Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J06-00480
Jones, P.J.
Appellant Daniel S. was made a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after he admitted being in possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)). He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the suspension of his driver’s license as a consequence of his commission of the offense.
BACKGROUND
According to the probation report prepared for the dispositional hearing, police officers observed appellant and another juvenile enter the rear doors of a car parked in front of a coffee shop. No one was in the driver’s seat and the engine was not running. Appellant and his companion appeared to be facing each other and looking down at something. The officers knocked on the door of the car, and when it was opened, they smelled marijuana. They questioned the juveniles; appellant voluntarily handed them a glass pipe, a bag of marijuana, and a pack of cigarettes. The other juvenile admitted having a stash of marijuana hidden under the first aid kit in his car.
According to the parties’ trial pleadings and argument, appellant was carrying a large backpack when he entered the car. On smelling the odor of marijuana when appellant opened the car door, an officer asked appellant if there was any marijuana in the car; he replied, “Yeah, I got some right here.” He opened his backpack, and handed an officer a padded corduroy bag that contained a glass pipe and a zip lock bag containing marijuana. The car belonged to his companion.
Appellant was placed on six months’ probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725) and ordered to reside in his parents’ house. The court also found that the car was incidental to the commission of his offense, and suspended his driver’s license for one year from the date of his plea.
DISCUSSION
Vehicle Code section 13202, subdivision (b) states: “A court shall order that the [Department of Motor Vehicles; DMV] revoke and the [DMV] shall revoke the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle upon conviction of [Health & Saf. Code, § 11357] when a motor vehicle was involved in, or incidental to, the commission of such offense.” For purposes of this statute, “convicted” or “conviction” includes a finding by a juvenile court that a person has committed an offense. (Veh. Code, § 13105; In re Colleen S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 471, 473, fn. 2.)
Appellant contends that, although he was in a car when he was found in possession of marijuana, the car was not involved in or incidental to the offense.
Because its language is generally the most reliable indicator of the Legislature’s intent in enacting a statute, courts look to the words themselves, ascribing to them their usual and ordinary meaning, to give effect to the statute. (People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 797; Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230-231.) “Incidental” is commonly understood to mean a weak or unintentional connection, (People v. Monday (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1489, 1492), “non-essential,” (Webster’s New Internat. Dict. [3d ed. 1961] p. 1142), and “subordinate to something of greater importance; having a minor role.” (Black’s Law. Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 777, col. 1.) By these familiar definitions, the car in the circumstances of this case was incidental to appellant’s possession of marijuana.
Relying on People v. Monday, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at page 1492, appellant argues that Vehicle Code section 13202 is intended to apply to transportation of illicit substances. In Monday, the defendant driver approached a house at which a search warrant was being executed; his car headlights were off. (Monday, supra, at p. 1491.) An officer shone a flashlight into the car and saw its passengers armed with shotguns. More weapons were found in the car, and methamphetamine was found on the defendant’s person during a booking search. (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court’s finding that a motor vehicle was involved in the offense of possession of methamphetamine for sale. He argued that section 13202 could be imposed only if there was a nexus between the offense and the vehicle. (Monday, supra, at p. 1491.)
Monday disagreed that imposition of Vehicle Code section 13202 required a nexus in the sense of “used” a vehicle in the commission of an offense. “Unfortunately for defendant, his employment of a vehicle to move both himself and the contraband readily meets this low standard” of the generally understood definition of “incidental.” (Id. at p. 1492.) Monday continued: “Nor is this result unjust or unreasonable. The Legislature has generally provided more severe penalties for the transportation of narcotics and other dangerous drugs than for simple possession or even possession for sale. [Citations.] This represents a recognition that the fact of transporting contraband carries an increased potential for harm, regardless of the purpose of the transportation. [Citation.] [¶] . . . [D]efendant could have been charged with the more serious offense of transporting methamphetamine. Instead, having been charged with possession for sale, he was still properly subject to the license suspension under Vehicle Code section 13202, subdivision (a). While the vehicle in which he was travelling was only incidental to the offense, the added punishment is reasonably addressed to the dangers and criminal opportunities created by the ready mobility of contraband.” (Monday, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1492, 1493.)
Appellant contrasts the Monday facts by observing that in his case, the car was parked, there was no one in the driver’s seat, and the engine was not running. Hence, he argues, the car was not being used as a tool for transporting anything and was at odds with Monday’s recognition of the statute’s legislative purpose.
We do not read Monday as requiring some movement of the car for imposition of a Vehicle Code section 13202 license suspension. Its conclusion leaves open the question of the statute’s breadth: “While we will here not attempt to set in stone the boundaries of ‘involved in, or incidental to,’ the phrase is broad enough to cover this case.” (Monday, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1493.) We conclude the statute’s low standard is also broad enough to cover this case. The officers saw appellant and his companion enter the car. When they knocked on the rear door window and the car door opened, they immediately smelled marijuana. Appellant then retrieved a bag of marijuana from his backpack which was in the car. The court could reasonably find that the car served as a site where appellant could possess his marijuana in secret from all but his companion, with, inferentially, the intent that the car would serve to conceal his clandestine use of the marijuana; as a mobile object, the car was separate from a fixed place like his house or school locker where the marijuana was more at risk of being detected or discovered by others. As such, the car was incidental to his possession of marijuana.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: Gemello, J., Needham, J.