Opinion
NO. 00-2489, SECTION "K"(3)
January 3, 2001
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the Court are defendant Richard Coleman's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Doc. 5) and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 4). Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, complaint and relevant law, the Court finds merit in the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Relief rendering the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction moot for the reasons that follow.
Procedural Background
On July 25, 2000, Richard Coleman ("Coleman") was allegedly injured aboard the MODU PRIDE WYOMING when he fell down a flight of stairs located on the vessel. He is a resident of the State of Alabama and contends that he is a seaman and member of the crew of the MODU PRIDE WYOMING. On August 8, 2000, Pride Offshore's claims manager wrote to an investigator hired by counsel for Coleman asking that the investigator not contact Pride Offshore employees and that the investigator have Coleman's counsel forward a letter of representation. Thus, it is clear that Pride knew that Coleman had retained counsel and intended to pursue his legal remedies.
On August 22, 2000, the instant Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, or Alternatively Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability was filed by Pride Offshore, Inc. ("Pride"). Pride seeks a declaration that because of material misrepresentations made by Coleman in his pre-employment physical, he is not entitled to maintenance and cure. Furthermore, Pride contends that Coleman is not a seaman. Indeed, Pride argues that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act is applicable to claim, rather than the Jones Act, because the rig was actively engaged in oil and gas exploration. Based on its reading of Chandris, Inc. v. Latzis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995), Pride maintains that because the rig was not in navigation, Coleman is not a seaman. in the alternative, Pride seeks to be exonerated from liability or limit its liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183 and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims
On August 24, 2000, before the waiver of summons was received by Coleman in this suit, Coleman filed a Jones Act, general maritime law, and maintenance and cure suit in Texas in its 212th Judicial District Court for the County of Galveston against Pride International, Inc. which plaintiff believes is the parent corporation of Pride. Apparently, no jury request has been made to date in that matter. Coleman seeks to dismiss the Complaint for Declaratory Relief alleging that it is being used as a tool to deprive him of his right to choose a forum, to litigate his claim for personal injuries under the Jones Act and the General Maritime Law together with his claims for maintenance and cure, and to bring his action in state court, as authorized by the Saving to Suitors Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
Bearing in mind, the procedural history of this matter, the Court will now turn to the Motion to Dismiss.
Analysis
As this Court noted in Gulf Tran, Inc. v. Pellegrin, 1999 WL 974021 (E.D.La. Oct. 22, 1999), it is not obliged to treat plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief in the same manner it would treat a claim for coercive relief. Peters v. Bell Helicopter, 1994 WL 637736 (E.D.La. Nov. 14, 1994) (Clement, J.) citing Southwind Aviation Inc. v. Bergen Aviation Inc., 23 F.3d 948, 950-51(5th Cir. 1 994). Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has made clear that a "district court is `not required to provide declaratory judgment relief, and it is a matter for the district court's sound discretion whether to decide a declaratory judgment action." Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Magnolia Marine Transport v. Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1581 (5th Cir. 1992).
Certain factors have been suggested by the Fifth Circuit in Rowan to aid the Court in determining whether dismissal is appropriate. These factors include:
(1) whether there is another pending state proceeding in which the matters in controversy between the parties may be fully litigated;
(2) whether the declaratory complaint was filed in anticipation of another suit and is being used for the purpose of forum shopping;
(3) whether there are possible inequities in permitting the declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in time and forum; and
(4) whether the suit is inconvenient for the parties or witnesses.Rowan, 876 F.2d at 28. None of these factors takes precedence over the others, and the district court has discretion to consider as many of the variables as it wishes. Torch Inc. v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1991).
There is a pending state case which provides an adequate forum for the fair adjudication of Coleman's claims against Pride. Particularly in light of the fact that his claim will require a determination of his Jones Act status, and Coleman filed suit in state court, he has a right to adjudicate that matter there. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a). If the matter cannot be removed, then certainly, the Declaratory Judgment Act should not be used as an end run around the prohibition of removal. Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Myers, 1993 WL 218239 (E.D.La. June 14, 1993).
Considering the timing of the filing of the instant suit, it appears to the Court that the declaratory judgment action is an attempt to obtain a federal forum for this claim — that is to say forum shop. It is beyond peradventure that Pride has a right to seek exoneration and limitation in such an instance, but to have included the instant declaratory judgment action within this suit has an appearance of forum shopping. Pride knew Coleman was pursuing his legal remedies and despite its protestations otherwise, it filed the limitation well in advance of the expiration of the cut-off for filing a limitation action. Furthermore, in this single claimant context, it seems highly unlikely that the fund will be insufficient to meet the damages sought by Coleman.
It seem inequitable to this Court to allow Pride to control plaintiff's litigation in this manner. Coleman has a right to litigate his maintenance and cure claim along with his Jones Act claim in front of a jury in the forum of his own choosing as that right is recognized inFitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 1650(1963). See Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Blanton, 764 F. Supp. 1090 (E.D.La. 1991) (Feldman, J.). Thus, this factor calls for the dismissal of the declaratory judgment.
Finally, judicial economy would be served by the dismissal of the declaratory judgment in that all but the exoneration/limitation issues would be tried before one court. While this Court recognizes that because of the limitation suit, there will remain issues before it, balancing all of these factors convinces the Court that the declaratory judgment should be dismissed. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Richard Coleman's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Doc. 5) is GRANTED and his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 4) is MOOT.