employer liability under the farming and ranching exemption contained in § 8-41-401(4)(c), C.R.S. 2003. We affirm.
The ALJ found that respondent Shea is engaged in the business of constructing new homes. However, Shea also owns approximately 9000 acres of property which it leased to respondent Matt Clough (Clough) doing business as Clough Cattle Company. The ALJ found that Shea leased the acreage to Clough for the purpose of raising cattle and to conduct other agricultural operations. Shea receives a tax benefit for maintaining the land as agricultural property.
The ALJ further found that Clough hired the claimant as a cowboy to assist with various functions including raising the cattle, repairing fences, and repairing broken ranch equipment. Clough paid the claimant an hourly wage and provided free housing.
Clough also had a "construction contract" with Shea under which Clough installed new fences for Shea's housing projects. The ALJ found the claimant, in addition to his work as a cowboy, "also performed work building new fences" for Shea.
The ALJ found the claimant was injured on March 20, 2002, when he fell from a horse "while riding Clough's pastures checking for cattle and checking fence lines." At the time of this injury Clough did not have workers' compensation insurance.
Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded Clough is immune from liability under § 8-41-401(4)(c) because he was the lessee of a farm or ranch operation. The ALJ further found that Shea "was in the ranching business by virtue of the lease with Clough" and is also exempt from liability under § 8-41-401(4)(c).
I.
On review, the claimant contends the ALJ's conclusion that Shea is immune from liability under § 8-41-401(4)(c) is contrary to law. The plaintiff argues that Shea is actually in the homebuilding business and is not entitled to protection of the statute. We are not persuaded.
Section 8-41-401(4)(c) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, no person, company, or corporation contracting with a landowner or lessee of a farm or ranch operation to perform a specified farming or ranching operation nor any employee of such person, company, or corporation required to be covered by workers' compensation pursuant to this subsection (4) shall have any right of contribution from, or any action of any kind, including actions under section 8-41-203, against, the person, company, or corporation contracting to have such agricultural labor performed.
This effect of this statute is to exempt agricultural operations from statutory employer liability under § 8-41-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2003. Sorensen v. Goldman, 837 P.2d 266, 267 (Colo.App. 1992). Thus, where it is determined that a putative statutory employer is engaged in a farming business, the only question is whether the contracted services are part of the farming operation. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 405, 406 (Colo.App. 1985).
Here, the ALJ found that Shea, as the owner of the land where the claimant was injured, contracted with Clough to perform ranching and agricultural activities on the leased premises. The claimant contracted with Clough, as lessee of the land, to perform ranching activities. Because Shea contracted for the performance of agricultural labor to be performed on its land, the ALJ correctly ruled that it is immune from liability under § 8-41-401(4)(c). State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission, supra.
It is true, as the ALJ found, that Shea is engaged in other business activities including the construction of homes for sale. However, that fact does not vitiate the applicability of § 8-41-401(4)(c). The proper focus when determining whether the exemption applies is the "nature of the work itself." Sorensen v. Goldman, 837 P.2d at 267. Further, "agricultural labor" is broadly defined and incorporates "any activity incident to farming or ranching." Id. at 267.
The ALJ determined that at the time of the injury, the claimant was counting cattle and checking fence lines. Both of these activities are "incident" to cattle ranching. Thus, the claimant's injury clearly occurred at a time he was performing agricultural labor. The fact that Shea may engage in other business activities does not negate the agricultural labor exemption. The exemption applies "notwithstanding" § 8-41-401(1)(a), which might otherwise impose statutory employer liability on Shea. Moreover, agricultural landowners and lessees could have non-agricultural business interests. The statute does not indicate that the mere existence of non-agricultural business interests and activities nullifies the agricultural exemption where the facts warrant its application.
For the same reasons we reject the claimant's argument that the ALJ's findings of fact do not support the order. It is true the ALJ found that on some occasions the claimant performed non-agricultural labor when building fences on Shea's housing projects. Had the claimant been injured when performing such activity, the exemption provided by § 8-41-401(4)(c) would not have protected Shea from statutory employer liability. Sorensen v. Goldman, supra (construction of building to be used for agricultural purposes was not incident to farming or ranching). However, in this case, the claimant was performing agricultural labor on property leased for that purpose.
II.
The claimant next contends the ALJ's finding that Shea was engaged in ranching or agricultural business is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
We must uphold the ALJ's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2003. This standard of review requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 1995).
Here, there is ample evidence to support the ALJ's determination that Shea was the lessor of land used for ranching and agricultural business. This finding is supported by the lease itself, which states that the premises are to be used for "a ranch for grazing of cattle and livestock and agricultural uses incidental thereto and for no other purpose whatsoever." Additional evidence established that Shea wished to maintain the land for agricultural purposes since it received a tax benefit from this arrangement.
It is true there was some evidence in the record which might have supported a contrary conclusion. However, the ALJ did not cite this evidence. Therefore, we conclude that it was implicitly rejected. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo.App. 2000).
Further, the ALJ did not fail to resolve conflicts in the evidence. The ALJ determined that Shea is in both the agricultural and homebuilding businesses. This finding is consistent with the testimony of witness Roberts who stated that part of Shea's business is to maintain the land in agricultural status to preserve the land for historical purposes. (Roberts Depo. p. 11).
Insofar as the claimant makes other arguments, they are unpersuasive.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated April 22, 2003, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ David Cain
______________________________ Bill WhitacreNOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a Petition to Review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order was mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2002. The appealing party must serve a copy of the Petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this order were mailed to the parties at the addresses shown below on November 7, 2003 by A. Hurtado.
Dustin A. Davis, 42603 Ricki Dr., Parker, CO 80138-4710
Matt Clough d/b/a Clough Cattle Company, 9910 S. Ranch Rd., Highlands Ranch, CO 80126
Shea Homes, 300 W. Plaza Dr., #300, Highlands Ranch, CO 80126 AIG, c/o Tanya Avedovech, Specialty Risk Services, P. O. Box 221700, Denver, CO 80222
John W. Swanson, Esq., 3914 6th St., Greeley, CO 80634 (For Claimant)
James B. Fairbanks, Esq. and Matthew C. Hailey, Esq., 999 18th St., #1600, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents Shea Homes and AIG)
Jack Kintzele, Esq., 1317 Delaware St., Denver, CO 80204 (For Respondent Matt Clough d/b/a Clough Cattle Company)